STATEMENT OF VICTOR L. LOWE, DIRECTOR, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED NAZI WAR CRIMINALS RESIDING IN THE UNITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000600070023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 19, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Expected at 9:30 a.m., EDT
Wednesday, July 19, 1978
STATEMENT OF
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VICTOR L. LOWE, DIRECTOR, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Our testimony today deals with our report dated May 15, 1978, entitled
"Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War Criminals
Not Supported by Available Evidence--Controversy May Continue." Mr. Chair-
man, your letter dated January 13, 1977, requested this report on whether
INS personnel deliberately obstructed active prosecution of alleged Nazi
war criminals or engaged in a conspiracy to withhold or quash any informa-
tion in its possession.
We believe it is unlikely that a widespread conspiracy existed, but we
cannot absolutely rule out the possibility of undetected, isolated instances
of deliberate obstruction. Our investigation was hindered by the effect of
the passage of time on the availability of information and limited access to
agencies' records. In any event, the inherent difficulty in establishing
f a cons Tracy must be recognized. ,_
p
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the existence o
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To du his review we selected a sample of 111 cases in which INS had
received allegations that individuals were Nazi war criminals. In 57 of
them allegations had been made before 1973 and in 54 the allegations were
made in 1973 or later. The basis for our selection is shown in the appendix
to our statement. Also, we sent a listing of the 111 individuals to the
FBI, CIA, State Department, and Defense Department, and requested that we
be allowed to.review any information these agencies may have concerning
them.
We reviewed INS case files on 94 individuals. Two of them had been
expelled.from the country, one by deportation and one by extradition.
Probable cases were developed and prosecutednbut, for various reasons,
the individuals were allowed to remain in this country. However, INS'
investigations of most-cases before 1973 were deficient or perfunctory..
In some cases, no investigation was conducted. The quality of INS investi-
gations has improved since 1973; however; improvements are still needed.
There has been one successful prosecution since 197 which occurred after
our report was issued. The possibility exists that some individuals under
prosecution now or in the future may never leave the country due to appeals
and other procedures available under the law.
The CIA as agreed prepared summaries in lieu of our receiving actual
case files on our sample of 111 names. We reviewed the summaries, and the
agencies when requested provided original documents appropriately sanitized
to remove intelligence sources and methods on any matters which they considered
to be significant to the investigation. The summaries included references to
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information originated by other agencies so that we could contact those
agencies to obtain the documents if necessary. The agencies' summaries,
.as agreed, did not contain personal identities, intelligence sources or
methods, and other information not related to our inquiry.
The CIA said it had contacted 22 of the 111 individuals on our sample
list as sources of information. One decided not to be involved; of the
other 21, 7 were paid for information or services provided. The CIA said
its contacts with some of them came at a time when there was an acute
shortage of intelligence on Soviet intentions and on developments in Eastern
Europe.
The FBI as agreed also prepared summaries in lieu of our receiving actual
cases. The FBI had information on 47 individuals. It said it had a confi-
dental relationship with two of them, but they were not paid. The Depart-
ment of State had information on 46 individuals, one of whom was employed
as a consultant. The Department of Defense said it had information on 33
individuals, one of whom was provided employment.
At least three of the individuals included on our list had been assisted
in entering the United States. The CIA Director used his authority to bring
a former senior official of the German Foreign Ministry during the Nazi era
into the country. This official was an expert on the Soviet Union. He de-
parted in 1953 and records show that it was not until years later that INS
received an allegation that he had been involved in atrocities..
One of the Defense agencies assisted an individual's entry,into the
United States and provided employment after entry under a Presidentially
approved program to aid our postwar military research. No known or alleged
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war criminals were to be brought to the United States under this program.
