PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN SMALLER ISLANDS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002500060010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 22, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For RI
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
vvas^inr'o D.C. 2052o
March 22, 1979
MEMORANDUM
?TO: ARA/CAR
Mr. Hewitt
FROM: IN
-/-AR/OD
- Hunter L. Estei
Prospects for Stabilit
the Eastern y in Smaller islands of
Caribbean
As you requested, we have reviewed the situation in
St. Lucia, Antigua, Dominica, and St.
the apparently successful coup in GrenadaCeto asses the
Possibility that similar developments s Grenada's neighbors. We might occur among
G each of describe below the current situation
in Movements. eilands, with particular attention t
tion a also examine the Cuban strate o or the , to the the followingeconclusionsxtent this be determined.-' We have `-~' for the
reached
On the one hand:
--There is little or nd evidence that o
in the islands are sufficient)
o Pposition groups
nor are the conditions ripe, f prepared k dthat in
Grenada to be attempted for a coup like that in
in the near term.
--Though it has quickly become a truism, the tradition
of democratic processes is strong opposition groups would unquestionably p efern o
Power through peaceful means, i.e., eections.to'
reach
-Outside assistance to the New Jewel
Movement the basis of avialable evidence Consisted Only of on
training, encouragement, and perhaps modest fridu dig.
--Events ng.
in Grenada have alarmed its
leaders (and NJM friends abroad) seem neighbors; bee coup
much concerned over international reaction a and pareen
larly that of the US. particu-
ticu-
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--The successful coup in Grenada cannot fail to stimulate
radical groups in the other islands to consider a similar
attempt, particularly if a group's prospects for achieving
= power through~eaceful=atethods are very poor. Outside
supporters, e.g., Cuba, will also be encouraged.
--Cuba sees real opportunities in the Eastern Caribbean for
- developing inf-luence-at-very--little risk or cost. While
-Havana does-nit appear to be actively promoting leftist
coups, it is pursuing programs likely to encourage such
tendencies among opposition groups.
Governments-fn--the other islands will henceforth be more
alert against potential coup plotting, gunrunning, and
-similar --threats to stability,--.but their defense forces are
probably incapable of putting up much resistance to well-
planned attempts carried out by a well-trained and equipped
force with substantial local support or acceptance.
--Once the new regime in Grenada consolidates its position,
the island may become a clearinghouse of a sort among
radical groups in the Eastern Caribbean.
In short, our conclusion for the near term is that the
Grenada coup is not likely to be repeated in a neighboring island.
The medium term is less predictable and requires more analysis
as further information becomes available. Gairy's ouster was
symptomatic, in many ways, of the unstable balance of forces within
these tiny islands. All of them have serious economic problems,
and their restricted potential for development may mean that they
are not inherently viable. The islands could accordingly fall
into political turmoil which might result in increasingly radical
regimes, almost certainly of the left.
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(C) St. Lucia became independent last February, under
Premier John Compton's leadership. Compton had for some time
--.pressed the British to grant independence. He claimed that his
United Worker Party's (UwP) general election victory in 1974
mandated that course. It is true'that the desirability of
independence_was part of the UWP platforn`but the issue was not
a crucial one during the campaign. Moreover the UWP did not
score a strong victory, registering 53 per cent of the vote to
the opposition St. Lucia Labour Party's (SLP) 45 per cent.
(C) The SLP, for its part, objected to the granting of
independence without new general elections or a referendum.
The Party was not opposed in principle to breaking the final
ties with British, but did not want Compton's identification as
the leader of the independence to strengthen his political
position. The general elections due in 1979 are expected to be
close.
I I The SLP is divided into factions, the largest
of which is headed by George Odium, the founding father of St.
Lucia's radical movement.. Odium's group has called for
nationalization of property, land reform, and increased control
over foreign investment. The more conservative SLP faction
-believes=the-UWPg_overnment=has ignored.-the agricultural-segment=
of-the population-and emasculated the labor movement. There may
be some cracks in SLP unity.
Opposition Ties with Communists and Socialists
Odium is an admirer of Fidel Castro. He has often
worn Cuban green fatigue uniforms and has stated that he looks
upon Cuba as a model for restructuring St. Lucian society.
