WORLDWIDE CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002100050014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OLC #78-
36
10C
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
1g7p
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
MEMORANDUM FOR:' Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director for National Foreign
Assessment
SUBJECT Worldwide Congressional Briefing
REFERENCE Your Memo of 21 November 1978
1. I propose that the worldwide briefing of Congressional
Committees this year cover seven major topics as described in
the attached outlines. Events may require that additional
topics be added and, in any case, coverage will be available
as backup. A list of candidates for this category is also
2. Assuming continued progress on SALT, it may be dif-
ficult to avoid getting bogged down in questions about moni-
toring capabilities. We should try to make it clear to the
committees ahead of time that this is a complex subject de-
serving of separate treatment. II
3. Work has already begun on several sections of the
briefing, but it would be helpful to have your reaction to
the outlines and the list of backup topics. I propose to
get you a draft of the total package shortly after our return
from the Far East. The briefings presumably will again be
held in late January-early February.
4. I have asked Congressional
Support Staff to handle preparation of the briefing.
25X1
Robert R. Bowie
Attachments: a/s
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Orig
1
1
1
1
1
1
- DCI
- DDCI
- D/NFAC
- CSS/NFAC
- OLC
- Exec. Reg.
- NFAC Reg.
NFAC/CSS~
4 December 1978)
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 NFAC #5560/78
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
SP - 310/78
8 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Congressional Support Staff
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: DCI's Congressional Worldwide Briefing
1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 November 1978 to
all National Intelligence Officers containing guidance for preparation of
the DCI's Congressional worldwide briefing.
2. We are now preparing the portion of the DCI's briefing covering
the strategic balance as called for in your memorandum. Our approach is
as follows:
a. In coverage and level of detail we are following last year's
DCI briefing on the strategic balance.
b. The content of the briefing is being drawn from the draft of
the Executive Summary of NIE 11-3/8-78 which the DCI has reviewed and
approved.
c. The DCI's Congressional briefings in the past have contained
more details about force developments than carried in the draft
Executive Summary of this year's NIE. Material for this portion of
the briefing, highly condensed, will be drawn from the draft of Volume 1
of NIE 11-3/8-78.
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Acting NIO/CF
11 Dec 1978
DCI's Congressional Worldwide Briefing: Schematic Outline
Balance of Theater Forces
Understanding the "Balance" has to Begin With Definitions
-- Geographic area: where does Europe stop?
-- In the East, at the Soviet border or Urals?
-- In the West, with the UK or the Rockies?
-- To reduce this complex issue to manageable proportions:
- We tend to examine regions or theaters (Central Region,
Northern Flank, Southern Flank, North Atlantic),
- We also consider the balance at different periods
of time after mobilization.
-- Measures of the balance: there are a multitude, and the
balance cannot be reduced to a single ratio or index number.
-- Common measures: "bean counts," that is, new and major
items of equipment (tanks, artillery pieces, etc.).
-- Qualitative aspects have to be measured too.
Presentation of Force Comparison by Region
This segment will make use of material from updated, briefing material
prepared for the President's summit briefing last year and proposed meeting
with Aspin. The latter is in a notebook which the Director has in his
possession. It will consist primarily of a map and accompanying table of
manpower and equipment for each region or theater (sample attached) with
accompanying text.
CONFIDENTIAL
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-- Central Europe (NATO Guidelines Area plus Western MDs)
Northern Flank
-- Southern Flank
-- North Atlantic
-- Reserves in interior MDs of the USSR
-- Forces opposite China
Trends
Foregoing represents a snapshot of the "balance." Of greater
interest are trends in manpower growth and equipment holdings which
show where we and they have been and are going (sample attached).
-- Trend charts of manpower and major items of equipment,
accompanied by explanatory text.
Qualitative Measures
"Bean counts" are only part of the story; qualitative measures are
important too. (Graphics showing trends in force capability such as
range and payload capability of Pact aircraft, ittiek measures of equipment
effectiveness as shown in briefing books, as shown in sample.)
Summation
CONFIDENTIAL
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Forces in Central Europe
NATO
FRANCE
DENM
ARK
CANADA
BELGIUM
N ET
H.
