TWO FLAILING CARTER APPOINTEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002000090187-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 187
• Publication Date: January 9, 1977
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R002000090187-5
CIA OPERATIONS CENTER
NEWS SERVICE
DISTRIBUTION II
The attached are from today's Star.
Date. 9 ,j-an
Item No. 2
Ref. No.
/Charles Bartlett
Two flailing Carter appointees
President Carter has
been impressive for the
alacrity with which he con-
cedes and corrects his own
mistakes. but so far he has
seemed distressingly toler-
ant of two bad personnel
choices.
The CIA and Action,
agencies with diverse but
sensitive roles, are being
ground into a morbid state
of morale by the maladmin-
istration of the Carter ap-
pointees, Stansfield Turner
and Samuel Brown. In both
cases the damage to morale
has stemmed from suspi-
cions that they regard their
as impulsive lurches that
reflect the directors' anxi-
ety to assert their power
more than their concern
with the morale and per-
formance of their subordi-
nates.
Reporters are bustling
now around Washington to
nail down allegations that
Brown, who gained fame as
a mobilizer of Vietnam pro-
tests, is using the agency as
a personal vehicle. Embit-
tered employees are anx-
ious to show that Brown has
been softening ground rules
drafted to protect the volun-
teer spirit from sullying
involvement with the pres-
sure groups.
The impact upon the
Peace Corps, still lustrous
after 17 years as an express
sion of American idealism,
has been especially nega-
agencies as stepping-
stones.
Hopes that Carter is mov-
ing to curb Turner, whose
management decisions are
highly controversial, have
been stirred by the White
House's insistence on nam-
ing Frank Carlucci as his
deputy director. Turner.
wanted rotating deputies
who would not intrude on
him, but in Carlucci he will
confront a strong and inde
pendent spirit.
Although a deputy can
lean against the director's
course of an ambitious
admiral who pulls away
from the voices of experi-
ence within the agency.
Surrounded by an inner cir-
cle of his own selection and
preoccupied with speeches
and public relations ges-
tures, Turner is not creat-
ing a climate in which he is
likely to learn from his mis-
takes.
There is great commotion
in both agencies, but much
of it is change for the sake
of change. In both places
the new leadership has im-
mistakes, he is unlikely, posed reorganizations
however, to change the which are widely perceived
boast that he has rescued
the Peace Corps from the;
oblivion of the Nixon-Ford
years, he has given top
priority to efforts to swell
the numbers of volunteers
dispatched. to developing'
nations.
In every'change of ad-
ministration, the newcom
ers are tempted by what is.11
known to civil servants as
"re-inventing the wheel."
This is an exercise in which
the newly installed adminis-
trators discard the experi-
ence of their predecessors
in order to gain the look of
innovators. It is part of the,
price of democracy.
But the silliness at Action
and CIA reflects more than
the usual ego exertions and
is causing more than the
usual damage. Turner took
over the CIA at a delicate
point, when it had begun,
under George Bush, to
recover from the trauma of
a national re-thinking of
intelligence activities. The I
Peace Corps had been sub-
merged by its incorporation
into Action, so it was partic-
ularly vulnerable to the
adversities and neglect of
the past 11 months.
Bad performances by key
appointees pose a vexing
problem for presidents. But
the unhappiness in these
two agencies is swelling to
a point at which it deserves
to be weighed against Car-
ter's instinct to be loyal to
these two men...
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Chinks
.
oors to
Our Atom Arsenal
By iJ978 oso ph Albright Newspapers
As an imposter I talked my way
)ast the security guards at two
iighly secret Air Force nuclear
weapons depots last month and was
given a tour of the weak links in their
defenses against terrorist attacks.
I passed within a stone's throw of
six metal tubes that appeared to be
hydrogen bombs. I could not tell
whether the tubes were real bombs
or training devices.
Without doing anything illegal, I
also purchased a set of government
blueprints showing the exact layout
Ot the weapons compounds and'-the
nearby alert areas where bomb-
laden B-52s of the Strategic Air Com-
mand are ready to take off in case of
nuclear war.
One blueprint disclosed a method
of knocking out the alarm circuits.
Another diagram showed two un-
guarded gates through the innermost
security fence.
CARRYING A Brooks Brothers
topcoat and a yellow plastic hardhat,
I appeared at the first base last
month and claimed to be a potential
bidder on a construction contract.
Reporter-imposter
Discovers Secrets Easily
No one questioned me or asked for
any credentials except for my Dis-
trict of Columbia driver's license. No
one searched me or demanded to in-
spect my bulky briefcase. As far as
the guards knew, I could have been
carrying hand grendades.
