LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM WILLIIAM PROXMIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001200150003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 31, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

WILLIAM PROXMIRE
,WISCONSIN
Apprpved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
'Wnffeb Zf"faz Zonate
May 31, 1978
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
A
I am very pleased to learn that you are available to
testify in our annual hearings on the "Allocation of Resources
in the Soviet Union and China." Your appearance is scheduled
for Monday, June 26, 1978, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 5302 in the
Dirksen Senate Office Building.
As in the previous hearings on this subject, your
testimony will be received in executive session to permit
the free exchange of views. The hearings will eventually
be published in sanitized form.
The format used in the earlier hearings has worked well
and I am agreeable to following it again. We look forward to
a comprehensive, concise presentation of economic conditions
in the Soviet Union and China, changes since last year's
testimony, allocations of resources for both civilian and
defense purposes, and prospects.
In order to develop issues of special interest I have
prepared a number of specific questions which I have attached
to this letter. I would appreciate your incorporating as
much of the information requested in your presentation to
the Subcommittee. It would be useful for the Subcommittee
to have as much of the information as you can provide in
advance of the June 26 hearing. This will facilitate better
preparation on our part.
I am very grateful for your coopera n and assistance.
Chairman
Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economy in Government
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
1. What are the key variables likely to condition Soviet
economic performance to 1990? What is the range of
projections from best to worst performance in terms of
GNP growth rates?
2. One of the areas of dispute between the CIA and many
U.S. non-intelligence and European professionals concerns
the certainty of your oil, weather, and manpower utiliza-
tion factors. This applies to both predictions on natural
phenomena (resources, climatic shifts, demographic
variations) and also policy options. Is it fair to say
that you are now predicting rather than projecting
alternatives as in the past? Is this a source of some
of the differences of views?
3. We understand that the Soviets are upgrading their effort
to "prove out" more West Siberian oil. This appears to
be a policy option you did not anticipate. We also
understand that you no longer project a 3.5 million
barrel rate of hard currency import for the Soviet Union
in 1985 as was referenced in the President's energy
message. Is this correct? Have you also scaled down
your views on cutbacks of deliveries to East Europe?
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
SOVIET DEFENSE
1. When comparing the costs of the defense establishments
of the U.S. and Soviet union, can you exclude from those
comparisons costs of Soviet forces that do not pose a
direct threat to us, such as forces arrayed along the
China border?
2. What part of the differential between the dollar costs
of U.S. and Soviet forces is due to the manpower differ-
ences?
3. What do these comparisons, in dollar terms, of U.S. and
Soviet defense activities imply about the capabilities
of both countries?
4. Do you have benchmarks against which to judge the accuracy
of the estimates derived with the "building block" approach?
To what extent is Soviet economic data helpful?
5. What is the extent: of the Soviet civil defense programs?
Please provide a sanitized version of the interagency
study of Soviet civil defense for the record.
6. What portion of Soviet forces are allocated against NATO
and what is the estimated dollar costs of those forces?
7. Can you estimate the dollar costs of the non-U.S.-NATO
forces?
8. How do advanced technology weapon systems such as the
anti-satellite and SA-10 influence Soviet defense spending?
9. We understand Soviet troops are often used for civilian
construction projects. How is this activity reflected
in your estimates of the costs of Soviet defense programs?
10. What is the extent of Soviet foreign military sales to
the lesser developed countries?
11. We understand the numbers of young men becoming eligible
for service in the armed forces in the Soviet Union are
declining. What impact will this have on the armed
services?
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
12. You forecast a continuing decline in the rate of growth
of the Soviet economy, but a continuation of the historic
trend in defense spending into the 1980s. Would you
elaborate on the reasons for these projections?
13. What is the likely impact of a SALT II agreement on
Soviet defense spending? Is such an agreement likely
to yield substantial economic benefits?
14. What portion of Soviet POL consumption is accounted for
by the military forces and what does this imply about
their oil situation?
25X1
16. When you have had an opportunity to examine Soviet equip-
ment in general, what improvements have you made to your
cost estimates of the equipment? What other insights
have resulted from equipment examinations?
17. The Soviets seem to have a number of civilian programs
that are designed to aid wartime mobilization and combat
readiness. Examples are training of Aeroflot pilots for
combat supply missions. How large are the costs of these
activities and how are they reflected in your cost estimates?
18. Since your reexamination of your methodology for estimating
Soviet defense expenditures, there have been a number of
books and articles that continue to criticize your approach.
Please summarize these various critiques and your responses
for the Committee.
