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Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CI~J ReTt 7TO098OR000800120132-5 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M{ }kWOQ0800120132-5 Materials in the Studies are in general to he r -r ed tr xcrsonnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence ,l . his not ::,1 , . to be treated as information privy to the US official c:r::,unit ail opies of each issue beginning Summer` 1964 are nuns ie d set iiv ,end subject to recall Central Intelligence Agency or, "any other component of ti All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the ruthor They do not necessarily, represent the-official views of tl intelligence community. Sensitive Intelligence: Sources. and Metl ocss Invol ed g NATIONAL SECURITY. INFORMATI:- N Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to.4 Crtminol :Sane :xis Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 25X1. 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 pproved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R0008001201~RET NOFORN The tumult and the shouting dies? THE MYTH OF TIIE ROGUE ELEPHANT INTERRED John Waller :he in As the first session of the 95th Congress came to a close, Senator Daniel K. Inouye of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported to the Senate on the work of the committee which he had chaired for a year and a half. His remarks were ,i good tonic to a long-beleaguered CIA. While he commented that "There is no uuestion that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment, and failures by the intelligence agencies have harmed the United States," he made the significant point: "In almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State." "Further," he added, "in almost every instance, some members of both Houses of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable about these activities." 't'hese remarks should have finally laid to rest the myth of the "Rogue Elephant.' What seems to have been lost to the press and public in the welter of sensationa sounding disclosures was essentially the same conclusion reached by the (liurcl Committee in its final report following the intensive investigation of CIA. It may be interesting and currently useful to revisit some of the key conclusions of the 197(. Congressional investigations of CIA. This may serve as a reminder that the employee of CIA never deserved the image of amoral practitioners, much less uncontrolled delinquents, and the excesses committed by the Agency were not the product W. inadequate control. If anything, the Agency's problems could be traced to the tradition of strong discipline and responsiveness to direction from above. The Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Church, in pursuing it mandate, focused on three broad questions, one of which bore on command anti control: "whether the processes through which the intelligence agencies have bee). directed and controlled have been adequate to assure conformity with policy and th- law."' The processes referred to are of two kinds: (1) the process of external contro , and (2) the process of internal control. A general conclusion which appeared in the Senate Select Committees final report is: "The Central Intelligence Agency in broad terms is not `out of control,' although the Committee found that "there were significant limits to this control" from above S the CIA. Pursuing farther the thesis that the problem lay in external, n( t internal, control are the following additional quotes from the "General Findings" of the SSC Report: The Committee finds that United States foreign and military intelligence agencies have made important contributions to the nation's security, and generally have performed their missions with dedication and ' Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with liespect ' Intelligence Activities-United States Senate, Book 1, "Foreign and Military Intelligence;" 26 April 19-6 (Report No. 94-755) (hereafter cited by short title, SSC Final Report), p. 4. E Ibid., p. 427. ' All emphasis in this article has been added by author. Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Rogue Elephot)t Approved For Rlelease 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 distinction,' The Committee finds that Congress has failed to provide' the necessary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies , arry out their missions in accord with constitutional processes.' In addition to blaming Congress for inadequate external control, the Senate Se'e t C ommittee, in its final report, blames the Office of the President: The degree of control and accountability exercised regarding covert action and sensitive collection has been a function of each particular President's willingness to use these techniques .... 