INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001700060039-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 17, 1978
• Content Type: MF

SEI4DER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
U1.ICLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
OLC
z
4
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
The attached was forwarded to the Director
via the DDCI. Copies furnished 0GC and OLC.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Ben Evans, Ex.Sec.
20 Apr 78
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
AppfP. I F `7ZeILYbg'&2'00t-i52t/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R00170006Vb39-
 MNNI uveu F VI rlteieaae euvaiu'+iee.. '..I, -rCVrv I ivi V7 JV , 1 (vv v
Ln ,
THE WHITE HOUSE '~b'~,, rr`
%A/ A C IJ t At /" T (1 AI rt~
April 17, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: I OLC #78 39;
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Intelligence Charter Legislation
I have read your memorandum of April 7 concerning the process by which
you propose to develop for SCC review proposed Administration positions
on the charter legislation before Congress. Two aspects are of great
'concern to me and require modification.
1. The NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) will be the
decision-making body on important policy issues concerning intelligence
charter legislation, not just problems that cannot be resolved in lower
interagency forums. The Senior Working Group should, therefore, as a
matter of highest priority identify and define those issues that fall
into this category and prepare appropriate recommendations for SCC
consideration.
65i
2. The Senior Working Group should have broader membership and
perhaps higher level leadership. The legislative charter problem is
much more than a legal problem. It also requires consideration at this
critical level by persons with broader practical experience and, in my
opinion, a Chairman who has your full perspective of the Intelligence
Community. I, therefore, suggest that you consider appointing your
Deputy, Frank Carlucci, as Chairman of the Senior Working Group and
encourage Defense and State to provide participants experienced in the
intelligence business. At a minimum, as Chairman of the SCC, my representative
will participate as a full member of the Senior Working Group.
Your preliminary identification of major substantive issues indicates
that we have considerable work to do in a relatively brief period of
time. I would, therefore, like to convene the SCC for an initial session
on a Senior Working Group proposed agenda within two weeks.
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
 ThcDirector Executive Aac,^st.
Central tnteliiornce Agency ?
r
` p13
Approved For Release 2005/04/22.:._CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060
. ,
7 April 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
SUBJECT : S. 2525 - Proposed Intelligence Charter Legislation
1. As you will recall, by your memorandum of 6 December 1977 you
asked that I assume primary responsibility for the coordination and develop-
ment of the authoritative Administration position concerning the proposed
intelligence charter legislation, reserving for the National Security Council's
Special Coordination Committee final review and approval.
2. At a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 14 February
1978, based upon that charge and my further conversations with you on this
subject, I instructed the various entities of the Intelligence Community to analyzo
thoroughly the legislation as introduced on 9 February and to submit resulting
comments and suggestions on 28 March. Many comments have been received,
with more to come, and have been reviewed briefly. In addition, I have discussed
with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, my Deputy for Resource Manage-
ment and my General and Legislative Counsels, the complexities of the proposed-
legislation and the steps that are necessary to ready ourselves for the
legislative ordeal that lies ahead.
3. The attached memorandum discusses in summary fashion the major
issues which the proposed legislation presents and requests that the appro-
priate Department Heads join in an organizational arrangement to permit us
jointly to address these issues forthwith. STANSFIELD TURNER
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
 --((~~~0ence A~enc
2~ CIA-`1 P81 M0098OR0017000
7 April 7.978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of Energy
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : S.2525 - Proposed Intelligence Charter Legislation -
Organizational and Substantive Considerations
I. General Background
1. In keeping with the charge from the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs that I coordinate the development of Administration
positions regarding the many issues presented by the proposed intelligence
charter legislation, at the NFIB meeting of 14 February, I requested comments
on that legislation from your representatives. In response my Office has
received a large number of comments, with more to come, ranging from broad,
general policy considerations of large organizational or operational importance
to editorial and grammatical suggestions. Summarized in this paper, for your
consideration, are the major issues which are presented by the bill and will
require resolution prior to further progress in this regard. Those issues
which cannot be dealt with at the working level, will, of necessity, require
decisions by the SCC, and in some cases the NSC or the President.
