RELEASING NATIONAL ESTIMATES TO CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000200040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 31, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Legislative Counsel
,JD fz 6,'), .zt
25X1
assistant Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : Releasing National Estimates to Congress
1. Background: Agency policy on this subject has varied
over the years and has not until very recently been clearly
articulated. The general trend, however, has been toward greater
availability of NIEs as far as the Congress is concerned. Former
DCI Bush decided that the newly organized SSCI would be given
access to all Estimates with the exception of those which discussed
sensitive policy options in connection with ongoing policy deliberations .
Bush (30 January 1976-20 January 1977) also gave other committees
with an oversight role vis a vis the Agency access to Estimates
on subject matters related directly to the committees' mandates.
Thus, the annual Estimate on Soviet strategic forces (NIE 11-3/8)
for 1976 was made available to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
OLC journals indicate that in July 1977 Volume I of NIE 11-3/8-76
was also made available to Committee staffers Rhett Dawson and
Larry Smith upon DCI approval of a request made by Committee
Staff Director Frank Sullivan. The SSCI has a copy of the current
Estimate on Soviet strategic forces (NIE 11-3/8-77, issued 21
February 1978) on loan. NIE 11-3/8-78 is scheduled for publication
later this year.
2. Current Guidelines: Guidelines drafted by NFAC/CSS
were approved by the DCI on 17 June 1978. With respect to the
SSCI and HPSCI the Guidelines provide that NIEs will be released
by authority of D/NFAC "when the requested material bears upon
committee evaluation of our intelligence product." The Guidelines
also specify that D/NFAC will consult with the DCI in the event
that either of the select committees requests an Estimate "dealing
with sensitive on-going policy options or negotiations." It should
be clear that NIE 11-3/8 does not fall into this latter category,
despite its relationship to SALT negotiations. The category is
meant to encompass Estimates that deal, for example, with
potential foreign reactions to possible U.S. policy initiatives; not
with basic evaluations of military force structures.
25X1
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The Guidelines further provide that any other committees
requesting access to an NIE will be offered a briefing. Requests
for access to the actual document are to be made by the committee
chairman to the DCI.
The Guidelines also contain provisions regarding Inter-
Agency Intelligence Memoranda (these are produced under the
aegis of the DCI but do not have top-level inter-agency approval;
they are less formal documents than NIEs). A copy of the Guidelines
is attached.
3. The Uniqueness of Estimates: A rationale apparently
once used for denying NIEs to Congress was that they were prepared
by the DCI for the exclusive use of the President and his senior policy
advisors, and hence were in the realm of documents covered by
Executive Privilege. While it is possible that a few Special Estimates
(SNIEs) commenting on sensitive live policy options might in the future
fall into this category it is certain that the rationale cannot be applied
to the bulk of Estimates produced in the past or being produced today.
I have attached for your information the summary section of a paper
on National Estimates done by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
It is worth reading. (I have, incidentally, brought this document to
Ed Sherman's attention in connection with the House Appropriations
Committee's desire to look into the Estimative process).
4. The Immediate Problem: As I understand it, the immediate
problem involves Senator Jackson's desire to have NIE 11-3/8-77 made
available for review by Richard Perle and/or Dorothy Fosdick. Because
NIE 11-3/8 is a codeword document, the problem must be considered
in two interrelated contexts: provision of Estimates to the Congress,
and guidelines for the issuance of compartmented clearances
to the Legislative Branch.
Perle and Fosdick are both in possession of compartmented
clearances in their capacity as regular staff members (i.e. ,
P.L. 95-94 Section 111(b)(2) type) of Jackson's Governmental Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. But Perle also
supports Jackson in his capacity as Chairman of the Armed
Services Arms Control Subcommittee. Perle's affiliation with the
Armed Services Committee, if any, assumedly is in the nature
of a P.L. 95-94 Section 111(c) designee (i.e., a classic "S. Res. 4"
type staffer). The question is whether the Guidelines and Procedures
for the issuance of compartmented clearances should operate to
prevent a Section 111(b)(2) staffer with compartmented clearances
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issued in connection with his assignment to one committee from
using those clearances in support of his principal's work on
another committee. I do not believe the Guidelines and Procedures
can be read so broadly, because they pertain only to the issuance
of compartmented access approvals . Similarly, the rationale
I have previously constructed for differentiating between Section
lll(b)(2) and 111(c) staffers (excerpt from the statute attached) is
practical only in so far as the issuance of clearances is concerned.
