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July 31, 1978
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ADM NIS 1 [ASSISTANT ongV t. of tje WIteb P"b" tate. ;~Y yASp-.oved For Release 2004$,5/0 DP81 M00980R000700110105-7 JOHN N.AL:-9N 0uZe 0 rprem;entatlbe 1asjington, D.C. 20515 July 31, 1978 Dear Colleague: An article in the current issue of AIR FORCE Magazine calls attention to the serious threat to our national security which would result from passage of the Administration's Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (H.R.7308). I am attaching reprint:: of several pages from this magazine and would draw your special attention to page 13, "Tighter Senate Shackle:. for Intelligence." In line with the editor's comments, I hope that you will consider substantial amendments to the pending legislation so as to eliminate the "special court" and "judicial warrant" requirements for foreign intelligence gathering. In the alternative, it is my recommendation that you support the substitute bill, H.R. 13442, which would impose strict Executive Branch responsibilities without transferring such executive authority to the Judiciary. t With best wishes, I am S/j t SECRLTMIES, MISS BETTS SPRACHER MRs. JEAHNE TiMMoNs MRS. HAZEL ALEXANDER MRS. JESSICA Wn10M MRS. MARY AHLFELD MRs. DELANE MCHONE Miss ELAINE DUDLEY Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000700110105-7 PUBLISHED BYTHEAIR FORCEASSOCIATION aJ/~/E In this preprint of AIR FORCE Magazine's "In Focus . . ." column for the August 1978 issue, Senior Editor Edgar Ulsamer reports on the damage to national. security that could be done by the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- lance Act of 1978 as passed by the Senate, and on proposed corrective action embodied in H.R. 9745 --- reintroduced as H.R. 13442. Your attention is called to the item headed "Tighter Senate Shackles for Intelligence." Reproduced by permission of AIR FORCE Magazine, published by the Air Force Association, Washington, D.C. Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000700110105-7 BY EDGAR ULSAMER, SENIOR EDITOR Washington, D. C., July 5 New Space Policy On May 11, 1978, President Jimmy Carter committed the nation to a new space policy by signing PDM (Presidential Decision Memoran- dum)-37. The policy statement breaks new ground in projecting the principle of sovereign rights-and the right to defend them-into space. Asserting that any nation's space systems are "national prop- erty" entitled to free passage and unhampered operation, PDM-37 commits the nation to "activities in space in support of its right of self- defense and thereby strengthen na- tional security, the deterrence of attack, and arms control agree- ments." While seeking verifiable, compre- hensive limits on antisatellite capa- bilities and their use, the US, in the absence of such an agreement, "will vigorously pursue development of its own capabilities. The US space defense program shall include an integrated attack warning, notifica- tion, verification, and contingency reaction capability which can effec- tively detect and react to threats to US space systems." Though US and Soviet negotiators already have spent a week discussing possible approaches to a verifiable agree- ment barring space weapons, this column learned that realization of such an accord should be consid- ered a distant goal. Most senior Administration offi- cials feel that a treaty "freezing" the US and the Soviet Union in their present positions regarding anti- satellite weapons (ASAT) is out of the question. The Soviet Union has an operational ASAT launch com- plex and a fleet of ASATs in being. While these weapons have exhibit- ed some deficiencies during test flights, such as occasionally failing to destroy test targets, and altitude limits below 600 miles,. they provide the Soviet Union with a destabilizing lead over the US, whose ASAT pro- gram is not yet off the drawing board. Most experts believe, there- fore, that the US must draw abreast military operations during national emergencies. In the main, this 05/05: CIA-RDP81 M00980RUWM i9 rypting packages of Soviet ASAT capabilities before a treaty banning development and de- ployment of space weapons can be entered into. The incipient US ASAT program concurrently is developing a num- ber of technological options, some of which involve capabilities attain- able only at great technological risk. High-energy laser weapons, viewed as the most versatile long-term ap- proach, fall in this category. A tech- nologically more "mature" US ASAT design centers on a modified SRAM-equipped with a miniature homing device to be launched by high-flying aircraft. The Army's HIT (Homing Interceptor Technology) program, developed originally for ballistic missile defense, was trans- ferred to USAF to serve as a fore- runner of a miniature homing de- vice. An aircraft-launched ASAT would be limited to operation against hostile spacecraft in low- altitude orbits. For that reason, another design approach is being pursued, involv- ing a missile booster that delivers a warhead/homing device combina- tion to higher orbital altitudes. This basic concept is being explored in a variety of ways to provide the capa- bility of intercepting across a wide range of altitudes and modes. Lastly, advanced jamming and other countermeasure technologies to frustrate Soviet space