LETTER TO THE HONORABLE STANSFIELD TURNER FROM ELMER A. STAATS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001600040003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 29, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
l~'~'L~p /,?,y~ rs
WASHINGTON. O.C. ZM48
The Honorable Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
March 29, 1978
Dear Admiral Turner:
Enclosed is a copy of our report to the Congress entitled "Drug
Control in South America Having Limited Success--Some Progress But
Problems Are Formidable." The report briefly notes the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's role in the drug control program.
The report discusses the problems and achievements of the U.S.
South American drug control program, Drug Enforcement Administration
efforts to comply with legislative restrictions on its overseas activ-
ities, and some lingering deficiencies in the Department of State's
international narcotic control assistance program.
Comptroller General
of the United States
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BY THE COMPTROLLER ~ -i NFRAL
Report To The Congress
OF THE UNITED STATES
Drug Control In South America
Having Limited Success--Some Progress
But Problems Are Formidable
Large quantities of cocaine and marijuana
come to the United States from :south
America. Despite efforts to stop this flow,
it is increasing. Program officials believe
the real key to controlling the drug flow
is a stronger commitment by South Amer-
ican governments. Without this commit-
ment the problem will probably continue
to exist.
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ARCH 29, 1978
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20548
To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This report discusses the problems and achievements
of the U.S. South American drug control program, Drug
Enforcement Administration efforts to comply with leg-
islative restrictions on its overseas activities, and
some lingering deficiencies in the Department of State's
international narcotic control assistance program.
Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting
and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).
Copies of this report are being sent to the Attorney
General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
State, and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
Comptroller General
of the United States
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S DRUG CONTROL IN
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS SOUTH AMERICA HAVING
LIMITED SUCCESS--SOME
PROGRESS BUT PROBLEMS
ARE FORMIDABLE
D I G E S T
Nearly all of the cocaine and most of the
marijuana entering the United States come
from South America. Peru and Bolivia are the
major producers of coca--from which cocaine is
made. Colombia is the primary processing and
transmitting country for cocaine and has sur-
passed Mexico in marijuana production.
Disrupting and intercepting the flow of drugs
into the country is a major U.S. law enforce-
ment objective and an important part of the
worldwide U.S. drug control program. Presi-
dent Carter has supported this program, and
particularly the effort to reduce international
illicit drug production and trafficking. In
South America this effort is multifaceted and
involves several agencies, including the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Department of
State, the Agency for International Development,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S.
Customs Service. The program has been active
in most South American countries since 1973,
and funding for the fiscal year 1977 program
was $9.8 million.
Concerned about certain Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration activities in Bolivia, Senators Javits,
Church, Tower, and Bentsen and Representa-
tive Chisholm requested that GAO review several
aspects of the international drug control program
in South America.
DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM IN SOUTH AMERICA
HAS HAD A MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE DRUG FLOW
International drug control program officials
believe that the cocaine flow into the United
States is increasing. Accurate information on
the amount is not available--estimates range
from 15 to over 100 tons annually. The drug
Tear Sheet. Upon removal, the report
cover date should be not d ereon,
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program in South America has had a minimal
effect on the flow of narcotics. Xlthough the
Drug Enforcement Administration says that since
October 1977 progress in seizures and trafficker
arrests has been encouraging, GAO believes such
efforts are important but will not solve the
problem.
One problem hampering enforcementefforts--
which the Drug Enforcement Administration recog-
nizes--is a paucity of systematica_ly analyzed
intelligence. As a result, U.S. and host coun-
try enforcement efforts to eliminate major traf-
ficking networks may not have been as effective
as they could have been.
U.S. officials said the real key ttr: program
success is a stronger commitment bM South
American governments to control tht- drug flow.
Without that commitment, U.S. effo,:ts will not
achieve desired results. Official. believe
that the United States must contin?r.e to try
to reduce the drug flow while encotraging
South American governments to becor?e more in-
volved in drug control. They also believe,
however, such a possibility is lim..ted by
corruption within many South American countries,
particularly Colombia, and a lack of host gov-
ernment resources that can be allocated to drug
enforcement. (See ch. 2.)
CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM--
SUCCESS IN DOUBT
Crop substitution is one approach to reducing
the flow of cocaine to the United Estates. How-
ever, pilot projects to identify adequate al-
ternative crops have so far been unsuccessful.
Drug Enforcement Administration and State De-
partment officials in Peru and Bolivia doubt
that such programs will succeed. Iieir counter-
parts in Washington, D.C., on the other hand,
believe that U.S.-financed rural deielopment
projects combined with efforts of tze Govern-
ments of Bolivia and Peru to limit!c oca produc-
tion will ultimately reduce the cocaine flow to
the United States. They point out that suc-
cess or failure depends on these governments'
willingness and ability to limit production.
Bolivia has promised to limit coca production,
but Peru has not.
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GAO believes that prospects for limiting coca
production in South America are unfavorable
because
--no adequate alternative crop that can
match coca's economic return has as yet
been found,
--coca has become ingrained in the local
culture after centuries of wide use, and
--coca can be grown easily in many areas.
(See ch. 3.)
PROHIBITIONS PLACED ON THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES
To control the illegal drug flow in South America,
the Drug Enforcement Administration participates
with host government police in a variety of ac-
tivities, including undercover surveillance,
training, and interviewing arrestees.
Because of concerns over American involvement
in sensitive internal law enforcement operations
in other countries, the Congress in June 1976
amended the Foreign Assistance Act to define the
scope of allowable activities. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration agents in South America ap-
pear to have generally complied with the amend-
ments. However, GAO identified one instance in
which, while reportedly pursuing authorized
activities Drug Enforcement Administration
agents were confronted with and participated
in an arrest action to protect a host country
police officer from potential danger. The
Foreign Assistance Act prohibits Drug Enforce-
ment Administration participation in direct
foreign police arrest actions. Such _a situation,
in which routine performance of authorized drug
enforcement activities unexpectedly leads to
participation in prohibited direct arrest ac-
tions, could happen again. (See ch. 4.)
MONITORING OF NARCOTICS CONTROL
EQUIPMENT STILL A PROBLEM
From fiscal year 1973 through fiscal year 1977,
the United States has provided $7.8 million
worth of law enforcement equipment to 10 South
American countries. In 1973 and 1974 legisla-
tion was enacted that placed prohibitions on
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providing U.S. financial assistance to foreign
police. These prohibitions in gen,?ral do not
apply to narcotics control. Since then the
Congress has been concerned about foreign
police diverting equipment to unauw.horized uses.
In a February 19, 1976, report (ID--76-5) GAO
recommended that the Department of State
develop an "end-use" monitoring sy>>tem to
control the use of narcotics contr)l equip-
ment. In two of the three countri!s GAO
visited during this review, no such system
was established. In the third couitry such
a system had been developed but wat> considered
ineffective. The Department of State has re-
cently taken action to improve the monitoring
activities. (See ch. 5.)
AGENCY COMMENTS
Because of urgent congressional ne#,d for the
information in this report, GAO dit not request
formal written comments from the Dcpartments
of Justice or State; however, the Lrug Enforce-
ment Administration, the Departmen?: of State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed
the report and their comments and suggestions
were considered.
The Drug Enforcement Administration; told GAO that
the report did not adequately refl?>ct the value
of its drug control efforts and accomplishments
in South America. Drug Enforcement. Adminis-
tration officials said that their south Ameri-
can operations form an integral part of the
overall drug control program.
The Department of State generally agreed with
the report, but did not agree with GAO con-
clusions on the crop substitution program.
The Department said that it was toc early to
judge the impact of these efforts.
The Central Intelligence Agency sail the
report was accurate overall. It male several
suggestions which were incorporated in the
appropriate sections of the report. (See
ch. 6.)