There is, I believe, a limit on the extent to which we can attempt
to influence how individual Senators utilize their staffs . How a
Section 111(b)(2) staffer functions is a matter to be worked out
between a Senator and the appropriate committee chairman. I do
not think we can complain if Perle does not put in a full day's work
for the Government Operations Committee. I do recognize that he
is not subject to the rules and discipline of the Armed Services
Committee, and that his support of Senator Jackson's work on this
Committee may be offensive to the Committee Staff Chief, but I
think that the most we can do is to insist that a staffer have a
regular affiliation with some committee in order to get
compartmented clearances. Politically and practically speaking,
we cannot be in the business of monitoring the activities of Section
111(b)(2) type staffers to ensure that they work and use their access
approvals only in connection with the committee staff to which
they are assigned. It is, in short, a loophole in the compartmented
clearances scheme that we will just have to live with.
This brings us back to the Guidelines for access to NIEs .
Section lc says that with regard to committees other than SSCI and
HPSCI, requests for NIEs should come from the "committee chairman."
This provision could reasonably be interpreted to mean "committee
or subcommittee chairman." The alternative would be to insist
that Senator Jackson (or any subcommittee chairman) get the
chairman of the full committee to make the request. I would
recommend the broader interpretation of this provision.
It should be noted that the Guidelines on access to Estimates
do not distinguish between members and staff. Neither is there any
mention of the use of the SSCI as an intermediary in providing NIEs
to others (we already know that Jackson objects to this procedure).
The Guidelines on access to NIEs, in other words, leave such
matters as access to 11-3/8 on the part of Jackson and/or Perle-
Fosdick to the ad hoc determination of the DCI. Thus, there
appears to be no firm basis in either set of Guidelines for denying
11-3/8 to Jackson and/or Perle-Fosdick out of hand.
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An additional piece of background to bear in mind in this case
is that there is no indication that anyone on the Armed Services
Committee staff has actually reviewed the current version of 11-3/8.
Should we decide to supply the document to Perle, therefore, we
may want to offer it to Sullivan first.
25X1
Assistant Legislative Counsel
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A. Guidelines for Congressional Access to National Intelligence
Estimates and Inter-Agency Intelligence Memorandums
B. Summary Section of National Estimates: An Assessment of the
Product and the Process
C. Excerpt from P.L. 95-94
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13 O CT 1978
FPH:
to boil down his paper coming up with the
above recommendation.
SIIOUlu UC UUl:1Ceu UpwarUS.
2) The other option is to ask
?n; k
WMR,outcome of Jackson/Perle meeting
is an obligation felt by DCI on NIE's
vailable to Congressional staff, etc.,
anticipating this problem earlier in the
summer, I asked to think through
this issue anew ancome up w?-Eh a thoughtful
piece of paper, which he did (att'd). We
could do two things:
1) We could send it forward to DCI
with a short covering note from you boiling.)
down the essence, which would be we should
provide the NIE's unless they contain policy
options, etc., which raises the Executive
privilege type of issue, impinges upon the
Executive process, or whatever other phrase-
ology we wish to invent, in which case release
would not be. solely withi'our province and
In either event, I think it would
be well if we seize the initiative and
get something to the DCI that he can chew
on and decide. Whatever we send forward
we should send via NFAC as a courtesy.
LLM
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DATE OF REQUEST
TO
T
1 August 1978
PENSE DATE
FROM
SUBJECT:
Releaseing National Estimates
to Congress
NOTES
Memorandum you requested.