weapons are being studied under the ASAT program. According to an Admin- istration official who declined to be named, "If we want an ASAT capa- bility, we can achieve one that is high quality, that is as good or bet- ter than theirs." President Carter, as yet, has not authorized go-ahead on an operational ASAT system, even though PDM-37 asserts that "the United States finds itself under in- creasing pressure to field an anti- satellite capability of its own in re- sponse to Soviet activities In this area." The new policy statement directs the Secretary of Defense to set up a space counterpart to the Civil Re- serve Air Fleet (CRAF) through a to important nonmilitary satellites to prevent the Soviets "from taking over these systems" 'in wartime. For the moment, such militarily im- portant systems as the civilian US weather satellites are vulnerable to acts of space piracy. The only alter- native would be their destruction-by commanding these spacecraf` to spin out of control. PDM-37 seem- ingly provides the option to place military payloads on nonmilitary satellites in "piggyback fashion," to increase redundancy. Hardening civilian satellites earmarked for mil- itary use during crises Is also pro- vided for. While relaxing the limitation on remote earth sensing for civilian purposes by boosting permissible pictorial resolution to ten meters- compared to eighty meters at pres- ent-the US government will super- vise and control all such informa- tion. The idea its to withhold such military information as the location of I IS or other naval forces from third countries. Possibly PDM-37's greatest sig- nificance lies in a subtle change in relationship between the intelli- gence community, In near-absolute control heretofore of space-based intelliger ;e and saconnaissance In- formation, such as that produced by Lockheed's Big Bird satellites, and the military services. Much of this information has been so highly classified by the CIA that it rarely reached the, operational level of the military. PDM-37 redresses this in- congruity by reducing the classifi- cation of such Information to assure adequate support of military require- ments, especially at the unit level. USAF will continue to operate the nation's secret spacecraft for the CIA. The Presidential directive sets up an intragovernmental arbiter and ombudsman, the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, to settle routine squabbles, or to channel especially thorny issues to the President for resolution. The committee is chaired by the Direc- tor of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Dr. Frank Press, and includes representatives from DoD, NASA, the CIA, and other gov- ernment agencies concerned with US space operations. Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980ROOWI 'W yazine / August 1978 Tighter Senate Shackles sties involving foreign powers and could not detect low-yield Soviet for intelligence foreign agents. Appropriate safe- testing in the view of congressional d Appac ntly"fRg% figra e 2 lhldt M friBd pMfM IV II uuu pdtlt@,10&;p would have serve ?~_ __, :.:,,. ous lack of congressional oversight over US Intelligence operations, the Senate recently passed legislation that could have disastrous conse- quences for national security. Known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, it Is a revolutionary approach to foreign intelligence-gathering that would transfer responsibility for authoriz- Ing such actions from the Executive Branch to a "Special Court." The wisdom and constitutionality of the new bill-now before relevant House committees-seem to be flawed on at least two counts: The expertise of federal judges in con- trolling foreign Intelligence is lack- ing-and has never ' een sought; also the power to authorize-or re- fuse to authorize-foreign intelli- gence-gathering activities tradition- ally has been exercised by the President and seems granted him under the Constitution, which makes him responsible for all decisions regarding national security. To treat decisions on foreign Intelligence as anything other than integral issues of national defense seems illogical. As Congressman Robert McClory (R-III.), a member of both the House Judiciary Committee and the Per- manent Select Committee on Intel- ligence, told this column: "To pass the buck on such decision-making to a special court might give an ap- pearance of safeguarding Individual rights or justifying Executive deci- sion-making. However, It is inher- ently dangerous to our national security because of the delays and frustrations which might result, and it is an unjustified attempt to excuse the President from a Constitutional responsibility and accountability which he should be required to as- sume." The stringent guidelines of Execu- tive Order 11905, issued >~y Presi- dent Ford in the wake of Watergate to preclude abuses by the Intelli- gence community, and supplemental instructions by President Carter, ac- cording to comprehensive congres- sional testimony, have proved fully effective in controlling foreign intel- ligence collection. On the strength of this evidence, Representative Mc- Clory has introduced a new bill, quirement "for minimization or elimination and destruction of in- formation regarding American citi- zens which might incidentally or accidentally be included in an electronic information-gathering op- eration," according