6 Presidents have not established specific instruments of oversight to prevent abuses by the Intelligence Community. In essence, Presidents have not exercised effective oversight.' In general terms, the Senate Select Committee's History of the Cent,-ca Intelligence Agency (Section IV) states at the outset a conclusion which suggests that CIA activities have not always been viewed in relationship with foreign police The current political climate and the mystique of secrecy surrounding the intelligence profession have made it difficult to view the CIA in the context of foreign policy., Book I of the Senate Report admits to misconceptions about CIA and stag's The CIA has come to be viewed as an unfettered monolith, defining ,nd determining its activities independent of other elements of government and of the direction of American foreign policy. This is a distortion. During. its twenty-nine year history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress and the Executive, the other components of the intelligence community, and an examination of the interaction among all these forces." The House Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), although failing to gain Congressional approval for release of its final report, arrived at the following eveii more categoric conclusions concerning the control of CIA (if we are to believe drafts of its report shown the CIA and the version of the report appearing in The Villag,' Voice): All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs. b0 Congressman Pike, in effect, accused CIA of being a supine elephant, not a rogut elephant. In his eyes, CIA was too responsive to higher authority-its abuses were committed as a result of too demanding command control, not too passive o; permissive control. 'Ibid., p. 424. ' [bid., p. 425. Ibid., p. 427. ' Ibid., p. 429. ' SSC Final Report, Book IV, "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and \4ilitary Intelligence," p. (1). [bid;, Book I, p. 97. "The Village Voice, 16 February 1976. This passage refers mainly to covert action. Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Ap ved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R0008001201 FRET Rogue Elephant What neither Congressional committee stressed adequately was the significant fact that all abuses or illegal activities, except two specific cases in the chug experimentation field, were identified, decried, and corrected by CIA itself before the investigations began, and before the press published its sensational charges. The rolx? of the committees, essentially, was not one of original discovery but one of airing past abuses, already discovered and rectified. While this may have been useful to serve as a basis for new legislation, it would have been helpful to the Agency's image if more credit could have been given in the Senate's report to CIA's own efforts to get its house in order. Described below are some Congressional conclusions of a more specific nahire. First, the subject of control over covert action" is summarized. The Senate Select Committee found: The CIA has not been free ... to carry out covert action as it sees fit. The Committee's investigation revealed that, on the whole, the Agency has been responsive to internal and external review and authorization requirements." In the case of Chile, singled out for a separate, in-depth report, the Senate blamed the ('resident for by-passing the 40 Committee machinery in the case of the so-called "Track II" part of the operation, but did not consider this to be an example of CIA out of control. It was noted that other aspects of the Chile operation were carefully cleared by the 40 Committee. And the SSC's question: "Did the threat to vital U.S. national security interests posed by the Presidency of Salvador Allende justify the several major covert attempts to prevent his accession to power?" was answered in its report by the statement: "Three American Presidents and their senior advisors evidently thought so." " The SSC report on Covert Action (Volume 7) states categorically: "Executive command and control of major covert action was tight and well-directed." " The SSC did criticize the procedures in which CIA itself determined which covert action projects were submitted to the 40 Committee, and it felt that certain intelligence operations not submitted to the 40 Committee had political action implications requiring 40 Committee approval. But the Senate did not charge that covert action operations had been carried out without the knowledge and approval of at least the D i rector.'s The House Committee disagreed with some of the covert action operations performed by CIA but concluded, as mentioned above, that the Agency was "utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" and was not "out of control." The draft report added: "it is further clear that CIA has been ordered to engaged in covert action over the Agem?y's strong prior objections." 'S The draft Pike Committee report allegedly made the following comment which makes clear that in those instances in which the 40 Committee did not specifically pass on CIA's recruitment of individual stand-by covert action assets (sometimes called "Covert action was not considered by the Senate in the abuse category except in the case of assassination plots. SSC Final Report, Book I, p. 447. Senate Select Committee Report, "Intelligence Activities," Senate Resolution 21, Volume 7, "Covert Action," p. 198. Ibid., V. 199. " Ibid., p. 199. 1e The Village Voice, loc. cit., p. 84, "Covert Action." Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Approved FolsLRclmBe 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R0008001201 ,& Elvohant "infrastructure") or other minor action operations, at least the l)ireit(--not subordinate officials-provided approval: . _ - the CIA Director determines which CIA-initiated covert aciiol projects are sufficiently `politically sensitive' to require Ptesider,ti-I attention. 