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
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2C April 197f3
GUIDELINES FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUMS
1. The following guidelines will apply to providing
Congress access to National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)
and Interagency Intelligence Memorandums (IIMs)
a, In the case of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, NIEs will be released by
authority of Director, National Foreign Assessments
Center (NFAC) when the requested material bears upon
Committee evaluation of our intelligence product.
In the event that a Select Committee requests an
NIE dealing with sensitive on-going policy options
or negotiations, the Director, NFAC, will consult
with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to
release.
b. Interagency Intelligence Memorandums may be
released to the Select Committees upon their request.
If, in the opinion of the Chief, Congressional Support
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Staff, an 11M deals with sensitive current policy
issues, he will advise D/NFAC and obtain his con-
currence before releasing the document.
C. Other Committees requesting access to NIEs
will be offered a briefing on the estimate. If they
insist on access to the estimate itself they will
be requested to have the Committee chairman contact
the DCI.
d. Other Committees may be allowed access to
IIMs under the same rules as pertain to the Select
Committees.
2. NIEs and IIMs will be handled in accordance with
their sensitivity. When approved storage facilities are
not available, material will be delivered to and picked
up from the reader the same day. Where proper storage
facilities are available (the two Select Committees),
readers will be asked to return NIEs and liMs as soon as
they are finished with them. Codeword material will
normally be read at Headquarters.
3. Requests for NIEs and liMs will be made to the
Office of Legislative Counsel which will forward the re-
quests to the NFAC Congressional Support Staff for approp-
riate action.
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ti
NAflONAL ESUMATES:
AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE PRODUCT
AND THE PROCESS
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APRIL 1977
1'R/IM 77-03
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I. SETTING THE STAGE (pp. 19-22)
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) have changed over
the years from short, narrowly focused papers dealing with
near-term problems to include more comprehensive, analytical
studies of longer-range issues. This change resulted from:
--greater analytical capabilities;
--an enlarged data base; and,
--changing requirements, as readers grew more
numerous, more sophisticated, and more demanding.
The role and importance of estimates in policy making has
varied with Administrations, particularly in response to:
--the structure of the policy making machinery
and the place accorded estimates;
--the attitude of top policy makers toward intel-
ligence; and,
--the quality and relevance of estimates as
perceived by the principal users.
Reaching their zenith in the early 1960's, estimates sub-
sequently declined in prestige and drew increasingly sharp
criticism. The criticism contributed to the decision of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1973 to abolish the
Board and Office of National Estimates (ONE) and entrust the
preparation of estimates to a group of National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs).
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II. ESTIMATES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY SUPPORT (pp. 23-50)
The criticism of estimates has continued since the change,
however, and this chapter sets forth the views of policy makers
.and other consumers on the present quality and utility of esti-
mates and comments on how and for whom they should be written.
The Traditional Doctrine (pp. 23-24)
National estimates were intended at their outset to be the
most authoritative appraisals available to the top levels of
government on foreign developments of national security concern.
Issued by the DCI, they were to be forward looking and predictive,
rather than historical and descriptive, of high quality and
objectivity, and national products with respect to subject
matter, audience, and process of production. The interviews
for this study were conducted with this doctrine in mind and
the results were measured against it.
flow Estimates Fared (pp. 25-34)
Against the traditional standard, estimates did not fare
well. Although highly praised by some users, and found use-
ful in one way or another by most others, they were judged
in the aggregate to fall well short of the traditional ideal.
They clearly have not played the important role envisioned
for them in the national security decision process.
The Negative Side (pp. 25-28). Estimates seldom reach
the top levels of their intended audience--the President and
members of the National Security Council (NSC). Such of their
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:ive,
content as does is usually included in memoranda or briefings
prepared at lower levels, where estimates are widely received,
and read to varying degrees. The complaints about estimates
focused on quality and relevance; estimates were criticized
for being:
--irrelevant to, or oblivious of, the specific
policy problems of the readers;
--insufficiently analytical and overly descriptive;
--conservative and imprecise in their judgments
about the future;
--inadequate in explaining judgments and con-
clusions, and in discussing the alternatives
considered and discarded; and,
--unable to contribute much that is unique or
not already known to the policy maker, par-
ticularly on political subjects.
