SALT OUTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001300030026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 9, 1978
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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7/
9 NOV 1978
I. It appears a SALT agreement will be submitted as a Treaty, although
the initial SALT treaty was submitted as an Executive Agreement
requiring Congressional ratification, and this option has probably not
been foreclosed.
A. Treaty requires 2/3 approval of Senate
An Executive agreement would be submitted requiring
majority vote of both houses, although 60 votes would
be required to overcome a Senate filibuster.
A. Foreign Relations has jurisdiction and will vote and
report
B. Armed Services may also hold exploratory hearings
C. Hearings likely witnesses: Vance, Turner, Brown,
ACDA Head, Service Chiefs or Staff, C/JCS, public
witnesses
1. Issue staff report mid-December re SALT
verification
2. Hearings - January - February with DCI and
others re SALT verification
3. Issue report reflecting Committee judgments
in three versions
a. CODEWORD - for review of Senators
only in SSCI offices
b. TOP SECRET - for use in closed Senate
session during debate
c. Unclassified - for public release
4. The Committee which remains a bit uncertain about
the Senate's commitment to a permanent intelligence
oversight committee, views SALT verification as an
opportunity to demonstrate its value to the Senate.
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E. Floor Action
1. Will include closed session on verification,
possibly other issues
2. Vote
III. Intelligence Community Involvement
A. Substantive Information Flow
1. We can anticipate a large number of requests for
briefings on Soviet military capabilities and
intentions. Our key problems here are insuring
that our briefings are packaged well, and that we have
the resources available to handle requests, in order
to take full advantage of this opportunity to demonstrate
our expertise and willingness to assist Congress in
policymaking decisions.
2. Can also anticipate requests for access to NIEs 11-3/8
(Soviet strategic forces); 11-6 (Soviet peripheral strike
forces, e.g., BACKFIRE, SS-20); and 11-4 (Soviet
intentions); and other relevant substantive intelligence
reports. Under existing guidelines, these would be
made available to SSCI and HPSCI, while other
Congressional requesters will be offered a briefing.
Insistence on access to the estimate will bring about
a request for the Committee Chairman to contact
the DCI.
1. We can expect requests for personal briefings on
our verification capabilities, and requests for visits
to our relevant facilities.
a. Verification capabilities do not appear to have
been a major concern during the debate
on SALT I interim offensive agreement
and ABM treaty. How big an issue verifi-
cation will be is unclear--much depends on
final treaty or protocol provisions, e. g. , re
telemetry encryption, and on the conclusions
of the Executive Branch and SSCI reports on
these. If any of these emerge pessimistic on
our ability to monitor Soviet actions restricted
by the agreement, verification will be one of
the major issues.
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b. Prior to debate on the Panama Canal Treaty,
up to one-half of the Senate visited Panama
on fact-finding trips. This enabled Senators
to tell constituents they personally had
inspected the Canal and met with Panamanian
leaders and were assured U. S. interests
would be protected. Since Members cannot
visit Soviet military facilities, many may
want to assure constituents that they have
personally inspected U. S. intelligence
capabilities, and are convinced the agreement
can be monitored. Senator John Glenn is the
first to ask--he would like to spend 2 days in
early December touring our photo and SIGINT
offices.
2. These anticipated requests for briefings on our
capabilities and visits to intelligence facilities pose
opportunities as well as problems, in contrast to
requests for substantive briefings, which appear
basically trouble-free.
a. We would be setting a precedent by opening
our doors to non-oversight Committee
personnel. For example, when Members
travel abroad, CIA Station personnel can
brief them as a part of the Embassy team,
but briefings on station make-up and activities
are provided only oversight Committee
Members. Both technical and HUMINT
collection are intelligence sources and
methods, and on this level it would be
inconsistent to treat them differently.
b. Security--an influx of Senators generally
unfamiliar with extremely sensitive
information and without SSCI discipline
poses a substantial security risk. Whereas
the SSCI can and will show such sensitive
data to Senators only under the protective
provisions of S. Res. 400, we have no
such protection.
c. Charges of playin politics--a too-agressive
stance in "selling ' our capabilities could
be interpreted as overt Intelligence
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Community support for the treaties, and
assistance to its backers, charges similiar
to those resulting from President Carter's
use of CIA estimates to support his energy
program.
Benefits:
a. The Intelligence Community would gain
the attention and likely the support
from Senators to a spectacular and non-
controversial area of our business.
b. Members would probably emerge with more
confidence in our ability to monitor a SALT
agreement.
3. Options:
a. Oppose deviation from traditional position
restricting sources and methods information
to oversight committee Members, and refer
all inquiries to SSCI
b. Make known to Senators requesting information
on and visits to SALT-related facilities that
SSCI has thoroughly studied this area and can
fully inform them. However, agree to show
these facilities if this is the Senator's preference
c. Make known to individual Senators our willing-
ness to show and explain the SALT -monitoring
process to them.
Recommendation:
I recommend we adopt course b. I believe this path will demonstrate
our willingness to be helpful on this important matter, while not under-
mining the SSCI's sought-after role and creating problems for us with
the Committee. We can also explain that we are going to extraordinary
lengths in exposing individual Members to our SALT verification programs,
because of the importance of the SALT issue, thereby doing minimizing
damage to our sources and methods profile.
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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RECEIVED R)RWARDED
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1 DDCI
Attached is a. paper projecting
Intelligence Co;- fnm.i. ry involvement
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Con
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a SALT II trE.aty, potential problem._,
and benefits frur Oi is involveries?it
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requests to the C ~~rnl~ rra.t:y in
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relationship to a SlU,T agreement.
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questions up with 0 ., Iar'~r i.
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consultations in th_1 manner. 11
Our immediate problem is JTow~ rr~
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request to spend two or three days
Viewing l.ntell.igenCEre COIT91)iu ity
in ~V S}1_LTIL;t:o]' involved
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in monitoring the SALT II treaty.
Glenn has asked to do thi in
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