Looking equally amateurish, I
entered another SAC base a few
weeks later and joined a tour of its
weapons' compound that had been
organized for - prospective contrac-
tors. This time, guards required two
ID's - a credit card and my driver's
license. They also manifested a con-,
The first SAC base is less than 10
miles from a medium-sized Ameri-
can city, in a region that has been
beset by terrorist dynamitings. The
second SAC base is about 20 miles
(This story deliberately omits the,,
identity of the two SAC bases men-
tioned as well as a precise account of
their security arrangements. The
names of weapons custodians and
other base officials have been
changed.)
The exercise was part of a two
month investigation into one of the
ghastly, yet unavoidable, questions
of the nuclear age: are Americans
safe from their own nuclear weap-
ons? Without succumbing to hand-
wringing or hysteria, it is fair to con-
clude that there are some vinexcusa-
ble U.S.
chinks in the doors
atomic arsenal.
Informed in advance about this
story, Pentagon nuclear weapons
chief Donald R. Cotter ordered an
immediate investigation into Defense
Department construction procedures
involving weapon sites. As part of the
inquiry, Cotter phoned Air Force ;
Gen. Richard Ellis, SAC commander
in Omaha, to find the exact circum-
stances of my unwanted visits.
"You did find a considerable chink]
in the security system A-6'
fense Harold Brown's assistant for
atomic energy.
I "THIS WAS TOO goddamn sim
h
ld
"Thi
`
`
"
ou
s story s
said Cotter
ie
,. ie e a plus for our security efforts."
In recent years, Cotter explained,
construction jobs at weapon's sites
have been opened to contractors
without security clearances in an ef-
fort to avoid concentrating too much
business among a small "club", of
siderable interest in my middle ini-! gon and Department of Ener
gy
:10 - zveudd._be "
a,fewyears
p
tial. They even went so fat as to weapons experts, includes
search all briefcases. However, no ?`" yet!'- before e any terrors t group
one asked whether I re i was a - would be able to manufacture or
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study hillin 1 add d:
'f. . . a more likely scenario - at
high-priced builders.
My nuclear excursion was only one
piece in a disturbing pattern. Other
evidence, found in government docu-
ments and In interviews with Penta-
? The CIA,-Defense Department and
_ ey rr _ y
-concerned about the aossibI'I ty of
tertorist groups seizing weapons of
rs~as: nor..ltigTi=fao-
1iti.calextortiutn,._?`It seems prudent to
assume that sooner or-` a r some
grab 1 oun to take 'er p u e,"
an unciassifi K tu3---dedtared in
? Although no one has ever stolen a
nuclear weapon, there have been
troubling incidents which have re-
ceived little or no publicity. Thus in
1974, guards at an Nike-Hercules
anti-aircraft battery near Baltimore
were unable to capture an iintruder
whom they saw near the corner of a
warhead building. In 1975 a terrorist
group affiliated with the West Ger-
man Baader-Meinhof gang report-
edly stole some mustard gas from a
munitions depot in France. In 1976,
an unidentified Army unit found what
the Defense Nuclear Agency calls
"indications of possible attempts to
reconnoiter or photograph a storage
site." Last year, according to the De-
i.fense Nuclear Agency, an Army unit
'reported that two individuals at-
empted penetration of the outer .
`-boundaries of a security area."
? Despite these warnings, the De-
fense Department is relying ' on- rela-
tively unsophisticated devices to
keep intruders out. When the mili-
tary finishes its $300 million grogram
to "harden" weapons storage sites,
they will have stronger fences, better
lighting and bullet-resistant glass in
the guard shacks. But in many cases,
the sites will not be protected with
the most modern electronic sensors,
Much as those which make up the
2~'gSinai early warning system operated
by a U.S. support mission 1:o detect
an attack from either side.
? Officially, the Defense-Department
tries to keep secret the location of nu-
clear storage sites by refusing to con-
firm or deny the presence of nuclear
weapons. However, in congressional
testimony, the Air Force published a
list of 16 of its bases where it sought
.funds for "nuclear weapons security
improvements."
r. , e .. trdy "Inter-
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least in the short term - would seem
to be- a terrorist seizure of nuclear
weapons storage facility or a nuclear
power plant in a straightforward
barricade operation. Such a group
need not threaten a nuclear holocaust
(although that possibility would be in
the back of everyone's mind), just
the destruction of the bunker or reac-
tor. with the attendant danger of
radiological pollution. The publicity
would be enormous. And if their de-
mands were to be denied, the terror-
ists would be in a position to tailor
the amount-of damage they actually
inflicted to their appreciation of the
existing circumstances."
U.S. BOMB EXPERTS insist that
American nuclear weapons are de-
signed so that the nuclear compo-
nents can not be detonated by an
external shock or fire. However, nu-
clear weapons contain powerful TNT
charges, which can explode and scat-
ter plutonium into the atmosphere
even though there is no nuclear blast.