The Positive Side (pp.28-30). Some respondents were high
in their praise of estimates and others were on the whole well
satisfied with them; almost all found them useful in one way or
another. For example:
--those with strongly positive views, including
two former cabinet members, tended to be less
concerned about the relevance of estimates to
immediate policy issues, and valued them for
their presentation of a disinterested view;
--others with a positive view expected less of
estimates, and were not troubled by the
deficiencies perceived by the more critical;
--most users valued estimates for their balance
and professionalism, because they pulled
together all that was known about a subject,
and because they helped assure the reader
that he had considered all the factors
bearing on a problem.
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Other Findings (pp. 30-34). Estimates got good marks
for objectivity--some users considered this one of their
principal virtues. Most users who said they had observed
bias, considered it a comparatively minor problem, easily
discerned and adjusted to, and the consequence of human
imperfection rather than of deliberate intent.
It proved difficult to get the views of users on dif-
ferences in the quality and utility of estimates since the
1973 change in the production system, because of the turnover
of officers in policy positions. There was, however, a fair
degree of consensus between users and producers on two points:
the NIO system has produced a modest improve-
ment in the relevance of estimates and some-
what greater improvement in-the responsiveness
of the system; but,
--estimates are more uneven in quality than those
produced before 1973, because of the new drafting
procedures.
The interviews revealed different reactions to different
kinds of estimates:
--those on military, scientific, technical and
economic subjects were better received than
those on political subjects, not because of
differences in quality, but because most
users were less able to handle the complex
data, perform their own analysis, and reach
their own conclusions.
We found little or no support for criticism heard in
recent years concerning:
--the proliferation of intelligence publications
containing estimates;
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--the issuance of departmental as well as national
estimates; or,
--the absence of an explicit scale of probabilities
in estimates.
Why the Gap? (pp. 34-40)
The substantial disparity between traditional expectations
and what users said is attributable in large part to deficiencies
in the product:
--the failure to be fully responsive to the policy
question;
--the failure to be sufficiently venturesome; and,
--inadequacies in drawing implications for U.S.
policy.
Some Unrealized Assumptions (pp. 35-38). There are
other reasons for the disparity, which individually and
collectively are of considerable importance. A basic one
is that the traditional doctrine puts an unrealistic burden
on the DCI and the intelligence community. It rests on some
unstated and unrealized assumptions.
One is that estimates would have a major influence on
the formulation of national security policy:
--in fact, estimates have played only a modest
role, partly because
--security policy is not directly driven by facts,
analyses and resulting judgments; it is the com-
plex product of an often lengthy and untidy pro-
cess, in which many other considerations come
into play.
A second assumption is that policy makers would seek and
welcome the contributions of estimative intelligence, even
when they cast doubt on current policy:
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--in fact, policy makers often believe that they
can estimate as well as the intelligence spe-
cialist, if not better; also,
--estimates may say unwelcome things and cast
those who produce them in the role of
troublemakers.
A third assumption is that the relationship between policy
and intelligence would be close, and communication free and
complete:
--this relationship has usually not existed; it
has been very weak in recent years; moreover,
--there is an absence of structure for system-
atically insuring that estimates are part of
the policy process.
Other.Reasons (pp. 38-40). Two other circumstances have
contributed to the failure of estimates to play their prescribed
role. One is that the foreign policy establishment tends to be
highly operational, and to focus on the short term and highly
specific matters immediately before it. However:
--estimates were originally intended not merely
to support day-to-day operations, but as con-
tributions to the formulation of basic, long-
term national security policy;
--from this perspective, the difficulty may be
with the way policy is formulated. Government
institutions, such as State's Policy Planning
Staff, which were designed to assist with long
range policy, usually focus instead on short
term issues.