UK
FRG
U
S
TOTAL
53,000
29,
000
5,000
83,000
83,0
00
71,000
437,000
238,
000
1,000,000
MEN
3/0
1/2
0/1
2/1
2/0
4/1
12/6
4/5
28/16
DIV/BDE
480
270
40
420
9
50
590
3,800
4,
320
10,870
TANKS
140
390
20
180
5
00
190
1,370
520
3,310
ARTILLERY
220
4,
320
60
260
3
80
170
2,070
2,
370
9,850
ANTITANK WPNS
210
90
40
290
2
20
150
2,490
720
4,210
AIR DEF WPNS
0
90
60
150
1
60
150
710
300
1,620
AIRCRAFT
WARSAW PACT
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
POUND
E. GERMANY
USSR
TOTAL
206,000
323,000
144,000
520,000
1,193,000
MEN
10/0
15/0
6/0
27/0
58/0
DIV/BDE
3,340
3,300
3,040
9,570
19,250
TANKS
890
1,160
710
3,270
6,030
ARTILLERY
680
980
340
1,620
3,620
ANTITANK WPNS
970
1,090
560
2,390
5,010
AIR DEF WPNS
570
810
320
1,190
2,890
AIRCRAFT
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O/W arsaW Pact Ground Forces
In Central Europe, 1969-78
PNa~or Antitank Weapons
att.
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Numerical Advantage
Pact
NATO
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I - 1 metric. ton
Radius Based On HLH
ASD (P & E) Rules
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Prospects for the USSR
I. Introduction
As Brezhnev era nears its end, the Soviet Union faces prospects
that are highly varied and uneven, in context of greater than usual
uncertainties.
A. Growth of Soviet military power the most enduring and successful
accomplishment of this regime. In next few years, particularly in strategic
arena, Soviet position in military balance of forces will generally be
perceived as better than ever before. But outlook beyond the mid-1980s
much more uncertain.
B. Largely on strength of USSR's military accomplishments, Brezhnev
era has seen USSR emerge as truly global power. Interests, prestige, and
credibility of USSR now more broadly engaged, and both self-image of
Soviet leaders and foreign perceptions and expectations regarding Soviet
international behavior have developed accordingly.
C. Yet concrete results mixed. Along with important successes, which
have established USSR as major actor in regions formerly denied them, major
setbacks. Hallmark of this leadership has been perseverance and determination
to make weight of the USSR's influence increasingly felt in world, willingness
to accept local failures as inevitable price of progressively more forward
position in world. Predisposition of the Soviet leadership to seize fresh
external opportunities strong, undiminished by uneven successes.
While we expect this broadly assertive Soviet external posture to
persist in the years ahead, there are important large uncertainties and
potentially constraining trends which must temper Soviet optimism about
their prospects in 1980s.
-- Economic pressures
-- Leadership succession
-- China and its growing partnership with the West
-- Uncertainties about the future course of Soviet relations
with the West
II. Soviet Union entering a transitional period of increasing internal
strain and uncertainty
A. Converging economic pressures
-- harsh demographic trends
-- return on capital investment dropping
-- rate of growth of industrial production dropping
-- undiminished construction backlog
-- agriculture still highly variable and chancy
C, r 25X1
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-- oil picture as increasingly grim
-- rate of growth of total GNP will henceforth be depressed
below rate at which military spending has grown in
last decade.
- If military spending is to go on growing at same rate,
this therefore likely to cause Soviets economic pain
of kind they have not had to bear in the past.
B. Generational change in the leadership is approaching
-- Brezhnev's infirmities grave, he unlikely to last beyond
next few years
-- Kirilenko older, obviously only interim successor
-- No obvious successor beyond Kirilenko
-- Chernenko lacks strong organizational base, himself 67
years old
-- Government leadership likely to be revamped in next few years
along with party leadership. First Deputy Premier Mazurov
has already been dropped, leaving key vacancy, and Premier
Kosygin also in. 70s.
-- Successors to Kosygin and Brezhnev will have to grapple with
growing economic headaches mentioned, as well as ongoing
external problems -- especially with US and China.
III. Impact of these internal developments on foreign policy will be diverse
A. We see serious consequences for Eastern Europe over next decade.
-- Because of Soviet oil problem, oil shipments to East Europe
mai not only not increase, but are actually likely to go
down after 1930. Some such reduction could begin as early
as this year (1979).
-- Major effect on East Europe's economic growth. They will not
have hard currency to make up the energy difference in direct
purchases themselves. Could well mean serious political trouble
for the Soviets in East Europe over next ten years.
