SENATE FLOOR DEBATE ON S. 3076

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000700120100-1
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: July 5, 1978
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000700121ftr1
RFC010cipy
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
OLC 78-2348
5 July 1978
SUBJECT: Senate Floor Debate on S. 3076
fre/4-
During the Senate floor debate on S. 3076, the Department of
State Authorization Legislation, on 28 June 1978, there was extended
discussion of a "Treaty Powers Resolution." Senator Clark, the sponsor,
inserted in the Congressional Record a Fall 1977 Foreign Policy article
on Executive Agreements by Loch Johnson and James McCormick.
The article co-authored by Loch Johnson in general takes a very
broad view of Executive Agreements -- i.e. , that many more than at
present should be sent to the Congress for prior approval as treaties --
and specifically mentions intelligence agreements as one category of
"agreements" in which Congress does not -- but should -- have a voice.
This is, in my view, an interesting viewpoint that we should keep in mind.
STAT
Distribution:
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1 - MMP
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Chief Legislative Counsel
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000700120100-1
' lovvegi VIVe* think of usurping congres- tion -truly intended to tsantinct its ?for-
- essecal powers. This may well be true. and eign activities so as to avoid confrona
tacerelY hope ta
aeaanor.g that hope rasa however valid that write set by the war powers TelVitt
ie-;.---l-iiiiipttobrebluAdvReitti*tzsaivono payrteRam
eller. they regrettably afford no comfort and treaty powers resolution and It
bea placed in bistorical perspective. would, therefore, not hesitate to endorse
: er tire evidence of decades of practice both wholeheartedly. But because the ad-
sha many administs-ations--Democratic irdnisteation refuses to do so, it is not
.,-anald Republican?demonstrates that the unreasonable to assume, I think' that
roblesrt has been a recurring one wheel .it regards both as somehow imposing nu-
kurill not have been eliminated simply be- wanted restrictions. That, it seems to
use one administration has chosen to me, is the strongest argument of all In
constitutional limitations-It is favor. of .both measures being nnay
task of the Congress to legislate for in place. rs -. -
- --- ? ,
future, not simply the present. ' - -X would also point out td my colleagues
I"- At the risk of appearing an alarmist that Senator Gates and 1, on April 11,
-I would add that I am not nearly so told the are-ministration that we were-
sanguine as some of my colleagues about considering going forward with this res-
the intentions of this administration. ?lunar' and asked them to- submit a
Last week a major departure occurred Proposal of-their own to see whether
from previous arbeeeisteation policy on something acceptable to both, branches
. anvery cimils-r subject?the wax-mak- could not be wonted out. No response
lag pewees neeliee. the. arirninistratliall ? was recaived?nothing. During the mark-
_ had inetcated that it did not challenge up of this bill, that request was reiterated,
the constitutionality of the war powers Again. ewe have received no response.
resoluteon. During 'Secretary Vance's Only Monday, the staff of the committee
coreartaation hearings before the Com- again met with officials of the State De-
znittee - on Foreign Relations, he, was partraent and again sought to develop
asked by Senator Jevrrs. "DO you or the some compromise soluton. Arid again,
newadesinistrationsee any problemwith the alministration was able to offer
the good-faith observance of that law?" non-deg more than a restatement of its
Secretary Vance replied, "/- do -not." intent to consult. This intent is deeple-
Senator JAW= then askede"Doyou dial- appreciated, and I say that sincerely, but
lenge it under the Constitution as to the there comes a point at which the ritual-
President's power?" Secretary Vance re- istic incantation of the. "coasulta.-
- spondee', "No." The President banself tion" inust give way to a recognition that
- took essentially the same position. In 'differences of opinion may not be re-
his March 5 19T7 "telethon," he said that solved by mere consultation and that it
the war powers -resolution "is a reduc- -- is not inappropriate for either branch
tiott obviously in the authority that the to establish a procedure for effectueting
President has had prior to the Vietnam its ovenjudgment. - _ . - . e ..
