S.2525- -TITLE I - - MEETING OF CIA REPRESENTATIVES ON 22 MAY 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001900070036-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: May 23, 1978
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/08/01: CIA-RDP81 M00980R001900070036-6
S.2525--Title I -- Meeting of CIA Representatives on 22 May 1978
The following issues as to Title I of S.2525, arranged in order by section
numbers, were raised and discussed at a meeting on 22 May involving repre-
sentatives of various CIA components:
a. Sections 103(4) and 114(c) may imply authority in the Congress "to
impose requirements on the IC as opposed to being a mere consumer of its
products.
b. Sections 104(17) and (19) raise the issue of the sufficiency of sources
and methods protection provided due to inadequacies in these definitions.
[Also 104(18)(D), because of its separation from 104(17) and (19) and lack
of a qualifier concerning the type of R&D concerned, may imply that R&D
matters do not qualify for such protection.]
c. Section 111(a) is unclear concerning the relationship between the NSC
and the IC entities which are placed under its "direction and control."
d. Sections 114(b) and 114(m) may become problems if State pursues
its suggestions to, respectively, require the DNI to coordinate counterterrorism
activities abroad with the Chief of Mission and to keep the Chief of Mission
fully informed "and otherwise comply" with 22 U . S . C . 2680a.
e. Seciton 114(d), in connection with the Presidential transfer authority
in 117, raises the issue of whether the DNI should remain as head of CIA (and,
parenthetically, if not what degree of independence from the DNI should the
head of CIA possess).
f. Section 114(e) (3) may be a problem if DOD persists in its suggestion
to limit DNI coordination to "national" clandestine collection activities abroad.
g. Section 114(j) embodies the issue of requiring prior or any reporting
of foreign liaison agreements. State has suggested such reporting be sub-
sequent and be exempted from the Case Act requirements.
h. Section 114(1), although related to the overall issues regarding sources
and methods, may give rise to independent issues if DOD persists in its assertion
to limit this DNI authority to protect only "national" intelligence sources and
methods, and if State pursues its amendment to remove this protection as it
may apply to deny information to Chiefs of Missions.
MORI/CDF
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i. Section 116(c) may raise an issue in that it requires the DNI and all.
IC entities to comply with the Federal Advisory Act (which now exempts CIA)
except as they may specifically waive its requirements which include, among
other things, open meetings, filing a detailed committee charter with OMB,
publishing information in the Federal Register, etc.
j. Section 121(a) may give rise to an issue to the extent other agencies
oppose inclusion of the CIA-suggested language from E.O. 12036 giving the
DNI authority concerning reprogramming within the NFIP.
k. Section 123 gives rise to issues regarding the appropriate initiation,
scope and recipient of GAO audits of intelligence activities (initiation by GAO
alone, any committee or only the oversight committees? Program and manage-
ment audits or only financial? Report to only oversight, or to other, committees?)
1. Section 151(a) provides a statutory charter for the IOB and calls
into question the advisability of such a provision in law.
m, Section 151 (j) (3) protects so-called "whistleblowers" too well .
n. Sections 151 and 152 include 15 separate requirements for reports
to the Congress and- present the general issue of the proper form and nature
of such reporting provisions.
o. Sections 152(d) and (e) will present great practical difficulties and
will disrupt normal records-keeping practices.
p. Section 153 may present an issue as to controlling access by Senate
staff personnel to sensitive information through requiring security clearances
and other measures. Also, it should be made clear that the oversight committee
procedures provide the sole authority for access by other members of Congress
to such information. (Note that 153(d) (1) may take care of this problem by
providing that the access and use limitations of (c) (2), among other provisions,
will constitute House and Senate rules and supersede other inconsistent rules.)
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 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
OLC ~a
I
7
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OM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Assistant General Counsel
DATE 2 3 MAY 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column often each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
A TI DDA
Attn:
This is my summary reconstitution
of the matters discussed at out
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Attn:
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7- Legislative Counsel
Attn:
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8.
9. Comptroller
Attn:
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10.
11.
Inspector General
6E08
12.
13.
14.
15.
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