to Mr. McClory. It would seem absurd to deny the US the right to timely, secure sur- veillance of foreign agents at a time when the number and audacity of Soviet operatives In the US are at an all-time high. The Test Ban Treaty The Administration's policy on a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ostensibly cast in concrete when President Carter signed PDM-38 on May 20, 1978, without concurrence by either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Depart- ment of Energy (DOE), Is undergo- ing an agonizing reappraisal. Catalyst for reopening the case was a high-powered White House meeting in mid-June requested by Energy Secretary James R. Schle- singer. Billed as a fifteen-minute meeting, it went to an hour and a half and reportedly caused the President to comment, "You gave me a lot to think about." Highly placed sources told this column that several participants reached the conclusion that essen- tial information concerning the ef- fects of halting all nuclear testing had not reached the President, even though that information had been briefed to congressional committees by Defense Department and DOE witnesses, including the then-acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones. Specifically, the President did not appear read in on why DOE and the JCS consider a "zero-yield" test ban or moratorium unverifiable. Neither did he seem to be aware of the fact that the Soviet negotiators had rejected a central safeguard re- quested by the US as unacceptably intrusive. This would involve placing some thirty teleseismic arrays on Russian territory. The only monitor- ing scheme acceptable to the So- viets is sharing data from some five or six Soviet-built seismic detectors, to a cessation of testing.) The persuasiveness of the evi- dence presented by Dr. Schlesinger and two DOE laboratory directors appears to have caused changes in the Administration's position on this issue of pervasive importance to na- tional defense. The White House- at a Special Coordinating Commit- tee (SCC) meeting late In June- decided to limit any Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to three rather than five years, and decreed that renewal thereafter would require the ap- proval of both the Executive Brunch and the Senate. The same cabinet- level meeting also decided to insist on the need of continued low-yield "controlled" testing-at the level of a few hundred pounds-even tt'ough Paul Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reportedly had threatened to resign if the Administration re- neged on "zero yield." Other proposed safeguards, viewed by congressional experts as of a more cosmetic than curative nature, Include firm provisions for maintaining US R&D and production capabilities, and constant readiness to resume testing. The latter safe- guard is important; It took the US more than a year to resume full- scale testing after the Soviets re- nounced the bilateral test morato- rium in 1961. Congressional opposition to a CTBT appears formidable and grow- ing, a fact that the AdministraJon seems to recognize. During recent congressional testimony, Defense Secretary Harold Brown disclosed that CTBT would not be concluded until after SALT II. In addition to questioning the wisdom of entering into an essentially unverifiable ac- cord (see p. 9, April '78 Issue), rele- vant committees of the House and Senate have urged that the Thresh- old Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty that went into effect more than two years ago should be ratified before the Senate considers CTBT, and that weapon systems allowed under SALT 11 should be tested adequately before a CTBT goes into effect. The Senati Armed Services Com- H.R. 9745, that translates these an arrangement deemed wholly In- mittee, at the behest of Sen. Henry guidelines into statutory form and adequate by most US experts. (Even M. Jackson (D-Was,r.), plans to hold makes the Executive Branch re- the full complement of arrays hearings on the historic and tech- sponsible for all Intelligence activ- _ coupled _with- on-site inspections___ nical aspects of test bans and nu- -- --------------------- - AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1978 13 I II'IJIa, ,wU,n[y;4: tL)-N. H.) ano ben. are chary of this approach because Jake Ga 0". - % - :an), recommended it preempts the Defense Department funding dM& ;a relQimi%nary '~ A 14 007 j~ j'e s f its principal expertise, S0ReIease 2QQ Ong of US military capa- clear weapons reliability and safety. The purpose is to compile an authoritative public record of the grave consequences of plunging headlong into a halt of nuclear test- ing. There is widespread concern that the Administration may bypass the Senate's seemingly strong op- position to a "zero-yield" test ban treaty by seeking a trilateral mora- torium with the Soviets and the British. England's Prime Minister James Callaghan, during a US visit in June 1978, reportedly made clear that his politically hard-pressed labor government was keenly inter- ested in going before the British voters at the coming elections In the role of a "peacemaker." The PRC on Superpowers The Foreign Minister of the Peo- ple's Republic of China, Mr. Huang, unleashed a lengthy harangue against the "superpowers" during the recent United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament. His po- lemic was noteworthy