-- Soviets will probably play this by ear, and adjust export policy
to East Europe somewhat if they run into grave political
consequences.
B. Some Soviets also seem to be anticipating necessity of some
reduction in Soviet oil sales to the West over next few years. This will
ultimately mean cut in Soviet hard currency earnings -- which in turn likely
to have continuing impact on the quantities of grain and technology the USSR
can import.
C. Some impact already on their traded with the West.
-- 1979 plan envisions a third consecutive year of slowed
trade growth.
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-- This partly reflects measures since 1977 to reduce hard
currency payments deficit, partly also unresolved
difficulties in absorbing Western machinery and equipment
already purchased.
-- But we believe it also reflects recognition by Soviet leader-
ship that oil exports to the West may have to be cut, and
that earnings will therefore decline.
IV. Harder to visualize effect upon political and strategic posture of a
new Soviet leadership toward West and Third World.
A. Despite fact that Soviet military expenditures likely to be perceived
as increasingly onerous burden, Soviets have viewed their steady improvement
of relative military position vis-a-vis US over last decade as vital factor
in the strengthening of Soviet geopolitical position in the world. It will
be politically difficult for a post-Brezhnev leadership to challenge ongoing
military programs to make significant resource transfers from the military sector.
B. At same time, despite friction with US over Soviet involvement in
Third World in recent years, Soviets regard this as area in which they have
made significant gains at expense of Western influence. Moreover, they believe
objective circumstances in certain areas may lead to more such gains in next
few years -- e.g., in southern Africa and Iran. New Soviet thirst for external
sources of oil procurable without paying hard currency could be additional
factor impelling Soviets toward continued involvement in third world and
friction with US.
C. Further complicating picture for Soviets is concern over mushrooming
of Chinese relations with capitalist industrial powers, prospect of Chinese
arms technology purchases from the West, and closer Chinese dealings with
Yugoslavia and Romania.
D. In sum, three dynamic trends interacting:
-- Soviets want to preserve sufficiently good relations with
West and US to maintain momentum of arms control negotiations
as well as the transfer of Western technology so far as may
be possible within tightening economic constraints they now
increasingly foresee.
-- They unwilling to pay any political price for the maintenance
of such relations in terms of reducing activities in the
Third World harmful to the interests of the West.
-- On the other hand, they also see the West as unwilling on its
part to constrain the expansion of its dealings with China
which the Soviets see as harmful to their interests.
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I. Background: Sino-Soviet relations are at a very low point.
1. The two countries maintain correct but distinctly
cool relations. They are at loggerheads over con-
flicting territorial claims. The Chinese believe
the Soviets are trying to "encircle" China militarily
and politically.
2. The Soviets continue to upgrade the capabilities of
their 43 divisions bordering China. Peking has
embarked on a major, long-term military modernization
program to improve it's ability to thwart a conventional
Soviet assault and to deliver a modest strategic strike.
3. There is some activity in the economic sphere. The
Chinese exchange consumer goods for some kinds of
heavy Soviet machinery and trade may increase slightly
but at rate slower than China's trade with the West
and Japan.
II. The key question in Sino-Soviet relations is whether there
are trends toward increased hostility or toward ameliora-
tion of the hostility:
1. Politically, the Chinese will, of course, watch for
positive signals after Brezhnev dies, much as the
Soviet watched after Mao died. The prospects for
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significant improvement seem poor, however, Peking
continues to demand reductions of Soviet forces
along the border and in Mongolia, followed by ter-
ritorial concessions that few Soviet leaders would
be prepared to propose and which some Soviet power-
holders would actively resist. The Chinese believe
the Soviets are increasing their influence in the
international sphere, in order to be in position to
press their views on the US and China.
a. Concerned above all with survival and
modernization, the Chinese continue to oppose
and undermine Soviet interests abroad.
b. They realize western political support for
China is closely linked to their anti-Soviet
posture.
c. They are also painfully aware of the rela-
tively inexpensive gains the Soviets have re-
cently made in Indochina as a result of the
Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict. Peking has a
long-term and vital interest in isolating
Soviet influence there without resorting to
risky military confrontation. This situation
is of deep concern to China. China's position
is reactive and cautious but they cannot see a
client state (Cambodia) go down the tube.
