AVIATION WEEK ARTICLE, 'SOVIET SUBMARINES VIOLATE PACT'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002000040047-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM

Approved For Release 2006/11/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R002000040047-5
TO:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washin ton D. C. 205
Telephone:
8 March 1978
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
S-116, The Capitol
Washing? D.C. 20510
ATTENTION: Bill Ashworth
Dear Bill,
passed on
your request for information on
Soviet ballistic missile sub-
marines. I am forwarding a copy
of the Aviation Week article
along wit' h a one-page memorandum,
which I hope will provide the answers
you wanted. Please do not hesitate
to contact me if I can be of
further assistance.
FORM 1533 OBSOLETE
6-68 rREV
E O ITIONS
0./e-,!~ X90
Approved For Release 2006/11/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R002000040047-5
 Approved For Release 2006/11/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R002000040047-5
Approved For Release 2006/11/22 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R002000040047-5
 V, ripi-RIrle., P"(7"i
Russians have two more boats at sea than permitted under
interim offensive agreement; three more ready to deploy
By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.
Washington-Soviet Union is operating 64 ballistic missile submarines in violation of
the interim offensive agreement that binds both sides pending completion of the second
strategic arms Ii itation accord now being _negotiated in Geneva.
Under the interim pact, the USSR is permitted 62 ballistic missile boats with an
aggregate 950 launchers. The interim agreement expired Oct. 3, 1977, but both sides
said they would respect it until it is replaced with a new agreement.
In addition to the 64 ballistic missile
submarines already at sea, the Soviets under construction on the date of the
have three Delta 'class suTmarines outfit- SALT I agreement required dismantling
tted .and ready to put to sea. That is and destruction of ICBM launchers on a
s partially the reason why the official Soviet one-for-one basis.
newspaper, Pravda, recently called for a "It was clearly a part of SALT 1 and
rapid conclusion of the SALT 2 treaty, understood by both sides that Hotel boats
U.S. strategic arms experts said. One would be counted," one U. S. strategic
official of the Administration of President ? arms expert said. "Now, hbwever, the
Jimmy Carter said that with the limit in U. S. has waffled on that item, and it is
fthe SALT 1 accord, "the Russians are! unclear just what we are counting."
shackled because they are moving more Gen. George S: Brown, chairman of the
and more of their nuclear armed missiles Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress this
to sea, phasing out older ICBMs (inter- month that "the Soviet ballistic missile
j continental ballistic missiles), and they are submarine force continues to grow in size
stymied until SALT 2 is ratified." and capability, a reflection of its high
Under the proposed SALT 2 agreement priority.,As of Jan. 1, 1978, the Soviets
based on the Vladivostok framework, it had almost 900 submarine-launched bal-
would not be necessary to dismantle or 'listic missile launchers on SSBNs in oper-
destroy older ICBMs in order to increase tional status. There are additional launch-
SLBMs, piovidcu iuai tiic aggregate iimit crs on SSBNs, which arc fitting out, on
of 2,400 strategic delivery systems- sea trials or under construction. There also
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and
heavy bombers-or the sublimit of mis-
siles with multiple independently retarget-
able vehicles is not exceeded, a Defense
official told Congress.
U. S. officials said that in addition to
the Delta submarines now at sea, there are
another six or seven Hotel class boats
being operated that also are over the limit
in SALT 1. "Part of the problem is that
the Soviets said they were dismantling
'. some of the older ballistic missile subma-
rines, but there is no real move on their
part to do that," another U. S. official
said.
"This is just another example of the
Russian characteristic to see how far they
can push until we call them on it," the
official added.. "It was only a year or so
back when we had to demand that they
dismantle some SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM
launchers to compensate for submarines
armed with ballistic missile launchers
[Aw&sT May 31, 1976, p. 14; May 24,
1976, p. 20].
"They were in violation of the interim
treaty then," the official added.