17 Assassination planning was an especially reprehensible case of abuse in the s overt action field. These cases were completely aired by the SSC. There were split ot-inions on whether or how much successive Presidents knew and approved such opt,r itions. While the SSC quite correctly believed that the doctrine of plausible denial, the use of euphemisms to describe "assassination," and the theory that authorities granted l) one Director could be assumed to cover subsequent Directors all created "the rk of confusion, rashness and irresponsibility in the very areas where clarity and '.oher judgments were most necessary," 18 it did not suggest that such actions ei er took place without at least approval at the top of the Agency." Intelligence activities affecting the rights of American citizens understan.iabiv loomed large in the abuse category of the Senate Select Committee. This isseiuded infiltrating and surveilling groups of American dissidents, dissemination of material collected on these groups, and covert action designed to disrupt or discredit ';U3,11 groups. The following general statement by the SSC seems to he a fair one aiti' (Inc which places the blame where it belongs: We must acknowledge that the assignment which the Covernment has given to the intelligence community has, in many ways, been impossible to fulfill. It has been expected to predict or prevent every crisis, respond immediately with information on any question, act to meet all threats, and anticipate the special needs of Presidents. And then it is chastised for its zeai Certainly, a fair assessment must place a major part of the blame uison th:~ failures of senior executive officials and Congress.20 The SSC blamed the excessive power of the Executive built up over the Yeats ind the failure of Congress to exercise the Congressional check and balance role whir It is essential. But whatever the problem, the picture here is not one of a Ci-r,tral Intelligence Agency out of control. The CIA did not restrict itself to servicing FBI requests for information on Americans, but "under White House pressure" 21 the CIA developed its ou n dome, is counterintelligence program-Operation CHAOS. According to the Senate Select Committee final report (Book 11), "Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he established the program in response to President Johnson's persistent interest in lie extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidents." 22 In 1969, President Nb,cr~'s 1' ibid. ''Senate Select Committee Report, "Alleged Assassination Report Involving Foreign Leatlc:. 20 November 1975, Report No. 94-465, p. 277. CIA took exception to the SSC definition and anplicati?e, of "plausible deniability." CIA felt it was legitimately intended to make it possible for the governrliet, including the President, to disclaim something, while the SSC tended to say it permitted internal (1k records to cloud the facts. "In the case of the assassination plot against Lumumba, the Senate found that when Mr. Mci:ene became Director, he may not have been informed by the Deputy Director of CIA of this p?a~, 2?SSC Final Report, Book II, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," p. 290 21 ibid., p. 99. 22 Ibid., p. 100. The MHCHAOS domestic counterintelligence was concerned with making file en lb;-: on certain dissident Americans. The operational aspect of MHCHAOS was overseas, i.e., inve;tigatio, dissident Americans overseas who might have foreign intelligence ties- 4 -ECRE 1 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 App ed For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81 M00980R000800120132-5 Rogue Elephant SECRET White House required the CIA to study foreign Communist support to American protest groups. `In 1972, the CIA Inspector General found `general concern' among the overseas stations over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the politi,,al vices and activities of Americans....... 23 This led to a reduction in the program, but it was not terminated until March 1974. 1 iowever questionable this program may have been, even considering the context of the times, it is clear that it was undertaken and sustained by two successive Presidents, and the Inspector General machinery did at least what it could to mitigate the program despite Presidential pressure. Inadequate control was not the problem. The opening of mail in the U.S. Postal Service was understandably criticized by the Senate Select Committee. This program, however, was condoned by the FBI and Justice Department for many years. The FBI not only was aware of this program, but relied on the CIA for the product from it. The FBI, in fact, tasked the CIA.24 The Attorney General's findings on this program 25 are interesting. 1'he report dated 1.1 January 1977 (White Paper) concluded that it was highly unlikely that prosecutions based on CIA mail openings would end in criminal convictions and recommended, therefore, that no indictments be sought:26 ... prosecution of the potential defendants ... would be unlikely to succeed ... because of the state of the law that prevailed during the course of the mail openings.... It would be mistaken to suppose that it was always clearly perceived that the particular mail opening programs of the CIA were obviously illegal.