U. Organization
2. Initially, however, we must organize ourselves to begin the process
of correlating., analyzing and resolving the hundreds of issues, both large and
small, which have been identified and others which are not evident today but
will rise to the surface as our understanding of the content and intent of this
of attempt at comprehensive reformation and regulation of the intelligence activities
of the government develops more fully over time. The legislative process is
likely to be lengthy and complex with multiple hearings by various committees,
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M0098OR001700060039-6
proposaIs, counterproposals, "mark-up" sessions, etc. To ensure a thorough,
coordinated approach to the legislation and to provide for an ongoing means
for examination and resolution of the issues which have been and will be raised
during this process, I plan to establish the following framework.
3. Mr. Anthony Lapharn, Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence,
as well as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall act in the
former capacity to direct the organization and functioning of a senior charter
legislation working group to be comprised of a principal legal officer from the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and
the Central Intelligence Agency, those being the entities with the foremost
equities in the ultimate shape of this legislation. This group shall develop
as it sees fit, and preside over, an appropriate organization of representatives
drawn from each of the named entities, as well as the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Energy, the National Security Council, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security
Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the DOD reconnaissance offices,
and the military intelligence services. These representatives may be arranged
by the senior working group into lesser working groups by specialized area,
by portions of the bill, or in some other form, may be assigned tasks individ-
ually, or may be organized in whatever other manner the senior group believes
will most effectively accomplish the purpose of developing issues and positions.
Issues and other matters which cannot be resolved at the lower working levels,
or which require more authoritative consideration, will be brought to the senior
working group for review and, to the extent possible, resolution. This working
group shall be responsible for periodically reporting to the member's principals
and the NSC Special Coordination Committee concerning the status of this process
and the legislation, and shall present coordinated positions, policy matters,
and unresolved major issues, with appropriate recommendations, to the SCC
for consideration and resolution. The heads of the entities represented on the
senior working group are requested to furnish to Mr. Lapham by 15 April the
name of the legal officer who shall participate in the group. T11r. Lapham will
convene the group shortly thereafter to discuss the functioning of that group
and the supporting organization.
III. Major Substantive Issues
4. Summarized below are the major areas of concern developed in our
preliminary analysis of the comments received to date, and which should form _
the basis for initial deliberations by the senior working group structure
described above and should be brought to the SCC for consideration shortly.
5. While complete comments have not yet been received from all the NFIB
entities, in, general there do not appear to be deep, irreconcilable differences
between the intelligence agencies concerning the proposed charter legislation.
Several general areas of concern appeal- to be shared widely including:
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
 prove or Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
a. The most basic issue concerns the acceptable scope and
detail of legislation concerning the world of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence. The FBI has suggested that the existing bill is
so far removed from its preference as to suggest the need to draft a
counter-bill. The wisdom and practicality of this approach as an
alternative, or in addition, to revising the SSCI bill should be
determined.
b. An additional area of concern is the elaborate and encumber-
ing system of oversight and reporting requirements which S. 2525
waiuld visit upon the intelligence agencies of the government. Attached
C> 4D.
is a compilation and description of the 68 major reporting requirements
which have been identified in the text of the various titles. The effects
of this scheme would appear to constitute a tremendous burden on
existing resources and a major obstacle to the smooth functioning of the
Intelligence Community. These reporting requirements raise ancillary
questions as to whether, for example, it is proper for Congress to
insert itself into the day-to-day affairs of the Executive Branch and
whether the decision-making processes of the President may be required
to include the National Security Council and certain specified factors
and considerations. It may also be argued that the extensive congres-
sional involvement by way of establishing arbitrary yet specific investi-
gative thresholds and time limits constitutes execution of the laws,
reserved to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution, rather than
enactment of the laws of the U.S. Finally, the requirement for prior
reporting of agreements with foreign intelligence services is most
troubling and has already been the subject of some concern to such
services.
c. The organization of the Intelligence Community as envisioned
in S. 2525 must also be treated as a matter for consideration. The inter-
relationships embodied in the bill deserve careful review. For example,
the Attorney General would be required to approve a wide variety of.
FBI activities and to annually review all its "intelligence activities," a
review encompassing some 20-30,000 actions each year according to the
FBI. The relationship between the control and review authorities and
responsibilities of the Attorney General and the DII concerning counter-
intelligence and national intelligence activities is unclear- The inter-
action of the centralized signals intelligence function given the National
Security Agency and the specialized activities in that area of, for example,
the FBI (internal security), CIA (clandestine collection operations), and
the Air Force (counterintelligence and law enforcement) should be
clarified. The difficult question of the demarcation between law enforce-
ment and intelligence or counterintelligence activities must be raised.
