LETTER TO THE HONORABLE EDWARD P. BOLAND FROM W.E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000200060163-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 163
• Publication Date: January 19, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CI&RDP8 M00980R0002 6 4 s(... /7
DOLBY. 1LLER Be HANES
S
WILLIAM E. COLEIV COLBY. M1, 1625 r TREET. NW
MARSHALL LEE MILLER 162b "1'
DAVID G. HANES SUIT
WASHINGT-
January 19, 1978
The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman
U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairman Boland:
Thank you for your invitation to testify before the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on whether the
figure representing the intelligence budget should be made
public, I understand I am to appear at 2 p.m. on Tuesday,
January 24, 1978.
As requested, herewith is a prepared statement which
I propose to.read together with a copy of testimony I gave
on this subject earlier to the Senate Committee, which I
ask be incorporated in your record.
Sincerely,
WEC:pdk.
Enclosures/as stated
cc: The Honorable Stansfield Turner..
Approved For Release 20914/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Testimony of
William E. Colby
(Former Director of
Central Intelligence 1973-1976)
Colby, Miller & Hanes
Washington, D.C.
24 January 1978
MR. CHAIRMAN. Thank you for this opportunity to testify
to this committee on whether the U.S. intelligence budget
should be made public. On April 27, 1977 I was privileged
to testify on this question to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and rather than repeating all the points
in that testimony, I attach a copy of my statement then for
your review and record. Orally, I will merely summarize a
few main points.
The presumption against secrecy in our government
activities requires that a good reason be found for main-
taining the secrecy of the intelligence budget. The good
reason here is that publication would assist foreign nations
identify and frustrate our intelligence activities. We
would thus be kept in ignorance of what they want to keep
secret from us.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-2DP81 M00980R000200060163-4
This danger is not dissipated by the proposal to
publish only a single overall figure, as that figure
would inevitably start a chain of exposures. A single
figure would :nave to be explained as to what it covers
and-what it does not cover, and the reasons it goes up
surge in the h'udget figure or variation in the amounts,
for the various categories would immediately. stimulate
or down in suiasequent years would have to be explained.
The demand would soon arise for a division of the figure
into component: categories of activity. Any exceptional
general figure without some reference to the activities
were conducted.
Balanced Ugainst this risk, there would be little
public benefit in the revelation of an overall figure.
Public decisions about the level of effort of our intelli-
gence community could not be made only on the basis of a
telegraphed to the nation against which such activities
substantial sh:Lft in our priorities of coverage, or. a
major reduction in some part of our program would be
its disclosure. A large new technological venture,
identify the reason for the variation, leading rapidly to
-foreign analysts and? our own investigative reporters t:o
:the figure pays for. And such a detailed review and dis
cussion can and does take -place both within' the Executive :
-Branch and the committees of the Congress who are fully
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 -3-
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
informed of the figures as well as the programs they
support.
The real problem to which this proposal is addressed
is public confidence in the propriety and efficiency of
our intelligence activities. This confidence can be ob-
tained through three steps much more on point than debate
consensus such a statute would provide for our intelligence
activities.
b. Firm Congressional supervision of our intelligence
activities, already exemplified by the work of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and which this Committee
is 'now undertaking for the House. Serious, responsible
criticism where it is deserved, matched with praise where
it is deserved, by these Committees will clarify the real
The'Senate Committee is currently engaged in developing a
proposal of this nature, and I am sure that this Committee
could make a major contribution towards the constitutional,
about dollars spent. The three are:
a. Early adoption of revised legislation pro-
viding a clear charter of our intelligence activities, co-
difying and updating Executive Order l1.905 of 18 February 197
value of American intelligence to the public.
-.c. Increased public release of the end products
of our intelligence efforts, both information and assess-
ments, while protecting the fragile sources and techniques
from which they are derived. Experience with the utility
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
_4_
.and excellence of these products will, in my opinion, do
more to develop public confidence in our intelligence acti-
vities than d:.scussion of how many dollars it spends.
Mr. Chairman, this question has long been debated.