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C o n t e n t s
Page
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION 1
The international drug control
program 2
DEA's enforcement program 2
The international narcotics
control assistance program 2
Program funding 3
Scope of review 5
2 THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM
IN SOUTH AMERICA HAS HAD A MINIMAL
EFFECT ON THE DRUG FLOW 6
Cocaine flow into the United States
is increasing 6
Seizures and arrests--what is their
impact? 8
Current impact 8
DEA believes recent efforts are
encouraging 10
Future impact 11
Key problems restricting progress 11
Intelligence efforts need
strengthening 11
Other obstacles 13
U.S. officials believe the program
is showing some results 14
Conclusions 15
3 CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM--SUCCESS IN
DOUBT lb
Coca--a 'short history 16
U.S. programs to limit coca produc-
tion 16
Conclusions 18
4 MANSFIELD AMENDMENT PLACED PROHIBITIONS
ON DEA'S OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES 20
DEA's mission in South America 20
Actions prohibited by Mansfield
Amendment 20
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CHAPTER
Agents' participation in authorized
activities can lead to amendment
violations
Page
U.S. embassies aware of DE:y-'s
activities
Opinions vary on value ofDEA
activities
25
Conclusions
26
5
PROBLEMS PREVIOUSLY NOTED IN INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
STILL EXIST
Formal program to monitor end-use
27
of equipment still does not exist
The training program needs a followup
27
system
Department of State officials say
reorganization will help correct
29
past problems
32
I
II
III
AGENCY COMMENTS
Host government commitments to drug
control
Equipment provided to South American
countries
Principal officials responsible for
administering activities discussed
in this report
33
ABBREVIATIONS
AID Agency for International Develoament
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
GAO General Accounting Office
INC international narcotics control
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INTRODUCTION
Concerned about the role of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) in the arrest of U.S. citizens in Bolivia,
Senators Javits, Church, Tower, and Bentsen and Representa-
tive Chisholm requested that we review several aspects of
the international drug control program in South America.
Because other legislative and executive branch groups were
studying the specific issue of the American prisoners in
Bolivia, it was agreed with the requestors that our review
would concentrate on DEA and Department of State inter-
national narcotics control programs in South America.
Reducing the flow of drugs to the United States is a
major American foreign policy objective. In June 1971,
President Nixon called for an all-out attack on the drug
problem, focusing on both the supply and demand aspects.
To control the supply, a program of technical, financial,
and commodity assistance was started, helping foreign
countries to strengthen their drug interdiction efforts.
Several agencies are involved in the effort, with the De-
partment of State having overall responsibility for the
program.
President Carter recently reiterated the need for a
strong U.S. program against international illicit drug pro-
duction and trafficking. In August 1977 he directed the
Secretary of State to give greater emphasis to this task.
In South America, a central goal of the drug control
program is the control of cocaine. Nearly all, illegal
cocaine reaching the United States originates in Bolivia
and Peru, with other South American countries, particularly
Colombia, used as transshipment points. Past U.S. policy
lists the control of cocaine as a fourth priority behind
control of heroin and other dangerous drugs, barbiturates,
and amphetamines. However, according to a draft policy
paper, the control of the flow of cocaine to the United
States will soon receive a higher priority. Although co-
caine abuse has not been shown to be as harmful to society
as heroin abuse, cocaine use is increasing. According to
the draft policy paper, cocaine interdiction is important
because
--cocaine has high abuse potential,
--profits from cocaine trafficking can be used to
finance organizations trafficking in more danger-
ous drugs, and
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-the huge flow of money generated by illicit
production and trafficking undermines a nation's
social, economic, and political integrity.
THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM
The U.S. drug control effort in Sout:i America is multi-
faceted, but essentially consists of an enforcement program
aimed directly at traffickers and an assistance program
which is designed to develop host country narcotics control
capabilities. The U.S. effort involves several Government
agencies. Key agencies implementing the 3rogram are the
Department of State and DEA. Others involved are the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), responsible for develop-
ment of narcotics intelligence; the U.S.Customs Service,
responsible for giving customs training to foreign offi-
cials; and the Agency for International Development (AID),
responsible for implementing development,programs in drug-
crop-growing areas.
DEA's enforcement program
A key feature of the international d
is enforcement. DEA was designated by a
plan as the Federal agency to deal with f
forcement officials. In doing so it rece
from the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in t
fice of the President, from the Secretary
the U.S. Ambassador assigned to each coun
the important drugs of abuse in the Unite. States originate
in foreign countries, DEA places a high priority on encour-
aging other governments to commit themsel'es to controlling
all aspects of illicit drug production anc" distribution.
Primarily this involves assisting foreign government offi-
cials in preventing supplies of illicit drugs from entering
the United States.
To accomplish this in South America, DEA has assigned
35 agents and intelligence analysts to 11 countries. The
agents seek to develop narcotics trafficking cases jointly
with host country police. This method not only is intended
to immobilize the traffickers; it provide.- "on the job"
training for host country police. Joint efforts like this
are termed "institution building."
The international narcotics control
assistance program
The other key feature of the U.S. effort besides en-
forcement is the international narcotic control (INC) as-
sistance program, which is designed to encJurage foreign
ug control program
973 reorganization
reign drug law en-
ves policy guidance
e Executive Of-
of State, and from
ry. Since many of
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countries' cooperation in drug control and to assist foreign
governments and international organizations in augmenting
their own antidrug capabilities. The INC program is admin-
istered by the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and
Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters.
Until fiscal year 1978, various aspects of the program
were implemented by AID, DEA, and the U.S. Customs Service
under the guidance of the Department of State. AID was
responsible for programs in individual countries, which
consisted primarily of providing equipment to the host
country's narcotics police and developing crop substitu-
tion projects. DEA and the U.S. Customs Service were
responsible for narcotics control training programs for
foreign officials. In addition, DEA was responsible for
a small amount of INC funds used to support the host coun-
try's police in their narcotics control operations.
During fiscal year 1978, the INC program will be reorga-
nized to centralize more program functions under the Senior
Advisor; most components formerly implemented by AID will
be the Senior Advisor's direct responsibility. The Depart-
ment of State will also be responsible for administering
operational support funds for local police. DEA and the
U.S. Customs Service will still provide narcotics control
training, but the Senior Advisor will monitor this activity
more closely than was done in the past.
PROGRAM FUNDING
Funding for the drug control program in South America
has come from two major sources: INC funds and DEA funds.
Beginning in fiscal year 1974, INC funds were-appropriated
by sections 481 and 482 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Be-
fore that date AID funds were used to implement the program.
The chart on the next page shows the flow of DEA and INC
funds for various program components.
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DEA AND INC PROGRAMS IN
SOUTH AMERICA
Funding Flow and Responsibility'
00
OPERATIONAL
ACTIVITIES
OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT OF
LOCAL POLICE
EQUIPMENT
-'/Responsibility for some programs is being shifted to the De;k. tment of State during Fiscal
Year 1978 as described on p. 3.
DEA DISTRICT
OFFICES
4
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The chart below shows DEA and
America since fiscal year 1975.
INC expenses in South
Fiscal year
1975
1976
(.note a) 1977
--------(000 omitted) --------
DEA:
Personnel costs
$1,877
$1,887
$2,312
t
831
1,560
1,799
s
Other cos
DEA
l
708
$2
$3,447
$4,111
,
Tota
,
INC:
Country programs
$2,060
$6,301
$3,888
(note b)
ote c)
i
700
1
1,824
1,794
ng (n
Train
,
INC
l
760
$3
$8,125
$5,682
,
Tota
,
A & INC
468
$6
$11,572
$9,793
Total, DE
,
a/Includes transition quarter.
b/Includes equipment, crop substitution, and operational
support costs.
c/This figure is our estimate based on the average amount
allocated for each participant.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Our review was directed toward assessing the effective-
ness of the international drug control programs in South
America. We analyzed DEA activities with regard to the
"Mansfield Amendment" (see ch. 4), the Department of State's
management of the INC program, and implementation of crop sub-
stitution projects. We reviewed DEA investigative reports,
planning documents, and statistical data and held discussions
with field and headquarters personnel. We analyzed Depart-
ment of State documents, including INC program plans, crop
substitution reports, equipment lists, and training statis-
tics and held discussions with pertinent U.S. agencies'
headquarters, district offices, and Embassy personnel. Our
review was conducted at
--DEA, Department of State, AID, and CIA headquarters
in Washington, D.C., and
--U.S. Embassies and DEA district offices in Bolivia,
Peru, and Colombia.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM IN
SOUTH AMERICA HAS HAD A M:NIMAL
EFFECT ON THE DRUG FL(?W
The primary target of the U.S. international drug con-
trol program in South America is cocaine. Marijuana. and
opium are also targets. The U.S. effort to control these
drugs includes an enforcement program gainst traffickers
and an assistance program to help develop host countries'
narcotic control capabilities.