The protocol to the .interim agreement
permitted both the U.S. and USSR to
increase the size of submarine-launched
ballistic missile forces-from 656 to 710
on 44 boats for the U.S. and from. 740 to
the 950 on 62 submarines for the USSR
Backfire Issue
Washington-Soviet Union's Tupolev
Backfire bomber is expected to be elimi-
nated from any formal treaty arrange-
ment between the U. S. and the Soviet
Union as part of the Strategic Arms Limi-
tations Talks (SALT) 2.
Congressional staff members said
U. S. negotiators have agreed to a Soviet
bargaining position that the Backfire be
handled in a separate written statement
to be issued by the Kremlin leadership
that assures the bomber will not be
deployed as a threat against the U. S.,
and that the monthly production rate will
not be increased.
At the same lime, the U. S. also would
issue a statement that would present
conflicting views concerning the Backfire.
"None of the Soviet so-called collateral
restraints are verifiable," a congressional
staffer said.
Sen. John Tower (R. Tex.), a member
of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, said he is dissatisfied with State
Dept. explanations concerning the Back-
fire issue. "The Soviet Backfire bomber
has strategic capability," he said, after
meeting with State Dept. officials. "It is
undeniable. I will not be a party to any
delu ion t t
But any i ro, F.R,1.,$,Q~p6/ 1/22 : CIA-I V X00980R0020(
are launchers on older diesel units, i
are not accountable under the S
interim agreement."
In response to an AVIATION WE
SPACE TECHNOLOGY query, the De
Dept. said that the Soviet Union was
ating. as of Jan. 1, the following nur
of submarines:
s Yankee class nuclear-powered
armed with 16 SS-N-6 ballistic mi
with a range of 2,400-3,000 km.
vessels.
n Delta class boats-27. This is a
of both the 12-launcher Delta I ant
16-launcher Delta 2. Both vessels arc
armed with the SS-N-8 missile wi
7,800-km. range.
rs Other older ballistic missile sul
tines-30. This includes nuclear-pow
Hotel boats that are armed with three
N-5s each. The missile has a rang
1,300 km.
rr Cruise missile submarines-65.
M Attack submarines-195. ?
Defense Secretary Harold Brown
the Soviet SLBM force continues
undergo both expansion and moderr
Lion. Construction of the Yankee-(
submarine stopped at 34 boats with
launchers. "However, we believe t:,
new solid-fuel missile :k;iis a t,vs.
vehicle, greater accuracy and range-
SS-NX-17-may be backfitted into s
or all of the Yankees- To date, only
unit has been so fitted," Brown said.
? He added that "the Soviets now ha'
total of 27 Delta submarines. The Deit
and 2s carry the SS-N-8, a single-warh
missile with a range of at least 7,800
A new submarine, the Delta 3, is
undergoing sea trials. The Soviets are
testing the SS-NX-18-a very long-re
liquid post-boost vehicle and up to tl
M I RVs.
Both the SS-N-8 and the SS-NX
will permit the Soviets to cover tar;
located in the U. S_ from patrol areas
distant as the Barents Sea and the wai
of the North Pacific. With the SS-,N
the Soviets already have a system
greater range than the Trident 1,' Brc
explained.
The Delta 3 has 24 launchers. -
One of the major problems facing
U. S. Navy today is obsolescence of
Poseidon fleet ballistic missile force.
normal 20-year life of some Poseidon!
being extended to 25 years, but even w
that there will be a significant reductior.
U. S. SLBM launch tubes in the 1980s
"Since the Polaris/Poseidon force %
built at a faster rate than that planned
Trident, with a 20-year service life,
U. S. would encounter a low level of 2
OQS &4-a5nchers in 1986 as compared
 ??y vpcrauonal
SSBN forces as a result of
te~ ,rblF~at Release 2WW11122 : CI - 81 0 -
onal considerations are the role TO f1 SAL
all x Ir of strategic forces.
"However, potential force levels can be