GAO COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001500070008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 28, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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OLC X78-2/101i
28 August 1978
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel
FROM : Special Assistant to the DDCI
SUBJECT : GAO Compartmented Clearances
1. The Director and Deputy Director met with Mr. Elmer Staats
to discuss GAO access to compartmented information. The talking points
presented by Mr. Staats are attached.
2. In addition to these Discussion Notes, Mr. Staats made
several statements regarding clearances. He would agree to:
a) limited duration clearances;
b) clearances for specific projects;
c) clearance for the product, e.g. photography from specific
systems;
e) accept TK clearance
3. Mr. Carlucci would like you to review the Discussion Notes and
other issues to determine if a modification of our present policy is
possible.
cc: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Inspector General
Director of Security
CL BY
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1. Informally, the Department of Defense advised the General
Accounting Office on March 14, 1978, that the Director of Central
Intelligence, acting pursuant to Executive Order 12036, January 26,
1978, directed that intelligence information requiring special
intelligence clearances could no longer be made available to the GAO.
Hence, documents available in the past could not be seen by GAO
representatives, including documents used widely in the Department
of Defense.
2. GAO has clear legal authority and responsibility to audit and
evaluate DOD programs, some of which are justified or administered
on the basis of information contained in the classified documents in
question. GAO does not seek access to this information for the
purpose of evaluating its accuracy or quality. It is needed for the
purpose of evaluating DOD programs sometimes initiated and carried
out as a result of intelligence information.
3. The effect of the action of the Director of Central intelligence,
if sustained, is to make it difficult if not impossible for the GAO to
carry out responsibilities assigned to it under the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 and subsequent statutes, including the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Act of 1974. These statutes give GAO access to records
of the executive branch except records of unvouchered expenditures
certified as necessary by the head of the agency.
4. For approximately 10 years GAO has prepared in-depth analyses of
weapons systems, as agreed upon between the GAO and the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees. These reports, usually classified, are used by the com-
mittees extensively in considering the authorization. and funding
requests of the DOD. Intelligence information which is involved is
usually an integral part of the files reviewed and relevant to discus-
sions held between GAO representatives and representatives of the DOD.
Without this information, reports can be incomplete, erroneous, and
possibly misleading to the committees of Congress utilizing such reports.
The current list of such projects, expected to lead to reports to
Congress in early 1979, are the following:
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In addition, committee requests are made from time to time for GAO
studies which cannot be anticipated in advance.
5. Any itemization of specific material involved which is protected
by compartmental security clearances would tend to become a security
violation in itself so we cannot give specific examples. We are con-
cerned because we are not being given access to data which could
seriously impact on either the stated needs for new equipment or upon
the efficiency of the equipment if it were to be deployed. Specifically,
without these special intelligence clearances:
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--we are not permitted to review the specific studies and
evaluations which were conducted to establish the quantity
and quality needs of s_ystems;proposed for development,
--we cannot question the program manager or DOD claims that
the best available information is being used to formulate
the design of the. system in development,
--we cannot review the evidence being used to support any
arguments about the probable effectiveness of the system
against future threats,
--we cannot determine if the intelligence community is being
responsive to the needs of the R&D community.
6. GAO will require at any given time only a very limited number
of individuals requiring access to special intelligence clearances
and believes, therefore, that the concern of the Director of Central
Intelligence with respect to possible leakage of this information is
not warranted. Only seven individuals concerned with the review of
weapons systems in the past 4 years have had access to such information.
In two of these cases, the clearances were limited to a briefing to
verify data omitted from a previous DOD briefing.
There have been other limited occasions in the past where special
clearances have been required and there may be similar needs in the
future.
7. GAO has strictly adhered to DOD security arrangements in the
past and will continue to do so in the future. GAO is agreeable
to discussion of any further arrangements with the Department of
Defense and the DCI for safeguarding sensitive intelligence information.
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