CIA SPECIAL WORK AREA IN HSCA OFFICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP81 MQN980R000600320027-2
20 July 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : CIA Special Work Area in HSCA Offices
I. I spoke with on Friday, 14 July 1978,
about his assignment to rep ace the CIA employee who had
worked in the HSCA area. I made the following points:
a. The arrangment there had evolved from
what had been intended originally as a turn-around
service by the Agency, in providing documents
for use in interviews, depositions and hearings
by the HSCA; the material was to be returned to
CIA after use. Whether by design or natural
circumstances, the HSCA investigators took notes
from those documents(thereby creating what we
consider CIA-derived material) and mixed them
with their analysis in preparation of questions;
while the resulting material was of a proprietary
interest to CIA it contained, in this form, HSCA
attitudes that they wish to screen off from us.
The above developments occurred while the HSCA
was still reviewing a draft agreement that
represented what we had undertaken to do; that
agreement was never signed by HSCA.
b. In trying to find a way out of this
situation, and at the same time present an
accommodating posture, we had continued the
arrangement while different possible arrange-
ments were considered. The operation appeared
to be primarily a mechanical one, which had led
to a non-staff employee being assigned the
chore. It was this employee he was replacing.
c. The Memorandum of Understanding between
the Agency and HSCA--which has a number of
 Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R000600320027-2
unattractive features, from our point of view--
provides that notes taken at CIA Headquarters by
HSCA investigators would be reduced to "summaries,"
which in turn would be sanitized at CIA before
transmittal to the HSCA area for final use in the
drafting of reports. This sounds fine in concept
but is impractical, in fact. Further, although
not a controlling consideration, it imposed a
sanitization work load that we had not handled
well. We had been considering with HSCA transmitting
to HSCA (for retention in the special CIA work area
there) the notes taken. at CIA, in unsanitized form.
d. Thus there would be two types of papers
to be retained in the CIA work area at HSCA. The
first of these is the paper in the original beachhead,
as we call it: those memoranda of interviews, trans-
cripts of depositions and hearings, stenographer's
notes and typewriter ribbons (we had requested
that the typewriter ribbons be destroyed after
transcripts had been prepared, and that stenographers'
notes be destroyed after the transcripts are veri-
fied, to reduce the sheer volume of this, which
Mr. Blakey had said he would do). The second collec-
tion of paper will consist of the materials now being
moved to the work area from CIA. We will continue
to provide documents for use in hearings, etc., on
a turn-around basis; he will have to baby-sit
them when in use.
e. The new material is all being stapled
into specially marked folders, covered with log
sheets; in addition to which specially marked
note paper (legal tablets and typewriter paper)
is being provided; HSCA personnel are to be
allowed to bring with them to the area working
papers and documents of their own, and remove
them (not those from the safe already there) when
they depart. They are to bring no blank note
paper with them, nor are they to write on any-
thing but the specially marked paper provided in
the special work area. All writing on these
specially marked papers will remain in the work
area when not being used, and will not be removed
from the area. When the final report is written
drafts will be couriered to CIA Headquarters for
review. Upon eventual completion of the investi-
gation all the work papers and intermediate drafts
will be destroyed, the final report to speak for
itself.
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f. The CIA representative will not take any
interest in HSCA paper or other matters. This
should not present earlier problems now that the
new CIA work area is to be separated from the
area where the more sensitive materials of the
HSCA are stored. There should be no interest
shown in the various drafts, only in ensuring
that it is signed for an withdrawal and on its
logging back into the safe.
h. We could not say what problems there
may be in destruction of paper in the course of
work, but the assumption is that something
reasonable could be worked out; I had been told
by Mr. Blakey that there were arrangements for
this.
g. There are possible problems in the fact
that we now will have two kinds of paper held
in the special area--the earlier paper in safes
used for that purpose, and the new paper marked
distinctively. Whether some new system of logs
or marking is appropriate I could not say, but
he may develop some feeling for this after he
has had a chance to work with it.
i. I also mentioned the question of
future man-power requirements, Mr. Blakey having
told me that in the next week we may have to make
another man available when the HSCA people start
working longer hours and weeks. Hopefully, they
would provide sufficient lead time for us to
arrange this without difficulty.
2. This is more in the nature of a description of
the arrangements, and how.they have developed, than a
set of firm instructions. s an intelligent
professional, and we will nave depend on him to a
great extent. It may be useful to have additional advice
from the Office of Security,
OLC/SDB/hfs
Distribution:
Orig. - Adse
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - D/Security
1 - O/DDCI
1 - Legislative Counsel
rec lnri ge
25X1