SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HEARINGS ON INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION (S. 2525)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002900040028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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OLC 78-0399/66
19 April 1978
SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearings
on Intelligence Charter Legislation (S. 2525)
/S. n a 2z_ / /''
1. Senator Joseph Biden (l]., Del.) chaired this third hearing of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCT) on the intelligence
charter legislation, S. 2525. Other Committee members present were
Senator Charles Mathias (R., Md.), Senator Jake Cana (R. , Utah) and
Senator John Chafee (R., R. I.). Numerous SSCI staff members attended.,
and Carolyn Fuller, Legislative Assistant for Senator Walter. Huddleston
(D., Ky.), was also present. Present on behalf of the DCI to observe
the hearing were the undersigned an Assistant
General Counsel. The witness was Mr. McGeorge Bundy.
2. Although Mr.. Bundy did not have a. prepared statement, foilotivring
brief introductory remarks by Senators Biden and Mathias, Mr, Bundy
stated briefly that he was pleased to be appearing before the Committee
to discuss the uses of intelligence and the intelligence needs of our
policy makers. Mr. Bundy also indicated he was in general support of
many of the views expressed in previous testimony by Messrs. Clark
Clifford, William Colby, George Bush and E. Henry Knoche (e.g., he
endorsed the notion that the Director of National Intelligence should
remain as head of the Central. Intelligence Agency). Mr. Bundy t:Ihen
responded to a number of questions posed by the Senators.
3. Senator Biden questioned Mr. Bundy on the following issues:
--Has the legislative oversight process thus far lcd to any
detrimental effects on recruitment of intelligence officers?
--The manner in which CIA intelligence differs from that
of "policy" agencies and departments.
-Were, and are, CIA intelligence analyses truly independent,
and can or should a clear distinction be made between the Agency's
analysis role and its operational mission.
'v1ORUCD
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--flow can the prospects be enhanced that independent
analyses reach persons who need them?
--There is a need to free the UNI from the day-to-day
responsibility for managing the CIA.
--There is a clear distinction between covert activities
("special activities" in the language of S. 2525) and sensitive
collection operations which: are perhaps more important in terms
of our foreign relations and the impact thereon.
--Also on the issue of sensitive collection activities,
should not the charter provide that U.S. ambassadors abroad
be made fully aware of all intelligence activities, particularly
the details of sensitive collection operations.
--Should not the intelligence oversight committees be kept
fully informed as to the details of sensitive collection opera-
tions?
--Is there a danger, and if so, should it be dealt with
through the legislation, that in making more intelligence
product available to the public, the CIA would engage in
?'selling" policies within the U.S., and attempt to influence
po Licies$
In his response to these questions, M4r. Bundy emphasized that, in his
opinion; there were too many reporting requirements in the charter
legislation; the restrictions provisions should more properly be cast
in general terms rather than in terms of specific limitations; CIA
intelligence product has been independent; it probably would not be
possible to legislate the appropriate relationships between entities
of the ]Intelligence Community in order to absolutely ensure that each
entity performs its proper role; the general oversight responsibility
of the Congress probably would provide the best way to ensure an,
appropriate and clear distinction between the analysis and operational
roles of the CIA; it would not be possible to ensure by legislation that
every policy maker who needs to see the intelligence product actually
see it; the DNI should remain as head of the CIA, and the responsibility
for the day-to-day management of the Agency should remain with Deputies; although
U.S. ambassadors should be generally informed of all intelligence activity
within their country of responsibility, the tough questions regarding
sensitive activities should come back to Washington for resolution; the
oversight committees should be aware of particularly sensitive collection
operations, but there must be great care directed to the danger of providing
specific: information to large numbers of persons on the Hill; and although
it would seem desirable to increase the public availability of CIA intelligence
product, there always will be a danger that such product could become tainted
by policy or policy considerations, but this should not obscure the fact
that every effort should be made to provide as much intelligence to the
public as possible.
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4. Senator Mathias' questions emphasized the following points:
--The best way to ensure that the intelligence product gets
to the President is to create a "better" intelligence product.
--The principal duty of the DNI is to convey intelligence
and diverse points of view to the President.
---To what extent should the Attorney General be involved
in intelligence?
-Do the "Harvard guidelines" on relation ships with the
academic community provide an appropriate )Ttoclel for -the
corresponding provisions in the charter legislation?
Mr. Bu-idyls responses to these questions included the following points of
interest: ensuring that diverse points of view are included in the
intelligence product is extremely important; although, noting that he
was not qualified to give a well--informed response regarding the role
of the Attorney General in the intelligence process, Mr. Bundy indicated
in his view the legislation should not build in procedures that presuppose
that the DNI could not "get the job clone" and therefore include provisions
for extensive: Attorney General involvement in intelligence; on the issfie
of academic relationships with intelligence agencies, Mr. Bundy said.
although he strongly supported exchanges of and cooperation on analysis,
he had problems with recruitment of academic types for operational purposes-TAT
but that any limitations should be the responsibility of the institutions
themselves rather than statutory restrictions; anal although it is i)iq ortant
to get "unpopular" intelligence to the President, this would be a very
difficult matter to legislate.
6. In his questions directed at Mr. Bendy, Senator Chafeemade the
following points of interest:
--On the matter of providing in the statute rostrict .ens on
paid intelligence use of certain categories of persons, there did
not seem to be a reasonable basis for placing limitations on certain
types of persons and not others,
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._--Regarding relationships between non-Goveirnrtental insti:
tions and intelligence agencies, the issuance of guidelines o:
(imitations should be a matter for the institutions themselves
rather than statutory limitation.
-taintaizng in a single institution--CIA--the primary
responsibility for conducting covert activities and producing
intelligence analysis did seem to present somewhat of a dilemm
Mr. Bundy responded to Senator Cha_fee's questions by emphasizing. the
right of any person to work for his or her Government, including an
intelligence agency thereof; that, although he was sympathetic to
institutions' sensitivity to charges of connections with intelligence
agencies, this should be a matter for the institutions themselves to
resolve; that there did not seem to be any rationale for placing
statutory limitations on certain categories of persons having relation-
ships with intelligence agencies and not others; and that perhaps the
best ma.uner in which to ensure that the intelligence analysis and covert
action responsibilities of the CIA did. not improperly overlap would be
to rely on the general oversight responsibilities rather than splitting
up theses two roles into separate organizations.
Distribution:
I -- D/NFAC
I - Asst. for Public Affairs
I .- DDA
I - DDO/PCS
I - DI)SUT
I IG
I - OCCC
1 - Compt
1 -- OLC Subject
I -- OLC Chrono
OLC:RLB:skm (21 Apr 78)
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