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2. Militarily, the Chinese have a stake in a moderate
level of tension in Sino-Soviet relations.
a. If Peking accommodates Soviet interests,
the incentive for western governments to approve
arms and technology sales to China decreases.
b. If, however, the Chinese radically in-
crease tensions, western governments might become
jittery and balk at helping.
3. Economically, too, the trend is for China to continue
to move away from the USSR.
a. The technology, credits, and markets China
now seeks are not in the Soviet bloc, but in the west.
b. The long-term arrangements being made for
trade agreements and science and technology exchanges
suggest that for at least 5-10 years, the Chinese
will put their eggs in the western basket.
c. Japan in particular appears to be profiting
from China's economic outreach.
d. This situation inhibits the cultivation
of Soviet influence among Chinese economic interest
groups and fosters links with the West.
III. As for amelioration, China will seek to avoid direct mili-
tary confrontation:with the USSR. It will strive to
maintain correct relations in diplomacy and trade with
3
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the USSR and will continue to reach agreements on minor
matters such as navigation of rivers and exchanges of
prisoners. Similarly, trade may expand and some form
of cultural exchange could occur.
_IV. The outlook, however, is for continued, unimproved rela-
tions between Moscow and Peking.
a. The prospect of an increasingly powerful and
wealthy China might send shudders through Moscow
that could lead to a confrontation.
b. The Chinese, however, have demonstrated in
the past the diplomatic skill needed to modulate
bilateral relations with the Soviets and they may
succeed in keeping the USSR off balance, thus
buying time to continue modernizing.
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III. Internal Prospects. Events in Iran and the Baghdad Summit will make many
regimes nervous and probably encourage dissidence.
A. The monarchies, particularly the oil-rich variety are unsettled
by the events in Iran. Not only do they view these events in
a mirror-image way, they also see the regional fireman role of
Iran disappearing.
B. At Baghdad a new nationalist language emerged that may well give
heart to internal dissidence.
IV. Relations Amon the Key Countries. The potential isolation of Egypt,
xa 1 led by an Iraqi-Syrian axis and the reduction of the clout of the
moderates will mark the coming year.
A. If Egypt signs a treaty with Israel without fairly convincing linkage
language, the most powerful and important Arab moderate state will
have opted itself out of the Arab camp.
B. Whether it is tactical or real, the Iraqi-Syrian axis -- in the
absence of Egypt -_ becomes the most important political factor
in the Arab World.
C. Nervous and disorganized and without Egypt, the moderate camp will
lose its clout in the Arab World, unless the Saudis show more
determination than they have.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
4 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR
ie , 0 1 Support Staff
VIA : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for the
Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT : Outline for Middle'East Section of Congressional Worldwide
Brie fing
REFERENCE . CSS Memo of 27 November 1978
tability in the Middle East
I. Two events have changed the outlook for stability in the Middle East:
Camp David and the Baghdad Summit.
A. Camp David holds the prospect of peace and the prospect for the
radicalization of the area. Sadat's ability to get concessions
that will satisfy the moderates will determine which path events
take.
B. The Baghdad Summit was a victory for the radicals. Syria and Iraq,
the Summit designers, sought to isolate Sadat, condemn Camp David,
and get the moderates on board. The fact that they were highly
successful does not bode well for moderation.
II, The Arms Balance. Whether the Egyptians are still in the Arab equation or
not, the Israelis will still have an overwhelming advantage.
A. Israel will retain its overall advantage to defeat any combination
of Arab forces decisively. The 1973 experience will encourage
them to think preemption. The cost of war will be greater in terms
of personnel losses, economic dislocation and negative international
reaction.
