LETTER TO HONORABLE GEORGE H. MAHON FROM FREDERICK P. HITZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R003200040066-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 66
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2006/08/08: CIA-RDP81M00980R0032Rg0l09E6-.1,,,1:
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Legislative Counsel
OLC 78-1944/X
I 0 OCT 1978
Honorable George H. Mahon, Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
I need not impress on you the need to protect sensitive compartmented
intelligence which is so vital to our Nation's intelligence collection efforts.
The Director of Central Intelligence became seriously concerned by the
increasing numbers of persons granted access to compartmented intelligence
and initiated a review within the Executive Branch to critically assess the
basis for the granting of such access. The Director has extended. this review
to the Legislative Branch and issued Guidelines establishing my office as the
Community focal point to oversee the issuance of compartmented clearances
for the Congress, the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
A member of my office will be in contact with Mr. Keith. F. Mainland,
Staff Director, to review existing compartmented clearances for staff
members of your Committee and to establish procedures for the issuance 25x1
of future clearances. We will nt all Community agencies which
sponsor the issuance ol learances for staff members
on your Committee. I assure you that is program is not intended in
any way to impair the work of the Congress which requires access to
sensitive intelligence. Our only concern, which I know you share, is that
there be a clearly established need for such access.
I feel certain that in a spirit of cooperation we can work out suitable
arrangements to effectively limit and control the issuance of compartmented
clearances and thereby enhance the protection of our most vital intelligence
collection assets. Enclosed is a copy of the Director's letter to the Speaker
informing him of the program. A similar letter was sent to the President of
the Senate.
Sincerely,
Enclosure Od-e 7k -
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/encl
1 - D/OS w/o/encl
1 - Exec Sec - Security Committee w/o/encl
1 - OLC Subject w/encl
1 - OLC Chron w/o/encl
OLC :PLC:jms (4 Oct 78)
MORUCIDIF
 Approved For Release 2006i08J.0Ii::?.JA-RDP81 M00980R003200040066-1
Honorable Thomas 1' P. O'Neill
Speaker of the House
house of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker;
In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods, I became greatly concerned by the proliferation of highly
sensitive intelligence collected and maintained within systems of
corc:partrnentation. I initiated a review within the Executive Branch to
reassess the justification for existing clearances and to limit issuing;
future clearances based On the strictest application of raced--to-"know.
This same concern extends to the Legislative Branch. As you knoll,
staff personnel of our Congressional oversight committees have been.granted
access to highly sensitive cornpazrtmented intelligence information. However,
due to the broadening of interest in foreign intelligence within they Congress,
C> foreign
access has been extended to staffs of other committees. It is imperative
that a review, similar to that underway within the Executive Branch, be
undertaken within the Legislative.Branch to assure that current and future
access to highly sensitive intelligence information is clearly justifiable.
Accordingly, I have designated my Legislative Counsel to serve as the
focal point to review all requests for such access for Congressional
staff personnel. His office will contact the chairmen and staff directors
of those committees concerned to assess the justification of existing
clearances and to establish agreed upon guidelines to assess critically
the need-to-know for future clearances. I do not intend in any way to
impede or impair the work of any committee which requires access to
sensitive intelligence. It is my concern, however,- that the need-to-know
be shown to be clearly warranted. In this regard, experience has shown
that most congressional requirements. for substantive intelligence can
be satisfied without access to highly sensitive sources and methods
information.