Secondly there has been suspicion and distrust of estimates
at the top, and this has had serious effects on their use.
--Unless estimates are welcomed and read at the
top, they are not likely to be taken seriously
elsewhere.
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The Market for Estimates (pp. 40-50)
Even the most critical users believe that estimates have
a role to play in the policy process.
What Should Estimates Do? (pp. 42-46). Users believe
that estimates should:
--identify policy problems not yet in the fore-
front, and pose questions about them;
--sort out the facts in complicated situations
where such facts are elusive, apparently con-
tradictory or fast changing;
--identify and evaluate the forces at work and
their interplay, and discuss how their con-
tinuation or manipulation could affect the
final outcome;
--judge the consequences of ongoing developments
for U.S. policy; and,
--judge foreign reactions to U.S. policies, present
or contemplated.
There was a relative lack of interest in specific pre-
dictions of future events such as coups, elections, or changes
of government.
Most striking about these comments is their reaffirmation
of the traditional doctrine, with its emphasis on the analysis
of forces, trends and their implications for the U.S. in a
context analytical and forward looking, rather than descriptive
and current.
For Whom Should Estimates Be Written? (pp. 46-48). The
nature of the audience is important, for it affects the way
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estimates are organized, their level of detail and how they
present facts, analyses and conclusions.
Some of those interviewed thought that estimates should
be written with readers at the very top in mind--the President,
the NSC, and other cabinet members--not because estimates would
regularly be read there, but because so aimed, they would catch
other readers along the way.
--But the perspectives and needs of those at
the top are not necessarily the same as those
of the individuals who support them.
--Some estimates will be read at the top, par-
ticularly those that the DCI believes should
be read there, and which he urges upon the
senior policy makers.
Most respondents believed that estimates should be aimed
at the Assistant Secretary of State, White House Staff or com-
parable level, and we agree.
--These are the officials who set the terms for
the policy debate by formulating the options
and alternatives, who enjoy the confidence of
policy makers at the highest levels, and who
constitute the highest level combining expertise
and the power to act on many problems.
Flow Should Estimates Be Written? (pp. 48-50). Such
readers are able and knowledgeable, have access to the same
material as estimators, and feel competent to reach judgments
on the basis of their own analysis. If estimates are to
appeal to this audience they must:
--emphasize analysis rather than description,
show the relationships among data, analysis
and conclusions, and describe the thought
process by which the estimators came to
their judgments;
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itch
--explain what issues were contentious and what
was disgarded and why, and set forth any dif-
ferences of opinion;
--describe continuity and change as compared
with previous estimates, and identify earlier
material now judged incorrect; and,
--clearly state the implications of their
analysis and conclusions for U.S. policy.
IIi. IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN TIME PRODUCTION PROCESS FOR NATIONAL
ESTIMATES (pp. 51-79)
This chapter discusses the views of producers, some users,
and the study team on aspects of the process by which estimates
are produced.
Self-Initiated Estimates (pp. 51-52)
About half of all national estimates are initiated by the
intelligence community and most producers and users who com-
mented on the subject found this satisfactory. A very few
felt strongly that, to avoid irrelevant papers, estimates
should be produced only on request, but the majority and the
study team believe that producers have a duty to initiate an
estimate when they perceive a development of significance
for U.S. policy.
Terms of Reference (pp. 52-54)
The degree to which users participate in preparing the
terms of reference is likely to determine the real relevance
of an estimate to the needs and interests of its main recipi-
ents. A formalized procedure providing for such consultation
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should be instituted. The risk of predetermining the outcome
by a conscious or unconscious "loading" of the questions
appears minimal and manageable.
Multidisciplinary Work (pp. 54.57)
Users and producers alike agreed on the need for more
cross-disciplinary or analytically-integrated estimates, and
on the difficulty of doing them. A common complaint was that
readers were left to synthesize separate sections on political,
economic, military and other subjects. Bureaucratic separa-
tion and increasing specialization among analysts were cited
as the causes for this situation. There is, however, little
agreement on how best to accomplish good multidisciplinary
synthesis. At a minimum, it probably requires bringing
various analysts together under an effective project leader
for wide-ranging "synthesizing discussion" before drafting
begins.