In recent years both the House and-the Senate have voted'
to retain thE! secrecy of the figure. The reasons for
those votes a1 e: no less valid today. I recommend that
the issue be :'Left where it is and that all concerned move
to the more thp.ortant areas in which public confidence in
our intelligence ? activities can., be built.-1
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
direction to change existing habits and procedures toward the regular
49
TE;TIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Coraty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the
committee's invitation to express my views on whether the budget for
intelligence should continue to be secret or should be revealed in pub
lie. I spoke to this issue publicly when I was Director of Central In-
telligence on August 4, 107:x, before the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the House. I am pleased to supplement those comments with
some more timely ones as this committee considers the question.
Let me first say that under our Constitution and form of govern-
ment there is a presumption against secrecy in our g overnrnenta.l ac-
tivities. I fully accept this presumption and su'iport a change from
the centuries old tradition of total secrecy about intelligence. Some of
intelligence's recent difficulties were the result of holding too long to
this tradition in a new and American political atmosphere. We are
now developing a new approach to intelligence, making public as
much of its activities and reports as possible. For example, many of
the information reports and assessments of our intelligence can be
made available to the Congress and to the public who must share in
the foreign- policy decisions of our government., as President Carter
did with the recent oil study. I believe we need 'furt.her steps in this
k
provision of open information and assessments on foreign matters to
our public.
I also believe that many of the overall policies and procedures of
our intelligence, agencies can be made public and I participated in
,tea For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 MU0980R000200060163-4
4
rnru ti consider the question or opening them intelligence: budget to
Public and inevitable foreign scrutiny.
Fotrees and methods. It is from this statutory charge that l thinlc we
l l
opening some of these while I was in office. I nun happy to see that an
open Presidential Executive order has clarified the proper limits and
improper activities which might otherwise be condurted by intelli-
gence, replacing previous vague, secret and ambiguous directives. I
understand that this committee is considering amendments to the
National Security Act of. 1047 to incorporate into law specific missions,
responsibilities and limitations for American intelligence. I fully sup-
port this effort.
But our Nation does, and must have secrets. Certain important con-
; tributiors to our free society will only work i f their secrecy is pro-
tected. The secret ballot box'is vital to our free country. The privacy
of our income, tax returns is protected by criminal sanctions against an
Internal Revenue Service officer who would expose them without au-
thorization. Approximately 30 suds statutes exist in our code today
in order that certain important functions be Protected if they must
exist in secret. None of mg knows who "Deep Throat" was, but we have
all benefited by his revelation of abuses of power. Public identification
of him could discourage future "Peep Throats". Consequently his
identity is being protected by the journalist who dealt with him.
It. is equally necessary that our Nation.protect the sources of in-
formation necessary to keep it safe and free in the complicated and
? dangerous world in which we live..The present. National Security Act
requires flint the Director of Central Intelligence protect intelligence
 R c
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP81 M0098GR0061
A cci tention exists tlutt- sevrecy of the intAiigence budget conflict;
with it rt.iele I, set-Lion 9. rhulse 7 of the Constitution. That chtuse wa:r
adopteil after clebutes.itt the. Constitutional Convention over whether
coneea!1:tcnt of certain expenditures should exist in the public interest,
and wns not part of the initial draft.. Language was first suggested by
Oeorgr :tL-tsoi- which would have required all annual account of public
c?xpenlli:ut?cs. James Alluliso11, lloweae-?, nrgued for a change only tt..
re4:1uu?c, reporting "from time to tilue" mil explained that the intent;
of his iti-ienlntent was to "leave enough i.n the discretion of the leg.
islttturo." Patrick Ilenry opposed the Madison huiguage because hc:
said it made concealment possible. But when the debate was on'or. it,
was the Madison language and purpose which prevailed. An indicator
of wht:t the discretion of the legislature might include appears it.
article r, section 5, clause 3, which states :
Each Homo shall keep a Journal or its iiroececiings and from time to tinur
publish Cie same, except such ports as may in their Judgment require secrecy
Confidential expenditures have existed from the earliest days o1'
the Republic. President Washington in his first annual message r&
quested. s, special fund for intelligence activitids. Congress, with many
Members having participated in the formulation of the Constitution,
'agreed end provided for expenditures from the fund to be recorded.