It is difficult to tell whether this effort is reduc-
ing the quantity of these drugs that roaches the United
States. Reliable data is unavailable. However, intelli-
gence, statistical reports on availability, and arrest and
seizure statistics suggest that the program has had a mini-
mal effect on the availability of coca le and marijuana in
the United States.
Nevertheless, DEA officials inform d us that they are
encouraged by the increased commitments to drug control of
host governments in South America and by recent increases
in drug seizures and arrests of major traffickers.
COCAINE FLOW INTO THE
UNITED STATES IS INCREASING
Nearly all of the cocaine flowing to the United States
comes from South America. For the most part the coca is
grown in Peru and Bolivia, and processed into cocaine in
Colombia. Data on the amount of cocain reaching the
United States is inadequate--estimates cf coca production
and cocaine flow are varied. Some recert estimates of
annual production are as follows:
--DEA officials in South America ettimate that
Bolivia could produce up to 88 tons of cocaine
annually and Peru's potential annual production
of cocaine is 26 tons.
--DEA officials in Colombia estimate that up to
69 tons of cocaine could be produared from
Peruvian and Bolivian coca and that from 28 to
46 tons of cocaine processed in Colombia are
reaching the United States.
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--A November 1977 report of the Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control said: "There is
a potential of 100 tons (of cocaine) available
for the United States and Europe."
--DEA and Department of State headquarters officials
said that the "official U.S. Government estimate"
of cocaine available in the United States is be-
tween 15 and 17 tons.
We did not try to determine which of these estimates
was the most accurate. The situation was probably best sum-
med up by a Department of State official who said that any
estimate of cocaine availability in the United States is
"imprecise under the best conditions." This position is
supported in part by information furnished by a DEA offi-
cial, which indicates that estimates of Bolivia's production
of coca are substantially understated.
Even though the estimates of production and flow vary,
officials generally agree that the amount of cocaine coming
to the United States is increasing. A 1977 National Insti-
tute on Drug Abuse study supports this; it found that cocaine
use in the United States was growing. DEA and Department of
State officials said that a similar growth was occurring in
Europe. In line with these increases, coca-growing areas
have expanded in South America. DEA officials in both Peru
and Bolivia said that coca production in those two countries
is increasing rapidly.
A DEA report on the availability of cocaine in the
United States as of September 1977 stated:
"Cocaine availability, as measured by retail
purity has shown little change, although prices
have continued to exhibit a gradual increasing
trend. * * * All available evidence suggests
that illicit suppliers of cocaine remain capable
of meeting the demand for this drug."
Marijuana, the only other drug of any significance in
South America, is primarily grown in Colombia. DEA now esti-
mates that Colombia has surpassed Mexico as the principal
supplier of this drug to the United States.
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SEIZURES AND ARRESTS--
WHAT IS THEIR IMPACT?
Current impact
Seizures of drugs and arrests of ttaffickers appear to
have had little effect on the current availability of co-
caine and marijuana in the United States.
DEA's "foreign cooperative" seizures of cocaine and
marijuana in South America are shown below:
Fiscal
year
Cocaine
(pounds,
Marijuana
(tons)
1973
477
-
1974
859
1
1975
847
125
1976
2,416
89
Transition quarter
206
-
1977
1,990
10
1978 (1st quarter)
2,472
23
1978 (2nd quarter)
(note a)
1,242
165
a/Data through Mar. 7, 1978.
The cocaine statistics shown above, when compared with
the most conservative estimates of cocaine availability,
indicate that less than 7 percent was seized in fiscal year
1977.
Although seizures of cocaine in South America have been
limited, they are greater than the seizures in the United
States. For example, in fiscal year 1977 domestic cocaine
seizures by all Federal agencies totaled only 1,380 pounds,
while during the same period 3,136 pounds were seized in
foreign countries (of this total 1,990 pounds were seized in
South America). This gives credence to the major reason for
the U.S. international drug control program: that the drug
flow can be more effectively controlled at its source.
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There has been little increase in the number of DEA
foreign cooperative narcotic arrests in South America during
the past 5 years. In fiscal year 1973, 444 individuals were
arrested for narcotics trafficking and in fiscal year 1977
the number arrested was 498. In addition, the majority of
those arrested were classified by DEA as low-level traffick-
ers. DEA has established categories for individuals arrested
for narcotics trafficking. For example, a class I traffick-
er, the highest classification, could be the head of a major
trafficking organization known to deal in large quantities
of narcotics. The lowest category, class IV, could be an
individual arrested with less than 4.4 pounds of cocaine.
In fiscal year 1977, 84 percent of DEA's foreign co-
operative arrests in South America involved class III or
IV traffickers. In the three countries visited, from
82 to 84 percent of those arrested during the period January
1976 to October 1977 were low-level traffickers. DEA for-
eign cooperative arrests 1/ in South America are shown below:
Arrests
Major traffickers
Fiscal
(note a)
Others
year
Number Percent
Number
Percent
Total
1973
(b)
(b)
-
-
444
1974
(b)
(by
-
-
310
1975
111
25
328
75
439
1976
108
19
469
81
577
Transition
quarter
24
19
102
81
126
1977 (note c)
78
16
420
84
498
1978, 1st quarter
14
10
128
90
142
a/DEA classifications I and II.
b/Classification'data not available.
c/Beginning in fiscal year 1977 DEA's criteria for classi-
fying traffickers were changed. This change increased the
requirements needed for designation as a major trafficker.
1/Arrests made by foreign police officials based on
intelligence provided by DEA.
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DEA points out that agents in South America spend more
time on major trafficking cases than the arrest figures on
major traffickers indicate. They said the disruption of a
major trafficking organization may result in many arrests,
of which only two or three would be classified as arrests of
major traffickers. They pointed out that during the first
quarter of 1978-even though only 10 percent of those arrested
were major traffickers, almost one-third of the cases and 44
percent of the arrests involved major trafficking organiza-
tions.
In addition, DEA commented that special task forces have
been established to concentrate on specific major traffick-
ers. Two such task forces have operated in South America
with some success. For example, one tas,~ force operation
resulted in the arrest of 142 trafficker-3, with 58 percent
of these being classified as in class I or class II. While
these task forces are concentrating on major trafficking
organizations, they represent a very small portion of DEA's
effort in South America. A DEA official said that these
task force operations depend greatly on the information
and evidence gained from other DEA operations.
DEA believes recent efforts
are encouraging
DEA"officials said that since October 1977 significant
progress has been made in disrupting South American cocaine
and marijuana trafficking. Several major trafficking organ-
izations have been disrupted in Colombia and Peru. The of-
ficials cite the following examples:
--In October 1977, alleged major Colombian
trafficker Jamie Cardona-Vargas and several
of his associates were arrested and 432 kilo-
grams of cocaine base were seized. Followup
action resulted in the seizure of 299 kilograms
of hydrochloride and arrest warrants being issued
for two other alleged major Colombian traffickers.
--In November 1977, Peruvian investigative police
arrested Vicente Guzman-Zuniga, an alleged major
Colombian cocaine trafficker, and several of his
Colombian and Peruvian associates. They seized
234 kilograms of cocaine base and $400,000 in
negotiable checks.
In addition DEA officials stated that about 40 cocaine
labs have been seized, and that a joint U.S.-Colombia pro-
gram has resulted in U.S. domestic seizures of over 425 tons
of marijuana.
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Future impact
In foreign countries DEA primarily assists host govern-
ments in preventing supplies of illicit drugs from entering
the illicit traffic into the United States. DEA believes
that the host government must have some capability and a
real commitment to drug enforcement, and feels that its
efforts to develop this capability and/or commitment have
contributed significantly to institution building in the
South American countries.
