LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM WILLIAM PROXMIRE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81M00980R001100030003-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 5, 2005
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 15, 1978
Content Type: 
LETTER
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP81M00980R001100030003-4.pdf155.61 KB
Body: 
JOHN L. MCCLEU.AN. ARK., CHAIRMAN WARREN e'S MAONUSON, WAS". MILTON R. YOUNG. N. DAK. ,.70NH CrREMN191 MISSTI ~~M~CLhF~R . ~~S.h'.J_.'...?... 2005/12/7A CI RDP81 EAAA~O0R001100030003 A WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS. MARK 0. HATFIELD, DREG. DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII TED STEVENS. ALASKA ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.. MO. BIRCH BAY", IND. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA, LMON OKLA. THOMAS F EAGLETON MO HENRY BEI lUnif eb zf of ez Zonate al'. I :? . LAWTON CHILES. FLA. LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN. COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LA. WALTER D. HUDONSTON. . KY. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510 gUENTIN N. BUR[SICK N. DAK, PATRICK J. LEAHY.VT. JAMES F. BASSER, TENN. DENNIS D4 CONCINI. ARIZ, JAMES R. CALLOWAY CHIEF COUNSEL AMC STAFF DIRECTOR March 15, 1978 Admiral Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Admiral Turner: 'my service with this and other committees has made me increasingly aware of the influence of Iran on the Amrican economy, and on defense planning and foreign policy. Our recent discussion reminded me sharply that the govern nt of Iran is a one-'man regime, thoroughly controlled and directed by the Shah. I am therefore interested in what would happen if the Shah should die or be killed suddenly. Experts outside the goverment have given me their views on this subject and I request your assessment of it as well. Please include in your reply responses to these questions: (1) The loyalty of government and military officials in Iran appears to be directly and personally to the Shah, rather than to a system of government or to each other: How much of this loyalty might be transferred to a successor regime, such as the regency by the Queen provided in the present. formal succession arrangements? (2) The Shah's present ruling methods appear to perpetuate and exploit constant rivalry among his subordinates. Can they be. expected to offer unified support to a successor regime or is a long period of squabbling and disorganization,. likely? (3) Who are the likely contenders for power if the Shah dies suddenly? The military has been a stabilizing force during transition periods in some other developing countries. For reasons of culture and history, the Iranian military apparently has a relatively low status and Iranians prefer other national models of modernization and efficiency. Is it therefore likely that, in addition to struggles by and among military officers for power and influence in the course of succession, there will also be further destabilizing contests between civilian elite groups and military officers? Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP81M0098OR001100030003-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP81 M00980R001100030003-4 Admiral Stansfield Turner Page 2 March 15, 1978 (4) Does the present pervasive control exercised by the Shah over all aspects of Iranian public life and expression make it likely that there will be among politically active and aware Iranians a powerful urge to release repressed actions and feelings, and a strong reaction against continuing his system of rule? I realize that an examination of the consequences of the Shah's retirement or lingering death could also be important and interesting. However, I prefer now to concentrate entirely on the situation which would be likely to follow his sudden death from accident, disease, or assassination, since this would be most likely to produce the most severe crisis and present us with the mast difficult decisions. Best wishes. WP:jwg Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA RDP8IMOO98OR001100030003-4 To 4:. Please develop DCT response in . coordination with NFAC. STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP81 M00980R001100030003-4 UNCLASSiFIE? -l-- CONFIDENTIAL -~ - SECRET Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP81M0098OR001100030003-4