. .
but I tbirfirt it is an appropriate re- The fourth and fln,al argenneat reesle
eqductionneAnd last summer, during hear-
tugs - held before the Foreign Relations
.,Committee on the resolution, -we were
gstold by the State Department Legal Ad-
-Wein' e- r that thee-administration -"is not
mixing the -cortstitutiorrality of the
In-noun-and -"is not going to challenge
for the thought that we hate." I think
a related principle is at issue here. I
Rtspriceilllit"Wiprocediluutiral.?Pahslinfegunlardsea:15 info;
proposals we agree with, not-simpLY for
those we dislike. It also means insistence
on procedural safeguards during admin-
istrations we support, not '-imply those
we oppose. So I hope that our effort to-
day will be perceived by neither the
President nor the House as-confronta-
tional or derisive, but rather as a good-
faith insistence that constitutional pro-
cedu.res be upheld by Democratic as well
as Republican presidents, in times of po-
litical harmony as well as in times of
political strife.
Mr. President, I yield-to ? the distin-
guished Senator from Ohio.' ---
Mr. GLENN. I Yield to the Senator
from New Jersey.:
_ Mr. CASE., ane grateful, 'indeed. - deed,. to
my colleagues.
. l5rmsi-nl.
- - PCPZIGN POL3CY err ExaiefrilVe Pier "
(13y Loch Johns.2.n..44.2.....
am
? -In the crucible of war, the Corsittution
. may take on malleable properties. President
Lincoln's expensive interpretation of the
commander-in-chief clause during theCivil
War is a. case in point. Wore recently, 'World
War If and the protracted cold war pro-
foundly-altered the thee* of executive-legis-
lative relations in the area of foreign policy:
As the nation embraced strong leatieribip to.
_thwart external threats, power shifted dra-
matically to the presidency.:: ? -
? This aggrandizement is -reflected- in -the
startling number of overseas enintary com-
mitments inee the end of World War XI thet
have been grounded in claims of lithe ent ex-
ecutive authority. The-executive branch has.
among other things, placed military person-
nel in Guatemala., mainland China, Ethiopia.
and Iran; pledged military support to Tu:r)tey.
Xran, Pakistan, and, on the-eve-cif .war, South
Korea; and contracted 'for military, bases in
' the Azores, the Philippines, .Lebemor. Diege
Garcia, and Bahrein In Booth Roree alone.
over at commitments were inside but _never
even reported to. the- Congress as required by
law. Beneath this tip of the Iceberg lies an
expanse of executive discretion, in peacetime
foreign policy ? that . reeefies
proportions... .
. Between January 1,-1946 auxi December 21.
1976, the United -States signed 7.201 agree-
ment& with othernstionae They dealt with a
wide range of ralliterye eoononele. cultural.
technical. transportation?- commurra?ationse
and diplomatic Issues. Approximately 6 per-
cent or the international agreements reached
. during the 21-year period were formal trea-
ties requiring Senate confirmstdon; 87 per
cent were pursuant to -congressional legisla-
tion (so-called eta-tit tory or . congressional-
executive agreements). But 7 per cent were-
so-called executive agreements, based par-
tinily or completely upon the presumed con-
' stitutional prerogatives - of-- the executive
- .- ?