According to a generally reliable source, Odium is surrounded by
young people who are impressed with Cuba's achievements and the
apparent egalitarianism of the Cuban socialist system. Nonethe-
less, Odium does not appear to be as close to Cubans or other
leftists as other Eastern Caribbean leaders.
insurgents elsewhere appear to be through the Workers Revolutionary
Movement (WRM) sources point
toward a limited WRM role in the near term, with the potential for
exerting stronger influence.' 25X1C
The major opposition links with Cuba and radical
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--In 1978, the WRM probably had less than.12 members, but its
ranks may have since increased.
-One-of the_WRM's members,--Earl Bosquet, was active in the
preparations=-.for the-Havana Youth Festival held last July.-.
The WRM--re_ centTY formed a St-.- Lucian/Cuban-Friendship Society
and opened_a cultural exposition.
--The WRM planned to send a representative to last December's-
Communist Jamaica Worker Party's conference in order to
discuss closer cooperation and united front activities with
the various Marxist parties and movements in the English-
speaking Caribbean.
ANTIGUA
(C) Antiguan Premier Vere Bird has recently pressed for
Antigua's independence, which should follow St. Vincent's. His
Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has generally favored severing the
remaining British ties, but Bird had not pushed the issue until
last year.
(C) The ALP has no specific ideological character but re-
portedly draws its support from the middle class. In the 1976
f the I7 seats in
general elections, the ALP received 10 seats o
t-hslegislature. -- -
The main- opposition party, the Progressive Labour
C
(
)
t (PLM) also seems to be a party of personalities, rather
--
Movemen
__ =than issues. In ntrast to-the-ALP, it draws--its support from-
loyed on the island.
bs of unem
p
num
-labor union -and--the large_er-
(LOU) In February, the PLM suffered a setback when its
le_ der, former Premier George Walter, was convicted on charges -
n was
ti
o
of corruption and fraud while in office. The prosecu
instigated by the Bird government, and the investigation which
led to Walter's conviction has contributed to a rather severe
political polarization on the island... The timing of Walter's
prosecution may well have been inspired by the Bird government's
embarrassment over Bird ties to Space Research Corporation, a
Canadian company which a]l gedly ships arms to South Africa through
Antigua.
In the context of Antigua's current internal
, tensions the Afri-Caribbean Movement (ACLM) Antigua's leading
tion may make some headway. According to a
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--ACL!4 leader Leonard Timothy Hector stated that both major
parties had been adversely affected by political scandals,
and as a result, an opportunity existed to fill the political
vacuum.
--Hector was not yet certain whether a move to fill the void
should be under the ACLM's sponsorship or if a new political
party would emerge.with himself and other ACLM members in
leadership roles.
(C) The ACLM's major appeal is to Antiguan youth., Hector
is the ACLM founding father and is avowedly pro-communist. He
is also reported to be a racist and a Black Power advocate.
ACLM Ties with Cuba and other Leftists
(C) Apparently there are links between the ACLM and other
regional leftist groups, such as Grenada's New Jewel Movement.
In 1977 Hector and another ACLM member visited Cuba, with the
stated purpose of discussing "Puerto Rico's struggle for indepen-
dence and the movement for independence among the smaller islands
in the Caribbean". The ACLM visitors also planned to urge the
Cubans to extend assistance to freedom fighters in Zimbawe
(Rhodesia) and South Africa.
(C) St. Vincent may be the next island in-the Eastern
Caribbean to become independent. Should it.do so this year,
Premier R. Milton Cato is expected to reap benefits in the general
elections slated for late 1979. As the only well-organized party
on the island, Cato's St. Vincent Labour Party (SLVP) is expected
to win resoundingly, even if independence is not achieved this
year. In 1974, the SLVP gained 10 legislative seats to the
opposition's three.
Of the many small political groups in St. Vincent,
the YOULOU United Liberation Movement (YULIMO) probably poses the
greatest challenge to the SLVP. According to a generally reliable
source, YULIMO has a membership of 1000, primarily among St.
