MEETING WITH HSCA STAFFERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000600320084-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 84
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R0 6 9
SECRET OLC
SUBJECT : Meeting with HSCA Staffers 25X1
in the company of
_Jmet with Messrs. Blakey, ornwe ,
and Goldsmith yesterday for about two hours, starting at 25X1
about 1600. After some preliminary bowing and scraping as
to who would go first, I started.
2. First, I passed to Mr. Blakey a package of papers
prepared for release under FOIA, involving records of
conversations with him in reference to a HSCA staff employee
who did not meet all security criteria for work on this
matter. I stated that we wanted to know if it gave him
any problems; he undertook to let us know today.
3. I reported that we had notified Mr. John McCone
of the HSCA desire to interview him. I said that this had
been done through Walter Elder, now with Resource Management
Staff. Elder had been the DCI's Executive Assistant when
McCone was Director, and was the channel through which
Mr. McCone preferred to have contacts of this sort made.
Elder had reported-that Mr. McCone was departing his home
for Seattle at the time of his telephone conversation with 25X1
him, and that he had not heard further. I had spoken with
Mr. Elder about dealing directly with the HSCA and gave
them his telephone number Elder will keep us
posted of developments.
4. I stated that we are trying to look ahead to
potential problems that can be resolved before the last
minute. I asked specifically what plans they had for the
public hearings in September, and what they would require
of us. I specifically noted our interest in security
considerations. Mr. Blakey said they have been thinking
of it also, and he would come back to us on this in ten
days. I replied this would give us plenty of time to
address the problem.
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5. I noted that I had written asking for an up-to-date
statement of the internal practice of access within the HSCA
staff. I knew that they observed a need-to-know principle
and it would be helpful to us to know who was approved for
access to certain matters. After saying that everyone was
cleared basically, with some having extra clearances, he
said that the basic principle was by team. I noted that
defector issues involved sensitive matters, 25
and who should be given access to this was useful information
to us. He said he would check my written request--which he
did not recall--but did not make any other commitments.
6. I asked about the Beachhead agreement and the
subsequent issue. He said that there had been no formal
acknowledgement of the beachhead draft proposal, as it did
not coincide with his understanding of what had been agreed.
I said that there was only one reason for the undertaking,
and that was support of the hearings, and that was what the
agreement had attempted to record. I said that there are
counter pro osals on how to handle the materials for the
defector problems. I said that the given reason 25X1
tor wanting to hold those materials for writing was their
concern we may learn of their thinking. Noting that con-
veni consideration (Goldsmith had indicated
thisi in a conversation last week), I 25
said we are prepare to install the two-combination safe
up there, to hold the materials on those two subjects
separately from the beachhead materials used relevant to
hearings, per se. However, we did not intend to move
additional Agency documents to the HSCA area. I tabled
a draft statement of what we are prepared to do in this
respect. I said that we were not proposing an arrangment
to be negotiated, but are stating what we are prepared to
do in an attempt to accommodate ourselves to their expressed
problem, under the existing agreement, and this is our answer.
If this was not acceptable, I said we could provide a four-
drawer safe at CIA Headquarters with a combination set and
controlled by them, for purposes of report writing, and
they could move their material to that safe. Blakey said
he would review the draft statement (copy attached) and
let me know.
7. Blakey said that things had changed since his
early days. Full agreements had been reached quickly,
then, but now things took longer. He noted the atmosphere,
and also noted the "changing of the guards" (referring to
my arrival). I said that one of the first things I noted
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in arriving on the scene was the atmosphere. I had given it
considerable study, and felt that there was at least a
problem of communications. I stated that it is clear to
me that we say things to one another that are not heard or
understood.
8. I undertook to tell them one thing I had done to
plumb the matter. I said that I knew they tested hypotheses,
and I had done the same thing. My experience was that there
is a temptation on the part of some congressional staff
investigators to plant versions of things in the minds of
witnesses and then extract answers on the basis of that. I
cited the Schweiker Report as containing some examples, as
addressed directly in the 1977 CIA Task Force study on the
Schweiker report. I said that as soon as they finished in
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said t at
aistrust t the Agency was implicit in their approach to
things (and that they should understand that we are not
cloned from one figure making up one gigantic conspiracy)
and that this contributes to the communications gap. I
said I had been participating in inspections for some fif-
teen years, running individual inquiries much of that time
and directing a program for some five years. The biggest
problem is to avoid the "avenging angel" approach and to
realize that the investigator does not speak from Mount
Olympus--my written instructions to inspectors so stated.
Objectivity takes a lot, and its absence will affect rela-
tions.
Si E ;.
tCE
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13. Mr. Blakey described the physical problem growing
out of the failure to resolve the question of the beach-
head issue. There are some six-eight depositions and
three-four hearings. Transcripts, typewriter tapes and
notes are held in the two-drawer safe. We observed that
once the transcripts have been corrected and verified
there is no practical reason for keeping either the type-
writer tapes or steno notes. They agreed to check on this.
14. Mr. Blakey stated that he felt there was a steady
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deterioration in relationships. He observed that it had
been from 1'June to 28 June on the priority requests,
with no results. I said that our move and a new reporting
system had delayed advising HSCA of results, which was
not acceptable to him. He felt that it would be useful
to have a common document showing status of reports, to
which I demurred; I said that if we took time out to work
on yet another log system (having just gotten one started
for ouselves) we would further delay things. I wanted to
work out the paper and then would be happy to give time
and attention to a joint evaluation of where things stand.
As he envisioned it, it would record date of request,
date of completion and date of review.
15. Mr. Rln'kp-v said there is a sense of outrage in
the Committee
He felt that third party solution was viable an reason e.
The key to this statement is the point that he was speaking
of Committee members, per se, and not just staff members.
17. Blakey expressed some concern, not detailed, about
the Office of Security standards being extended to other
paper.
We, said we will
inquire further into the procedures being followed, for
we did not understand that anything other than this is
being done.
18. Blakey described the problems of sanitizing notes.
I had undertaken to see if notes (as distinguished from
summaries) could be summarized; if so we would sanitize
them rather than requiring summaries. Blakey mentioned
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from the unsanitized version o the 1977 Task Force Report,
emphasizing the portions already deleted from the sanitized
version; I had said he would have to do a summary. That
could have been avoided by exercise of discretion. Goldsmith
asked that we check the system for sanitizing.
S. D. Breckinri ge
Attachment
Distribution:
Orig - OLC Subject
1 - 0/DDCI CH. Smith)
1 - DDO
1 - C/SE Division
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - DDA
1 - D/Security
1 - C/PCS/LOC
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
S RET
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