- .The - executive agreements -reprenent
email percentage -of the total. but many of
' them may be more signilicent than the
treaties. The question arises: Has the Con-
gress been excluded frost decisions about
-crucial commitments abroad? While chair-
loan of _the Senate Foreign Relaticuas Corn-
- mutes, Hulbright (I)...-Arkansas)
against this section Is that, because it
amends the Senate rules, it is -within the
jurisdiction of the Rules Committee. In
my judgment, that is not O. It does not
amend the Standing Rules of the-Senate;
rather, it amends the rules in -a more
generic sense,- as do many other mess--
urea commonly reported from every cora:-
position, I regret to say, has now mittee. To cite only one of many escape-
oeen abandoned by- the administration., plea, on the day that-this bill was
?an his message to Congress -last week on reported, the Committee on Foreign Re-
egislative vetoes'----the President said ? lations reported another bill?the ACDA
-Mr" ."1"Mlegr?r=rulesequerrtly adopts a authorization, Ilia 11832?which con-
bation to veto an executive action" tains asjuriedictionally identical prairie
twitch-is, of course, the' heartof the war -sion: It causes a point of order-to lie in
powers resolution?"we will give it seri- the Senate against any billejoint resolu--
us consideration. but we will not, under tion, or. con emeries report containing
reading of the Constitution, consider
legally binding." Attorney General
indicated the' same day--that the
,E7-4nustice Department-would try to rel-
ive the issue in the courts. -Upon Me
Tries by the staff of the Foreign Rela-
Y-oe..
ns Committee, it was made clear that
kef-Iltahe Attorney General's intent -is -to seek
court tet of some less significant eleg-
etve veto" and,- in the process,' try to
e..-tmee vtn.ce the cam-eta-hand -down -a. broad
-1`-'-;7eling which will sweep away more sa4-
.acant "legislative vetoes" such as
- e contained _tn. the war powers res-
and the AnnseExixrrt Control
certain program requests unless-an arms-
control impact statement has been trans-
mitted
ethnaenavtsleess:tw. er cdLArsoaybsebefitrigorebanressmaxed,dr:,
par-
ticularly in his understanding of what
that
as
er
led to
man of the Rules Committee and a man
the Reuls eS Comr snofittee. Asproa coollealguenoof
Senator Przees on both committees. I
sense of fairness. I .am certain -that he
would apply. the -same-jurisdictional-
princi les-evenhandedly to both.
--earnbes ..egurer excludes, secret agreements
there is no gresderocrranit ser,es to To :noncludee Mn-President, the Issue made by the United States. According to thelor us to take comfortlietbe admen-before us todayis one of reemetple. Jns- Departmeee it)I State', 63 secret agreements
tion's cuserent intent ,.to consult nee :Holmes sairr.that the principle of were. reported to C,ongreas between August
the Senate.-,should .as- free stb.ought rtio.9-n% "not free thought .1972 (when the reporting requirement tape
- ?? - WAJXUJ _
Tani .1...=:-271a-doesei&aaeir-4 exeoutive ogree;.3- illustrated In-Figure .1; theonureefer ;ern.
? '? .
eisPicted..-the. crux of the coatKW.-:
versyr 'The Senate is reeked toelzroar
e
emcee_ to approve- hi4i1X4
treaty to preserve. cultural artifacts in a-
friendly lasaghboring country. At the Wad
time, the chief executive is moving tailitarer
maxi and material around the globe Like 50
many pearni In a clime gleam" More gene
erally, the: Foreign, Betenieee Cott:miter
conapLeined in a 1969 report aboat Ica..
balaneer W. have come claw to reversing
the tree:Le:loud dieting-non between the treaty
as an Lnetzuniane of a major commitment.
and the executive agreement as the instrue
meat of a mister MIL" Since then...the trend
has accelerated, - . ?
, .
"
? -
acestean esinonse Amu 116333C3CaNTS3
In this analysis we explore the trei-kty
powers debater by Ice ng military
commitment* abroad. for thaw obitigattalaa
have-peered to be particularly ccuatrovere
_
Of the 7,2131 international agreements
in 1946.4978 period. 1,235 (or
17.1-percent) related to military matters.