Vincent youth. Its Marxist leader, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves is a
lecturer at the University of the West Indies in Barbados. He
and a core of other YULIMO leaders have gained considerable
regional media attention for the YULIMO movement.
0
Apparently YULIMO's strength and activities have
increased in the past year. According to
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?
25X1
(LOU) Attempting to inject itself into the independence
picture, YULIMO circulated several constitutional proposals last
year. They called for an independent St. Vincent, guaranteed
human rights, and government acquisition of properties with
compensation. Gonsalves pointed out that these proposals were
not--in themselves "socialist". However, YULIMO's stated intention
is to build a "scientific socialist state".
YULIMO's Communist and Socialist Ties
(S/NF) Ralph Gonsalves has travelled to Cuba and Guyana.
At one time he organized university students to distribute
English language communist materials which originated in Guyana.
According to a generally reliable source, one of the reasons
'Gonsalves was chosen YULIMO leader was his direct contact with
"international socialists".
I Other YULIMO members have no doubt also
4 communicated with Cubans and leftist sympathizers.
Ireport:
25X
--Grenada's New Jewel Movement sent delegates to the YULIMO
congress in August 1977.
--Renwick Rose, a prominent YULIMO member, visited the
secretary general of the communist party in Guadeloupe
(CPG) for private discussions in.-November 1978.
Cuban ties.
--In mid-October 1977, 25X1
YULI11O, said that Cuba was providing tunas and guidance
to pro-Cuban political parties in the Caribbean.
indicated in mid-1978 that Cuba had issued a set of
ins ructions to YULIMO to be used in preparation for St.
Vincent's elections.
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--One of YULIPMO's members in 1978 reportedly claimed that
Cuban financial assistance is not given directly to YULIMO,
but rather is channeled through the YULIMO-Cuban Friendship
Society.
DOMINICA
- (C) Premier Patrick John led Dominica to independence last
- November. He has been the island's chief executive since the
1975 general elections when his Dominica Labor Party (DLP) won
16 of 21 seats in the legislature. The general election campaign
__-was personality oriented, with little substantive content.
(C) John opportunistically mixes rhetoric -- leftist and
anti-leftist -- to achieve his purposes. The main evidence of
his ideological persuasion was the DLP's expressed admiration
for Forbes Burnham's Guyana. John sought and received Guyanese
.advice on establishing a "cooperative society".
(C) The principal opposition party, the Dominican Freedom
Party (DFP) appears to be more moderate than the DLP, but its
precise ideology.is also vague. Eugenia Charles, DLP leader, is
strongl opposed to the Guyanese model. The DFP has not yet been
able tc3challenge John's rule effectively.
Perhaps the most imminent threat to the government
comes from the Douglas brothers. Michael Douglas is a former
cabinet member. His brother Roosevelt is a radical, and advocates
the Cuban model for Dominica. The brothers are attempting to
organize an alliance of opposition forces and consolidate their
political base. It is difficult to estimate their strength at
this time. They probably would prefer to come to power by
legitimate means rather than by force.
John apparently communicates with both men and has
been fairly adroit in fending off their challenges. Last year,
the Douglases attempted to discredit John by drawing public
attention to the severely limited composition of the country's
electoral commission. John outmaneuvered them, however, by
amending the constitution before they could make the commission
an opposition issue.
Roosevelt-Douglas' Ties with Cubans and Leftists
"Rosie" Douglas is one of the leading radicals 25X6
in the Caribbean, and he has'ties with others of similar persuasion
throughout the region. For example, F-
.reported that Douglas invited delegates
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to Martinique and Guadeloupe to attend Dominican independence
celebrations last year. During their visit, Douglas held
numerous discussions with them.
I There is little doubt that Roosevelt Douglas has
had numerous contacts with ans over the years. According to
25X1 --Douglas claimed in 1976 that Cuba considered Dominica's
geographical position important and would be prepared to
give substantial aid to Dominica.
--In 1978 Douglas expressed in private his disappointment over
the Dominican government's lack of interest in several Cuban
aid projects which he had negotiated.
--During that same conversation, Douglas stated he was
organizing Dominican participation in the Havana World Youth
Festival.