- The report continues: ... this case involves a general failure of the government, including the Department of Justice itself, over the period of the mail opening programs, ever clearly to address and to resolve for its own internal regulation the constitutional and legal restrictions on the relevant aspects of the exercise of Presidential power. The actions of Presidents, their advisors in such affairs, and the Department (of Justice). itself might have been thought to support the notion that the governmental power, in scope and manner of exercise, was not subject to restrictions that, through a very recent evolution of the law and the Department's own thinking, are now considered essential. [it such circumstances, prosecution takes on an air of hypocrisy and may appear to be the sacrifice of a scapegoat.28 The report chronicles the authority implicit in successive high officials' action,-. In 1958, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover approved the program. In t961, Postmaster General Day was informed in some degree.28 Director Helms, "a cabinet officer," and a person then serving on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) have all stated that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were aware of the East Coast mail opening program.30 In July 1969, the CIA Inspector General recommended that Ibid., p. 102. ibid., p. 107. zs Report of the Department of Justice Concerning its Investigation and Prosecutorial Decisions with Respect to Central Intelligence Agency Mail Opening Activities in the United States, 14 January 1977. z6 ibid., p. 2. 2' Ibid., p. 3. 2, Ibid., p. 5. Z9lbid., p. 13. 90 Ibid., p. 15. Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81 M00980R000800120132-5 Approved For Releget 6/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 92ogu?r Elephant senior officials of the Nixon Administration should he informed, and ira tune 1971, Director Helms briefed both Attorney General John Mitchell and I'ostmesr=?r General Blount." Former President Nixon has stated he was aware of CIA's rnonit,,raog of mail between the U.S. and the USSR and PRC, but there is no direct evidence that he was specifically informed of mail openings. The product available at the White House, however, made it quite clear that such had to he the ease. 31 In sum, CIA was acting with both implicit and explicit higher autlrotity in the mail opening programs. The program for testing chemical and biological agents was the only area where clearly inadequate control was found by the Senate Select Committee. It ,oncluded that this program raised . serious questions about the adequacy of command and Antrol procedures within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence. The CIA's normal administrative controls were waived for pr i ams involving chemical and biological agents to protect their security.... 1'hey prevented the CIA's internal review mechanism . from aden,uately supervising the programs." Excessive compartmentation of the program was also criticized by tie Senate Select Committee. An observation made by the CIA Inspector General that "the knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles . . ." 3, went r.=frheeded. Early drug-testing programs such as Project BLUEBIRD in 1950 . nd Project ARTICHOKE in 1951 were approved by the Director and enjoyed good intro-Agency coordination and control. MKNAOMI, begun in 1967 and ended in 1970, Kid Director approval and was conducted with the cooperation of the Army's Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick. MKULTRA, the principal CIA program involving the research and dt dopment of chemical and biological agents capable of being used in clandestine operations to control human behavior, was approved by the Director on 13 April 19`.3 Various aspects of the program were carried out in cooperation with universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations, although some of the activities were conducted without their CIA sponsorship being known. The National Institute of Mental Health and the l+Erreau of Narcotics also played important roles. In 1963, the Inspector General learned that under the MKULTR< grogram surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, non-voluntary human sr.brects was being carried out. This program was then known to and approved by t1 e then- Director. As a result of the Inspector General's protest, the. testing was halted and tighter administrative controls imposed. The program was completely teno:rrated in the late 1960s. The tragic case of Dr. Frank Olson in 1953 does reveal a problem of c=,niniand and control. Despite explicit warnings by the Deputy Director for Plans (')1 iP) that his approval had to be given before LSD human experiments were- condo, sera, the head of the Technical Services Division (TSD) of the DDP without such authorization " Ibid., p. 17. Ibid-, p. 18. " SSC Final Report, Book I, p. 386. 8, Ibid., pp. 385-386. Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 proved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Rogue Elephant SECRET went ahead with an experiment in which Dr. Olson unwittingly ingested LSD without being told in advance. Olson had a severe emotional breakdown shortly afterward and either jumped or fell to his death from a hotel room in New York. The atmosphere (2f the times probably lcd the approving officer to believe that lie had implicit license ti) conduct such experiments. Ile has testified that he does not remember .i DDE' nreinorrndurn requiring DDP The General Counsel concludes, however. that there seemed "to be a very casual attitude on the part of TSD representatives to the way this experiment was concluded. . . The shellfish toxin case was cited by the Senate Select Committee as thce other specific failure of command and control in the drug experiment area. That an Agenc: scientist failed to do away with 11 grams of shellfish toxin and instead kept it in CIi! classif icd storage despite a Presidential order that all such material had to be de.troyed is indeed a lapse of control. Yet this seems to be an individual human failing, not an organizational failing." It should also be noted that it was the CIA itself which discovered the store of toxin and brought it to the Senate Select Committee's attention Abuses committed by CIA over the years which were subjected to close st rutim by the Church committee investigation should not be minimized, much less condoned \or should misjudgments of any kind, which took place through the years, he allowed to recur. There were certainly instances of reprehensible conduct on the hart o individual officers and examples of the Agency taking advantage of lax oversight of loosely defined authority to commit excesses. It is not the purpose of this paper to chronicle past faults, however, but rather to put into perspective the issue of past control and accountability as seen objectively by Congress. The problems facing the Agency today are enough without adding to them at unwarranted burden of guilt, or stifling CIA with the incubus of additiona'i restrictions. The findings of the 1976 Congressional investigations, confirmed by the statement of Senator Inouye at the conclusion of a year and a half of Senatorial oversight, should be persuasive confirmation of CIA's own views of past abuses and their causes. As charter legislation is being formulated, it may be hoped that the lessons of the past will not be misread, and that oversight machinery and law will not go . beyond that which is constructive and necessary. 35 Ibid., V. 395, footnote 34. 35 Ibid., p. 398 (Memorandum to the Inspector General from the General Counsel dated 1/4/54). " With the perspective of time, the knowledge that this rare multi-million dollar item now is being used for the good of humanity by a U.S. Government public health laboratory perhaps mitigates t,, some extent the scientist's failure to carry out orders. Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 SECRET No Foreign Dissem 1'he economic analyst as middleman lx t weep collector and consumer in narcotics intelligence ANALYST IN A HELICOPTER I was used to the jungle and the mountains. My nerves were steady, and my heart no longer jumped to see the rocky clearing-surely too small for our assault helicopter-rushing up at us. Still, thought and breath stopped as the pilot sideslipped betwcen the mountains and put us down on a barren knoll among the trees. Whil' my companion collected her purse, I pushed open the door, partially blocked by the thick vegetation, and helped her to the ground. I leavily armed Thais emerged from the silence of the jungle. "It's okay," I said, more to myself than to Mathea. "They're our escort." 'I'hc clandestine morphine refinery was only a few hundred yards away, but it Was it good 20-minute sludge down the rain-slippery mountain path. The elephant grass closed over our heads as we slithered through the mud. It would he hard going for Mathca's dress and high heels, I found myself thinking. Suddenly, I was sliding, gaining momentum, headlong toward the precipice where the path turned sharply to the right. I clawed at the grass and the rock:, but could get no grip. This time you've done it, Eddie, I said to myself. Film clips of past missions passed before my eyes-the party circuit in Geneva, facing the machine guns of nervous soldiers on the Singapore waterfront, listening to the beep of a secret transmitter hidden in an opium-carrying wooden saddle, chasing pigs and cows off a precipitous mountain runway. Then I felt Mathea's fingernails gripping my arm. My slide slowed and stopped only feet from the edge of the cliff. Mathea's spike heels, dug inches into the mud, had saved me. Thank Cod for elegant women, I thought. Sound like something out of James Bond? Or a war story spun by a DDO veteran at the end of it cocktail party? Well, it's nothing of the sort; it's just a day in the life of an. analyst in NFAC's Office of Economic Research. Let me tell you how it all started. Hooked by the Drug Trade For eight years I have had a rare-for an NFAC officer-and interesting assignment in the field of narcotics intelligence. My responsibility has been research and reporting on the narcotics situation in the Golden Triangle. Over the years, the assignment has widened and now covers the spectrum of the intelligence production process from personal involvement in intelligence collection activites with case officers in the field to presentation of finished analysis to policy makers in the White I-louse and in the Department of State. My involvement in the narcotics intelligence effort grew out of a decision made by the White House in the late 1960s to try to stem the flow of illicit narcotics into the Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 Approved For Release 2006/11/16: CIA-RDP81M00980R000800120132-5 