An Inspection of the content reveals two
general types: substantive and adadni.strae
the.Sabstatittee military armaments deal
with the creation of rallitary alliances. the
signing of pesos treaties. the establishment
of military beees, the disposal of military
equipment. and the like. 4ne
eeletrailve
ones deal with secondary details, such as lb.estableoneent of & military headquarters
based on an alliance. personnel steam& lead
the like. Par the purposes of this study, the
substantive agreements are considered "sig.
ncson.- because -they commit this coon-
try to specenc policy position% the admin.1st-sties ageneenente are "insignificant.- be-.
cause they des/ with housekeeping matters.
Anace24t the ? 1496- military coramitcrientas
signed during' the- period from January' 1.
194.3 _to August. 9, 1974 (the day Presi-
dent letzen leer office), 42 (3.5 percent)
were the -form of treaties. 1,003 (839
per cent) were statutory agreements, and
151 (12.5 per cent) were executive agree-
moats. The texts of the 193 trestles and
executive agreements were studied to assess
their relative sigranicarace.
The finding presented in Table 1, is that
treaties In the poet-World War Or period have
benn used malety for important =Jittery
co-emit:manta. mot for trivial matters. Of the
42 military nestles signed in the extol e I tion from from Presidents Truman through Nix-
on, 32 (or 76.2 percent) dealt with major de-
fense obligation*. Among them were various
security arrangements with Jamul. the Fe-
public of Hares. and the nations of Western
En-cps; major arm control accords includ-
ing the nuclear test ban treaty of 1983: and
postwar peace treaties with former belliger-
ents (for example, the Treaty of Peace with
Italy). Ten of the trestles (23.8 percent) ex-
chided from the -significant- category dealt
with administrenee details of major defense
pacts--most notably the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Ifs short, the
evidence?at beat for defense commitments
abroad?doee not support the conventional
wisdom that the advice and consent of the
Senate has been requested by the Depart-
meat of ,?atie largely for policies with little
substantive meaning. ' ;
. ? . .
2 We examine only the use of trestles and
executive agreements, since they have be--
come far mere controversial than statutory
a-green:ten:a. Nonetheless, a separate study
is warranted on the accuracy and validity
of State Department claims for areement-
making authority based upon previous slat-
utes. some of which may DO ICITtger reflec-t
the or.i.nal intent of Convene ina, rapidly
changing worid
? , ? -. ere- ? -.ace . vr ;.-neniee
biZr4=4#13.00,111RIBM$ FOI MIMZIL
inagreements lase taways
ase
'is number of significant
_1948.4414ar7......... , -:__. _,. i -.2...:1- . ..,.. - ... ?_..--. trt'esties since the Second World War: To es-.
- ' - -
- - - e - a ? 'neer.tt.rnate more precisely- the extent to which .
: : e
, - algollicant military - commitments bay* ...--ere ,e..???-_-? - ' enter/glee* E' ..---Yeisee. shifted- from. treaties eto executive ' agree..
?::: ..,-,!....,::!*, _,...sit= - E:14:47z me
....unt rib; we conatructed :for each adroinistra-
..
- ? . e: ? nee.-
Avree '
_. Iwo . tion ve tions-simple -- Executi Agreement Index
__ cr}, . (EA) eeernee based upon -the proportion of significant -
: Th
military executive agreements among- the --
en= , 17 ? 18 .._ - -.81 total. number of significant treaties and ex-
" 20 -..-: ' .74.. ecutive agreements (EA/T --1- HA In. Table I ) ... .1
genneey een_ - - 1 `-aou
obo --.1 -3 - -.75 Tate index has. beers hig,b tlizogbout the e
e= ' ? --- -1- li---. 13 .-- ...,- -.713- post...World war If ere.. Clearly, most or the
- Nixon. --- - Oe :-", ''. -19: "o :- o.881- allizalicant- military' commitosente between
''' -... ' ....--"--')Ir'ar". -52.:"' .` =7..t. ':- ''.L. - - -_-__ 1946 and 1974 took the form of e
- -. Tata- -1- Of 'el- 32 -Le! -,C ? Tr,---,,-
- tration was by far the most vigorous cialtne
nee agree's:tents, tdoreover, the Nixon- admirals:-
. 3.1.zis table .sunuaarizsek vie.use 0L ram.. ant. for presidentiarn authority in military.