DEA recognizes that enforcement efforts alone will not
greatly reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the
United States. In order to bring about a large reduction,
producing nations will have to limit the production and
distribution of these drugs. Enforcement efforts will be
necessary to assure that producers comply with such program.
DEA believes that if producing nations adopt such pro-
grams through the diplomatic efforts of the United States,
DEA's current efforts will be a positive factor in the suc-
cess of these programs. DEA recognizes, however, that this
will be a long-term effort.
KEY PROBLEMS RESTRICTING PROGRESS
Several obstacles were hampering U.S. drug control ef-
forts in South America. A major problem was the limited
effort devoted to producing operational 1/ intelligence
which could be used in identifying major narcotics traf-
fickers. Other problems identified by U.S. officials in-
cluded corruption within South American governments and
the lack of host country resources to devote to drug con-
trol programs.
Intelligence efforts
need strengthening
The U.S. drug control program in South America depends
heavily on the development of intelligence--ranging from
estimates of drug crop production to identification of drug
smuggling routes and traffickers. Both DEA and the CIA have
1/At the operational level, intelligence concentrates on an
overview of trafficking groups and their operations in
order to discover patterns, routes, and modes of operations,
to assess vulnerabilities of those involved, and ultimately
to develop leads for potential conspiracy investigations.
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responsibilities in this area. We found that drug intelli-
gence at DEA offices in South America had not been system-
atically analyzed.
CIA's primary focus is on the collection of strategic
intelligence information for use in the formulation of nar-
cotics control policies. The Agency alsc provides tactical
narcotics information to DEA concerning foreign traffickers
and their supporting networks.
DEA agents as a part of their enforcement duties rou-
tinely gather drug intelligence information by various means,
including undercover surveillance, paymer;ts to informants,
and interrogation of prisoners.
DEA has not systematically analyzed this data. 1/ As
a result, the U.S. and host country enforcement efforts to
eliminate major trafficking may not have: been as success-
ful as they could have been. In addition, as noted earlier,
the great majority of DEA's foreign coope:ative arrests and
cases in South America involved low-level traffickers. The
paucity of usable operational-level intelligence may be con-
tributing to this situation.
DEA has not been able to systematically analyze intel-
ligence data because it has not assigned personnel trained
in intelligence development and analysis t_o South America.
Of the 35 professional DEA staff members assigned to the
South America region, only 1 is an intelligence analyst.
In addition, DEA has designated five of its agent positions
in South America as intelligence specialists. Three of those
five were in the countries we visited: B=:livia, Peru, and
Colombia. These positions were not being used effectively
for intelligence development:
--One was vacant.
--Another was filled by an agent who had not been
trained by DEA in intelligence.
--The third was filled by an agent w?o had received
DEA's intelligence training, but we.s not allowed
to concentrate on intelligence development because
of other priorities.
1/CIA told us that CIA and DEA are currently working on a
joint effort in Washington to analyze and collate all of
the available information concerning the most prominent
cocaine networks trafficking in South America.
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DEA special-agents-in-charge in all three countries
visited judged their intelligence capability as inadequate.
Even in Colombia, where the intelligence analyst is assigned,
officials said they needed at least two additional analysts.
DEA officials recognize this need and point out that
the shortage of intelligence analysts is not peculiar to the
South American region. Currently only 103 of the 228
agencywide intelligence analyst positions are filled; in
fiscal year 1978 DEA hopes to recruit at least 20 intelli-
gence analysts. DEA added that, in an attempt to deal with
the intelligence problem, about 50 percent of the agents
assigned to South America have recently taken a 2-week DEA
course on intelligenc-e gathering.
Other obstacles
There are other obstacles that are restricting program
success. According to U.S. officials the most important of
these is corruption in South American governments. They
said this is especially true in the principal trafficking
country, Colombia, where corruption is present at various
levels and places in the government, including the judiciary
and the police. High-level U.S. officials have discussed
this situation with Government of Colombia officials, but
note that it still greatly hampers program success.
Corruption is encouraged by the enormous amount of
money involved in trafficking. A DEA summary of the drug
situation in Colombia states that U.S. retail sales of mari-
juana and cocaine processed or grown in Colombia are esti-
mated at $6 billion annually. Illegal drug trafficking
reportedly returns an estimated $1 billion to the Colombia
economy every year.
The enormous profits that can be made from trafficking
in cocaine can also be illustrated by tracing prices paid
for the drug in various stages, from the coca leaf price in
Bolivia to the street price of cocaine in the United States.
The Bolivian farmer sells the quantity of coca leaves nec-
essary to make 1 pound of cocaine for about $60. These
leaves are converted to cocaine-base having a value of about
$1,000. Conversion to cocaine, the next step, increases the
value to over $2,000 in Bolivia. By the time the cocaine
reaches the streets of a city in the United States, the
Bolivian farmer's $60 in coca leaves costs the users over
$100,000.
Other program obstacles also exist. A major problem
is that the governments simply do not have adequate funds
to devote to narcotics control. Significant internal prob-
lems such as terrorism and underdeveloped economies affect
13
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foreign governments' ability to focus on the drug problem.
Further, even though some increases in South American gov-
ernment expenditures and personnel dedicated to narcotics
control have occurred (see app. I), manyU.S. officials
-believe most South American governments simply are not
firmly committed to narcotics control.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs considers this lack of commitment and motivation
to be the main impediment to drug control program success
in South America. He explained in testimony before the
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in
November 1977 that the lack of commitment to narcotics
control of most South American governments
"should not be surprising considering that we
are asking these countries to use scarce re-
sources to combat a problem which they may still
perceive to be primarily a United States problem,
or one that is not a serious or immediate threat
to themselves."
U.S. OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE
PROGRAM IS SHOWING SOME RESULTS
DEA and Department of State officials said that the
effectiveness of the international drug control program
cannot be judged solely by cocaine flow or drug arrest and
seizure statistics; other factors need to be considered.
These officials said that the countries of" Bolivia, Peru,
and Colombia now are more committed to narcotics control than
they were several years ago. Narcotics units have been es-
tablished and increasing host country funds are being allo-
cated to the programs. (Available data or., host country funds
allocated to narcotics control and personrel strengths of
local narcotics units is shown in app. I.)
Department of State officials said that in addition to
increasing host government allocations of personnel and funds,
there are other signs that the U.S. drug control program in
South America may be achieving some success. Some of these
signs are:
--Bolivia's plans to prohibit future increases in
coca production.
--Peru's willingness to start considering limiting
coca production to licensed areas.
--Colombia's reorganization of its narcotics
control enforcement activities.
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DEA and Department of State officials acknowledge that
there are many obstacles to program success. Department of
State officials said that success in limiting the cocaine
flow may take another 5, 10, or even 20 years. Recognizing
that the key to a successful program rests with the host
governments,. the United States must continue to encourage
these governments to increase their commitments to drug con-
trol programs. In the interim the U.S. effort must be to
disrupt as much of the drug traffic as possible.
CONCLUSIONS
The international drug control program in South America
has had a minimal effect on the drug flow. Seizures and
trafficker arrests are important but will not solve the
problem, though DEA says that since October 1977 progress
in this area has been encouraging.
One problem hampering enforcement efforts--which DEA
recognizes--is a paucity of systematically analyzed intel-
ligence. As a result, U.S. and host country enforcement
efforts to eliminate major trafficking may not have been
as effective as they could have been.
U.S. officials said the real key to program success
is a stronger commitment by South American governments to
control the drug flow. Without that commitment, U.S. ef-
forts will not achieve desired results. Officials believe
that the United States must continue to try to reduce the
drug flow while encouraging South American governments to
become more involved in drug enforcement. However, such a
possibility is limited by alleged corruption within many
South American countries, particularly Colombia, and a
lack of host government resources that can be allocated to
drug enforcement.
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CHAPTER -3
CROP-SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM--SUCCESS IN DOUBT
Many U.S. officials believe that enforcement activities
to control cocaine flow can have only limited success. The
Department of State believes that "ultimately, the only
fully effective solution would be the reduction and even-
tual elimination of.illicit cultivation at its source." In
furtherance of this belief, part of the IN] program in South
America consists of projects designed to e1courage local
farmers to substitute other crops for coca. Still, many
officials believe that coca substitution p:;:ograms in South
America have little chance for success.
