THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME II - REFERENCE AND INSTALLATION MANUAL

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE DEPARTM NT OF STATE
VOLUME II. REFERENCE AND NSTALLATION MANUAL
State Dept. declassification & release in tructions on file
Prepared B
CRESAP, McCORMIC and PAGET
Management En tneers
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
VOLUME II- REFERENCE AND INSTALLATION MANUAL
Prepared by
Cresol), McCormick and Paget
Management Engineers
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VOLUME II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Title
TechniqueS of Consumer Reaction Analysis
The Organization for Consumer Relations
User Education at the Desk Level
Distribution Policies
Classification Control
Current Intelligence Product
Style and Format of 'Written Producta
Techniques of Reviewing the' Utilization of the Analysts
Improved Use of the Time of Analysts
Reading Rate Improvement
Professional Development
Improved Facilities for Research Analysts
Techniques of Planning and Control
Three Approaches to Stronger Organization
Processing of Biographic Data
The Receipt and Distribution of Documents
The Procurement and Distribution of Publications.
IR Circulation Procedures
Records Management
Check-List Summary of Recommendations
Illustrations of Improvements in Style and Format
Illustrations of Use of Distinctive Typewriter Type Face
Intelligence Bibliography
'Present Procedures for Prodessing Biographic Data
Consumer Reaction Questionnaire
Present Techniques of Planning and Control
Detailed Techniques Proposed for Production Planning and Control
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Number
IV ? 1
VIII ? 1
IX ? 1
IX ? 2
XII ? 1
XIV ? 1
XV ? 1
XV ? 2
XVI ? 1
'XVI ? 2
XVI ? 3
XVII ? 1
XVII ? 2
XVII ? 3
XVII- 4
XVII ? 5
XVII ? 6
XVII . 7
XVIII ? 1
XIX ? 1
VOLUME II
EXHIBITS
Follows
Title Page No
Suggested Criteria for Determining
Product Distribution IV ? 6
Suggested Composition--Analyst Inter?
view Outline VIII ? 3
Outline for the Personnel Requirements
Analysis IX 10
Elements of Project Management . IX ? 18
Illustration of Application of Unit
Office Plan XII ? 6
Production Coordination Staff XIV ? 16
Present Organization of BI XV ? 2
Proposed BI Procedures XV ? 8
Present Organization for Document Flow XVI ? 2
Proposed Documents Distribution Unit XVI ? 8
Proposed Document Flow XVI ? 14
Present Publications Processing Organiza?
tion XVII ? 2.
Publications Procurement Procedures XVII ? 2
Publications Distribution Procedures XVII ? 4
Funds Allocated for Publication Procure?
ment XVI/ ? 6
Proposed Organization, Publications
Division XVI/ ? 8
Proposed Publications Distribution Pro?
cedures XVII ? 10
Proposed Publications Procurement Pro?
cedures XVI/ ? 10
Circulation Procedures XVIII ? 2
Inventory of Filing Cabinets in the R
Area XIX ? 2
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L TECHNIQUES OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS
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- TECHNIQUES OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS
Early in the planning of our field work, it was recognized that a
study of demand and use through the "eyes of ills customers" would offer
one of the most important sources of basic information regarding the
intelligence operations of the Department of State. Since precedents
in the form of previous fact finding efforts of this type were not
available to us, this portion of the analysis was conducted on the
basis of trial and error methods. The final result is thus imperfect,
although its major conclusions, reported in Volume I, are sufficiently
consistent to point clearly toward the principal steps which R should
take to improve its relationships with consumers.
It is the purpose of this chapter to review the experience of our
fact finding in order to outline suitable guides for future studies of
this type by the Department itself. Our suggestions regarding the most
fruitful approaches to evaluating consumer reaction, can best be stated
as answers to the three questions;
- What are the purposes which can be served by consumer
reaction studies?
-What methodology appears most productive?
- How can the findings of consumer reaction studies be
put to practical use?
A - THE PURPOSES SERVED BY CONSUMER REACTION STUDIES
One of the interesting and refreshing characteristics found in the
R Area is the use of concepts and terminology which are commonplace in
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business operations. One encounters frequently, terms such as "The
Product," "The Consumer," "The Raw Material," etc. This is considered a
beneficial tendency since it tends to clothe in understandable language
the difficult and abstruse (to many laymen) operations of an intelligence
organization. This usage of "commercial terminology" is particularly
apropos when one discusses the need for, and the techniques of, consumer
reaction studies. In business terms, the objective is that of conducting
a "market analysis" of the intelligence audience. It is believed that
three primary objectives of market analysis are fully applicable to study-
ing the audiences which the R Area is endeavoring to reach. These are:
(1) the identification of the market, (2) the development of the market,
and (3) the merchandising of the product to stimulate and sustain market
demand. Brief discussion of each of these elements of market analysis
should prove valuable in considering the purposes to be served by con-
sumer studies:
1. Identifying the Market
R has a many-sided mission. Among the components of this mission
are:
- To procure and/or distribute intelligence materials within
the R Area, to the Department, and among the intelligence
agencies. These materials range from the more commonly-
available printed books, serials, and reference works; to
the highly classified and sensitive pieces of information
garnered from reporting sources of the Department itself,
and from other intelligence sources. Included also are the
research products of others.
- To furnish convential library research and reference services.
- To maintain and provide biographic data on foreign person-
alities.
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- To conduct factual research.
- To analyze and interpret facts and events.
- To dram conclusions and prepare long-range estimates.
These services may be rendered orally, visually, by simple memorandum,
or by formally prepared research papers and reports. But throughout all
of these activities there runs one common thread - the provision of informa-
tion (whether factual or including interpretation and estimates) of actual
or potential value to someone else who can make use of it, now or in the
future, in taking decision actions. More simply stated, everything that
R produces and disseminates must find an audience which will find this
product of interest and value. If this is not true, R's continued
existence will be jeopardized.
Thus the first purpose of consumer reaction analysis is to locate
and classify R's various audiences. Our studies indicate that these
audiences extend from the Secretary of State to the single desk officer
within the Department, and to a very broad and much less readily identi-
fiable audience in the field and among the agencies. The relative size
and the varieties of interest found in each of these audiences are dif-
ficult to classify precisely. However, this is a study which must be made
on a continuing basis if the most accurate servicing of the audiences is
to be achieved. Among its initial purposes, consumer reaction analysis
should endeavor to measure the numerical size, the dispersion, and the
degrees of interest which each of the audiences has in Ris products and
services,
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2. The Development of the Market
It has been aptly cited to us that an important obligation of an
intelligence organization is to self-initiate many of the products and
services which it produces. This is to say that, in some measure, the
intelligence organization must decide what its market should have, rather
than "manufacturing" only those product lines (as does the typical
business) which the market will consume. This characteristic places an
unusual requirement upon the intelligence producer, since he must take
active steps to assure that his market is "trained" to appreciate, accept
and use the self-initiated products. Thus, another cardinal purpose of
consumer reaction analysis is to induce, through personal contact and
proper presentation, an understanding of the intelligence operations
leading to an ability and desire to use its services. Consumer reaction
studies must, therefore, discover the gaps and weaknesses which exist in
this regard in order to plan and conduct such indoctrination as needed.
3. The Improvement of Service to the Market
The objective of the above factor is to develop the market by making
the consumer want what he should have. The objective of the third factor
is to give the consumer what he wants, in the way he wants it, and at the
time that he will use it. This factor recognizes that a continuing
portion of the intelligence production will be devoted to specific
servicing of user-initiated demands. To the extent that this is a sound
basis for R's production, continuing studies of individual desires and needs
are essential to assure that the product pointedly answers these needs, and
to present products in the form and style which will be most satisfying to
the user.