tary treaties and-executive agreementa only: agreelnent-raa'king - - -.- .1.'. - - .
stasutory agreements. which are root* nue -a Thus far. only the...out/Inez of military
mareamarzodUa bttuare.r'''' lass_ - ectztr"1:31113.- aril-' 7t s- of PreeddrectixteaC-tmakb2Fordgadrearinclearg 41. ClfsaAtte1737sitragnilitimit."
2 Tisa numbers - in this column represent'
? for each Aftalaistration the- proportion of
signinciumt military executive agreements,
compered to the total number of significaret
cant military commitments made oversees by jr
the United States between August 9, 1974 ?4
and the- end of 1976, only two were in treaty '
form. and the rerascining- 30 94-
rcauThiatrxectreauustesAsztaeniand ?scut utd..".7x rovenewartgas front _zaweerrketa.slAiththeroustaghtutztoerystezeeDexecutive agree. ---/
not yet distinguished publicly whicti or these
30 agreements were based upon. presidential._ .
authority anci which upon statutes,. a tents... 4"
tive examination of their content, Indicates
that as many as 18 (or 60 per cent) mar have
been executive agreements. If accurate, this
figure would give the Ford administration
an Executive- Agreernent Index of .90, slightly
higher than that of the Nixon admbestran
tion. (That the State Department has Doi. yet.
core. up with a-legal justification for an of
the military pacts signed under Ford Is. In
Itself, a commentary on the difficulty faced
by legislators and the public In trying to
evaluate the legitimacy of International
commitments.). ? ? ? oe ? -
2-1313 cONCRESSiONAZ Iti.S.P0119N "
Too often the executive branch bee by-
passed the Congrees to make major military
committnents abroad simply by Ben:deg an
executive agreement. The Congress has long
been generally aware of the problem, but its
attempts to correct it have met with limited
sticcess. The primary congressional response
has been to propose legislation in three dif-
ferent arms: to require the reporting of all _
executive agreements to Congress; to permit
a congressional, "veto" of unwarranted ex-
ecutive agreements; and to require, el titer a -
positive majority vote In Congress for ap-
proval of military agreements (more than
an opportunity to veto) -or. the mandatory
use of the taneity-reaking procedure for "sig-
nificant" interuational agreemeetre -
? - Among those various attempts- tEL restore.
congressional powers, legislation requiring
the- executive branch to-report all exc.:eine&
0 to 1; the higher the index, the greater 'the
reliance on executive agreements for major-
cornrettfirrionta.
However. the Serene- Foreign Relations
CommIttee may be close to the mark in cona-
Val Wag about the use of executive agree-
ments for negotiating- important military
commitments. Although a naajority or the
151 executive agreements dealing with mili-
tary matters in the postwar period were In-
deed routine and minor (deeding with. such
Issue. as the establishment of a practice
bombing range in West Germany and of
reciprocal air rights with Canada for rescue
operations), a striking number involved ma.-
jor commitment, abroad. The following ob-
ligations were entered into partly or com-
pletely on the basis of an awartioisof execu-
tive authority:
use of the Azores minnow' by the United
States (1947);
placement of U.S. troop/ in Guatemala,
(1947):
establishment of U.S. bars* in to Philip..
pines (1947);
placement of U.S. troops in mainland
China (1948); - -
military security in the Itapublie of Hoe
rea (1949);
U.S. military mission in Honduras (1950);
- broad U.S. military prerogatives In Ethics.
pia (1953);
? U.S. military neserion to El nalvedor (1957);
? U.S.military mime= to Liberia (1958);
.