COCA--A-SHORT HISTORY
The coca bush is generally grown on tole eastern curve
of the Andes Mountains at elevations rangi;,,ig from 1,500 to
7,100 feet. The bush needs little care and grows where
other plants cannot survive. The plants g=own from seed are
ready to harvest in 18 months and are prod'.ctive for 50 years.
The leaves of the coca bush have been chewed and used
in religious ceremonies by Andean civilizations for at least
3,000 years. Today, estimates indicate that 90 percent of
the males and 20 percent of the females li'ing in the Peru-
vian and Bolivian Andes chew coca leaves daily. Coca leaves
are chewed by the villagers to relieve fatigue, hunger, and
cold. In most of these regions, coca is tie only cash crop
grown and the sole source of income for th? farmers.
U.S._ PROGRAMS TO LIMIT
COCA PRODUCTION
Coca production can be limited through eradication or
substitution projects. Because coca has been used for cen-
turies and provides Andean farmers with their only source
of income, eradication projects in Bolivia and Peru are not
considered to be acceptable. This leaves substitution as a
potential solution: a program is needed which will substi-
tute alternative crops or nonfarming activities for coca
production but will maintain or approximate the income coca
production provides.
Programs to identify suitable alternative crops, or crop
substitution programs, are being developed key AID using INC
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funds. 1/ AID has supported crop substitution projects in
Bolivia and has offered to initiate a pilot crop substitu-
tion project in Peru. According to AID, the search for
suitable substitute crops will take several years. It in-
volves finding marketable crops that will grow in the coca
areas and solving transportation, storage, and other market-
ing problems.
In fiscal year 1975, a pilot program for coca crop
substitution was initiated in Bolivia. As of October 1977,
AID had disbursed $668,000 for the crop substitution pro-
gram; fiscal year 1978 funding is expected to be $1.6 million.
Activities to date include research to identify potential
alternative crops and registration of coca growing areas.
Recognizing that simple crop substitution programs alone
cannot encourage coca farmers to switch to alternative crops,
the Bolivia program emphasizes basic rural development. The
basic rural development program (including water systems, im-
proved cultivation of existing crops such as coffee, market-
ing structures for other crops, education, and health) is
designed to improve the quality of life of the farming popu-
lation. Its aim is to mitigate the effects on the coca
growers of a phased ban by the Bolivian Government on coca
growing beyond that required for legal and traditional use.
In June 1976, the Secretary of State promised up to $45
million to support Bolivia's crop substitution and related
economic development program. ,
A crop substitution program has not been implemented
in Peru. In 1975, U.S. officials offered to provide $20,000
for a pilot crop substitution project. The Government of
Peru has never responded to the U.S. offer.
U.S. officials in both Peru and Bolivia generally were
pessimistic about the success of crop substitution. Even
with the large amount of funds promised to Bolivia for eco-
nomic development of coca growing areas, the officials point
out that the program will probably not achieve desired re-
sults. The key to crop substitution, either with or without
related economic development projects, is finding a suitable
alternative marketable crop. To date, the pilot project has
1/During fiscal year 1978, the Department of State's Senior
Advisor for Narcotics Matters will assume responsibility
for pilot crop substitution projects. AID will have re-
sponsibility for crop substitution and related economic
development programs.
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not identified such a crop. Even if one is found, a distri-
bution and marketing system will have to be developed.
DEA and Department of State officials in Bolivia and
Peru said crop substitution probably will not be successful
because
--coca has been grown and used in Bclivia and
Peru for centuries;
--coca growing requires little work, while potential
alternative crops require much attention; and
--no alternative crop can match the economic return
of coca, especially considering the unlimited
amounts of funds available to enco.irage produc-
tion. As discussed in ch. 2, the~Jifference
between what the farmer currently :eceives for
the coca needed to produce a pound of cocaine
($60) and the value of that cocain ($100,000)
demonstrates the potential funds a--ailable.
However, State Department and DEA officials in washing-
ton, D.C., believe the key to success doe:; not hinge on the
results of research on other crops. They are now looking
toward a basic rural development program ;in the coca growing
areas designed to improve the quality of life of the farming
population. They believe such a program gill allow the gov-
ernments to embark on a phased ban on coca, growing. The
Washington officials pointed out that Bolivia has already
banned new coca cultivation on un-registeryd lands. They
said success or failure in limiting coca production depends
upon Bolivia's willingness and ability to enforce such a ban.
CONCLUSIONS
Crop substitution is one approach to reducing the flow
of cocaine to the United States. However, pilot projects to
identify adequate alternative crops have s,, far been unsuc-
cessful. DEA and State Department officia::-s in Peru and
Bolivia doubt that such programs will succeed. State De-
partment and DEA officials in Washington, ',.i.C., on the other
hand, believe that U.S.-financed rural dev,.'lopment projects
combined with efforts to limit coca product' -ion by the Govern-
ments of Bolivia and Peru will ultimately; reduce the cocaine
flow to the United States. They point out that success or
failure depends on these Governments' will.;ngness and ability
to limit production. Bolivia has promised to limit coca pro-
duction, but Peru has not.
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We believe the prospects for limiting coca production
in South America are unfavorable. Programs to limit coca
production probably will not be successful because
--no adequate alternative crop that can match
coca's economic return has as yet been found,
--coca has become ingrained in the local culture
after centuries of use, and
--coca can be grown easily in many areas.
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CHAPTER 4
MANSFIELD AMENDMENT PLACED PROHIBITIONS
ON DEA'S OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES:
DEA agents in South America have generally complied with
1976 legislation (Mansfield Amendment) 1/ designed to limit
their foreign enforcement activities. Nevertheless, we noted
several instances in which DEA's participation in activities
not prohibited by the amendment could result:: in active in-
volvement in a situation in which violence could occur. One
situation culminated in DEA participation in a direct arrest
action, an activity prohibited by the Mansfield Amendment.
DEA agents in this case participated in the arrest to pro-
tect a host country police officer from potential danger.
DEA'S MISSION IN SOUTH AMERICA
Many of the U.S. domestic and international drug con-
trol efforts are aimed at supply reduction. This includes
attempts to disrupt the entire chain of production and dis-
tribution through eradicating crops in illegal growing areas
abroad, interdicting illicit shipments, arresting and jail-
ing important traffickers, and seizing and confiscating the
equipment and fiscal resources needed to operate traffick-
ing networks.
In foreign countries DEA primarily assists host govern-
ment officials in preventing supplies of il)icit drugs from
entering the United States. DEA agents assigned to South
America are integral to the U.S. effort to stem the flow of
cocaine and marijuana. They participate with host govern-
ment police in a variety of drug enforcement and intelligence
activities.
ACTIONS PROHIBITED BY MANSFIELD AMENDMENT
Concerned about U.S. officials' involvement in sensitive
foreign internal law enforcement operations, the Congress
moved to limit such activities overseas by adopting the
Mansfield Amendment, which provides:
1/International Security Assistance and Arm, Export Control
Act of 1976, P.L. No. 91-329, titte V, section 504(b),
90 Stat. 729, 764.
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"Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no officer or employee of the United States may
engage or participate in any direct police arrest
action in any foreign country with respect to
narcotics control efforts."
In adopting the legislation restricting U.S. involvement
in foreign enforcement operations, the Congress was seeking
to reconcile two important U.S. interests:
--Motivating foreign governments to cooperate to the
fullest extent in stopping drugs from reaching the
United States.
--Avoiding excessive U.S. intervention in the
internal affairs of other nations.
Reports of both the House International Relations Commit-
tee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included the
following explanations of what was meant by the amendment:
"In adopting this provision the committee
seeks to insure that U.S. narcotics control ef-
forts abroad are conducted in such a manner as
to avoid involvement by U.S. personnel in for-
eign police operations where violence or the use
of force could reasonably be anticipated. By
"arrest actions" the committee means any police
action which, under normal circumstances would
involve the arrest of individuals whether or not
arrests, in fact, are actually made. The com-
mittee intends that the U.S. Ambassador in any
country where U.S. narcotics control activities
are being carried out shall exercise close super-
vision over such activities to insure that U.S.
personnel do not become involved in sensitive,
internal law enforcement operations which could
adversely affect U.S. relations with that country.