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B - THE METHODOLOGY OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS
At the outset of our interviews with consumers, brief contacts were
made with top officials in each Bureau and Area of the Department. It
was the purpose, at this time, to secure an estimate of the number of
contacts which would be required to secure a proper cross-section of view-
points and, likewise, to test the types of questions which would elicit
useful reactions. The original interview guide was long and somewhat
general in character. It endeavored to secure answers to questions such
as nwhat is the meaning of intelligence information," "how are your needs
for intelligence information defined and communicated to those who will
supply these (Jabal', 'what is your evaluation of R's part in supplying
these needs," etc, After initial interviews in each Bureau and Area, it
was discovered that two conditions should be established:
- The interview approach should be so organized that a series
of brief conversations could be conducted with a large
number of individuals. This was found desirable since it
was realized that extensive coverage would be essential to
the securing of viewpoints susceptible of meaningful
analysis.
- The questions used should be phrased in simple but concrete
terms. This was found to mean that a small number of
questions should be used, whose purpose would be to elicit
comments regarding: (1) Is R used? (2) Is R useful?
(3) Is Rfs organizational status in the Department accept-
able? (4) Are there opportunities for improving the use of
R from your point of view?
Based upon these decisions a simple questionnaire form containing 14
questions, as illustrated in Appendix El was devised. At the same time, a
selection of desks to be interviewed in each Bureau was prepared with the
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objective of reaching each segment in each Bureau, including a representa-
tive sampling of top staff officers. .The resulting coverage, which reached
224 individuals, has provided a valuable background against which to sug-
gest future modifications and methodology. These observations can be sum-
marized under four headings as follow:
1. The Annual Survey of Target Users
The most, important group whose opinions should be regularly and sys-
tematically canvassed are those Who by reason of position, organization
location, and proximity have the most direct influence (whether good or
bad) on the standing of R and the use of its products. These are termed,
in our conception, the "target users" and are found for the most part with-
in the Department, although some are located in the field organization and
in other IAC agencies.
With respect to this group, organized coverage should be obtained by
personal interview. The difficulty of securing a thoughtfully prepared
questionnaire from busy and important operating officials is so great
that the "direct mail" basis of survey will yield results of doubtful
value. Our experience indicates that only the face-to-face interview
(which provides an opportunity to phrase questions in the most appropriate
and understandable manner, to stimulate thoughtful consideration and to
appraise the quality and objectivity of the responses given) will produce
findings susceptible of meaningful analysis and use. It is, therefore,
recommended that audits of target-user opinion be conducted by a wall-
qualified official of the R Area. As a Ouliplement to this technique,
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which will permit a higher degree of objectivity, it is proposed that a
representative of the A Area be invited to work with the representative
of the R Area. This technique, utilized in our study, might consist of
the following steps:
a* The R team meMber and the representative of the A Area
should work together in the initial selection of names to be interviewed,
having as their objective the selection of a suitable cross-section of
the organizational subdivisions of each Bureau and functional area.
b. A standardized interview technique, using a questionnaire
such as that in Appendix El should be developed and pilot-tested by the
team through a few joint interviews. This will assure that both team
members have the same concept of questions to be asked.
c. The team members should then divide the interview task,
but both should interview concurrently in the same organizational area in
order to permit periodic comparison of findings and decisions with respect
to the addition or deletion of names from the interview list.
With respect to the design of the interview program, three sug-
gestions are offered:
a. The number of questions used should permit completion of an
interview in approximately 30 minutes, but should likewise sustain an
interview of one to two hoursiduration in those situations where the inter-
viewee proves unusually cooperative and worthwhile. Our experience
Indicates that the use of several factual questions at the outset (such
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as "With Whom Do You Work in 11?") starts the interview on a highly con-
crete basis and avoids meaningless generalization. As the interview
progresses, it is well for the interviewer to be prepared with specific
materials as suggested below
b. A sample kit of products, thought to be of value and inter-
est to the officer being interviewed, provides an excellent basis for
stimulating specific discussion. The kits used during our interviews
were found to have one principal limitation; that is, they applied broadly
to the particular Bureau) but with insufficient directness to each sub-
division of the Bureau. It is felt advisable to construct kits after the
list of names to be interviewed has been chosen, so that the kit dis-
played to a given individual will be as fully representative of his
specific interests as possible. The use of the kit in a 30-minute inter-
view must be highly flexible since some respondents prefer to talk more
genernliy from total experience, and find their attention too narrowly
limited when specific pieces of material are displayed.
c. A third useful tool was found to be a list of research
projects in process. This list offers a concrete means of determining,
(1) the extent to which the respondent is acquainted with work in process
and has contributed suggestions regarding the scope of the project, and
(2) the degree and immediacy of his interest in the project.
It is proposed that organized consumer reaction studies embodying
the above principles be scheduled so that each major consumer area is
covered approximately once each year. To this end, it would appear
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advisable to schedule the studies so that one area is covered each month,
thus spreading the task of interviewing and analyzing throughout the
12-month period. Approximately one week out of each month would be
required if the interview task is so scheduled.
2* Ty_g_olltheSuraLTEoduct Users"
A large portion of the distribution given to R's products reaches
areas which may infrequently request projects, and whose interests may
be mainly with material suitable for background reading. This appears
to be particularly true among the IAC agencies, and it is assumed that the
same is largely true throughout the field establishment, Due to the vast
size of these audiences, and their geographic distribution, it is obviously
impractical to reach them through the technique of personal interview by
single representative of the R Area. It is our recommendation that a more
opportunistic (and thus less well-organized approach) be pursued in these
cases. The following suggestions may be worthy of consideration:
Advise the foreign posts, by appropriate comment in manuals
and other issuances, of Ills continuing desire to receive comments on the
content, utility and sufficiency of products reaching the field*
b, Use the Foreign Service Inspectors to secure and relay
comments to R. For these purposes, a simple questionnaire form should be
devised and distributed, with appropriate instructional guides, to the
Foreign Service Inspectors*
c. Include an appropriate question or questions in debriefing
sessions to glean knowledge of field use from those returning from the
foreign posts.
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d. Make an appeal to those going into field assignments for a
letter of comment. This is, of course, especially applicable in the case
of members of the R Area assigned to field posts or making trips to foreign
countries.
e. plore with established liaison personnel in the Military
Services the applicability of various techniques, including some form of
personal contact.
3. Special Studies of the Use of Selected Products and Services
After the organized consumer studies proposed above are well estab-
lished, use of spot analyses should be introduced. The methods which will
prove useful in these cases must be perfected through experimentation.
However, the following principles should be employed:
a. The EG and each division should be encouraged to suggest,
from time to time, specific papers which they have a particular interest
in following. The nature of this interest may be that a unique point of
view has been taken and I/ should carefully observe the reaction of its
audiences; or the subject may be of such importance that close follow-up
of the coverage and reaction achieved should be made; or it may be that
the division chief feels the paper selected provides a useful vehicle for
reassessing consumer attitudes in an area which he has found it difficult
to judge accurately, etc. In these and similar situations, the officer
designated to conduct consumer analyses can make an important contribution
by making pinpoint studies (through direct interview) of selected users
to discuss the content of a particular document or category of products.
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b. From time to time, questionnaire coverage should be utilized
where the less thoughtful responses ("yes," "no," or "no opinion") will be
satisfactory. This approach may be found particularly useful for example,
in reviewing the reaction toward more standardized services (LR, TAD, DI),
C ANALYSIS OF AND ACTION UPON CONSUMER STUDIES
Needless to say, consumer studies of the scope described will require
a heavy investment of valuable man-hours. Such an investment cannot be
justified if useable results are not forthcoming, or if results secured
are not put to practical use. Chapter II of this report discusses the
organizational vehicles through which such utilization can be obtained.
