LETTER TO HONORABLE EDWARD P. BOLAND FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R003100020013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 26, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

The Director of Central ir~telli~erate
OLC 78-1736/D
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~~ ~~ ~'~~
2 6 JUL X978 ~s~~
Honorable Edward F. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select CorrQnittee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
~~Jashington, D.G. 20515
I am writing to raise serious concerns that I have ~,rith I.R. 12171,
the "Federal Accounting and Auditing Act of 1978,?? which was ordered
reported on 19 July by the Committee on Government Operations.
H.R. 12171 would, among other things, allow the General Accounting
Office unlimited access to all information required to verify confidential
funds expenditures, including those currently made by Director of Central
Intelligence certification pursuant to authority in subsection 8(b) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (50 CT.S.C. 403j(b)).
NTot only would this legislation supersede this "8 (b) Authority?" but it
would also directly contravene the Director's statutory authority to pro-
test sensitive intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
(section 403(4)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as~amended; 50 D'tS.C.
l02 (d) (3)) . It is essential that the ?'8 (b) Authority' be preserved. In
the future as in the past, it will be necessary to undertake actions of
extreme sensitivity for which the withholding of information from all except
those directly involved with the activities or in the oversight process i~
essential to the success of the action.
The bill was introduced on 18 April 1978 by Chairman. Brooks of the
Committee on Government Operations. The bill was initially referred to
the Government Operations Subconunittee on Legislation and National
Security which, after one day of testimony by the Department of Justice
on 2b June, referred the bill to the full Committee without mark-up.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Lawrence Hammond presented testimony,
coordinated and concurred in by CIA, which stressed that unrestricted
access by G.4O to confidential funds expenditures is problematic from a
constitutional viewpoint since it threatens the balance between the
Executive and the Legislative Branches, and infringes upon the President's
privilege of confidentiality in the diplomatic, military and national.
security spheres. In addition, Oti1B and CIA each forwarded reports in
opposition to the bill to Chairman Brooks.
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H.R. 12171 directly addresses an essential auth:~rity of the Director
of Central. Intelligence; if enacted, it would have a major adverse impact
on the capability of this Agency to fu1f311 its vita. mission. Based on
your Coamnittee's jurisdiction over such legislative M~ia.tters under
H. Res. 658, I would urge that you request the bill ~~e sequentially
referred. to your Committee for immediate considerat~.~n of the intel-
Iigence equities at stake. j4e are prepared to prese~T:,t our case in full
before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligenca~:.
I have enclosed a copy of this Agency's views litter which was sent
to Chairman Brooks. Thank you for your attention to this very important
matter; I look fonaard to further disct~sions on it.
Sincerely,
srA~vs~z~LD
Enclosure
Distribution:
Orig -Addressee, w/encl
1 - DCT, w/encl
1 - DDCI, w/encl
1 - ER, w/encl
1 - OGC,.w/encl
1 - IG 'Audit Staff, w/encl
1 - Compt, w/encl
1~- 0/Finance, i,r/encl
'~` - OLC Subject, w/encl
1 - OLC Chrono, w/o encl
OLC:RJW:sm (20 Jul 78)
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 Central Intelligence P-~ency
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~.Y __
i 9 ~~~- 1978
Honorable Jack Brooks, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
~Ya.shington, D. C. 20515
I would. like to take this opportunity to comment on HqR. 12171; the ..
"Federal Accounting and Auditing Act of 1978,"
H.R. 12171 would allow the General Accounting Office unlima.ted
access to all information required to veizfy confidential funds expendf.-
tures, including those currently made by Director of Central Intelligence
certification pursuant to authorty in subsection 8(b) of the Centxal
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended. (50 U.S.C. 403j(b)), If
enacted, this would have the operative effect of eliminating confidential
funds as a resource available to the Director. Authority to account for
expenditure of funds solely on the certificate of an officer of the
Government is meaningless if such officex is subsequently required to
produce to an external authority complete docuanentation supporting the
expenditure. 'This authority i:s particularly crucial where the conduct
of sensitive intelligence activities is concerned, and we strongly oppose
legislation to override i.t.
The capability to carry out certain operations in the interests of the
United States Government in secret fashion is a capability that has been
continued through the nation's history. President tiPashington, for example,
asked for, and was granted, a secret "contingent fund" expenditures
authority, for which he could account "by making a certificate of the
amount of such expenditure, as he may think it advisable not to specify
and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
sums therein expressed to have been expended.?' (Stat. at Large. I. 299)
This fund was used by President Washington and successive Presidents
in conducting foreign intelligence efforts, and it was well understood
that the existence of the fund was grounded on the need for extxeme
secrecy in certain matters. This rather special capability comes down
to us in present times of more complex government in the form of statutory
authority for the President's Director of Centxal Intelligence to exercise
control over the expenditures of confidential funds. This is the Director's
"8 (b) Authority," cited above,- the actual terms of which, closely parallel
'the authority given President St~ashington.
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The capability for the Government to fund certa~~ sensitive under-
takings in a manner consistent with the requirements for strictest secrecy
has never been Iost or abandoned throughout our hist~~ry. H.R. 12171,
however, would have such an~adverse effect since, if' enacted, the bill
would supersede section 8(b) of the Central. Intelli~9nce agency Act; no
exception is provided #or.national security interests in general or CIA
expenditures in particiitar. This is unacceptable. tt is a basic require-
ment for the successful conduct of sensitive activit:~.es of the Agency that
the Director's "S (b) Authority" be preserved. In tv future as in the
past, it will be necessary to undertake actions of e~~ctreme sensitivity
for which the withholding of information from all ex~~ept those directly
involved with the activities or in the oversight prc~~~_ess is essential to
the success of the action.
This bill, in providing for comprehensive, unres'~ricted and otherwise
unlimited access by GAO to Agency activities--throug~i access to Agency
"books, documents, papers, records, and other information" and through
related external verifications relating to confidential expenditures--
to achieve the general and specific purposes of an a}.zdit, would not
only supersede the Director's "8 (b) Authority," but ~~rould also directly
contravene the Director's statutory authority to pm.eet sensitive intel-
ligence sources and methods from unauthorized discla pure (section 403 (d) (3) ,
National Security Act of 1947, as mended; 50 U.S.C. 102 (d)(3)). In effect,
the bill would make it impossible for the Director t~~ fulfill this responsi-
bility since it would require him to surrender to thy: Comptroller General
without restriction or selectivity aII records relat ~zg to any particular
expenditure. The bill does not reflect the considet~ztions on which the
Director's statutory responsibilities and authorities are based; intel-
ligence activities must of necessity be carried out :gin a confidential
manner, and the funding of these inherently sensitive activities is as
much a part of that process as are the particulars a~" the activities them-
selves. In recognition of these factors, the Congress has provided that
funding of sensitive intelligence activities shall nzt be subject to funding
and accounting requirements applicable to other, Ies`? sensitive Government
activities.
Furthermore, the requirements envisaged by I3. R. :;:.2171 are unacceptable
in that they would certainly create conflicts which,. according to the pro-
visions of the bill, could be taken to open court foa resolution. Because
the bill would grant the Comptroller General the sigh-t to bring an action
in the district court to compel the furnishing of an reeorcls not supplied
to him, the bill has the potential of making the Comb-troller General a
"special prosecutor" in times of conflict between thy': Legislative and
Executive Branches on intelligence matters. Taking such issues into
_open court could only further complicate matters, an