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DCI "Worldwide" Briefing Outline
I. Southern Africa-- Situation has continued to deteriorate in a
number r of ways despite strenuous policy efforts
A. Rhodesia - General situation familiar; focus of intelligence
has been on three aspects:
1. Military capabilities of guerrilla liberation forces
2. Developing weaknesses and residual capabilities of
Rhodesian regime
3. Soviet/Cuban involvements
B. But we also are watching, and concerned, over other aspects,
especially the continued dominance of security problems in
the thinking of local leaders
1. Zambia - internal breakdowns; economic disasters
2. Angola - internal problems of MPLA as well as UNITA
situation
3. Namibia - SWAPO capabilities; South African resistance
4. Soviet/Cuban relationships - where do they stand with the
region generally
II. South Africa - still the great cloud over the future
A. No movement visible yet toward any real power-sharing with
non-white communities; remind what basic demographic situation
is
B. Some very small signs of recognition that racist attitudes
are the core of the problem with non-white communities
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C. Capabilities of black nationalist resistance still
developing - where this stands
D. Soviet/Cuban role and involvement
E. Western European role and involvement
III. The "real" revolution elsewhere - at the moment - in the Horn
A. Revolutionary commitment of Ethiopian regime to
1. Unity of Ethiopia
2. Socialist society, as locally interpreted
B. Relationship with Soviets/Cubans
1. Military forces and support
2. Base facilities - present and potential
C. Role of Somalis - refuse to give up on Ogaden insurgency
IV. Continent in turmoil - some signs that relative equilibrium and
attachment to certain international values - e.g., integrity of
boundaries inherited from colonial powers - could be eroding.
Spells turbulence internally and frustration internationally.
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7 December 1978
VII. The International Energy Outlook
This presentation. would first provide a brief review
of the current situation in the world oil market, with special
emphasis (if necessary) on the impact caused by the disruption
of Iranian oil exports. The bulk of this briefing. would
address the outlook for the world oil market through 1985.
In this longer-term view, we would concentrate on the production
prospects of the major OPEC nations.
A. The Current Situation
1. Impact of Iranian supply disruptions
a. Nature and extent
b. Response of other major producers, especially
Saudi Arabia
c. Changes in world oil stocks and influence on
prices
d. Responses of major consumers OECD/IEA, Soviets.
2. Dynamics of OPEC decision-making on oil prices
B. The Outlook Through 1985
1. Factors influencing output by the major overseas
producers
a. OPEC (Saudi Arabia would receive most attention)
1. Technical considerations
2. Resource conservation
3. Spending plans
4. Political dimension
b. Non-OPEC Free World suppliers (Mexico, Canada,
and the North Sea producers will receive
emphasis)
1. Resource conservation policies
2. Political and economic tradeoffs
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c. Communist countries
1. Importance of western technology to
production growth
2. Political and economic tradeoffs.
2. -Factors influencing oil demand, expecially in
developed countries
a. Lower economic growth outlook
b. Energy conservation efforts and possible savings
c. Growth in availability of energy sources
1. Coal
2. Natural Gas
3. Nuclear
4. Other
3. Possible supply/demand. scenarios and their likely
price implications.
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Proposed Backup Subjects
SALT Monitoring
Telemetry
The Prospects for Eastern Europe--Internal and
relations with the USSR.
Western Europe--The prospect for unity; some national
political problems.
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
Chinese Political Situation
Prospects for the Key Developing Countries--Series
o brief items on Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela,
Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia.
Nuclear Proliferation--Programs and prospects for
the top hal -dozen candidates.
Korea--The military balance; longer term strategies
and prospects.
Arms Transfers--US-Soviet comparison; the prospect
for negotiated restraint.
Cuba--Foreign policy; military hardware acquisition.
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21 November 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Annual Worldwide Wrap-up Briefing for Congress
1. In view of your and my impending trip to the Far East at the end )
of December and through 12 January, I'd like'to suggest that we get u5~~~
started now on the annual worldwide wrap.=up briefjM for the Congress. 11Aa 1
I'm still uneasy about the one we gave last year because we didn't have u"
enough time to review it.
2. This year the overview of the strategic balance is going to be
more important than ever in view of the probable SALT ratification process.
At the same time, I would be reluctant this year to devote such a high
percentage of the time to the strategic military picture. Even beyond
adding in the conventional military balance in Europe, I think the worldwide
briefing should cover overall political trends and a few of the key trouble
spots. It will be difficult and take a lot of discipline to squeeze all of
this in, but first we need to develop our approach to each of the problems.
a. Specifically, I was not satisfied last year with the
conventional military balance presentation. We have done some very
good work since then, especially the notebook of comparisons prepared
for the NATO summit. I'm hoping we're going even further into
NIE 11-3/8-type qualitative and quantitative comparisons. This one
will take a lot of work.
b. Similarly, rather than just review the factual situation in
Iran, Rhodesia, etc., I wonder if we shouldn't pick out some of the
major trends and highlight them, e.g., the Chinese/Soviet rivalry
around Indochina; the Soviet economy; the world energy outlook; the
overall deterioration in Southern Africa; and the net change in
Ethiopia.
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