New Analytical Methodologies (pp. 57-59)
Although some critics fault the estimative process for
not incorporating more quantitative, mathematical, and
systems-oriented methodologies, we found little support
for this charge. There was a great deal of skepticism about
the use of computers and other new tools, and producers saw
some risks in the use of new methodologies. Nonetheless, it
is important to keep up with the state of the art, and some
new techniques appear to have at least limited applicability.
10
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Competing Analysis (pp. 59-63)
Another concept that has received attention recently
is the creation of "competing centers of analysis." The only
extensive effort to provide an alternative analytical approach
was the widely-publicized and controversial "B-team" experi-
ment. Undertaken last year during the preparation of the
annual estimate on Soviet strategic forces, it involved a
team of experts from outside the intelligence community.
There are many practical problems in such an effort, however,
and the best insurance of proper analytic competition probably
lies in the skill, perception, objectivity, and intellectual
rigor of the estimative manager rather than in any organiza-
tional technique.
Net Assessments (pp. 63-66)
Net assessments involving the U.S. require access to
data on U.S. forces, weapons and capabilities. Those inter-
viewed agreed fully that the intelligence community should
neither conduct them nor include them in estimates, because
of the inordinate risk of transforming estimators into
advocates or opponents of particular U.S. weapons systems
or policies. Net assessments comparing the capabilities of
two or more foreign countries are an acceptable and at times
essential part of national estimates, and there is need for
more of them.
i1
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Coordination (pp. 66-70)
This process brings together experts from the various
agencies to debate and revise the text of a draft estimate.
Coordination is central to the. concept of national intelli-
gence, allowing the I)CI as the nation's chief intelligence
officer to set forth his views while requiring other par-
ticipants either to agree or to express and explain their
disagreements. Substantively, coordination brings the
talents of the entire intelligence community to bear, makes
coverage of the pertinent issues more likely, and, at its
best, helps to define and sharpen issues.
The best way to avoid the pitfalls of coordination, such
as masking divisions and fuzzing conclusions, is to select a
chairman for coordination meetings who is tough-minded, inde-
pendent, judicious and skilled in running a meeting, and to
remember that consensus is often not what users want or need.
Dissent Summaries and Classification (pp. 70-74)
Consumers welcome the presentation of conflicting views
on controversial and complex matters, and they are sufficiently
sophisticated to distinguish between dissents reflecting sub-
stantive differences and those taken primarily to support
bureaucratic positions. The present trend of incorporating
dissents in the text of estimates, rather than in footnotes,
is clearly favored by users, some of whom want also to see
an elaboration of the rationale behind a dissent.
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Consumers emphasized that a tightly written and accurate
summation of the key conclusions is the best possible device
for ensuring high-level attention to the message of an estimate.
Many did not object to lengthy estimates so long as they led
off with a crisp, well-written summary. The importance of a
good summary can hardly be overemphasized.
Policy makers strongly favored the lowest possible security
classification for estimates as a means of widening their
audience and enhancing their utility. Where possible, highly
classified material seems best handled in separate, more
restrictively distributed annexes, so that a lower classifica-
tion can be given to the basic estimate.
Presentation, "Post-Mortems" and Updates (pp. 74-79)
While recognizing that both written papers and oral
briefings have certain advantages, almost all consumers com-
menting on the two methods clearly preferred to get most if
not all estimative material in written form. The bulk of
any effort to improve presentational formats ought therefore
to go into making written estimates as SUCcinct, readable,
and responsive to different levels of need as possible.
Post-mortems can be useful if done sparingly, and if
they include feedback from consumers.
There was almost no support from consumers for a regularly
scheduled revision. and update of estimates, except for the
annual Soviet strategic estimate, NIL 11-3/8. In our view,
estimates should be updated only when significant changes
have occurred..