The destruction of a bunker con-
taining "several" nuclear weapons
could scatter tiny but measurable
amounts of plutonium downwind over
a 100-square mile area, according to
a recent calculation by government
bomb experts at Lawrence Liver-
more Laboratory, made at the re-
quest of Cox Newspapers. -
Within -that area - roughly 50
miles long and two miles wide - the
plutonium contamination. of. the soil
would exceed the plutonium "screen-
ing level" recently proposed by the
Environmental Protection Agency as
safe for permanent human habita-
tion. In the event of such a nuclear
accident, the government would
move in and-strip away the most
heavily contaminated soil, ploughing
under areas with minor radiation
levels. However, it would be virtually
impossible to render a 100-square
mile area completely safe by EPA's
proposed .plutonium "screening
level."
Specifically, the EPA proposed a
"screening level" of two-tenths of a
millicurie of plutonium radioactivity
per square meter of soil. The EPA
much plutonium for a lifetime would
have something less than a one-in-
ten-thousand chance of getting can-
cer.from it. The EPA notice added:
"It - must be recognized that these
estimates are not precise, and have
an uncertainly of at least a factor of
three for cancer risk."
Yet last year, Joe F. Meis, a rank-
ing Pentagon logistics expert, ac-
knowledged to the House Appropria-
tions Committee that some of our
stockpiled tactical nuclear weapons
- those with destructive power
egpivalent to Hiroshima are not
fully safe.
"It is remote, but it is conceiv-
able," Meis said, "that an attempt to
capture a tactical nuclear weapon
might succeed against the limited
existing security systems. The latter
were designed for a quieter age and
not configured to meet the bold and
sophisticated operations of today's
highly organized revolutionary
groups."
The official assumption is that no
one could ever penetrate a SAC base
and seize a strategic weapon - a
weapon which could explode with the
force of 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs.
As Alfred D. Starbird, the retired
Army general who heads the nuclear
weapons program in the Department
of Energy, put it, bombs stored at
SAC bases "are secure at this time."
If my experience means anything,
the average commercial airport in
America is in some ways better pre-
pared against terrorists today than
readily deduce that this was a nu-1
clear weapons storage site.
The Army Corps of Engineers, j
which placed the contract notice, in-
cluded an inviting sentence: "Plans
and specifications available on or
about 14 Nov. 77 at a cost of $5.30 per,
set (non-refundable)."
Curious about whether the Corps of
Engineers could distinguish between
a legitimate contractor and a phony,'
I mailed them my personal check for
$5.30. It was accompanied by a five-
line letter, typed on my personal sta-
tionery in which my non-existent "as-
sistant" asked for the plans without
specifying that I was a contractor.
A fat brown. envelope, stamped
"Priority Mail," arrived at my home
the following week. Inside was a
large book of 53 blueprints showing
how the weapons storage area is
presently protected and how it would
be following planned security renova-
tions. Also enclosed was about 300
pages of technical specifications for
the contract, including instructions
on how workmen can get credentials
to enter the base.
Amid the dense language of the
specifications one passage stood out:
"Bidders are urged and expected to
inspect the site where services are to
be performed and to satisfy them-
selves as to all general and local
conditions that may affect the cost of
the contract..."
It took me three phone calls to
reach a Mrs. Hilda Ferry, a kindly
secretary who works in the base con-_
struction office. Could she, I won-
dered, arrange to tour the site next
Tuesday? She asked for my social se-
curity number and told me to call
back in 24 hours so she could check it
with her boss, Capt. William Bran-
ford. The following day, I telephoned
Mrs. Ferry once again. No problem,
she said. Be here at 1:30 p.m. and
ask for a Mr. Wilmer.
I know nothing at all about soil I
compaction, mitering of joints, elec-
tromagnetic capability or anything
else about the construction industry.
I thought I might pick up some of the;
jargon by visiting the Washington li-
brary of the Association of General
Contractors. As it turned out, I spent
two hours reading an encyclopedia ofj
constriction terms and got no further
than the"B"s.
Steve Wilmer, a civilian construe=
noted that even at this very low level
of plutonium contamination, resi-
dents would incur a slight extra risk
of developing cancer. The EPA esti-
mated that someone exposed to that
1
some of SAC's bomb storage sites.
This is due, in part, to revealing bits
of information in unclassified govern-
ment publications.
LAST FALL, A U.S. Commerce
Department magazine published a
notice -to prospective bidders enti-
tled, "Weapons System Security Im-
provements." According to the no-
tice, the successful bidder would
provide "lighting, fencing and se-
curity entry control facilities of both
the bomber alert area [ti apron) and
weapons storage area.' ' The cost
estimate for this job was given at
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000.