In the late 1940s, two Department of State Embassy. officials stated in a
memorandum that they waived a clearance for an individual and approved his
visitor's visa due to the apparent interest in. his trip of another Embassy
section and of another Federal agency and to the fact the individual was
recommended by persons in whom they had confidence. Also, one consular
official stated that the other Federal agency had provided funds for the
individual's trip to the United States. An Army intelligence agent was
responsible for assisting this individual's entry into the United States.
Shortly after the individual entered the country, he was arrested and sub-
sequently deported by INS because his entry was found to have been prejudicial
since he had advocated and acquiesced in activities contrary to decency in
behalf of the Axis countries during World War II.
We realize the involvement of other Federal agencies with individuals
under investigation by INS is controversial. However, we found no informa-
tion in INS files or at other agencies to indicate any of these agencies
or others engaged in a conspiracy. to withhold or quash any information in
their possession or deliberately obstructed active prosecution. But a
number of factors--lack of assurances that we have seen all documentation,
the inherent difficulty in establishing the existence of a conspiracy, and
changes in the political atmosphere--prevent us from being assured as to
the validity of this conclusion. However, we believe certain factors,
some of which cannot be validated and in some instances are conjecture,
should be considered in evaluation- INS' lack of progress.uch-ass;
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deceased or had left the country. Some allegations were flimsy;
for example, the allegation may have been that a person only
thinks a certain individual was a Nazi with no other details
provided. Others were not investigated or the investigation was
perfunctory because the allegation originated from Communist
countries; for example, in three cases the Department of State
precluded INS from obtaining information from Communist countries.
Thus, judgments were made in these cases in light of the political
atmosphere prevailing during the time in question, and other
cases were probably not pursued for the same reason. Also, the
judgment of INS and other Federal agencies that these allegation.;
were Communist propaganda may have been valid in view of their
experience and the political atmosphere.
--The time interval since the initial processing of most of the
cases under question makes it difficult to reconstruct the situa-
tion. Unclear memories or the death of some individuals prevented
us from determining both the reasons for certain decisions and
the type of investigation conducted as well as who should have
been and who actually was responsible. In this regard, INS decent-
ralized its operation in the mid-1950s and assigned responsibility
for managing caseloads to the field offices. Under this operating
procedure, INS headquarters officials generally would not have been
aware of allegations of Nazi war crimes. Top officials of INS
before 1973 indicated that they had little or no involvement in or
knowledge of the allegations. They said that with a few exceptions,
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Nazi war crime allegations were not high priority cases
and headquarters officials therefore would not have been advised
of them. Under such a procedure it is hard to pinpoint responsibil-
ity for many actions. In one or a small number of cases mal-
feasance would be possible but difficult to determine; in a large
number of cases, however, because of the number of people and
offices involved, a conspiracy to quash allegations would have
been much easier to determine, if it existed.
--Cases were investigated and prosecuted before 1973, but some
deportation orders were overturned or legal procedures enabled the
individuals to remain in the United States. As a-result, invest-
igatorsJmay have curtailed or not undertaken ongoing or future in-
vestigations because they considered the investigations to be
fruitless and therefore considered the pursuit of other types of
cases to be more productive.
--INS did know in some cases and may have known in others that
information was available at other agencies. Although conjecture,
this information may not have been obtained because it related to
internal or foreign security matters.
--We did not evaluate the merits of the involvement of the Federal
agencies. These agencies informed us that they did not intervene
in or obstruct any INS investigation or prosecution of alleged
Nazi war criminals. The CIA's reasons for contacts and assistance--
that the individuals, the majority of whom were from, and were
.knowledgeable about activities in, countries under Soviet jurisdic-
tion--appear valid.
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--Federal agencies will provide information to other Federal
agencies when such information will not disclose confidential
sources. We did not evaluate this policy of the intelligence
community or whether providing this type of information would
have assisted INS investigative and prosecutive efforts.
Information that we reviewed regarding such individuals and
information they may have provided as well as the identities
of individuals who were employed, have been classified by the
individual agencies.