Cuban Strategy
Cuba has found the English-s
e
ki
C
i
p
a
ng
ar
bbean mini-
states to be relatively fertile soil for attempts to establish
rapport and political influence, in contrast to, the Spanish-
speaking countries of the region. Cuba has represented its
economic and political system as a successful response to the
same economic and social problems faced by other Caribbean coun-
tries. It has encouraged visits by politicians, students, labor
-leaders, cultural figures, and even businessmen, many if not most
of whom have returned from Cuba favorably impressed. The unique
ingredients of Cuban "success" -- not only massive Soviet
assistance, but also a relatively advanced pre-revolutionary in-
frastructure and cultural level as well as the advantage of scale --
are often perceived only dimly or not at all by Cuba's admiring
Caribbean Visitors.
~ In Cuban eyes, the "democratic tradition" of the
An to o'~ne s
g P tates is probably seen, somewhat paradoxically, as
advantageous to Cuban objectives. Unlike much of Spanish America,
there is no strong, well-entrenched local oligarchy which has for _
generations sustained a conservative, authoritarian political
system, The British socialist tradition also causes Anglophone
West Indian political leaders to regard Cuba's radically egali-
tarian system with less suspicion, and Havana places great emphasis
-- on i-ts-claim to have eradicated racism from Cuba. Moreover, the
Cubans may well question the depth of West Indian commitment to'
British-style parliamentary democracy; their experience with
Michael Manley and Forbes Burnham probably has given them grounds
for doubt.
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In general, Havana sees little risk and considerable
potential gain in supporting leftist Caribbean political leaders
and movements with modest amounts of financial assistance, propa-
ganda support, or even political/military training. The expen-
diture of relatively small sums goes a long way in the very
limited political environments of the West Indies, and the
establishment of "Friendship Societies" helps build a favorable
political base among the young, relatively well-educated, and
politically active population. The conspicuously cordial relation-
ship established with Manley has helped legitimize Cuban activities
elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean. In particular, ties
with the more radical wing of the Jamaican PNP appear to have
given Cuba a willing ally and useful liaison in dealing with
opposition groups in the Eastern Caribbean.
0 There is little evidence that Cuba is actively
promoting violent political change in the Eastern Caribbean. How-
ever, given Cuba's political ideology, the ties being established
with opposition groups are likely to encourage such tendencies.
While Havana does not wish to be seen by regional governments as
a dangerous destabilizing influence in the Caribbean, Cuba prob-
ably is prepared to provide discreet, indirect military assistance
if requested by groups which it regards as viable, as long as
"plausible deniability" can be maintained.
- Imt/RAR:EMcKune:DGSmith:HLEstep:3/22/79
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Defense Forces
ST. LUCIA
(C) Local security forces; 417 member Royal St. Lucia
Force; 50 St. Lucia Auxiliary Constabulary; 1 port security
boat (police).
ANTIGUA
(C) Local security forces: Antigua Self-Defense Force
(a reserve force of 42 part-time soldiers; at present, it has
only one officer assigned to it but plans call for six officers
and 100 men); Royal Antigua Police Force, 325 (authorized
strength 340).
-- (S) The UK is responsible for external defense; contin-
gencies will be met by deploying ships from the Eastern Atlantic;
in addition, the British Armed Forces maintain a company of
Caribbean-trained Royal Marine Commandos in the UK prepared for
immediate airlift to the Caribbean. __>
ST. VINCENT
(C) Local security forces: 356 member Royal St. VIncent
Police Force; 105 member St. Vincent Auxiliary Police Force; 1
port security boat (police).
(S) The UK is responsible for external defense; contin-
gencies will be met by deploying ships from the Eastern Atlantic;
in addition, the British Armed Forces maintain a company of
Royal Marine Commandos trained in the Caribbean in the UK for
immediate airlift to the Caribbean.
DOMINICA --
(C) Local security force: Royal Dominica Defense Force,
120 members (force is a reserve unit); Royal Dominica Police
Force, 215 members; Rural Constabulary, 100 members.
NOTE: The text of the communique from the March 20 meeting of
the West Indies Associated States includes a proposal to
"establish immediately a regional security force."
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