"The committee emphasizes that this provision
is not intended to prohibit U.S. Government agen-
cies from assisting foreign governments to enforce
their own~laws on narcotics trafficking by pro-
viding such-assistance as training, technical
equipment, and intelligence." 1/
1/H.R. Rep. No. 94-144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976);
S. Rep. No. 94-876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976).
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After the Mansfield Amendment was adopted, DEA issued
guidelines for its foreign operations. Thg? most recent set
of guidelines issued in July 1977 includes a general section-
applicable to all overseas areas and a section with specific
guidelines for each country in which DEA e._ther has permanent
representatives or conducts liaison activities.
While forbidding active involvement in arrests, the
guidelines set forth a number of activities which are allow-
able if permitted under U.S. and host country laws and U.S.
mission policy. Some of the allowable functions indicated
in the guidelines are to
--perform in an undercover capacity,
--interview arrested persons or otherwise assist
host country officials after the arrest scene
has been secured, and
--provide instruction and training in various
police techniques.
AGENTS' PARTICIPATION IN AUTHORIZED
ACTIVITIES CAN LEAD TO AMENDMENT VIOLATION::
DEA agents in South America spend the majority of their
time on operational activities related toharcotics traffic.
To do this DEA agents, in association with host country
police, are involved in undercover surveillance and pur-
chase of information, interviewing drug arrestees, and
other actions needed to develop cases against narcotics
traffickers. The following examples are representative of
DEA actions in South America:
--DEA was contacted by the host country police
regarding two suspects entering the country to
purchase cocaine. DEA provided the local police
with information on the suspects' identity and
the hotel where they were registered. The local
police later arrested the suspects and found
9,800 grams of cocaine. DEA participated in
the interrogation.
--DEA and the host country police participated in
a joint investigation. DEA and the local police
learned that two suspects had entered the South
American country to purchase cocaine. After
joint surveillance, the local police arrested
the suspects with 2,500 grams of cocaine. DEA
reviewed all documents seized and further co-
ordinated the investigation.
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--DEA entered a case after the local police had
arrested four drug trafficking suspects. DEA
participated in the interrogation of the sus-
pects. DEA participated in the surveillance of
another suspect and was in the area when the
local police arrested the suspect. DEA partici-
pated in a search of the premises and interroga-'
tion of the suspect.
We identified several instances, since enactment of the
Mansfield Amendment, in which DEA agents were in the vicinity
of arrests made by host country police. In all but one, DEA
agents did not actively participate in the arrest, but
usually observed the arrest from a distance, actively par-
ticipating in surveillance before the arrest and interviewing
the suspect after the arrest. Some examples of this type of
activity are as follows:
--A DEA agent accompanied host country police to a
house in a rural area of a South American country.
The DEA agent waited in a car while the host
country police entered the house and arrested
two foreign nationals. Host country police then
signaled for the DEA agent to enter the house.
The DEA agent participated in interrogation of
the foreign nationals.
--Two DEA agents were at the scene of a roadblock
where vehicles and persons were stopped and
searched by host country police. At least one
foreign national was arrested while the DEA
agents were at the roadblock.
While DEA agents did not actively participate in these
actions conducted by host country police, their presence in
the area of arrests or potential arrests could result in
active involvement in an arrest action during which violence
could occur. In fact, this has already happened. We iden-
tified one example.
Two DEA agents, a host country narcotics agent, and
two host country local police units met at a site where an
informant was scheduled to meet a drug trafficker. The
trafficker arrived, picked up the informant, and drove away.
The two local police units followed but lost the trafficker;
however, the trafficker was kept under surveillance by the
DEA agents and the host country narcotics agent. It was felt
that the investigation, including the informant's status, had
been compromised. In addition, it was learned that a local
policeman, who had earlier been working on the case, had been
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found dead. The police counterpart decided -o arrest the
trafficker before he drove away. The police officer felt
that if the trafficker drove away, he would be lost before
assistance arrived. There were no other local police of-
ficers in the area to assist in the arrest. The DEA agents
felt that if the police counterpart attempted to arrest the
trafficker alone, his life would be in danger, and the traf-
ficker might kill the informant. The DEA age=nts covered the
police counterpart while he placed the trafficker under
arrest.
We discussed this incident with a DEA representative
in the country and were told that DEA's invo .vement was
justifiable since a police officer's life wa; in danger.
In addition, he stated that if the agents ha:] not assisted
their local counterpart, DEA would have lost the confidence
and cooperation of the host country police.
The activity that led to this arrest si?.uation was not
prohibited by the Mansfield Amendment. In fact, the amend-
ment's legislative history indicates that surveillance, in-
telligence, and training activities are allowed and in fact
encouraged. It should be recognized, however that an au-
thorized activity, such as that discussed abrive, may suddenly
escalate to a point where arrest of a suspect, becomes immi-
nent. In some of these cases, it may be impracticable to
require U.S. agents to avoid any participation in the arrest-
ing activity, such as holding a weapon on asuspect to protect
the arresting host country police officer from bodily harm.
Nevertheless, the Mansfield Amendment prohibm.ts U.S. agents
from participating in "any" foreign police arrest action.
U.S.EMBASSIES AWARE
OF DEA'S ACTIVITIES
As the committee reports on the amendment indicated, the
Congress intended that the U.S. Embassy exercise close super-
vision over DEA activities. DEA personnel ir. foreign coun-
tries, like most other official U.S. personnc.l abroad, are
under the full authority of the U.S. Embassy. Embassy of-
ficials in the three countries we visited were aware of DEA
agents' activities. These officials expressrd the opinion
that DEA's activities were not damaging U.S.'relations with
the host country. We did not hold discussions with foreign
government officials, but U.S. officials pointed out that
host governments were also aware of DEA's activities.
In each of the three countries visited, the Embassy
used a different method to control DEA activities. The
Embassy in Bolivia reviewed DEA's guidelines for foreign
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operations in 1976 and issued guidelines for DEA operations
in Bolivia to emphasize and modify certain points in DEA's
guidelines. In the guidelines, the Embassy directed that
DEA obtain advance Embassy approval whenever the agency had
a need for passive presence of an agent at an arrest. Al-
though the Embassy in Peru had not issued supplemental guide-
lines to DEA, it monitors all of DEA's cable traffic. The
Embassy in Colombia has a full-time narcotics coordinator
who is responsible for keeping the Ambassador informed on
all matters concerning narcotics control. He approves all
outgoing DEA cables in order to monitor DEA activities.
OPINIONS VARY ON VALUE OF DEA ACTIVITIES
Several Department of State officials responsible for
the drug control program believe that DEA should be pro-
hibited from active participation in police actions in
foreign countries. Their concerns stem from a desire to
be sure the international activities are carried out in
a manner consistent with the intent of the Mansfield
Amendment. They find it objectionable that "U.S. police"
are operating in a foreign country, where their function
should be that of liaison and institution building. They
believe U.S. interests in the long run would be better
served if host government police were able to actively
participate in unilateral drug enforcement without relying
on DEA's involvement. High-level Department of State of-
ficials said further restriction of DEA agents' activities
in South America to those outlined above would not signi-
ficantly affect our overall drug control effort.
However, other officials, principally from DEA, be-
lieve that involvement of DEA agents is not only justified
but needed if the United States is ever to be successful
in controlling drugs flowing into the United States. They
believe DEA agents need to be actively involved in drug
cases to motivate host country police to pursue drug traf-
fickers and to provide guidance and training in actual
police situations. Many DEA agents in South America be-
lieve that without active involvement it would be very
difficult to develop a close relationship with their
foreign counterparts, since the impression may be that
DEA agents are not as brave or courageous in the face of
potential danger as the local police. According to the
agents, this feeling of "macho" or personal pride is deeply
ingrained in the Latin culture and a major factor in being
able to deal effectively with the local police.