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IV. ORGANIZATION FOR TIIE PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES (pp. 80-91)
The current system for producing estimates gives each NIO
a larger amount of authority and responsibility than any one
individual had under the previous system, and it encourages and
requires a close working relationship between the NIO and the
main producers and users in his area.
Both of these results were highly valued by most of the
users who commented on the subject. Some of those interviewed,
however, felt that the present system places too heavy a burden
on the NIO, and that it suffers by lack of provision for col-
legial review, as once supplied by the Board of National
Estimates.
One benefit of the present system, in the eyes of some
producers, is that it puts the drafting responsibility on
analysts who deal with a subject on a day-to-day basis.
Others believed, however, that the analysts' lack of expe-
rience in estimative writing and the conflicting demands on
their time from other tasks often resulted in a lower quality
estimative product.
Changes in Current Practices (pp. 89-91)
Efforts have been made to respond to some of the criti-
cisms, including the authorization of a panel of outside
consultants to review estimative drafts. Without offering a
detailed blueprint, the study team believes that additional
steps should be taken. These are:
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d,
--to establish a body of generalists to serve
as an internal collegial review group;
--to establish a small group of analysts to
do the initial drafting of estimates as a
full time task; and,
--to activate the authorized panel of outside
consultants.
These steps would help insure high quality and the
thorough and complete treatment of a. subject. They would
provide an additional means of getting objective and dis-
interested national estimates, and would highlight the
primacy of the DCI. They should not be allowed to impinge
on a strong virtue of the present system: its improved
ability to maintain contact with the consumer and to
insure the pertinence and responsiveness of the estimative
product to the consumer's needs.
V. THE USER'S ROLE IN ESTIMATES (pp. 92-102)
If estimates are to be useful and relevant, producers
must clearly understand the needs of users. Such under-
standing can best be acquired by direct communication on
matters of scope, timing and the issues to be addressed.
An effective dialogue between producers and users would
seem to require:
--clear evidence of interest by the President and
senior policy makers in the use of estimates;
--a recognized procedure for fitting estimates into
the national security decision process; and,
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--active participation by senior policy and intelli-
gence officials.
To date, these conditions have been met only partially and
sporadically. The National Security Council Intelligence
Committee (NSCIC) was set up in 1971 to provide guidance by
users on their needs and to evaluate intelligence products,
but proved ineffective. Since it was abolished in 1976, there
has been no formal mechanism for user-producer exchange.
Despite what the NIOs have done to bridge the gap, intelligence
production and collection are still determined more by what
the producers think is needed than by direct requests or by
guidance from users.
Some believe that intelligence analysts should maintain
a certain remoteness from decision makers to keep intelli-
gence untainted by policy pressures. But most users and
producers took a different view, considering a close rela-
tionship mandatory--its primary benefit being a clearer,
more realistic appreciation by each of the other's capabilities,
limitations and needs.
Providing for Closer Contacts (pp. 97-102)
The major obstacles to closer user-producer relations
are lack of time, physical separation, and a view among some
policy makers that the producers of intelligence are well
enough informed and sufficiently competent to determine on
their own what users want and need. Most users agreed,
however, that efforts to improve communication are desirable.
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--One solution sometimes suggested is the creation
of a forum such as the NSCIC, but without its
liabilities. This course is worth trying, but
not a great deal should be expected of it.
It is quite clear that the improvement of communication
will depend mostly on the efforts of individuals, and that
the main burden will remain on the producer.
--Several policy makers stressed the importance
of developing personal relationships of mutual
confidence with intelligence producers;
--Users should do all they can to insure that
the producer is aware of trends in policy
and to understand what estimates can and
cannot do; producers must help them acquire
this understanding and absorb what is
readily knowable about policy concerns;
--More tours for selected intelligence officers
in policy offices would be helpful.
VI. TIIE FUTURE ROLE OF ESTIMATES (pp. 103-107)
As its power and self-sufficiency become more circum-
scribed, the U.S. will be increasingly dependent on accurate
estimates of the possible plans and actions of its adversaries
and friends. Thus, estimates will have a highly useful role
for the foreseeable future and should get high priority in
the overall intelligence effort.