In summary, it is felt that three steps should occur, following each major
survey of target users.
1. Analysis of the Findings,
The interview team should, immediately upon completion of the inter-
views planned, prepare a statistical summary and abstract of those comments
which lend authenticity and completeness to the reactions secured. If
previous studies have been made of the same organizational area, com-
parisons should be drawn at this time. A conversation should then be held
with the research personnel in R Area directly concerned with the audiences
reached by the survey, in order to obtain the reactions of the "producer"
to the comments of the consumer. (It is, of course, important that the
source of comments received in confidence not be divulged.) This step is
a continuance of the fact-finding part of the study since it brings to
bear additional data for analysis in reaching final conclusions.
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2. Report of Findings to Management
Following the discussion with the producing branch, the team should
draw its conclusions and propose actions to overcome negative findings,
as well as to sustain and extend positive findings. This report should be
released to those levels of management having an immediate interest in its
findings and the immediate responsibility for acting upon them. This will
include, in every case, the division chief concerned and the Director, OIR.
In unusual situations, where the findings are of great magnitude on the
negative side, top management should be informed immediately by forwarding
a copy of the report to the Deputy Special Assistant.
a. It should be normal practice for the team to meet with those
members of management concerned, after an appropriate time has elapsed, to
assist in developing an agenda of steps to be undertaken, and to decide
upon the timing of these actions and the delegation of responsibility for
their accomplishment. Whether or not this agenda is prepared with the
teamts assistance, a copy should be furnished for their records, and in
each case a copy should be forwarded to the Deputy Special Assistant.
b. Normal procedure should provide that one or more follow-up
reports will be made by management to the Deputy Special Assistant,
describing the progress which has been made in acting upon approved find-
ings. A copy of each such follow-up report should likewise be forwarded
to the consumer reaction analyst for his records.
c. In most cases, it would appear advantageous to have the con-
sumer reaction analyst attend a meeting of the research branch concerned
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to make a report of findings to the individual research analysts. This practice
can have very positive benefits in terms of giving individual analysts more
concrete perspective of the extent to which their work is being utilized,
and of the views (both positive and negative) which their customers are
expressing.
Summary of Recommendations Concerning Techniques of
Consumer Reaction Analysis
1. Varket studies" of R Area products and services should be conducted
for three main purposes:
a. To identify the composition and needs of its various audiences.
b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the under-
standing, interest, and acceptance cf its self-initiated
services by these audiences.
c. To assess,periodically, the specific interests and needs of
its audiences, so that the portion of its work which should
be based on audience interest is prcperly performed.
2. At least once each year an analysis of opinion should be made, by
personal interview., with those who constitute target users. These inter-
views should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the
R Area and one from the A Area, based upon:
a. A well-chosen section.
b. A preplanned and tested questionnaire.
c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products, and
lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basic, means should be developed to canvass the
views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and those
in the IAC agencies.
4. Spot studies, based either upon questionnaire or direct interview, should
be conducted from time to time to meet a particular need expressed by the
EG or a division. These will be conducted to secure view's regarding a
specific product or category of products.
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The completion of the survey of target users should include a
discussion with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of
a full report of findings and conclusions.
6. Action upon the findings of consumer reaction studies should be the
responsibility of management, rather than or the interviewer, but
the latter should be kept informed of actions taken and assist in
their implementation when appropriate.
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II. THE ORGANIZATION FOR CONSUMER, RELATIONS
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II. THE ORGANIZATION FOR CONSUMER RELATIONS
?4--
R can take pride in our finding, based upon personal contact with a
broad cross-section of Departmental customers, that its products and
services are extensivelz used. It must be equally impressed, however,
with the vast opportunities which exist for improving the intensity of
use ani: for securing a higher degree of satisfaction among its custom-
ers. The same consumer reaction interviews produced strong evidence
of these opportunities:
- Many customers, when questioned regarding the specific values
derived from H's research products and services, characterized
these values as supplementary rather than vital. While H's serv-
ices are widely used in all Bureaus, those who consider these
services most essential are the S/P, the IIA and a few Offices,
such as ER. While R may be inclined at times to discount the
views of its less enthusiastic customers, to do so may be an ad-
mission of weakness which could lead to undesirable and even dis-
astrous curtailment of research staff,
y However, there should be no cause for pessimism if the conclu-
sions of our interviews are indicative. In every Bureau, enthu-
siastic or otherwise in its present reaction to R, the majority
feeling emphasizes the hope, and more often the conviction, that
R can be more useful or more extensively used. In total, 76 percent
of these expressing an opinion indicated these views - though all
were not confident that H's philosophy of operation or its resources
would be responsive to the need expressed. The greatest number (as
reported on page 12 and 13 of Volume I) feel that improved utiliza-
tion of R must be preceded or accompanied by the development of
closer and more satisfactory "consumer - producer" relationships.
This means to such officials a willingness on H's part to remove
the "shroud of mystery" which appears at times to cloak its works
to show an interest in the individual desires of consumers, to
give more overt attention to consumer desires in the work planning
stage, and perhaps to be more clever and convincing in explaining
why one project must be given priority over another, as well as
why some projects cannot be undertaken at all.
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The attitude of the analyst provides still another significant gauge
of this need. Aith respect to an important percentage of their products,
analysts are vague in assessing the contribution they are making to
the decisions of policy and operating officials. Much of this feeling
is attributable to the lack of proper communications between the pro-
ducer and the consumer; some is certainly due to the absence of working
relationship which gives assurance to both analysts and consumers
that only useful, or potentially useful, work is undertaken.
The above observations have been lifted out of the context of findings
which are on the whole more positive than negative. This has been done
to dramatize the importance of more adequate relationships with those
whose attitude may affect the ability of R to continue the heartening
progress of the past 7 years. Before outlining those major steps which
it is felt will contribute to this improvement, our analysis will be
more understandable if a statement is made of the conditions which per-
mit such important needs to exist unanswered.
A - CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
A review of our findings indicates that four closely related fac-
tors contribute to the present desire of consumers for more adequate
working relationships:
1. The Intelligence Adviser Has not Provided an Effective Channel
or Representative for the a Area.
The basic concept of the Intelligence Adviser as described in cur-
rent position classification is very plausible. His responsibilities
read, in part, as follows:
"Under general direction of Assistant Secretor-, primarily responsi-
ble for developing the fullest utilization of intelligence by Bureau.
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Principal consultant in the determination and coordination of
Bureau's requirements from the intelligence area and from outside
intelligence agencies. Also participate, as the Bureau's repre-
sentative, in the initiation and development of broad and compre-
hensive intelligence programming policies and in the constant
readjustment of the over-all intelligence activities of the De-
partment in order to ensure that both immediate and long-term
intelligence needs of the Bureau are realized. The Intelligence
Adviser, in addition, is responsible for carrying out the Bureau's
responsibility toward the intelligence area."
The point does not need to be labored that the eminently desirable
objectives expressed in this description are not being fully realized
in the Bureaus today.* We believe that this will continue to be the
case because of weaknesses in this organizational concept, some of
which appear inherent:
a. The Intelligence Adviser under the most favorable cir-
cumstances cannot be a representative of RI nor a "merchant" of its
services. Psychologically the incumbent awes his allegiance to the
parent Bureau.
b. This factor might not in itself restrict the value of
the Adviser were R's services thoroughly understood and accepted among
all of the customers in each Bureau. Not only is this not the case
today, but it appears unlikely, due to the continuing turnover of desk
personnel among other factors, that such a condition can be hoped for
in the foreseeable future.
