YOUR 30 OCTOBER LUNCHEON MEETING WITH SENATOR ROBERT MORGAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002100050041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR

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QLC 78-3110
2 7 OCT "iJ73
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : Your 30 October Luncheon Meeting with Senator Robert
Morgan.
1. Action Requested: None, for information only.
2. Background: You should know of some of our recent dealings
with Senator iV oo grf an prior to your luncheon Monday. His schedule for
Monday is:
8:30 -. 9:30 - speak to Latin America Division Chiefs of
Station Conference at Headquarters.
9:30 - 10:30 - Briefing by
ORPA, re Eurocommunism and Portugal..
10:30 - 11:30 --Meeting with John McMahon
DDO, re stations
11:30 - 12:30 - Courtesy call on Dr. Bowie, visit to
Operations Center, and question and answer period with
NFAC China analyst
Morgan has never seen t e Operations Center and is partic-
ularly interested because of the Kampiles case. He was
originally scheduled to go to China in November in a
Congressional delegation, but dropped out because of a
conflict in his schedule. We offered him briefings on China.
Although he has dropped the trip, he has asked for the
briefings.
. 3. Our relations with the Senator over the past year have been
mixed. On the low side:
a. We refused to grant a compartmented clearance to
his personal staff member John Stirk. Morgan wanted Stirk
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to follow Armed Services Committee business for him.
However, a new avenue under which Stirk may be able
to obtain compartmented clearances has been developed
and Senator Morgan was so notified (see attachment).
This formula leaves the matter largely in the Senator's
hands to make the necessary arrangements with the firmed
Services Committee. To our knowledge he has not yet
b. You will recall the exchange: with the Senator over
leaks during an SSCI hearing, when he was angered by your
reference to newspaper articles as the source of your
charge of Congressional leaks. He missed the first part
of your presentation, however, and later apologized.
4. Other, more pleasant contacts:
a. We have briefed Senator Morgan numerous times
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5. Senator Morgan is scheduled to leave the SSCI at the end of
this year, under a rotation schedule. No one has been able to confirm
this though, and we would be interested in his position on this.
Attachment:
As stated
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OLC:DFM:hms (27 Octoberl978)
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Honorable Robert B. Morgan
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Morgan: .
Several months ago we discussed your concern over the Agency's
inability to approve access to sensitive compartmented intelligence
by a member of your personal staff. On 21 July I approved new
Guidelines and Procedures for the issuance of compartmented clearances
to the Legislative Branch. I believe your requirements for sensitive
compartmented information can be met within the framework of these
guidelines.
The Guidelines and Procedures are designed to provide a centralized
management control mechanism that will assure strict, uniform
application of need-to-know and personnel security criteria. A copy
is enclosed. Section D does confirm the general thrust of.previous
policy by specifying that only key staff members in the offices of the
Leadership of the Congress and permanent committee staff designated
by committee or subcommittee chairmen are eligible for compartmented
clearances. Committee staffers are subject to standardized security
procedures and discipline for controlling classified information which
are not applicable to personal staff.
Please note that Section D should not be read to exclude from eligibility
for compartmented clearances individuals who become associated with
committee or subcommittee staffs under the provisions of Section 1ll(b)(2) of
the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act of 1978 (P. L. 95-94, 91 Stat. 653).
Section 111 codifies Section 705 of Senate Resolution 4, 95th Congress.
Of course, decisions concerning the use of Sections 11l(b)(2) and 111(c) must
be made by each Senator in consultation with the appropriate committee
or subcommittee chairman. The key distinction between the two statutory
provisions as far as Guidelines and Procedures for compartmented clearances
are concerned is that under 171.(b)(2) an individual is actually appointed to the
committee or subcommittee staff "for the purpose of assisting [a particular
Senator) solely and directly in his duties as a member..., " while Section 111(c)
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pertains to a Senator's designation of employees "in his office" to assist
him with committee work. Should your legislative aide John Stirk, for
example, become associated with the staff of the Senate Armed Services
Committee under Section 11i(b)(2) we would be pleased to consider a
request for compartmented clearances -made in accordance with
Section D of the Guidelines and Procedures.
It is my belief that in the vast majority of cases it is possible to
meet requirements for substantive intelligence without disclosing sources
or methods of acquisition. We are always prepared to brief personal staff
with appropriate security clearances and a demonstrable need-to--know
on a non-compartmented basis.. Where this is inadequate to meet the particular
Congressional need we stand ready to fully brief'.Members of Congress .
personally. I am aware that compartmented access approvals granted by
some Executive Branch agencies prior to the effective date of the Guidelines
and Procedures have created several anomalous situations with regard to
particular personal staff aides. I intend to ensure that the Guidelines and
Procedures are applied fairly and consistently, and this may well. necessitate
the withdrawal of some outstanding clearances.
I hope that this explanation of the Guidelines,and Procedures and
the rationale behind them will be helpful to you. Let me stress that
it is not my intention to interfere with the work of any Senator. I
believe the Guidelines and Procedures constitute a reasonable response to
a situation that was on the verge of becoming a serious threat to the
security of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. While some sacrifice
and inconvenience may be necessary on the part of both the Intelligence
Community and the Legislative Branch, I am sure that the needs of all
Members of Congress can be accommodated.
If you wish to discuss this matter further, I would be most happy
to do so.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Enclosure
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