Where there is a clearly justifiable need, Tv embers of Congress are
given access to sensitive intelligence i.nform"2lationl. Personal staff of
0 0
Members, however, have been denied such access and I have reaffirmed
this policy. The only exception, which I and initiating at this time, is to
grant select.-d key staff members serving in the offices of the Leadership
Annrrnlar1 Fnr RaIaase. 70fF1fRIf8 ? ('IA-RnPR1nnnnaRnPnnngnnnannaa-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/08: CIA-RDP81 M00980R003200040066-1
of lie Co]?are ;S aWCC.C%:: E:.ince ~[!.^.fl' ~7.1')IIC:i) l5 Z'C?'eeive :; en;i1.).` e J.i"1fcLii~~C.`:ICi"
oii Ft J'es,Ill#li' !.)a`).::).~i i11ICi I'CC~IIlI.'(` :: iff Ei?: t.~:t`. )I1CC tflt \`il"11. include,_
CC`i ,
the :aa.fi;; of you1:- Off,
the l.~l'f:Sideii't 1'ro --Tertipoi'e of the Senate, and Ikif"'jority itn(l 1`:i.utor'ir;
y r_.^~ i~:lrlti.v.e Caucz.:el
Leader : of both the Senate and .1111c, House. l".fir
\J).1 be (:Ontaci.?.rt-; you t- offices to de tet'mi:zc: vlh-i.ch s:laff pc:~ :o:trlel you
have designated for slicil access. I recently :C'cc.ei.vefl a lc cr-,sirrri
:joirltty by Senate 1l ajori.ty L crad r fto'be:r-t Byrd a1?d S ertic. Miu.or il.y
Leader 7"lowarcl Baker- submitting a request for Staff ac ces i \rhic:h with.
be honored and handled directly with oleic offices.
It is ray firm belie-:f that these procedures not int r'fere with
the proper flow of intelligence to the ;Coi,.oress, but will serve to enhance
-the Protection of highly sensitive int'elli ,c:nce sources alicl, methods by
limiting access to 7 n absolute neefl- tc5~icrto;~r. I vioulcl welcome your
;;l.lppor t to facilitate acceptance of these procedures by col -IriLittee
chaiz'rrien in any wily that You Cl:'E'I1? appropriate
Yours sirtcere.iy . -
STAN7SI+ IELD TURNER
flr,rr^-r Pnr Ralanca 9nnA/n /fl . C'IA-RfP81 nn 80ROa 00040066-1
 Cc. ) ra!
Approved For Release 2006/08/(18: CIA-RDP81 M00980R003200040066-1
1`:7y;iR~.Ji~.O C ?,)So)
Honorable Walter Mondale
President of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. President:
2 1 Jul.
i 7
In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources,
and methods, I became greatly concerned by the proliferation of highly
sensitive intelligence collected and maintained within systems of
cornpartrnentat.ion. I. initiated a review within the Executive Branch to
reassess the justification for existing clearances and to limit issuing
future clearances based on the strictest application of nee(I-to-know.
Tf'his same concern extends to the Legislative Branch. As you know,
staff personnel of our Congressional oversight committees have been granted
access to highly sensitive compartmented intelligence information. 1-Ioweve)r,
due to the broadening of interest in foreign intelligence within the Congress,
access has been extended to staffs of other committees. It is imperative
that a review, similar to that underway within the Executive Branch, be
undertaken within the Legislative Branch to assure that current and future
access to highly sensitive intelligence information is clearly justifiable.
Accordingly, I have designated my Legislative Counsel to serve as the
focal point to review all requests for such access for Congressional
staff personnel. His office will contact the chairmen and staff. directors
of those committees concerned to assess the justification of existing
clearances and to establish agreed upon guidelines to assess critically
the need-to-know for future clearances. I do not intend in any way to
impede or impair the work of any committee which requires access to
sensitive intelligence . It is my concern, however,.that the, need-to-knoll
be shown to be clearly warranted. In this regard, experience has shown
that most congressional requirements for substantive intelligence can
be satisfied without access to highly sensitive sources and methods
information.
Where there is a clearly justifiable need, Members of Congress are
given access to sensitive intelligence information. Personal staff of
IMernbers, however, have been denied such access and I have reaffirmed
this policy. The only exception, which I am initiating at this tithe, is to
grant selected key staff members serving in the offices of the Leadership
 Approved For Release 2006/08/08: CIA-RDP81 M00980R003200040066-1
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