19. Past testimony has indicated that two or more design
bureaus often develop and sometimes produce similar models
of new weapons, especially missiles and aircraft. This
kind of redundancy may also be encouraged by the many
industrial groups in the ministries responsible for defense
production. Please provide a breakdown of design bureaus
and industrial groups showing the names and numbers working
on similar or parallel weapons, and the types and names of
weapons.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
20. In last year's hearing General Wilson responded to a
number of questions concerning Soviet readiness and
alertness levels. In general the Soviets seem to have
much lower standards than the U.S. We would like to
know your view on this subject, an explanation of the
Soviet approach to readiness and alertness, and the
cost consequences of the Soviet approach.
21. We understand that last year U.S. military leaders
mistook deployment. of the Soviet T64 tank for the T72,
especially in East. Germany. Please discuss this matter
and state whether the T72 is now being deployed.
22. Please provide an historical table showing Soviet
military manpower levels for each of the past ten
years, and deployments in East Europe.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
AND DEFENSE SPENDING
1. Is the PRC modernizing its armed forces? If so, what
is the pace of this effort?
2. The post-Mao leadership appears to give economic
modernization and growth high priority. How firm do
you believe this commitment to be?
3. Was there really economic disruption under the "gang
of four"? What was the correlation between politics,
ideology and economics?
4. Will oil developed in China drawing on Western technology
become a major factor in the Asian energy scene?
5. Discuss the recent Japanese-Chinese trade agreement and
state whether it indicates a significant shift in PRC
foreign economic policy?
6. We notice China is buying weapons in Europe. What do
you project in this area of arms purchases? Is the
United States likely to be an arms salesman to China?
7. Please provide a breakdown of the weapons purchased
abroad by China in each of the past three years showing
the type of weapon, their costs and the name of the
country that sold them.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 25X1
SENDER WILL. CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP ANO BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
2
3
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
_
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
2amark3:
ISIDER
L S CRET
FT-16 7*% 237 Use previous editions
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
26 May 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive ,~upp
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT Biweekly Report
1. The D/OER will be the CIA member on the Interagency Working
Group -- chaired by - that will prepare a PRM on
long-term national security strategy on oil prices. The Working
Group is part of a Task Force formed at Dr. Brzezinski's request and
chaired by Dr. Schlesinger. CIA will chair the subgroup on the
economic impact of oil price increases.
2. The DD/OER participated in a seminar on the outlook for the
Israeli economy sponsored by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Other participants included Israel's Minister
of Transportation and Communications, the Israeli Ambassador, and
Dr. Kissinger.
3. A briefing on OER's update of the world oil situation was
given by the D/OER and to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
4. In London next week will present a paper,
"Prospects for Soviet Oil," to the privately sponsored International
Conference of Petroleum Investment Analysts whose organizers are
aware of his Agency affilation and will make no attempt to conceal
coordination
5. OER furnished a copy of our note for the DCI on Soviet
activities in the Free World Cobalt market, to use in their paper
for the President on this subject.
6. In preparation for the annual presentation to the Joint
Economic Committee on the Communist economies, Chief
of USSR Division, and 17 Chief of China Division, together
LJiyrIDLi`I 11- flat`
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 200"61:'ZFtDP8'1'M00980R00
with the Congressional Support: Staff, met with Committee Chief Counsel
Richard Kaufman late last week to sort out as%Ixramnts. The DCIzs
briefing of the Committee is scheduled f
7- I F professor net with the
members of the ORPA Cuban Analytic Center on 17 May for a general
discussion of Cuban-Soviet political and economic relations.
is one of the experts on this subject in academia. He had read about
the Center in the recent New York Times item, knew our economist,
and called for an appointment,.
25X1
25X1
25X1
10. The East-West Issues Study, which was requested by the NATO
summit a year ago and which has required substantial inputs of
resources from NFAC and the NIOs for WE.and USSR since then, was
completed in Brussels.on 22 May. The study will be major item on the
agenda of the NATO summit that. begins on 30 May.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA; RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0
LJ
SECRET 1
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
x
3
DD/RM
4
DD/NFA
X
5
DD/CT
6
DD/A
7
DD/0
8
DD/S&T
9
GC
t0
LC
(0
iginal)
11
IG
12
Compt
13
PA
14
D/EEO
15
D/Pers
16
AO/DCI
17
C/IRS
18
DCI /SS
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE DATE:
Remarks:To 4; See DCI's notes on your Biweekly
Report of.26 May re need to discuss soon.
25X1
ecutive ecre ry
6 Jun 78
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001200150003-0