since he re- served his most scathing language for the USSR, whose global strategy he described as being "to control and monopolize Europe, to weaken and squeeze out the influence of the other superpower [the US] in all parts of the world, and ultimately to supplant the other superpower and establish its own hegemony over the world. Facts show that this super- power flaunting the label of social- Ism is more aggressive and adven- turous than the other superpower; it is the most dangerous source of a new world war and is sure to be its chief instigator." In another comment-one that the US arms control lobby should heed-the PRC's foreign minister dissected SALT: "In the t-ght years of SALT, the Soviet Union has brought its once backward nuclear arsenal up to par with that of the other superpower." He held out no hope that the next round of SALT would slow "social-imperialism," (read the Soviet Union) In its rapid expansion of "armaments of all kinds with a view to achieving mil- itary supremacy over its rival." missile for theater forces. Alterna- bilities. Also, the new comparative tives, according to the committee, assessments usually rely on optimis- could "include modifications of cur- tic long-term planning documents- rent Pershing, Patriot, and Minute- unencumbered by budgetary real- man missiles, or the development of ities-for forecasting US capabil- a new missile." Range of the pro- ities. posed new theater ballistic missile ? A reportedly "very tough" let- could be anywhere from 700 to ter by Defense Secretary Harold 1,500 miles. One of the candidate Brown has stiffened the Administra- designs is a derivative of Minute- tion's stance regarding range lim- man III, using its second and third itations for air-launched cruise stages and guidance system. missiles (ALCMs) at the SALT nego- Senator Garn sees a compelling tiations In Geneva. Dr. Brown per- incentive for deploying MRBMs- suasively argued that the ;~o-called which are not covered by SALT- "odometer" range of ALCMs must because such weapons, he told this be pegged at forty percent above column, "would significantly reduce the straight line limit of these the risk of surprise attack, provide weapons. Reason is that cruise mis- a theater ballistic missile compar- siles.must fly a zigzag path; in order able to the Soviet camp's formid- to penetrate 2,500 kilometers-the able SS-20 and older SS-4s and proposed SALT II protocol limit- SS-5s, and provide the advantage their actual flying range must be at of quick response and improved least forty percent greater. penetrability overthe cruise missile." ? ACDA Director Paul Warnke's The US Navy's Poseidon sub- campaign-supported by key State marines assigned to the US Euro- Department figures to declare a pean Command fall to provide "the moratorium on producing Special combined advantage of accuracy Nuclear Materials (SNM-the prin- and timeliness of a land-based cipal element of nuclear weapons) mobile MRBM," according to Sen- has gone sour in light of forceful ator Garn. Also, these submarines, opposition by technical experts. he warned, "might encounter severe Crux Is that the half-life of some communications problems in a com- SNMs is twelve years. As warheaf's plex electronic environment, thus containing these SNMs reached 619 further reducing their effectiveness half-life point, weakening US deter- to execute time-urgent attack on un- rence capabilities would invite nu- planned targets, unless they risked clear proliferation by allied nations detection and exposure by two-way and induce strategic Instability. The radio communications. Moreover, FY'79 SNM budget request is about the mobile land-based MRBM Is $904 million, compared . to about highly controllable, far more flexible $675 million last year. and survivable, and is less costly ? On May 18, 1978, a red-letter than the SLBM." An in M h h Washington Observations ? Even though opposed by many senior CIA analysts, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelli- gence, is bringing a new approach to the formulation of US intelligence estimates and assessments. In the past, the intelligence community confined itself to presenting military and other information pertaining to the Soviet Union and other foreign powers. These estimates served as a basis for "net assessments" done under the aegis of interagency groups that evaluated US vs. Soviet capabilities Net assessments . now A US MRBM? are being made under the direction The ;crenate Armed Services Com- of the Director of Central Intelli- mittee, at the initiative of Sen. gence. Old-line intelligence experts App 14 y ig -energy p ys-cs, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's twenty-laser Shiva system trained 26,000,000 watts of optical power in ninety-five trillionths of a second on a "heavy" hydrogen target the size of a grain of sand to achieve 7.5 billion fusions. The -historic experi- ment points the way toward larger- scale, economically viable duplica- tion of the continuous thermonuclear "burns" by which the sun and other stars generate essenti elly un- limited power. By the mid-1980s, follow-on US systems-Livermore's even larger Nova system and Los Alamos Laboratory's carbon dioxide laser-are expected to achieve a "break even," by producing as much fusion energy as the laser focuses on the target. K AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1978