Estimates will be more difficult to prepare in the
future. With the growing complexity and interrelatedness
of the world's military, technological, economic, political
and social affairs, it will be harder to understand and to
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foresee crucial developments, to be clear and precise, and
to phrase estimative judgments in simple declarative sentences.
The likely shrinking of intelligence resources will be coupled
with a requirement for estimates on a wider variety of sub-
jects aimed at more and different consumers, including
Congress and perhaps even the public.
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 91 STAT. 662 PUBLIC LhW 95--94---AUG. 5, 1977
Ante, p. 82.
2 USC 6lh--6.
Sir:c. 110. (a) Section 101 of the Suppleukental Appropriations Act,
197y, is amended--
(1) by striking out. "Majority Leader of the Senate and the
Minority Leader of the Senate" in the first sentence and inserting
in lien thereof "Majority Leader, Minority Leader, and Secretary
of the Senate" ? and
(2) by striking out "Majority Leader and the Miliority Leader"
in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "Majority Leader,
and Secretary of the Senate".
Leader
Minorit
y
,
Effective date. (b) The linenclnients grade by subsection (a) shall take effect on
2 USC 61h-6 xugust?I;Yiq , 7
note. SEC. 111 (ai) Except as provided in subsection (b), the aggregate
2 LSC61-I note. 6ftk.t,- oss compensation which may be paid to employees in the
oMCe of a.Sellator during each fiscal year under section 10. (d) of the
Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1968, us amended and modified
(2 T .S.C. 61-1(d)), is increased by an amount equal to three times
the amount referred to in section 105(e) (1) of such Act, as amended
ancl.;:n t lified.
In the case of a Senator who is the chairman or ranking
? . ff
niti7.orrFv member of any committee. or of any subcommittee that
receives funding to employy staff assistance separately from the fund-
ill- authority for staff' of the full committee, the amount referred to in
subsection (a) shall be reduced by the amount referred to in section
105(e) (1) of the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1968, as
ametg l and modified, for each such committee or subcommittee.
.. Iii the case of a Senator who is authorized by a committee, a
subEonilnittee thereof. or the chairman of a committee or subcom-
mittee, as appropriate. to recommend or approve the appointment to
the staff of such committee or subcommittee of one or more individuals
for the purpose of assisting such Senator solely and directly in his
duties as a member of such committee or subcommittee, the amount
referred to in subsection (a) sit 1,11 be reduced, for each such conunittee
or subcommittee, by an amount equal to (A) the aggregate annual
gross rates of compensation of all staff employees of that committee or
subcommittee (i) whose apj;>ointment is made, approved, or recom-
mended and (ii) whose continued employment is not disapproved by
such Senator, if such employees are employed for the purpose of
assisting such Senator solely and directly in his duties as a member of
such committee or subcommittee thereof as the case may be, or (B) the
amount referred to in section 103:i(e) (1) of the Legislative Branch
Appropriation Act, 1968, as amended and modified, whichever is less.
(3) In the case of a Senator who is serving on more than three com-
mittees, one of the committees on which lie is serving, as selected by
him, shall not be taken into account for purposes of paragraphs (1)
and. (2). Any such Senator shall notify the Secretary of the Senate
of tJre=cttlinnittee selected by him under this paragraph.
2 USC 72a-le. A Senator may designate employees in his office to assist
!u1f in connection with his membership on committees of the Senate.
ii employee may be designated with respect to only one committee.
(2) An employee designated by a Senator under this subsection
shall be certified by him to the chairman and ranking minority mem-
ber of the committee with respect to which such designation is made.
Such employee shall be accorded all privileges of a professional staff
member (whether permanent or investigatory-) of such committee
including access to all committee sessions and files, except that any
such committee may restrict access to its sessions to one staff member
per Senator at a time and require, if classified material is being
handled or disciissr