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CONCLUSIONS
DEA participates with host government police in a
variety of activities, including undercover surveillance,
training, and interviewing arrestees. Although the Mans-
field Amendment prohibits DEA participation in direct
arrest actions, DEA agents were placed in a situation in
which the performance of authorized activities unexpectedly
led to participation in prohibited direct arrest actions.
This could happen again.
Some Department of State officials are concerned about
the possible effect some of DEA's activities might have on
the U.S. relationships with the countries dealt with in our
review, although they could not cite instances in which
these activities had any adverse impact. Embassy offi-
cials in the three countries reviewed be1:_eved DEA's ac-
tivities were not damaging to United States relations with
the host countries. U.S. officials pointed out that host
government officials were fully aware oflEA's activities.
Whether or not the drug program's ac?,omplishments have
been commensurate with the costs incurred and the potenti-
ally adverse impacts in the foreign affairs area is a value
judgment that we are unwilling to make.
26
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CHAPTER 5
PROBLEMS PREVIOUSLY NOTED IN
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM STILL EXIST
In addition to the crop substitution program in South
America, which is discussed in chapter 3, the State Depart-
ment administers an INC program which funds the equipping
and training of South American police in narcotics control.
Our review showed that systems to adequately monitor
the "end-use" of INC equipment have not been established.
Also, a followup system for participants trained under the
INC program is needed.
FORMAL PROGRAM TO MONITOR END-USE OF
EQUIPMENT STILL DOES NOT EXIST
The largest portion of the INC program funds provided
in South America is used to provide narcotics control equip-
ment to various foreign government units. Through Septem-
ber 1977 AID had primary responsibility for the equipment
program. During fiscal year 1978, responsibility for the
program will be shifted to the Department of State under
the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordina-
tor for International Narcotics Matters.
From fiscal year 1973 through fiscal year 1977, $7.8
million in equipment has been provided to 10 South American
countries. In addition, over $3 million in equipment is
planned for fiscal year 1978. Equipment provided to South
American countries has primarily consisted of vehicles,
aircraft, weapons, 1/ police equipment, and communications
equipment. (A summary list of equipment provided to South
American countries is shown in app. II.)
In 1973 and 1974, legislation was'enacted that placed
prohibitions on providing U.S. financial assistance to
foreign police. I/ The area of narcotics control was, in
general, not subject to these prohibitions. In March 1975
1/An internal Senior Advisor office policy now prohibits
the use of INC funds to procure weapons.
2/Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 8.7
Stat. 714, 716; Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795, 1803-1804.
27
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the Senate Committee on Appropriations expre used concern
that this narcotics control assistance could be used for
purposes unrelated to controlling drug traffic. In its
report the Committee stated:
"* * * It is not the purpose of the narcotics pro-
gram to give the participating governme?ts access
to a continuous supply of free police e'==uipment,
much of which is possibly being used fo purposes
unrelated to control of drug traffic. The Commit-
tee therefore recommends a sharp reduct-..on in
equipment not directly related to increasing the
recipients' drug traffic control effort. Congress
did not intend that the activity become an inter-
national Law Enforcement Assistance prof;ram." 1/
We have also reported on the need for a system to moni-
tor end-use of INC equipment. In a February 19, 1976, re-
port to the Congress, "Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign
Police and Prisons" (ID-76-5), we recommended that the
Secretary of State:
"Institute a formal system of end-use monitoring
checks of major narcotics control equipment items
to insure that the equipment is not bers.ng misused."
In April 1977, the Senior Advisor, at Senator's urg-
ing, emphasized in a cable to American amba'W?sadors that they
should adopt procedures insuring the INC camtmodities are not
diverted for unauthorized use. Additionally, the Senior
Advisor requested that the ambassadors forty,-rd copies of
their observation procedures to her office -twhen they were
formulated.
During our review we found that formal end-use monitor-
ing systems had not been established in Bolvia or Peru. In
addition, AID Auditor General reports in 1916 and 1977 iden-
tified at least three other South American countries in which
formal monitoring systems had not been este{)lished. Although
such a system had been established in Colon..')ia, program man-
agers did not believe it was adequate to insure that equip-
ment was not being diverted.
We did not determine whether equipment diversion had
occurred. AID Auditor General reports of Various INC pro-
grams in South America during 1976 and 197' generally found
that most INC equipment could be accounted for. AID did
identify a few examples of equipment divert ion or lack of
accountability. For example:
1/S. Rept. 94-39, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. 8- (1975).
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--A May 1976 AID Auditor General report on the
program in Paraguay said that vehicles pro-
vided under the INC program were primarily
being used by a department in the Ministry of
Interior not related to narcotics control.
--An April 30, 1976, AID Auditor General report
on the program in Bolivia indicated that sev-
eral items could not be accounted for, including
revolvers, carbines, handcuffs, and submachine
guns.
Even though AID's Auditor General has not identified
significant equipment diversion or misuse, we believe strong
end-use controls are needed because of
--the sensitive nature of much of the equipment
and
--the fact that much of the equipment could
easily be used for nonnarcotic purposes.
Some examples of the types and quantities of equip-
ment provided under the INC program are as follows:
--Since 1973 the Bolivian narcotics police
enforcement unit has been provided 99 re-
volvers, 18 carbines, 7,shotguns, 16 sub-
machine guns, 4 gas guns, 4 tear gas
launchers, and 50 gas grenades.
--During the same period, the national civil
police and customs units in Ecuador have
been given 43 trucks, 31 jeeps, 5 sedans,
500 carbines, 231 revolvers, and 38 shotguns.
We believe that an end-use monitoring system could (1)
help assure that the equipment provided was committed to
narcotics control, (2) alert program managers to improper
maintenance or inadequate utilization of the equipment, and
(3) provide valuable information to assess future equipment
needs.
THE TRAINING PROGRAM
NEEDS A FOLLOWUP SYSTEM
Another major function of the INC program is the train-
ing of foreign police in narcotics control. Training is
provided in the United States and foreign countries by DEA
and the U.S. Customs Service and is financed with INC funds.
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Both training programs are administered frog Washington under
guidance from the Senior Advisor's office in the Depart-
ment of State. Funding for the program is centralized and
not separated by country, making a precise; identification
of costs associated with the South American portion of the
program impossible. From fiscal year 1972 through fiscal
year 1977, INC funds for training worldwide totaled $20.7
million. During this period about one-third of the par-
ticipants were from South American countries.
Since fiscal year 1972, 5,070 official:: from 13 coun-
tries have been trained by DEA and the U.S. Customs Service.
The chart below shows the number of participants trained by
country, and the agency providing the trainJng, since fiscal
year 1972.
INC South American Training Pr'(
Number trained by
Country
DEA Customs
Total
Argentina
544
72
616
Bolivia
250
200
450
Brazil
523
118
641
Chile
225
69
294
Colombia
531
183
714
Ecuador
34
192
426
Guyana
2
-
2
Netherlands
Antilles
72
137
209
Panama
258
116
374
Paraguay
86
30
116
Peru
382
142
524
Uruguay
147
195
342
Venezuela
222
140
362
Total
3,476
1,594
5,070
About 10 percent of these participants were trained in the
United States, and the remainder in South Araerica.
Customs' and DEA's training concentrate: on different
aspects of narcotics control: Customs trains officials with
border control responsibilities; DEA trains officials with
investigative responsibilities. The follow'J'.ng types of
courses are offered by both agencies:
--In the United States, executive seminars for
high-level officials and mid-management courses
for mid-level officials.
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--In foreign countries, drug control techniques
for line officers.
We also attempted to determine if officials trained
by DEA or Customs were being used for narcotics control.
We found that DEA, Customs, and the Department of State had
not systematically evaluated whether trained officials were
being used in narcotics work. Some followup of participants
trained in the United States by DEA is done on an "ad hoc"
basis, but for the most part DEA, Customs, and the Depart-
ment of State did not know what former participants were
doing. This is particularly true for participants trained
outside the United States.