3
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00-980R001700060039-6
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
There is some feeling that communications security must be treated
in a separate title rather than referenced somewhat briefly in this
proposal. To a large extent these issues may be a matter of definitic,,,:,:
precision, but the proliferation of definitions in the name of precisio,,
is not the answer as is illustrated by the fact that in Title I there ar,-
now 15 definitional variations on the theme of intalligence and relates,,
activities.
d. The difficult yet vital issues relating to legislative protectf
for -intelligence sources and methods, and criminal or civil sanctions r, r
their unauthorized disclosure, persist. These questions have yet tai
be resolved satisfactorily within the Administration despite a month.-
long study, and the recent SSCI subcommittee hearings served largr-.,
to establish only that a real problem exists. The charter process sew.
to present a suitable opportunity to make progress in this area.
e. Title III presents the wealth of issues associated with the
use of electronic surveillance against U.S. persons for foreign intel-
ligence purposes, not only as to the largely agreed upon provisions
of S. 1566 concerning domestic activities which it incorporates, but
also the principles to be applied to operations abroad, matters upon
which the Administration itself has not yet reached agreement, The
procedures and standards to be required in instituting such surveil-
lance, the duration of approved surveillance, and the treatment of
information acquired from such surveillance abroad, are all matters
of large import and concern which will require extensive discussien_
In addition, the existing bill subjects unconsented physical searches
and mail opening involving U.S. persons, both at home and abroad,
to similar requirements for judicial approval. Issues abound here
as whether judicial or Attorney General approval is required, whether
a criminal standard is necessary or advisable, and the problems pose-?i
by the unavoidable entanglement of foreign intelligence services in
these activities abroad.
f. Further issues are presented by the review authorities
assigned to the Department of Justice and the Comptroller General ba-
the bill. The practicality of requiring an almost constant presence-'~A-
the Justice Department and the advisability of aut'chorizing not only
detailed audits but also program reviews by the Comtroller General,
at the request of any congressional committee or on personal initiaNv-1,.
must be carefully considered.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
11
 t
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 CIA-RDP81 M00980R001700060039-6
g. The question of appropriate review, approval and reporting
of special activities and sensitive collection activities is a major one.
The mechanisms and findings which are required by the bill may be
inherently incompatible with the nature of the very activities which are
at issue.
h. Another area of debate is the various restrictions and pro-
hibitions which would be imposed upon intelligence activities by this
bill- The draft legislation raises knotty issues regarding, among other
things, relations with members of the clergy, representatives of the
news media, and individuals participating in U.S. Government-supported
exchange programs, the extent and nature of intelligence collection
activities initiated, and the techniques utilized, against U.S. persons,
as well as the protections to be afforded to foreign persons in the U.S.
Each of these areas will be the subject of extensive discussions and,
along with restrictions and prohibitions which are less subject to dis-
agreement, e.g., human experimentation, will require carefully drafted
language if retained in the bill so as not to destroy all flexibility or bar
legitimate intelligence activities.
6. There are a multitude of issues concerning the precise wording of
the various provisions of the bill and lesser policy issues. For instance, the
bill provides joint and several liability on the part of employees and the U.S.
for several types of violations. The proper Administration position in this
regard must be determined in view of the inconsistency of this provision with
the premises of the Federal Tort Claims Act and Administration consideration
of a bill to insulate employees from personal liability. Other issues concern
proper grade levels, terms in office, and requirements for senatorial consent,
where provided for intelligence agency officials. The Administration's pre-
ferred counterintelligence, counterterrorism and anti-narcotics structure
must be developed in order to engage in meaningful discussions of those
provisions of the bill. The questions attendant to any fair consideration of
security, cover, and proprietaries must be addressed to some degree. This
list of "minor" matters could go on and on but would serve little purpose here
other than to further illustrate the depth and breadth of the task ahead. The
r
senior working group should move expeditiously to f0c i_3 and n arrovl these
issues for the SCC. i
/
STANSFJELD TLIRNEll
. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP81 M0098OR001700060039-6