Added to this problem is the difficulty of achieving in
all Bureaus adequate status for the role of Intelligence Adviser.
Being enon-producer" in the eyes of desk officers, the Adviser tends
*The primary exceptions are ARA and FE, but fully satisfactory working
relationships do not exist throughout any bureau.
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to acquire the label "marginal contributor," and some have difficulty
in finding a sufficient range of constructive duties to occupy their
time as Intelligence Adviser.
d. As a consequence of the above, the Intelligence Adviser
position tends to create a vacuum into which are drawn regular operat-
ing responsibilities. In several Bureaus such "productive" duties
now consume the Adviser's time and interests to the point where as
little as 5 to l5 percent of his time remains for duties as Intelli-
gence Adviser.
e. Apart from the exceptions which now exist and have
existed to the above pattern, it is doubtful whether R's management
can delegate its consumer relations to a middleman, without creating
a detachment which reduces the personal status of the producer in the
eyes of the consumer, and which impairs the ability of the producer
to visualize and speak clearly, in the written word, to his audience.
Because of the above factors the degree of coverage now provided
by Intelligence Advisers and Liaison Officers is incomplete. Three
major areas having no coverage are NEA, IIA and TCA, and in five areas
on17 half or less of the time of the incumbent is devoted to duties
as Intelligence Adviser.
2. R's Channels to Departmental Customers Have Tended to be Con-
centrated at the Top and at the Operating Officer Levels.
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? The single most favorable consumer relationship encountered is
with the Policy Planning Staff and other "Fifth Floor" customers who
are serviced directly by the Special Assistant and the Officer who
acts in liaison with S/P. At the opposite extreme, but on a very
spotty basis, there are highly satisfactory relationships at the oper-
ating officer levels. The best of these were found in NEA, FE and BE,
although there are individual situations in every Bureau.
The gap which is left at the Assistant Secretary-Deputy Assistant
Secretary level, and among many office directors, is most distinct.
This can be explained by the fact that working level contacts between
OIR and the Bureaus have been most successfully developed (again with
exceptions such as DRS) by branch chiefs and senior analysts. In
several cases the division chief has not found a regular, effective
basis of relationships due undoubtedly to the fact that his "opposite
number" is not a producer in the sense of the desk officer, and thus
not as directly concerned with the production of research.
3. apnized Means Have not been Developed by Which Consumer
Reaction Can be Gauged on a Regular and Systematic Basis.
While this is presumably a responsibility of the Intelligence Ad-
? viser, an operating procedure designed for this purpose was found only
in BUR. This procedure, however, possesses the faults of a mechanical
and impersonal routine which renders the significance of its findings
of doubtful value. Consumer reaction in a sales or service enterprise
is most reliable when gathered at firsthand, on a planned sampling basis,
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to the end that strengths and weaknesses can be specifically identified
as the basis for direct improvements in the producing organization. Uithin
Ills top management, provision is not made for conducting such studies,
and initiative is thus lacking above the level of the branch chiefs who
should not be expected to conduct an objective appraisal of his own serv-
ices.
L. With Re ard to Outside Customers Re ar Devices_ofcchang-
3ng Plans and Ideas are Limit imarily to the
?lAO nd- its liatcn Committee.
Our visits with officials of the IAC agencies were, in general,
insufficient to assess the benefits to be derived from closer relation-
ship with respect to program planning. It was found that the relationship
provided by IAD and its counterparts in the intelligence agencies is satis-
factory and effective with respect to acquisition and distribution matters.
It was likewise found that, quantitatively at least, other intelligence
agencies are important consumers of !Ifs research products. However,
other agencies indicated that their principal basis of contact and col-
laboration with ?IR occurs th-ough working committees, particularly in
connection with the production of VIEs. It is noted in this connection
that the NSC Directives indicate that the agencies should exchange plans
and take steps to minimize independent intelligence production in the
fields of dominant interest assigned to another. Active steps to comply
with this requirement were not found in State's fields of dominant inter-
ests (political, cultural and sociological).
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B - RECOMMENDATIONS
In an area such as Ills, organizational solutions to consumer rela-
tions are at best but one step, the primary purpose of which is to estab-
lish machinery which will provide a minimum basis of working relationships.
More important than organization are (1) planned programs of user educa-
tion (Chapter III); (2) a strong desire to achieve proper relationships
on the part of individual members of management; (3) fortunate personal-
ity relationships; and (4) resourcefulness on the part of the producer
in maintaining dignified relationships without compromising his intellectual
integrity or reducing his status to one of subserviance.
With these important qualifications in mind, it has been found that
four steps of an organizational character should be considered for early
adoption:
1. Create a New 'Vehicle of Substantive Liaison with Each Bureau.
Though exceptions now e7:ist to the general weakness found in the
Intelligence Adviser concept they are so unusual that it appears unwise
for R to continue its reliance upon this device as the primary vehicle
of relationships with the Bureaus. It is recommended that these positions
be continued only to the extent that individual Bureaus desire to desig-
nate an officer to serve as the representative of the Assistant Secretary-
in the acquisition and use of intelligence from R and other intelligence
sources. To meet RS own requirements it is recommended that the follow-
ing steps be taken:
a. Create by directive of the Secretary of State (or other
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Appropriate authority) the position of "Intelligence Consultant" to the
Assistant Secretary of each Bureau, and the corresponding officer in
charge of each functional area.
b. Specify that this position shall be filled in each case
by a key executive of the R Area, who will assume this role as an ad-
ditional dut:. For this purpose, designate the chief of the corres-
ponding OIR division in the case of Regional Bureaus, and a similar
key executive from OIR in the case of functional areas (for example,
the CPI would be the logical Intelligence Consultant to IIA, and it is
assumed that DFI would furnish the Consultant to other functional areas),
The present liaison arrangement with S/P is an excellent illustration
of the Intelligence Consultant concept.
c. Define the duties of the Intelligence Consultant as those
of (1) counselling with the Assistant Secretary) and such other principal
Bureau officials as speak for him, on the program of major research and
estimates undertaken by the R Area; (2) providing such briefings and
other substantive services, including top liaison with other intelli-
gence agencies, as required by the Assistant Secretary; and (3) attend-
ing, for these purposes, meetings of the Bureau's top command at which
matters of policy are considered.
d. Include in the membership of the Estimates Group all of
those who are designated to serve as Intelligence Consultants, so as
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to bring to this Group a maximum of current and authentic knowledge re-
garding top policy views and needs in all major areas of the Department.
e. Provide other channels of contact between Rand the Exe-
cutive Directors of the Bureaus to be responsible for those relationships
concerned with the distribution and clearance of intelligence products.
(Further reference to this function is made in Chapter IV, "Distribution
Policies").
2. Reinforce This Revised Approach to Consumer Relations by a
Tre7FPolicy Regarding the Participation or Branch Chiefs 4nd
Senior Analysts.
There appears to exist today some uncertainty respecting the type
and degree of relationships which branch chiefs and senior analysts
should establish with their opposite numbers. At the one extreme is the
philosophy and practice of intimate relationships, a condition approach-
ing the relationships which might exist under decentralization. At the
other extreme is the policy and practice of minimizing direct relationships
to avoid the diversion of personnel to "unproductive" pursuits or the
loss of objectivity which might occur; ar to preserve a-role of strong
independence in the interpretation of facts and events. While it is
apparent that neither extreme presents the proper solution, we believe
that the latter extreme is overemphasized in respect to its dangers,
and that any branch chief or senior analyst Toiho lacks that mental
"fiber" which can resist bias is probably not a suitable intelligence
analyst in the first instance. In any event, we would urge a positive
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policy which permits and encourages the maintenance of frequent informal
working relationships, and which construes as an indication of weakness
on the part of the R Area any situation where a branch is unsuccessful
in establishing such working relationships. (It is realized that there
will always be situations beyond the control of an individual branch
chief, but these should become a challenge to be met by higher line
authority including, where necessary, the Special Assistant).