U.S. bees rights in Lebanon (1958);
security - pledges to- Traitor,- Iran,. and
Pakistan (1959); ? , .
military use of the Brides bland Diego agreements has been morn successful, no
Garcia (1968): - , e , . .._..: - doubt became It is-- the least demanding
nelitarel U34, of Babxeill 0271): - and controversial. The CaseeZablocki Act or
agreement terminating tannery and eco- 1972' requires the secretary of state. simply
nomic pact with Libya (1972): to report to the Congress within 60 day:: "the
agreement relinquishing land at ern. Naval text of any international agreenrent, other
Communications Station in the Plailippintre --------
establishment. of military mission in Iran - 'Senator Clifford. Case (9.-New Jersey) is
(1974)- ? - ? - - ? . - presently the ranking minority member of
- Almost half (73 of 151, or 48_3 percent) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sod
the military agreements signed during this Representative Clement 3. Zablocki (L)-Wis-
period represented signilicant commitments cousin) is chairman of the house Interns-
abroad which seemed to merit closer scrutiny tional Relations Committee. Case, the, popu-
by the legislative branch. Several of the las, soft-spoken elder statesman of the Sen-
commitments involved the establishment of ate committee. Is widely regarded as the chief
overseas bases a primary source of tension architect of the rebuilding of congreseionea
between the - executive and .. legislative authority in the agreement-making area. Ills
branches 3.3 the President asserte his author- interest arose initially during the Vietnam
ley under the commander-in -.chief clause of war era out of despair over the- falters- of
the Constitution and the Congress some- Congress to be aware of exactly what corn-
-times resists what it perceives to be unwar- mitments were being made abroad bv- the,
ranted militszy commitments. ? ? executive branch,
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Ci WIN talt..t.b.b -WIN ILL
-.1.3n=ent...of a fine and everlasting dichot- consulterrith appropriate congressionel lead-
? 10003
(4) may not be construed as derogateng
lonyeeteetween thesAatotQfyomakplaagaditmanstMeautR44, Iti?sa. right of the Senate
=eat-roerieg than e es at anytime, in the same
n---assurances that the Congress will be in- ments as they arise." Yet the Congress was manner and to the same extent es say other
? --normal la a timely faanion about all inter- not consistently consulted In the 1950s (cer- rule of the Senate.
nationat agreements and provided ado.. tainin not by Dunes), and it has been spo- (c) It is the purpose of this Reaolution
onquate opportunity to judge whether a corn- radically ignored in the 1960e and 1970s, too. ? to fulfill the intent of the Fraroers of the
-:-..caltment
is suelciently important to de-- That is why many members or the legislative Constitution. and to ensure, through use of
- -I-serve broader congressional participation branch want to go beyond a bit-or-miss reit- the rulemeleing and legislative power of the
-17-lin this decision-making process, either ance on occasional consulter...ions and feelings Senate that the Preeident seek the advice
eeternugh a treaty or some other form of of comity to develop a more formal, system- of the Senate in determining whether an
"Oelegislative involvement, atic, and reliable reporting and reviewing International agreement should be sub-
- Our ree.=e nocennonteeteestrtuallv all inter- procedure for international agreements. mitted to the Senate for its advice and COD-
.4at1011al agreements, frnrn -4-.7n al ro Mrs es Reflecting- upon his career, former Speaker . sent sea treaty. ? .
eto.wzcn .e tottetels onlc onoteltioltonont, of the House Carl Albert (D.-Oklahoma) ? (d) The Senate finds- that? .
newriona an-eements, simuld be reeorteci to said in an interview shortly before he re- ' (1) article It, section 2, clause 2 of the
ttereeente: --r--"Twr tired last year that the restoration of con- Constitution. empowers the Presideet .'by
sezou.s Co-reeso a2....eee gressional budgetary responsibility through and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
s seale Co ee-?? the .Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, ate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
:no ne-r-----onot and of war-making (or preventing) respon- the Senators present concur";
to sibuity through the War Powers Act of 1973, (2) the requirement for Senate e.dvices- and
se7 -,th_t_st.tToFO?neennenes.. Just as it aoes e- represented the, two major accomplishments consent to treaties has in recent years been
trween the president and his aides. U we are of the Congress in his memory.