In the f vivato Journals or the q. retl.sury. Later Congresses provider
secret :'minds to a series of presidents, and a number of examples oi'
confidential budgets can be found in our history. To contend that the
Constitution requires total exposure of our intelligence budget is tc,
contest x,00 years of consensus about the Constitution and the need for
secrecy in certain of our affairs. In this, of course, the United Stater
is siini'.ur to every other nation of the world which provides for the
possibility of secret budgets for intelligence; indeed, to my knowledge,
there is no rratio,t which publishes its intelligence expenditures.
It is important also to clarify how secret the inteiligeneo budget,
really :is. In fact, a number of bodies review it in as much detail a:r
they wi:,h and have the ability to reduce or conceivably add to it
Within i;lie executive branch, the budget of each intelligence agency hr
reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence reporting to tic:
Nationa:, Security Council.:1'he Office of Management and Budget also
review:, these. budgets in detail and has independent} examiners who
question the need for each separate item in these budgets. The bud-at,
is then incorporated in the President's recommended budget to the
Congresi so that the President himself is fully aware of the amount:
and the makeup of the intelligence budget.
Withi it the Congress, the intelligence budget requests are submi[`tec:
to the A.ppropriations Committees of each Houses anll to the appro.,
priate substantive oversight conapittees, in the Senate now the Senate
Commit;:oe on Intelligence, and in the House, the Armetl Set-vice..-
Cginmiti;ee. Detailed briefings on these budget requests are provided,
and questions are answered in whatever detail the individual Member:r
of the subcommittees charged with these reviews request. I under-
stand that the final figures are then certified to the Budd tCommit?
tees of c ach House, which then also become aware of the size of the,
intelligence budget. Certainly this degree, of availability enables the,
Congressi as well as the Executive to set the proper loyal of our intel?
Iigorice (expenditures through its qualified representatives, and audit,
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 1i .15,c Ah
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
and monitor the effectiveness of the agencies' use of the funds
ap ropriated.
T'o relieve the concern of some Members of the Senate or the House
that they could be kept in ignorance of something on which they are
required to vote, the chairmen of the Appro~ riations Committees of
the Senate anll House on the floor l-avo offered to inform any Me.niber
of the final figure for intelligence in the animal appropriation bill.
'Thus, any Member willing to iuulertake to respect the confidence. ex--
X tended by these chairmen could be aware of the lit;nres involver!.
Lastly, the el,airitien of the Senate, Appropriations Committee and of
{ the Ifouse Appropriations Committee have stated on the floor that the
entire expenditure for the CIA budget is included within the budget
for the Defense Department, so that the total sum exj)eiided for de-
fense is known to include whatever is necessary for intelli-enee.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence budget may be secret, but it is sub-
ected to a great deal of intensive review by the executive and the
legislative branches of our constitutional system. In this light, it is
significant that the Senate, in dune 1974 by a vote of 55 to 33, decided
to retain its secrecy, and the House made the same decision in the fall
of 1975 by a vote of 260 to 140.
I believe no one seriously contends that the budget of the CIA or
of the other intelligence agencies should be made totally available to
any public scrutiny, thus exposing its detailed activity to foreigner as
well as citizen alike.
This would clearly make it impossible to conduct secret intelligence
operations or protect the Nations sources and vulnerable technology.
But the contention is made that a total figure could be published as a
compromise between the present secrecy and total exposure. A. short
review of this question'will show how unreal this suggestion is.
On April 1, the New York Times carried it front, page story to the
effect that an intelligence budget totaling $6.2 billion was being re-
quested for fiscal year 1978. A review of that story clearly shows the
problems which would arise in any effort to reveal a total figure for
the intelligence budget. The story indicates serious question as to
exactly what the $6.2 billion refers to. It refers to figures published
elsewhere of $4 billion and of $l0 "billion, and states that these refer
to different ways of deterininingmvhat is in the intelligence budget. I
do not, know the 1978 request, but. I am in no way assisted in determni-
ing the value or lack of value of the $6.2 billion requested for 1978.
by that story. I am left in total confusion as to exactly what is meant
by the figure and what, it covers.
Thus, any- eft`ort to release an official figure for the intelligence
budget would have to be accompanied by considerable description of
exactly what kinds of programs were covered and whet. kinds of pro-
grains were excluded. For example, language would be necessary to
explain whether the radar, the intercept devices, the intelligence staff'
on a U.S. cruiser would be included in the figure or not, and exactly
which agencies were included and which 'were not. This kind of
clarification would have to go on until a very clear line appeared be-
tween the kinds of operations covered under the budget and those left
out. The Process would be accompanied by debate as to the wistloro
it of the dividing line selected
which could only reveal considerable de-
,
toil about our intelligence programs.