The regulation of consumer contacts by senior analysts should be
the full responsibility of the branch chief. At a minimum, the device
of a periodic branch meeting attended by a representative bureau customer
should be encouraged, as part of the program of professional develop-
ment discussed in Chapter XI.
When a branch chief finds that relationship will be enhalced, and
a worthwhile service rendered, through regularly scheduled briefings,
this should be freely encouraged.
3. Establish a Continning Plan of Auditing R's Services and Rela-
tionships by a Qualified Staff Officer of the R Area.
We were impressed with the interest displayed by Bureau officials
at all levels in the questions posed during our consumer reaction inter-
views. No matter how successful the substantive liaison at the Assistant
Secretary level, R cannot secure a realistic view of the reaction at the
desk level without a specifically designed plan of eliciting the opinions
of this large audience. A discussion of the techniques which we consider
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worthy of continued use for this purpose has been presented in ChTter
I. The execution of these techniques will require the following steps:
a. An officer should be chosen from Rs staff who possesses
the personality and talent to secure, on a face-to-face basis, the frank
opinions of customers who have both favorable and unfavorable reactions.
b. This officer should likewise possess the ability to inter-
pret, objectively but imaginattvely? the principal problems indicated
by such comments in order to develop an appraisal of the sufficiency
and utility of products and services provided to each target user.
c. This staff officer, whom we propose be known as the "Con-
sumer Relations Coordinator," should be able to report his findings to
any level of management which should be appraised of them in order that
proper corrective action can be taken. This means that if the staff of-
ficer is attached to the Director, OIR, it should be his duty to report
his findings independently to the Special Assistant when conditions war-
rant. It will be noted that this is in effect, the privilege which
intelligence officers must themselves insist upon in order to insure
that knowledge of their interpretations and estimates reaches responsible
levels of command. Normally, however, it is expected that the Consumer
Relations Coordinator will first communicate his findings to the branch
chief concerned, and work directly with the first level of management
in devising improvements.
d. The duties proposed will, by themselves, not justify the
full time of an officer of the caliber required to perform this function.
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There are described in succeeding Chapters (III, IV, V, VII) a number of
important related efforts which should be lodged under his jurisdiction.
4. Renew Efforts to Secure More Interest in, and Systematic Guid-
ance to, nis Major Program of Estimates and Research on the
Part of Leaders in the Department.
While it has been reported that the "Fifth Floor" represents one
of R's most satisfactory consumer relationships, it likewise appears
that specific continuing guidance is received primarily from S/P. It
is unrealistic to expect officials other than the Special Assistant
to devote substantial time and thought to the State Department's role
in the Intelligence Community, but it appears desirable that the major
burden not be carried by the Special Assistant alone, inasmuch as the
Department as an entity, rather than the R Area alone, has been dele-
gated responsibilities for intelligence acquisition and production in
designated fields.
The scope of this responsibility is indicated not only by the
specific content of R's research program at any given time, but also
by the resources (primarily in terms of trained manpower) which the
Department is willing to invest in intelligence operations. This is
a determination of such potential importance, in our view, that it should
not be left solely to R through negotiation with budget officials, but
should have periodic assessment by other top officials who are in a
position to comprehend the role of intelligence both in the context
of the Department and the Community at large. Thus, it may be found
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that the creation of a body similar to the Program Review Board, even
though the frequency of its meetings are limited to one or two per year,
will prove a stronger means of meeting this need than presently exists.
5. Take Steps to Secure Similar Improvement in Interdepartmental
Relationships.
Perhaps more immediate and tangible benefits to R's program planning
can be achieved through collaboration with IAC executives, since the
counterparts of the Special Assistant and the Director, OTR, have a more
immediate community of understanding. It would thus seem appropriate to
explore with the CIA and other members of the IAC the feasibility of
creating a "junior IACH in State Department's fields of dominant inter-
est. It may be found that such a body should have responsibilities
similar to those of the EIC in the exercise of leadership in the corn,-
=amity. The current importance of such a step is underscored, we believe,
by the transfer of responsibilities from the CIA to the Department of
State in January 1951 for functions formerly performed by the CIA in
the fields of political, sociological and cultural research, including
responsibilities for intelligence in support of psychological programs.
Summary of Recommendations Concerning the
Orgaaization for Consumer Relations.
1. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau, in
the form of an trIntelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secretary
and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.
2. Reinforce this revised approach to consumer relations by a clear
policy regarding the participation of branch chiefs and senior analysts.
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3. Establish a continuing plan of auditing R's services and relation-
ships by a qualified staff officer of the R Area.
L. Review efforts to secure more interest in, and systematic guidaace
to, Ills major program of estimates and research on the part of
leaders in the Department.
S. Take similar steps to secure improvements in interdepartmental rela-
tionships.
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III. USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LEVEL
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III - USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LETEL
The importance of a clear understanding of R's responsibilities and
capacities on the part of desk officers in all bureaus of the Department of
State cannot be minimized. Desk officers make up the largest single group
of those who request intelligence support from the R organization. They
represent the largest group of action addressees for R's products.
A - EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR PLANNED
PROGRAMS OF USER EDUCATION
1, The Attitude of a Majority of R's Professional Staff
It has been recognized by many individuals in the R organization that
R has the responsibility for taking the initiative in developing harmonious
working relationships. R is interested in developing good relationships
for the following reasons:
a. To assist in the production of a better and more timely
product.
b. To minimize misunderstandings regarding obligations, responsi-
bilities, and allegiances.
c. To permit the R Area and the bureau desks to properly comple-
ment each other in the planning of research and in the production of in-
telligence reports of substantial value in policy determinations.
d. For administrative purposes in respect to budgeting, space,
and aver-all program planning and review.
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2. The Attitude of Bureau Officials
Although, in general, R is widely known and used, a relatively high
percentage of users (54%) were not aware of any current research project
of interest to them. As further amplified in the Summary Report, this
unawareness of current R work varies widely between bureaus.
Opinions concerning the usefulness of R's products vary considerably
both within and between bureaus. The pattern of unfavorable response is
strikingly similar to the response by bureaus to the question raised in
the paragraph above.
There would appear to be a sufficiently large percentage of unfavor?
able response to warrant R's attention in respect to:
Timeliness,
Quality, and
Readability.
Although response on the part of R's customers in the Department of
State to the usefulness of specific reports was generally good, the varia?
tion in response seems significant. Again, the specific bureau response
conformed to previous findings. An over?all average rating of 52 percent
favorable comment was noted. The range of favorable comment, however, was
from 64 percent for Intelligence Reports (IR's) to 37 percent for the DIC
series.
The users of R's products suggest several significant things when asked
about ways in which R's services could be improved:
? 38 percent advocate closer working relationships--"cement?
ing relationships."
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- 27 percent feel that OIR staffing should be improved --"over -
worked and understaffed."
- 15 percent stress more timely service?na requisite of im-
proved use."
- 20 percent suggest other service factors--"distribution and
declassification problems," na more helpful attitude,"
"suggest a formal advance planning and scheduling procedure,"
etc.
3. The Varied and Changing Composition of the Bureau Audience
Desk officers come to their tasks with varied backgrounds. These do not
necessarily include a knowledge or appreciation of the current application or
usefulness of the intelligence service provided by the R organization.
There is a relatively high turnover of desk personnel in the bureaus
occasioned by the policy of foreign, service officer rotation. This would
indicate that a continuing program of indoctrination of desk personnel
must be inaugurated and maintained in order to establish and keep a uniform
and mutually helpful degree of understanding and appreciation.