SECRET Narcotics Intelligence United States by attacking the foreign sources of these products. The role ph yr d by the Golden Triangle in supplying the U.S. military market in South Vietnam .v as of particular concern to the President. I was initially selected to work on the pro;ratn because of my experience, as a China agriculture analyst in OER, with -')jects utilizing overhead photography for crop detection and measurement and be ciuse I had also written one of the earliest CIA reports on narcotics production in Contra.unist China. My job was to start from scratch in developing an intelligence resource rr-:e for the U.S. Government's new initiative in this area. The Golden Triangle is the term used to describe the conjunction of the b~rders of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, one of the largest illicit narcotics producing areas in the world. (See Map.) Since World War II this vast acreage of opium poppy cujusation has been controlled or contested by Communist, Nationalist Chinese, and ,-,rious insurgent organizations, by independent traffickers, and various tribal groups The area has been a cockpit of anti-Burmese government insurgency for years, muc; of it financed by earnings from narcotics trafficking. The situation is further comp rcated by political and military relationships between local governments and the into o gents and tribal groups in the area, relationships shot through with official corrupti n at all levels. The type of information required for analyzing the narcotics situation co 1d be obtained only through penetration of the narcotics syndicates arid smuggling :r=.arkets involved in the traffic, and at first we were forced to rely almost exclusively or; Truman source reporting. Fortunately the DDO had a number of fairly reliable ::s,-ts in Southeast Asia who could be assigned to narcotics targets in addition to the-ir other responsibilities. Soon thereafter, many of these assets were assigned exclu..'i" aly to narcotics targets. One of the first priority intelligence requirements placed on the field when I was assigned to this task was the collection of wholesale narcotics prices at various ovations within the Golden Triangle and adjacent areas. It was our contention that to ,measure the impact of narcotics control programs effectively, it was necessary to develo some understanding of the factors affecting prices of illicit narcotics. In time, a stanoduct. In recent years, however, this trademark has been copied by most refiners in the area regardless of the quality of the product. Despite the police efforts at surprise, the operators of the refinery had escaped into the bush when they heard the helicopters roaring into the zone Nevertheless, the troops maintained an armed guard around us as we made the arduous climb back to the landing zone. At Chiang Mai we boarded a waiting defense attache place for our flight back to Bangkok. Muddied and shoeless, Ms. Falco and I spert =he flight exchanging observations from our tours of north Thailand. On the Road to Mandalay, April 1977 My next stop in 1977 was- in Rangoon, where Ambassador Osborn was most interested in Washington's assessment of Burma's narcotics control grog arn. After a day of consultations and briefings at the mission, I was given a plan- ticket to Mandalay and told to make contact with the U.. Consulate. The consulate in Mandalay is the northernmost extension of the U.S Mission in Burma, and it was and remains the source of considerable intelligence on narcotics25X1 activities in the northern and central Shan States. Despite the shortness of my stay in Mandalay, I got a very detailed hriefing on the narcotics intelligence support, provided by the consulate, and then I d.~briefed a knowledgeable Burmese government official on the 1977 opium poppy Harvest. The information I obtained was decisive in adjudicating a heated disagrees eiit between Rangoon and Washington over the size of the harvest. This source also a=ovided me with useful background information on the load capacities of narcotics caravans, which has continued to serve as the basis for estimating the quantity c 1 narcotics moving between the Shan State of Burma and the Thai border. Mission Across the Border, January 1978 Returning to Chiang Mai, Thailand in January 1978 1 had expected a rather routine visit to ~iscuss intelligence aps and Washington priorities. I wa' pleasantly surprised when invited me to accompany hum ou two aerial photographic intelligence collection missions along the Burma-Thailand herder. These missions were in response to a request from Rangoon for an update on the location of heroin refineries in the area. Our first mission departed Chiang Mai by Porter aircraft early Sun1;i,, morning. Our flight path took us due north over the military bases of the Thine and Fifth Chinese Irregular Forces, the Shan United Revolutionary Army, the Shan United Army, and the Shan States Revolutionary Army. (SSRA). Our primary targets were on the Burmese side of the border around Lao Lo Chai and Doi Long, where centers for the refining of illegal heroin had long been concentrated. To get good=ertical and oblique photography we had to make a broad sweep across the border, limbing to 5,000 feet over the target area to avoid hostile fire. Around Doi Long v spotted a refinery run by the SSRA and photographed it from every angle. Flying