- circumvented by the nee of "executive agree.
have frank and meaningful relations with Will this congressional reassertion extend mental":
, neer countries. However, once Feneeal dip- to the agreement-making powers? An exam- ne) the senate rosy refuse, to consider
a:missions reac a-stage of rOrnised commit- ination of the public statements made by legislative measures to authorize or oppro-
Fer &ens. our diolomatic neotiatio--, an ten-. Inern12923 of the congressional committees on prime.e funds to implement those interne-
neseatantes must oe oone.4. To elrelltleo-It foreign WAIL"' /tidiest's- a resounding yes. As tional agreements about vehicle It has not
enciera, thee whatever commitments ere Case has said, "I think we should take back been consulted with respect to whether any
writtein on.tra.st to the full treaty power. and I'm not sure I such agreement should be submitted to the
-the zr.?'37.7Tee-----, ?nearinere..- won't have to join Senator Clark . . . Iii a Senate for its advice and Consent as a treaty;
?.-e7nit000ttneenneen____-;;. crusade." How Carter will react to this cru- ',and consent to ratification; and -
ot the commitments are of a sensi- sad*, remains to be seen. lie entered office. .?.(4) article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Con-
tree mature,-they will be protected in both with an ambivalence toward Congress on
rer.stitution grants to the Senate plenary power
branches under secrecy provisions, as has -foreign policy issues that Ls characteristic of to "determine the rules of Its proceeding:in
E=e-,..beert the rule under the Case-Zablocki Act, many presidents. Fresh from victory, the (e) It is the sense of the. Senate that, in
Leal. As Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D.- president-elect met with the Senate Foreign
determining whether a, particular interne-
F...-edinnesota) told Secretary -of State Cyrus , Relations Committee for the first time on tional agreement should be submitted as a
iraxles in public hearings on the eve of his November 23, 1976. "There will be times," be treaty, the President should, prior to and
"Onetirip to the Middle Bent earlier this year. said, -when nobody needs to know about a during the negotiation of suchT e.grecment,
itDon't make any commitments 'until you've foreign policy challenge eeennt me and the oeek the advice of the Committee oh Foreign
nteibeen beck here Ito Congress]?not even secretary of state, or sometimes perhaps just Relations.
eeenuteg ones." It is not a mater-of violating me and the bead of a foreign government." ?(f) (1) ;Where the Senate, by resolution,
nnexecutive privilege, but of who can genuinely Yet at the &erne meeting, re also said, "My expresses its sense that the President has
PI--.?ectmosit the United States to whet- Here . inclination Ls whenever posatbie to share the not sought the advice of such committee
,-F-rnernbers of the Congress believe they have knowledge that I have with you and to seek with respect to whether a given international
centa legitimate right-to participate; and they your advice and counsel. I win go a second agreement, hereafter entered into, should be
enekeeow that the first prerequisite for participao mile to meet you on this - Executive au- submitted to the Senate for its advice, and
reree,Oon 13 awareness.
k4 congress thorny versus institutional sharing. It will consent as a treaty, SO shall not thereafterton-Congress needs to review, 'U.S. commit- be an important choice for this president, -be in order to consider any bill or joint reoo-
; ?..7tnents abroad in a more meaningful ?way. as It has been for others. e hen major mil-. olution or. any amendment thereto,. or any
Conm'ess may be seen as a collectivity of pub... Itary commitments are 1333.09 abroad. report of a committee of conference, which
policy specialists; by interest, training, or
oneoranedreee - experience, some congressmenennertam'or No. (including budget authority for salaries and
o 1371
specialized in foreign policy. Legislation Mr. CASE, Mr. President, I have an ?administrative expenses) to implement such
e]:.-?'?-