Desk personnel are busy individuals. It will be necessary for R to
take the initiative to seek out the new personnel assigned. It is question-
able whether good production on the part of R, in and of itself, will be
sufficient to maintain proper relationships.
4. The Scope and qmplexity of RIs Services
The R organization is a relatively large one and the intelligence out-
put is correspondingly large. Desk: officers need guidance as to services
available and haw to secure them, projects and reports of current interest,
personalities in the R organization,-their location and special talents,
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the importance of mutual planning, etc. All of these factors are important
to the Desk Officer to help him do his lob better.
B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT
Five suggestions are offered to meet the conditions cited above.
1. Develop a Dignified, Highly Concrete, and Vivid Story of the
Intelligence Operations of the Department. Designed for Visual-
Oral Presentation
This visual-oral presentation would provide the device on which a
program of individualized indoctrination would be conducted for new or
uniformed desk officers and other bureau officials.
The visual-oral presentation in "demonstrator" or "easel-type" form
might consist of the following elements:
a. The Role of the Intelligence Organization.
b. R Organization Outline.
c. The Research Process--a plcturization. (Graphics now used
in the R Orientation Program could serve as a basis for a, b, and c.)
d. The Division Organization (specifically included in the
visual-oral presentation to match the interests of the particular desk
officer being addressed).
e. Principal Intelligence Products (Samples, objectives, fre-
quency, distribution, etc.).
Section A - General
Section B - Serial Publications
Section C - Biographic
Section D - Bibliographic.
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f.? How to Secure Intelligence Services. (What services available,
who to call, etc.)
g. Samples of recent products (to be left, if requested by the
person being addressed). These would be products specifically selected and
considered to be of current interest to him.
h. A list of names, room numbers, phone numbers, countries or
specialities covered by each individual, and a list of current projects of the
specific OIR branch the desk officer is concerned with. (This list to be left
with the desk officer.)
The visual?oral presentation would be made by the Intelligence Consultant
with the particular branch chief concerned in attendance. Depending upon the
interests of the person being addressed, the presentation might be made by a
branch chief with a senior analyst in attendance, or simply by the senior
analyst concerned with the country of interest.
2. Organize the Plan of Indoctrination on a Continuing Basis so That
All New Desk Personnel Are Properly Introduced to the Intelligence
Function in the Department of State Shortly After They are Assigned
As visual?oral presentations are made to office directors, additional
meetings should be established in the form of follow?up and planning meet?
ings and additional visual?oral presentation should be scheduled for other
desk personnel. These subsequent presentations can be accomplished by branch
chiefs and/or senior analysts. Selection of the R representative to make the
presentation should be conditioned by the ability to make the presentation
effectively as well as country or substantive knowledge.
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3. Compile and Maintain An "Intelligence Bibliography" Specifically
Tailored to the Interests of Principal Bureau Officials
The Intelligence Bibliography should encompass the following elements:
a. Loose-leaf form--so that additions and modifications may be
easily made.
b. The material contained should be indexed by subject (within
the country) in order to lend maximum assistance to the user.
c. The intelligence reports (R produced) listed should not in-
clude number, title, preparing division, and date but, in addition, should
include a brief of two or three sentences permitting an understanding of
the scope and objectives of the report.
d. The Intelligence Bibliography should include, in addition to
the still-pertinent R intelligence reports, the most significant LR holdings
on the country as well.
e. The Intelligence Bibliography should be organized as follows
(by country):
Cover
Introduction
Table of Contents (with names of person to contact
for material or information)
Part I - Intelligence Research Projects in Process
Part II - Index - by subject
Part III - Intelligence Reports
Part IV - Reference Mhteriols.
IR should have the responsibility for the compilation of the original
Intelligence Bibliography for each country or area. This should be referred
to the OIR branch responsible for the country for the addition of projects
in process, the expansion or the bibliography to add the brief of each OIR
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report listed, and for the removal of those reports which are no longer of
current interest. The maintenance of the bibliography should operate in the
same manner; i.e., LR responsible for the preparation of the periodic addi?
tions (monthly in most cases but no less frequently than quarterly) to
Parts II, III, and IV. The responsible OIR research branch should then be
responsible for review, addition providing Part I, and the brief of
intelligence reports listed; and for final preparation and delivery to the
desk officer.
Appendix C illustrates a sample bibliography (Ethiopia) prepared in
cooperation with DRN and IR during the couse of our survey. Time did not
permit the refinement of this bibliography in accordance with the specifi?
cations outlined above but it illustrates the basic principles intended.
4. Inaugurate a Program of Inial Studyy ZR of thedivid.t.Refece
Needs of Each Bureau at the "Officer?in?Charge" Level
The objectives should be to determine the reference materials required
and secondly, to establish a regular procedure for the systematic maintenance
of such reference tools. This should be done on the basis of individual
study of needs and should permit the identification of opportunities to pro?
vide an expanded spot factual information service through the reference ser?
vice of IR.
This function should be the responsibility of the chief of IR and
should be based upon individual study of desk needs for:
a. Organized reference materials.
b. A system of maintenance of these reference materials.
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c. Arrangements for the speedy handling of spot factual informa-
tion requests.
5. loodge ResponsibiliV for Development and Coordination ,of the
Program Outlined in the Consumer Relations Coordinator
It is considered that the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator should
assume major responsibility for program development, indoctrination scheduling,
and continual follow-up and guidance. The program as outlined in the visual-
oral presentation should be under continuous review and study so as to present
the best possible and most current view concerning R's capabilities, responsi-
bilities, and objectives. The assignment of program development and coordina-
tion to the Consumer Relations Coordinator does not relieve the Intelligence
Consultant or branch chiefs of the responsibility for conducting the presenta-
tions, for arranging for additional presentations, or for the continued agressive
maintenance of the proposed Intelligence Bibliography.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Develop a visual-oral presentation designed to introduce the intelligence
organization to new bureau officials.
2. Plan a continuing indoctrination program.
3. Develop and maintain an Intelligence Bibliography for active use by
bureau desk officials.
4. Provide a personalized reference service for bureau officials based upon
a survey of reference needs.
5. Lodge responsibility for program developmenticoardination, and guidance
in the Consumer Relations Coordinator.
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IV. DISTRIBUTION POLICIES
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IV ? DISTRIBUTION POLICIES
A trite observation (but one worth repeating at this point) is that
the best intelligence research may be of little value unless it reaches
the right person at the right time. We would add an additional factor ?
that the recipient be in a receptive frame of mind.
Despite its importance to the successful utilization of intelligence
research, distribution presents many problems which have not received
sufficient conscious attention by R's top management. Successful dis?
tribution policies and procedures are believed to require (1) an attitude
of service (but not of subservience), (2) procedures designed to serve
highest utilization of products, not simply widest dissemination; and
(3) steps to assure proper application of these procedures.
A ? OPPOSING ATTITUDES EXIST CONCERNING
DISTRIBUTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES
? 1, R Has Adopted a Policy of Wide Distribution.
The dominant philosophy of distribution found in OIR's Production
Control Staff (PCS) is to effect distribution to the widest audience
having direct or peripheral interest in written products. It is re?
ported that distribution is increased on 50 percent of the products
reviewed by PCS, and seldom if aver decreased.
This philosophy is also reflected in those parts of the OIR
Analysts' Manual, and the OIR memorandum of February 20, 1952, which
deals with the preparation of "Requestor Only IR's" and Special Papers.
The analyst is required to justify the preparation of a "Requestor
Only IR," and less than 1 percent of the products now produced carry
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this classification. As a consequence there is a tendency among analysts
to use special papers to avoid the requirement of numbering the paper
and preparing a reproducible master.