In several South American countries it seems likely
that many trained participants are not working in narco-
tics control units. Comparison of the number of partici-
pants trained in narcotics enforcement by DEA versus the
number working in narcotics enforcement units for countries
for which data is available is shown below:
Trained by
DEA
Currently
working in
narcotics unit
Bolivia
250
130
Chile
225
65
Ecuador
234,
250
Peru
382
110
DEA and Department of State officials point out that
participants trained by DEA working in other areas are still
beneficial to the overall narcotics effort. They explained
that, for example, these participants might notice evidence
of narcotics trafficking that might otherwise have gone un-
detected if they had not received this specialized training.
In addition, some host country police organizations have a
policy of rotating personnel among different police units,
including the narcotics control unit. Such rotation is used
not only to provide personnel with a variety of police ex-
perience, but also as a means to control corruption prevalent
in some narcotics units.
We agree that police training in narcotics control can
be valuable even if the official is not working in a unit
dedicated to narcotics control. However, we believe that
a formal followup system would be beneficial. Such a system
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could not only be used to evaluate how partcipants are
being used, but also, by obtaining particigint feedback,
provide valuable information to assess courFe effectiveness
and future training needs.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS
SAY REORGANIZATION WILL HELP
CORRECT PAST PROBLEMS
Department of State officials pointed cut that the INC
program has been inadequately coordinated ire the past. Ac-
cording to these officials, one of the main reasons for this
has been the fragmentation of responsibilities among the
agencies involved. This fragmentation probably contributed
to problems we noted with the training and equipment por-
tions of the program. To correct this, the INC program is
being reorganized. During fiscal year 1978, program com-
ponents, formerly the responsibility of AID, will be trans-
ferred to the Department of State's Senior Advisor office.
This will include the equipment and pilot crop substitution
projects. Headquarters functions were transferred to the
Senior Advisor office in October 1977, field functions will
be transferred by April 1978, and support functions (such
as auditing) will be transferred by the end of fiscal year
1978.
In addition, Senior Advisor office officials said they
will take a more active role in the training program imple-
mented by DEA and the U.S. Customs Service. DEA and the
U.S. Customs Service have assigned a full-time liaison
directly to the Senior Advisor office. Senior Advisor of-
fice officials hope that by centralizing program management
many of the past problems can be corrected.
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AGENCY COMMENTS
Because of congressional needs for the information in
this report, we did not request written comments from the
agencies in order to expedite its issuance. However, we did
discuss it with DEA, the Department of State, and the CIA,
and their comments and suggestions were considered in pre-
paring the final report.
DEA told us that the report did not adequately reflect
the value of its drug control efforts and accomplishments
in South America. DEA officials said that their South
American operations form an integral part of the overall drug
control program.
The Department of State generally agreed with the re-
port, but did not agree with our conclusions on the crop
substitution program. The Department said that it was too
early to judge the impact of its crop substitution efforts.
The CIA said that the report was accurate overall. it
made several suggestions which were incorporated in the
appropriate sections of the report.
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
HOST GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS TO DRUG CONTROL
1975
1976
1977
Colombia:
Personnel
264
524
N/A
Funds
$2,260,000
$3,341,000
N/A
Peru:
Personnel
N/A
N/A
110
Funds
559,000
$ 539,000
$ 658,000
Bolivia :
Personnel
70
80
130
funds
$ 273,000
$1,035,000
$1,345,000
Note: N/A--data not available. Available data supplied by
respective U.S. embassies.
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO SOUTH AMERICAN
COUNTRIES, FISCAL YEARS 1973-1978 (note a)
Fical year Total Planned
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1973-77 1978
--------------------(000 omitted) -------------------------
Argentina $ - $ 345 $ 44 $ 13 $ - $ 402
Bolivia 86 21 69 22 1,013 1,210
Brazil - 125 191 178 280 774
Chile - 68 29 - (b) 98
Colombia 332 200 333 2,574 - 3,438
Ecuador 406 216 276 179 177 1,255
Panama 43 17 - - - 60
Paraguay 28 14 4 3 - 49.
Peru - 195 96 211 - 502
Uruguay 19 23 10 - - 52
Country
Description Amount
Fiscal
year
Argentina
2 fixed-wing aircraft $120
1974
Bolivia
60 jeeps, trucks, and sedans 602
1973-77
50 tear gas grenades, 9 revolvers (c)
1977
various communications equipment 189
1977
Brazil
various police equipment 265
1976 &
1977
Chile
8 trucks and sedans 35
1974
120 tear gas grenades, 25 pistols (c)
1974
Colombia
98 trucks, jeeps, and sedans 531
1973-76
4 boats (17-23 feet) 46
1974 &
1975
3 helicopters 1,700
1976
404 narcotest kits (c)
1973-76
Ecuador
81 jeeps, trucks, and sedans 495
500 carbines, 231 revolvers, and 38
1973-77
shotguns (c)
1973-76
Panama
4 sedans 14
1973
Paraguay
3 jeeps and station wagons 17
1973
Peru
21 trucks, motorcycles, etc. 112
1975 &
1976
5 boats (17-23 feet, airboat) 55
1975 &
1976
120 pairs of handcuffs (c)
1976
Uruguay
5 trucks, jeeps, sedans, etc. (c)
1973-75
a/Data provided by the Office of the Senior Advisor for Narcotics Matters.
The year refers to the year of the funds used. Data includes only that
equipment that has actually been purchased as of Oct. 1977.
b/Amount under $500?.
c/Cost not identifiable.
805
159
731
Total $914 $1,224 $1,052 $3,180 $1,470 $7,840 $3,077
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'4 T.
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APPENDIX III
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIE3
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT
Tenure of office
From- To
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ATTORNEY GENERAL:
Griffin B. Bell
Edward H. Levi
William B. Saxbe
Robert H. Bork, Jr. (acting)
Elliot L. Richardson
Richard G. Kleindienst
Richard G. Kleindienst
(acting)
John N. Mitchell
Jan. 1977
Feb. 1975
Jan. 1974
Oct. 1973
May 1,473
June 1372
Present
Jan. 1977
Feb. 1975
Jan. 1974
Oct. 1973
Apr. 1973
Feb. X)72
Jan. 1969
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION:
Peter B. Bensinger Feb. 1976
Peter B. Bensinger (acting) Jan. 1)76
Henry S. Dogin (acting) June 1975
John R. Bartels, Jr. Oct. 1973
John R. Bartels, Jr. (acting) July 1)73
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE:
Cyrus Vance Jan. 1)77
Henry A. Kissinger Sept. 1973
William P. Rogers Jan. 1969
Dean Rusk Jan. 1)61
SENIOR ADVISOR FOR NARCOTICS
MATTERS:
Mathea Falco Feb. 1)77
Sheldon Vance Apr. 1174
William Handley May 1173
Nelson Gross Aug. 1)71
June 1972
Feb. 1972
Present
Feb. 1976
Dec. 1975
May 1975
Oct. 1973
Present
Jan. 1977
Sept. 1973
Jan. 1969
Present
Feb. 1977
Mar. 1974
Jan. 1973
36
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APPENDIX III APPENDIX III
From To
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR:
Admiral Stansfied Turner mar. 1977 Present
George Bush Jan. 1976 Jan. 1977
William E. Colby Sept. 1973 Jan. 1976
James Schlesinger Feb. 1973 July 1973
Richard Helms June 1966 Feb. 1973
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATOR:
John J. Gilligan Mar. 1977 Present
Daniel Parker Oct. 1973 Mar. 1977
John A. Hannah Mar. 1969 Oct. 1973
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:
W. Michael Blumenthal Jan. 1977 Present
William E. Simon May 1974 Jan. 1977
George P. Shultz June 1972 May 1974
John B. Connally, Jr. Feb. 1971 June 1972
David M. Kennedy Jan. 1969 Feb. 1971
COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERV-
ICE:
Robert E. Chasen July 1977 Present
G. R. Dickerson (acting) May 1977 July 1977
Vernon D. Acree May 1972 Apr. 1977
Edwin F. Rains (acting) Feb. 1972 May 1972
Myles J. Ambrose Aug. 1969 Feb. 1972
(18651)
37
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