TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002000040055-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM

ForCERelease NTRAL~ NTELL
IGENCE AGENCY
.
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washinaton, D_ C. 5
Telephon
7 Uu ch 1978.
TO: Mr. Joseph DiGiorgio
International Division
General Accounting Office 1)
A Q'7 A-
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. DiGiorgio:
Attachqd is some further informa-
tion from as we discussed
at our meeting. I hope you will
find it helpful
E
FORM
6.68 1533 9 OBSO V LEOTU S
0REI
EDITIONS
Enclosure is a computer listing of terrorist incidents
that happened throughout the world.
RJK:kjs
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3 March 1978
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
P 4JRANDUM
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY
PROTECTED PERSONS
This memorandum swrunarizes basic conclusions which can be derived
from unclassified data regarding terrorist activity directed against 45
and foreign diplomatic installations and officials during the past
decade. * The accompanying tables present detailed information on the
incidents upon which these conclusions are based. Interpretation of the
statistics should be based upon the appended codebook and explanation of
the limitations of the data.
Between 1968 and 1977, 234 acts of terrorism were directed against-
US diplomatic installations, and individuals abroad, Incendiary and
explosive bombings were by far the most- popular tactics in the terrorists' -
repertoire, accounting. for 62 and 88 incidents, respectively. A peak in
activity occurred in 1970 and 1971, when more than 50 incidents were
.reported each.year.- -While-these-,figures fell- off significantly in the
following years, there was an increase in the numbers of attacks reported
in 1977. (See Figure 1.)
* This discussion is confined to attacks aimed solely at diplomats
or diplomatic installations. It does not include incidents involving
military or other official representatives of the foreign government.
t
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, In tions and comments may be
addressed tol
RP-M-78-10088
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Latin America was the scene of the most attacks on American dip-
lomatic establishments (80 incidents), followed by Western Europe (54
incidents), and the Middle East (50 incidents). (See Figure 2. Charac-
teristics of each of these 234 incidents can be found in Figure 3.)
In the eight cases in which American diplomats were reported to be
victims of hostage incidents, terrorist demands included the release of
prisoners, safe passage from the scene, publication of manifestos, and
other non-logistic demands. Sixty-one prisoners were released from
foreign prisons in. response to these incidents. (See Figure 5.)
in-
During the past decade, foreign diplomatic installations and
dividuals were targeted in 497 cases. (See Figure 4.) Foreign diplomats
were taken hostage in 33 incidents. Terrorist demands paralleled those
made in the cases of American victimization, but also included specific
political changes to be made by a foreign government. (See Figure 6.)
Legal actions taken against offenders have varied, depending upon
the governments involved and the specifics of the case-.' In all but 12
of the incidents of attacks on American diplomats, we have no informa
tion indicating that any arrests were made. In these 12 cases,-a total
of 61 individuals were incarcerated. We have information on 48 cases of
attacks against foreign diplomatic facilities, indicating that 164
individuals were arrested. The ultimate disposition of the cases of
these suspects has varied according to circumstances of the incident.
(See Figures 7 and 8. The reader is warned, however that the disposition
of offenders is poorly reported in open sources. A comprehensive study
of governmental responses to these-incidents would probably give a far
different picture of the extent'of prosecutions.)
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A Note on Interpretation of Statistics
While compilations of data on terrorism can serve as a useful
analytical tool'in suggesting trends and probabilities based upon
historical experience, as well as retrieving information on specific
incidents, one must be aware of the assumptions and limitations involved.
To qualify for inclusion into the system, the terrorist incident
must have involved the use or attempted use of violence for political
purposes when (1) such action was intended to influence the attitude and
behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims, and (2) its
ramifications transcended national boundaries (as a result, for example,
of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the.
identity of its institutional or human victims, 'its declared objectives,'
or the mechanics of its resolution). Thus,-the statistics exclude
terrorist attacks on,US and allied personnel and installations-in, Indo-
china. They also-exclude most of the' mutual assassination efforts and
cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict; the
only exceptions are incidents that either victimized noncombatant nationals
of states outside the principal arena of conflict or were of such a
nature that they became the object of international controversy.
Figures also exclude bombing, shelling, and incursions by conventional
forces. Related but separately targeted actions undertaken by a single
terrorist group were counted'as individual incidents,-even when they
were staged on the same day and in close-proximity to one another'.
Terrorist operations that aborted during execution (as opposed to-those-
that were abandoned or countered during-the planning'or staging phases)
were counted.
There are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific
incidents and groups--and even those terrorist organizations and actions
on which there is considerable reliable information do not always fit
nearly..into-_the_typologies. that have been created for them. Moreover,
the number of incidents under review'is so small that unintended- omissions
'(of which there are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification 'of
borderline events could have a statistically significant impact. In
many cases in which the perpetrator is unknown, attribution to terrorists
may be misleading. The action may have been undertaken by criminals,'
psychotics, or revenge-seeking individuals with specific nonpolitical
grievances against the target, rather than by terrorists.'
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The statistics are based solely on unclassified material published
from 1968 through 1977. There is no way of telling how much of the
sharp rise in recorded terrorist incidents over the past decade reflects
a real.increase in such activity and how much is attributable to more
comprehensive and systematic reporting by the press. On the other hand,
many incidents have probably not been reported. For example, corpora-
tions appear to be wary of reporting threats or attacks against them,
for reasons of increased insurance, governmental sanctions against the
payment of ransom,. disagreement with governmental authorities regarding
how to handle the incident, and potential loss of public and investor
confidence. Official compilations are subject to other reportorial
inhibitions.
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