We believe these factors should help clarify some of the controversy
about INS' progress over the years in investigating and prosecuting alleged
Nazi war criminals residing in the United States, although the overall
validity, degree, and interrelationship of the factors is unknown. The
truth of the allegation that there.was an overt conspiracy by personnel
from INS or by INS and other Federal agencies is unlikely.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
We have no indication that the information provided to us by the various
agencies was not accurate and complete. Because of our restricted access to
the files, however, we cannot adequately assure the Subcommittee that our
findings are complete.
The matter of access to intelligence-type information by the Congress
or its agents, such as GAO, is complicated. Executive agencies must be
concerned with protecting sensitive information and congressional com-
mittees need the information to properly carry out their oversight func-
tions. Thus, the conflict between the need to know and the need to protect
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exists. Therefore, when we began our work in January 1977 an arrangement
was needed that accommodated both.
In April 1977, with your assistance Mr. Chairman, we reached an agree-
ment with the agencies whereby INS would screen the appropriate files and
cases for third-agency documents and would obtain approval from the third
agency, such as the CIA, FBI, and the Departments of Defense and State, to
release the documents for our review. However, it was not until August that
the majority of the third-agency documents were cleared and provided to us.
Also in August, the Department of Justice authorized us, under certain guide-
lines, access to cases recommended for or under legal proceedings.
Throughout our review, we were concerned with the need to protect the
integrity of the apprcpriate agencies investigative operations. Accord-
ingly,-while we believdd it was essential that we have access to informa-
tion in their investigative files, we were willing to do so in such a way
that would enable certain information in those files to be protected.
As you know Mr. Chairman and as previously stated, we entered into
agreements with the CIA and FBI whereby these agencies prepared summaries
in lieu of providing original documents of any file holdings on our sample
of 111 names. Also, it was understood by all agencies involved in our review,
that since a number of the cases were under current or possible future litiga-
tion by the Department of Justice, Department guidance would be obtained in
providing available information for our review. This understanding was
necessary so that the agencies involved would not in any way prejudice any
ongoing litigation by the Department. As part of our agreement with the
Department, the contents of our report and this statement were reviewed and
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approved on the basis that its contents would not prejudice any ongoing
litigation. In addition, all agencies involved agreed that individuals
included in our sample would not be named.
This agreement was made in order that we not prejudice any ongoing
litigation and also to protect those individuals against whom allegations
either have not been proven or investigations have not been completed.
Included in our sample are individuals who died before INS received the
allegation about them. INS' investigation ceases when it finds that the
individual has died; thus the allegation is neither proved nor disproved.
The above arrangements and agreements appeared reasonable in view of
the complicated matter of access to intelligence-type information, and
agency officials were cooperative and open in our discussions with them.
We believe our approach to this review clearly protected the integrity of
all the involved agencies investigative operations. However, due to the
constant screening of files, lack of an INS centralized file system or,
before 1973, lack of a program concerning alleged Nazi war criminals, and
the fact that we had to use CIA and FBI prepared summaries in lieu of
receiving actual case files, we do not have the assurance that we have
seen the necessary documentationiwhich would have enabled us to make any
valid determinations as to the objectives of the Chairman's request.
Mr. Chairman, even considering all. of the factors we have stated,
different people will undoubtedly interpret the information we developed
in different ways, depending on the preconceived notions they already
have. Some will be persuaded, as we were, that the existence of a wide-
spread conspiracy was unlikely. Others will probably find cause to
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strengthen their belief that deliberate obstruction did occur. Thus,
the publicity., interest, and controversy about INS' lack of progress may
continue. The controversy may be further compounded because legal delays,
appeals, and other procedures, considered with the age of the individual
and potential witnesses make it doubtful that the Government will ever be
able to deport many subjects of the allegations.
This concludes my prepared statement. We hope this information will
assist the Subcommittee in its oversight of INS activities. We would be
pleased to respond to any questions.
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