Eli
:? rApproved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4
 j ?~
'Du=,c, ilillii-1111 Its, in 1 year wouhi be coal)rortlided by the figure for
It second and silbsequent ye111?s. The iruniocliato clue4tion wo.i ld arise
its to wlI , t11o figure` %vent Up Or went clown. Any c:luinges in the cover-
ttge of l.lu figure through transfer of programs from one service to
another, or one category of activity to another would have to be ex-
pluitled to avoid presenting a false picture. Again the result would
only be tI outline in public more and more details of our overall in-
telligenco pr?ograni.
The public debate apparently sought by publishing the figure would
inevitably erode the secrecy of detail %Aich had been agreed at the
ontse3t. The demand would rise, for the breakdown of the total figure
into its -_onr,eouent major parts of investment, personnel, operations
by type, :.-egioltal allocations, etc. Each such breakdown would then
provide the basis fur- separate trends over the years, revealing the
vitriatior s in the composition of our intelligence program as it ad?
justed to new cireullrstnnces.
My core,-ern is not theoretical, Mr. Chairman. In 1947, the Atomic
Energy Camiirission account for the then-secret atomic weapons pro-
grain Wa3 felt to be so sensitive that only a one-line item was placed
in the budget that year to account for alt such Weapons expenditures.
In theory ruany of these expenditures are still secret, but that one line
St
b
em
y 1974 hact expandd t 15f dild
eo pages oetae explanation of the
AEC's weapons program. I could only foresee a similar erosion of the
secrecy which will be necessary to successful intelligence operations in
the fat urn.
-
Another real example shows the probable effect of such P. move. The
Chinese CV)vernmertt did not publish the value of its industrial pro-
duction a:fier 1950. But they did publish percentage increases for the
elation and most of the provinces, apparently believing this would not
reveal the. absolute figures. The revelation of one key figure mule it
easy to detorinine the absolute figure for all the data, when the Chinese
reported tl:.at the value of industrial production in 1971 was 21 times
that of 191:). Since we did know the figure for 1949, it was easy to de-
termine tM 1971 figure, and to reconstruct the absolute figures boti
before and after that data, both nationally and by province.
Other nations have followed our example in expanding the intelli-
pence discipline to include the scrutiny and study of public releases of
inforniatiari. With a public bud rot figure for intclligenca and its in-
evitable erosion to specify its subprograms, it woulcf'be easy for for-.
sign natioir.r a
d f
n
or our own energeti ititi
cnvesgave reporter to asso-
ciate incrca es in intelligence funding with new ventures in operations
or in technology, thereby stimulating countermeasures by their targets
to make such programs fruitless, and leave America in Ignorance.-
Mr. Chairman, you are being asked to make a watershed decision on
this question. If you decide to make this total budget figure public, I
confidently. ;predict that you will be inundated by a series of questions
in the comi n g years as to what the figure includes and what it excludes.
Why does . 4';;o up? Why does it o downs I
it
s
worth it? How d.
oes. work? Aa i I believe that we will in a very short time be losing much
of the value of the sums appropriated for th
i
lli
ese
nte
gence atiiti
cves.
~r~ his, I believe that it is not necessary, that it would not b& helpful
?f (mUbll IiIt it 11' wVAtlirl lin 1A.,~...a..4;__.. L-_ ___. _ _
Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP81 1
1 w:i ~lti,.; i.,?
18.E
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4'
 't "tt k 1112-F.CIAw-RDPRI"fi4~0980R000200060163-4
CONFIDENTIAL I I SECRET
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing SLp
D/DCI/IC
5 DDI,'-:
6 DDA " .~trr
71 DDO
8 D/DCI/NI
GC
10 C..
IG
12 Comet a-
13 D/Pare
14 D/5 ' ~.
15 DTR
16 ;A/DCI/PA
17 AO/DCI
18 C/IPS
19 DCI/SS
20
21
22
Remarks:
SUSPENSE
3437 (5.77)
DATE INITIAL
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000200060163-4