EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450 - ANTICIPATED REVISION THEREOF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050058-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: May 9, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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9 May 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Community Security
Group
Personnei Industrial
Security Branch
SUBJECT: Executive Order 10450 -
Anticipated Revision Thereof
1. RECOMMENDED ACTION: It is recommended that
the Director of Security brief the Director of Central
Intelligence on the possible implications of the revision
of EO 10450, with the anticipated exemption of CIA and
the Intelligence Community. At that time the DCI should
be advised of the previous CIA position in the matter as
set forth in CIA memorandum dated 23 December 1976. (See
tab A attached).
2. BACKGROUND: In February 1975 an intraagency
organization, referred to as Project Ten, under the direction
of the Domestic Council began a series of meetings which
were co-chaired by a representative of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense and an official of the Civil Service
Commission to revise EO 10450. CIA was not invited to, and
did not participate in, any of the meetings which culminated
in the preparation of the draft revision which was submitted
to the Office of Management and Budget in August 1976 for
formal coordination within the Executive Branch. See
reference thereto in the CIA memorandum dated 23 December 1976
which is attached as tab A.
3. CIA was informally advised of these efforts to
revise EO 10450 in February 1976. Subsequently the Office
of Security briefed the SECOM and the CIA position that is
set forth in tab A was evolved. It should be noted at
this point that there was no SECOM agreement as to the scope
of the recommended investigative standards. In this
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connection it should be noted that the Department of
Defense unilaterally reduced the scope of DOD investigations
by memorandum dated 3 May 1976, by order of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth. (See tab B attached.)
The DOD policy basically provided for a five (5) year
investigative scope for access to Top Secret. Access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information in the Department of
Defense is governed by DCID 1/14. As a result of that order
military personnel now may be granted a Top Secret clearance
on the basis of a favorable National Agency Name Check
plus ten (10) years of continuous honorable service.
Civilian employees and military personnel who do not have
ten (10) years of continuous honorable service are subject
to a five (5) year investigation.
4. The final draft submitted by Project Ten Committee
essentially consisted of the five (5) year investigation
which was implemented by the 3 May 1976 Ellsworth memorandum.
The Department of State has a seven (7) year investigative
requirement for access to Top Secret information.
5. From the foregoing it should be apparent that there
is no agreement within the Intelligence Community as to the
scope of investigations for non-SCI access. The Investigative
Standards Working Group has been unable to reach an agreement
in this area, notwithstanding the fact that two (2) surveys
have been conducted since 1976 which have indicated that
the five (5) year investigative scope is inadequate. The
DOD representatives and others concede this point but are
reluctant to take any official position inconsistant with
the Ellsworth directive of 3 May 1976, which was taken to
offset the reduction in DOD resources as a result of a DOD
budget curtailment.
6. No positive action was apparently taken by OMB
on the 23 December 1976 Agency position as set forth in tab
A. In April 1977 I was advised that a working group would
be established to reconsider the matter. However, in
May 1977 I was advised that the decision had been made by
the 0MB to refer the entire matter to the CSC for the
preparation of a new draft for OMB. This was accomplished
unilaterally by CSC, without Agency coordination, in August
1977. The CSC draft that was submitted to OMB exempted
CIA and the Intelligence Community. (See bottom of page
two (2) of tab C.) Since that time 0MB has delayed further
action on the matter due to other priorities. The last
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information received from the Office of Legislative
Council indicates that the proposed new Executive Order
is still under active consideration however, has been
deferred for more pressing matters. It could be
reactivated at any time and reportedly is ready for
submission to the agencies for formal coordination.
7. It is unknown at this point if CIA and the
Intelligence Community will be exempt from the final
draft that OMB will submit for Agency coordination.
However, it is believed that this will be the case. If
this is the case then it is submitted that it will be
incumbent upon the Community Security Group to come
forward, in a relatively short time, with a coordinated
written policy directive (like a DCID). If this is not
done I submit that the DCI and the Intelligence Community
will be subject to severe criticism. As indicated above
there is a fundamental disagreement as to the proper scope
of investigations within the Intelligence Community and
therefore a compromise will have to be reached among the
SECOM members which will be less than the recommended CIA
position. We can, I suppose, say that this is the minimum
standard and take the position within CIA that we will
continue to follow our own higher standards , that the
mission of CIA requires same. However, I submit that this
is less than desirable and that we should continue to
strive for one uniform standard, not only in the Intelligence
Community but throughout government, as set forth in the
former DCI George Bush memo of 23 December 1976 (tab A).
8. In addition to the foregoing it is further
assumed that there will be no provision for oversight for
the Intelligence Community. (In the last CSC draft the
National Security Council was assigned a oversight role
over the CSC and the Department of Justice in the operation
of the proposed new Federal Personnal Security Program.)
Consideration should be given as to the degree and
organizations which properly should preform such oversight
for the Intelligence Community. In this connection it is
not believed that the Community Security Group would be
appropriate for this function - perhaps this would be an
appropriate function for the Intelligence Oversight Board
or some other external group, including the congressional
oversight committees.
9. During my recent informal conversations with a.
representative of the Office of Legislative Counsel we
considered the pros and cons of proposing that OMB, instead
of exempting CIA and the Intelligence Community, issue a
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separate Executive Order for CIA and the Intelligence
Community, or accomplish the same objectives by amending
EO 12036. I am not in favor of this approach because I
feel that it will raise all sorts of political questions
as to the reasons for the different treatment and the
lack of due process guarantees, etc., for the Intelligence
Community as opposed to the rest of the Executive Branch.
In conclusion, I think the best approach is to leave the
OMB alone and to accept the exemption for the CIA and
Intelligence Community, if it is in the draft submitted
for Agency coordination.
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STAT
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7D 35 Hda s .
REMARKS:
DATE
10 May 1978
Per our telecon of
9 May 1978 this is a reminder that
the recommendations expressed her
in have not been approved. It is
requested that you contact the
undersigned in the event that your
office contemplates any action in
this matter.
Respectfully,
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