What was dangerous. about the no-
Lice was that it - named the base
where this construction would take
place. By referring to published con-
gressional testimony, anyone could
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tion employee at the base since 1966,
was mostly interested in talking
about the weather. At one point he
said something about electrical
generators I did not understand. I
said I was deaf in one ear. He nod-
ded.He suggested that I could leave
my yellow hardhat in my car.
Under the specifications for the
contract, the Corps of Engineers had
the right to ask for a list of my other
construction contracts before show-
ing me the site. No one asked: Nor
was I asked to prove that I was a
licensed contractor. Although many
states require contruction contrac- ,~
tors to be licensed, it turns out that
the federal government does not.
EVEN SO, I thought the game was
up when Wilmer led me into a win-
dowless room inside the SAC security
detachment and we stood waiting for
20 minutes. The only trouble, it!
finally developed, was that the ser-
geant who was supposed to escort us
was out to lunch. So Lt. Andrew
Ford, the chief Air Force security
man on duty, offered to drive us
around the post in his pickup truck.
First stop was the bomber alert apron, a fenced-in airplane parking
lot where I counted the row of jungle-
camouflaged B-52s. Before entering
the area, Ford spent almost a minute
checking under the hood of his truck
and inside each of the wheel covers
to find if anyone was hiding there. If
he had any curiosity about me, he
satisfied it by examining my D.C.
driver's license.
Inside the alert apron, I asked
Wilmer why the Corps of Engineers
had decided to bulldoze one area
near the fence. "We have to get rid of
those hiding places" said Wilmer,
pointing to several erosion-caused
ditches. "We wanted to do a little
more work over there, but it was cut
out." I asked why. "Money," said
Wilmer.
Ford now drove us a mile down a.
isolated road to a weapons depot, a
fenced compound about the size of
six football fields. Inside the fence
were about half a dozen earth-
covered mounds, known in the Air
Force as igloos, which serve as ware-
houses for city-buster bombs. At
Ford's suggestion, we began by
slowly driving around the outside of
the fence.
"You know how long it would take
to get over that?" Ford asked, nod-
ding at the chain link fence topped
with barbed wire.
I said I didn't have any idea.
"Three seconds," Ford said. "If
you know what you are doing - three
seconds."
Just then, I noticed a small tractor
hauling an open trailer inside the
weapons compound about 150 feet
away. On the trailer were four
torpedo-shaped cylinders, each
painted silver, with metalic fins on
their tails. The tractor driver was
slowly maneuvering the cylinders
into what looked like a cinderblock
garage.
At that moment, I was holding my
briefcase, which no one had bothered
to examine. Ford, who had a pistol on
his hip, had both hands on the wheel.
Based on unclassified Atomic
Energy Commission photographs
which I had examined before my
visit, the cylinders looked exactly
like model MK-28 hydrogen bombs,
each least one million tons of TNT. Four
such bombs is the typical payload of
a B-52 bomber when on nuclear alert.
"Seen enough?" asked Ford. One
more thing, I said: how about letting
me inside the security guard house in
the weapons compound? He looked
sideways at me but agreed, after
once again asking for my social se-
curity number. I stayed inside the
guard house long enough to count the
guards and to find the button which
opens the turnstile to the weapons'
compound.
Then, on my way out, I asked'
whether "my" work crews would I
have to worry about guard dogs. No,
replied Wilmer. He proceeded to tell
me the hours when the dogs are kept
in their cages.
Could it have been a one-time fluke
that no one saw through this pose?
TO FIND OUT, I mailed $6 to
another regional office of the Corps
of Engineers and asked for plans and
specifications for a similar construc-
tion job at yet another SAC base.
Back came an equally revealing set
of blueprints, along with an invitation
to bidders to join a tour of the site. .
For me, the highlight of touring in-
side the second weapons storage area
was the sight of an unattended red
trailer on the west side of building
323, about 100 feet away. The trailer
could have carried two canoes. In-it held two taered wh ch looked considerably clikedthe
official photographs of B-43 hydrogen
bombs.
My host, an Air Force sergeant,
was also good enough to tell me the .
route and approximate daily sched-
uleof the vehicles that carry nuclear
weapons between the storage site
and the B-52s.
Upon learning of my tour, the Air
Force issued a statement declaring
that its records indicate the objects I
saw were dummy training bombs
and not liv
l
Could I have seized a nuclear
weapon? Not at the second SAC base,
where the guards -were careful to
search all briefcases. And even at the
first base, where the security verged
on lackadaisical, the odds would
have been against me.
If I had overcome the first set of
guards, backup troops would prob-
ably have surrounded the compound
in a few minutes. Escaping with a
hydrogen bomb is not a simple mat-
ter since the MK-28 model weighs one
ton.
But, there was a chance I might
have succeeded. Given a few suicidal
confederates, a CB radio and a fast
getaway helicopter, there is no tell-
ing how far I might have gone.
e nuc
e1I/ e
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