Another evidence of the philosophy of wide distribution is the fact
that the standard Intelligence Brief (IB) distribution, regardless of
subject, is 174 copies, of which 131 are to the State Department and
the remaining 43 outside of the State Department.
2. Departmental Customers for R's Products Indicate a Preference
for Faster and More Accurate Distribution.
In contrast to the philosophy of vide distribution found in OIR
management, and particularly in its Production Control Staff, strong
evidence of an opposite point of view among customers has been found:
a. Several of the analysts interviewed reported that
irritation has been encountered when a report produced for a specific
requestor is given wide general distribution.
b. Our interviews with 224 bureau customers confirm this re-
port and establish a number of sound reasons for it. It is felt in the
Bureaus, for example, that a policy of wide distribution -
- Causes the author to go beyond the needs of the target
user in completing his research and composition, and
- Causes OIR to devote more time to "finishing up" the
paper (editingj reproduction) than justified.
Some of OIR's most appreciative customers report that by the time a
paper has reached the rough draft stage, it has served the needs of the
target user and need not be placed in final, edited form.
IV - 2
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c. Another and more serious observation was made during inter?
views with customers. A number of the products now reaching desk officers
are of indirect or peripheral interest. The endless flaw of reading
matter to the typical operating official is in such volume that few can
afford the time for peripheral reading. Thus, the receipt of papers which
are not of direct interest creates in the minds of some the
that R is a producer of marginal products, produced because
R rather than R's audience. This impression is most apt to
reader who has been refused a requested research project or
a paper whose promised deadline has been passed.
d. It is also of interest that despite OIR's desire to reach
the maximum audience, some customers are not receiving papers which would
be of direct interest to them. In displaying sample kits to Bureau
officials, a few in each Bureau noted titles that appeared of interest
which had not been seen.
impression
they interest
occur to the
who is awaiting
3.. Distribution Lists for Serial Products Show a Constant
Tendency to Grow,
The problem of distribution lists was reviewed and reported upon by
the "Ad Hoc Committee on Internal Information Publications" in their
report dated July 19, 1948. One statement is considered to be pertinent,
"A considerable part of the growth of distribution lists can be attri?
buted to infrequent critical review of distribution lists to insure that
they are revised currently to include only those recipients having a
justifiable need for materials. The need for frequent review relates to
the turnover of personnel, organizational and functional changes, and
the atrophy or cessation of a previously bona fide need." The growing
IV ? 3
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distribution lists for R's principal serial products suggests that this
observation may still be pertinent.
Original Distribution Present
Title Distribution 6 Months Later Distribution
Soviet Affairs Notes 310 585 1,089 (3 years
later)
Countering Soviet 69 506 808 (2 years
Propaganda later)
Soviet Affairs 371 401 450 (3 years
later)
Chronology of Principal 163 194 429 (3 years
Events Relating to USSR later)
B - RECOMMENDATIONS
R's desire to secure a maximum readership for its products is believed
attributable to three commendable objectives: (1) to preserve a plan of
communication which will assure the availability of important intelligence
to all who might benefit from this knowledge, (2) to honor the obligation
of the State Department to share its production generously with other
intelligence agencies, and (3) to demonstrate to the Departmental audience
that R is in fact -a prolific producer of important papers. These objectives
are worthy of attainment, but it is our conclusion that a more important
service can be rendered to RIs basic audience - the Department of State -
without undue sacrifice in its obligation to the Intelligence Community.
To this end four steps are proposed:
1. Base Initial Distribution on a Proper Evaluation of the
"Audience Factor" and the "Need-to-Know" Factor for Each
Report.
We believe that more harmonious consumer relations and more constructive
use of R's products will result from a conscious policy of cultivating the
IV - 4
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attention of those most likely to profit from the information contained in
each paper. If this premise is sound, each paper should be evaluated prior
to distribution and placed in one of three categories defined in Exhibit I1J-1.
a. Limited distribution - means that the paper is intended
primarily for the use of a known user or group of users to whom limited dis-
closure is important; or that in the judgment of R limited distribution will
not jeopardize the essential value of the information to the Intelligence
Community. This decision should be made by the research branch and should
not be changed by the distribution staff in OIR without the approval of the
branch chief or other higher line authority. Products falling into this
category should be one of two types:
SPECIAL PAPER (SP): This type of paper, in signed
memorandum form addressed to a specific recipient
outside of R, provides the vehicle by which a senior
analyst may express informal opinions or present facts
on an informal basis. Special Papers do not represent
the official views of the R organization.
SPECIAL INTELLIGENEEJIEESITLIlai: This type of paper,
in typed standard IR format and with an IR number,
? provides the vehicle by which the R organization provides
special and personal intelligence research service to a
requestor (usually in the State Pepartment). An SIR
may later be given "normal distribution," as defined be-
low, after it has served its original purpose. In such
instances, it would appear desirable to circulate an
abstract which indicates that one copy of the manuscript
is available in IR for loan upon application.
It should be the policy of OIR to adopt a liberal policy toward the
production of SPIs and SIRts in the interests of economy and service.
(Under ideal conditions such papers might represent 10 to 20 percent of
total analyst production.)
b. Normal distribution - means that the paper probably has
interest and value beyond the target audience, but that this fact should
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be verified by the advance distribution of an abstract; or? that R should
advertise the availability of the product and be prepared to furnish copies
upon request in order to meet its obligation to the Community and ensure
proper attention by the target audience. This should become the principal
basis of distributing IR's and many IB's, and should be the treatment
accorded a paper by the distribution staff in the absence of a specific
recommendation to the contrary by the research branch. Procedurally,
"normal distribution" products should receive the following handling:
- A mimeograph stencil should be cut of the full text,
but a carbon copy produced for immediate hand delivery
to the requestor or target user.
- An abstract should be prepared and given immediate dis-
tribution to the full list of addressees considered
appropriate.
- The stencils should be held until demand from the
abstract distribution has been established (one to two
weeks) after which full reproduction and distribution
should occur.
c. General distribution - means that the scope of the subject
matter or its importance to the Intelligence Community transcends the
specific audience factor, and that maximum distribution based upon R's
judgment should occur immediately. It is assumed that NIE's, IEls and
SE's will uniformly fall in this category. The research branch should
designate IR's or IB' s worthy of this treatment, and no IR should be
raised to this category or removed from it without the approval of the
branch chief or higher line authority. It should be the conscious pur-
pose of R to reserve this category for papers of manifest importance so
that no recipient will consider them of marginal importance to his area.
VrRximum attention to style, format and appearance should be accorded these
IV- 6
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SUGGESTED CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION
DISTRIBUTION CATEGORIES
THE AUDIENCE FACTOR
THE "NEED TO KNOW" FACTOR
TARGET
CUSTOMER'S DESIRE
Rs APPRAISAL
TO INFORM
TO FOCUS ATTENTION
A. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
Informal - Special Paper
Formal - Special IR (SIR)
-Or-
Customer desires limited
disclosure or maximum of
informality in transmission
of information.
Content is of such special-
ized character - or form of
presentation so informal -
that "normal distribution"
not warranted.
-Or-
Material probably of neg-
ligible value beyond tar-
get user,
Acceptance or use by target audi-
ence would be jeopardized by
wider disclosure at this time.
B. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Full text to target audience;
abstract to broader audience
as basis for ultimate distal-
bution
-or-
Requester feels that broad-
er audience may be inter-
ested.
Content is of probable in-
terest and value to wider
audiences.
-or-
State Department's obliga-
tion to other agencies re-
quires that they be informed
of availability,
Target audience will not give (or
has not given) adequate attention
to product unless the possibility
of broader distribution exists.
C. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
Concurrent distribution to all
who might find of interest and
value
-or-
Product of such scope or
importance that no single
audience reaction can or
should be recognized.
Content is known to have
interest and value beyond
the target audience,
-Or-
Material should be given
maximum circulation due
to the uniqueness of its
content.
The subject matter is so urgent
or vital to current considerations
that it must be given dramatic
emphasis.
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papers. Abstracts should accompany them, and in Some cases be given
separate distribution as an advance announcement of the full paper
which is coming.
2. Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with Supervising
Distribution Policies and Assuring the Most Suitable Basis
of Distribution Within Each Bureau.
In the proposed organization (Chapter XIV), the Consumer Relations
Coordinator and his staff should assume responsibilities for distribution
control now lodged in PCS. These responsibilities should include:
a. Review of the distTibution list accompanying each product
to evaluate the propriety of the distribution determination made by the
research branch and to add or delete names in the case of "normal" and
"general" distribution papers, as defined above.
b. Review the suitability of the abstract being issued and
make suggestions for improvement.
c. Identify inadequacies in distribution policies through
his periodic contacts with users, and propose revisions to the Director
of Intelligence Research.
d. Review with the Executive Director's staff in each Bureau
the procedures followed in the Bureau's Message Center in the receipt
and routing of R's products.
e. Explore in each Bureau and Office the desirability of
maintaining a master file of Ft's products of interest to the area, as a
means of providing faster service to Bureau officials.
It should be noted that these responsibilities are directly allied
with securing the most effective "merchandising" of R's products and
services, and are a natural component of the other responsibilities
IV ? 7
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? oecurity iniormation
assigned to the Consumer Relations Coordinator; namely, classification
control, style and format standards, and consumer reaction studies. In
connection with all of these matters, the Consumer Relations Coordinator
should maintain close contact with the "Intelligence Consultants" and the
Assistant Division Chiefs (Production) in order to follow through promptly
on problems disclosed through their contacts with the Bureaus.
As distribution policies and criteria are made known to analysts
and branch chiefs and as compliance by review is observed, the review of
distribution lists should be accomplished on a post?audit rather than pre?
audit basis.
3. Supplant the Weekly and Monthly Lists of ProJects in Process
and Completed, Through the Use of "Tailored Bibliographies"
and Abstracts.
Chapter III of this report proposes that LR develop a system of
tailored bibliographies in loose?leaf form to be kept up to date by
monthly accessions lists and revisions. This scheme, when fully developed,
should eliminate the need for the present weekly and monthly product lists,
insofar as Bureau users are concerned, since a more serviceable reference
bibliography will thus be furnished. It is recommended that the, principles
of this scheme be applied to general users including the IIA, the S/P, and
the IAC agencies so that they, too, will have a "perpetual inventory" of
R products available to them, supplemented by a monthly accessions list
and periodic revisions. Current knowledge of specific papers available for
"normal distribution" will be called to the attention of eligible users
through the issuance of abstracts.
The semiannual catalogs of R products should likewise become un?
necessary for List I and II addresses as these "tailored bibliographies"
IV B
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are developed, although their continuance for Lists III and IV will remain
necessary.
4. Conduct a Periodic Audit of Nailing Lists for Serial Publications.
The rapid rise in circulation of serial publications has been noted
previously and indicates the need for periodic culling in order to maintain
active and useful mailing lists.
It is recommended that the mailing list review be accomplished by the
"subscription renewal" principle, whereunder periodic issues of the serials
contain tear?out blanks which must be returned to assure continued receipt
of the publication.
Renewal audits should take place annually for monthly publications
or those issued more frequent],Y: and at least every two years for those
serial publications issued less frequently than monthly.
Summary of Recomme4dations
Four recommendations are offered to develop more accurate, timely,
and flexible distribution policies:
1. Base initial distribution on a proper evaluation of the "audience
factor" and the "need?to?know factor" for each report. In this
connection, establish three principal distribution categories'
limited, normal, and general.
Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with supervising distri?
bution policies and assuring the most suitable basis of distribution
within each Bureau.
Supplant the weekly and monthly lists of projects in process and
completed through the use of "tailored bibliographies" and abstracts.
Conduct a periodic audit of mailing lists for serial publications.
IIT ? 9
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V. CLASSIFICATION CONTROL
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V ? CLASSIFICATION CONTROL
A large percentage of RIs reports bear a high security classification.
A sample of about 100 recent reports indicates the following distribution
by security classification:
Secret 37 percent
Confidential 33 percent
Restricted 20 percent
Unclassified 8 percent
There are opposing pressures in existence regarding the classification
that shouki be applied to R's reports. On the one hand, there is the human
tendency to assign a high classification in order to be "safe." On the
other hand, there is continually increasing pressure to assign a low
classification ? preferably none ? in order to permit wider distribution and
use. This pressure is particularly strong from personnel connected with
information programs. Occasional remarks from other bureau officials were
noted during our interviews concerning overly?classified R reports.
A significant portion of the time of CPI analysts in the R organiza?
tion is now spent trying to find unclassified sources for some of the
classified products R produces. Or, valuable time is spent securing per?
mission to use certain extracts for propaganda purposes.
Much of the high classification for R reports is accounted for by the
fact that source material bears a classification higher than necessary ?
at Iaast in the opinion of many observers.
Since classification regulations are complex, the analysts have re?
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duced them to two factors:
- Classify the report as high as Athe highest source
material used.
- Use judgment if the subject matter of the report appears
to warrant a classification higher than any of the
source material used.
A ? THE PROBLEMS
Our studies have shown that the high classification assigned to R
products have highlighted certain significant aspects of the problem which
are enumerated in the paragraphs that follow.
There is a growing pressure for the declassification of intelligence
reports by personnel connected with information programs. One official
of the R organization estimated a 300 percent increase in usefulness of
R products for propaganda purposes if classifications could be eliminated
or substantially reduced.
The major responsibility for the determination of report classifica?
tion rests upon the regular program analyst. His branch chief reviews
but seldom questions the security classification applied. The regulations
regarding report classification are not easy to apply and thus the "safe"
and therefore highest classification is used. There is room for judgment
but consistent guidance in the application of judgment is lacking.
There is recognition of the widespread tendency to averclassify
intelligence reports. The analysts themselves consider reports overclassified.
In the analyst interviews, 27 percent of the analysts considered that re?
ports were classified too high, none considered them to be classified too
low, and the remainder thought that the classification applied was correct.
V? 2
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? The Committee on Declassification was established November 9, 1949 in
order to develop procedures and standards for declassification action.
The Committee has not met since July 19516 A review of the files of this
Committee indicates that the declassification procedure planned to date
is extremely cumbersome and possibly unpromising.
The predominant reason, by far, for the relatively high classification
assigned to R reports is the classification of the source materials used.
This factor is consistently cited by the analysts. The problem of defining
and securing uniform and accurate classification on source documents is
a difficult one.
B ? PLAN OF IMPROVENENT
These factors pointed to the establishment of a systematic program of
classification review and ]ad us to the identification of several fields
of improvement.
Previous experience in the R Area with a systematic program of down?
grading and declassification has been very good. In a 3?month period during
the summer of 1949, the Projects Control and Distribution Section accomplished
the following through the activity of a half?time declassification clerk:
Action
No. of ReportE Percentage to Total
Downgraded
65 27%
Declassified
115
49%
Classification retained
55
24%
Classification upgraded
1
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Six specific actions are suggested for consideration:
1. Establish the position of "Classification Control Officer" on
the Staff of the Proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator.
The Classification Control Officer should have sufficient authority
to exert strong influence upon the classification of reports, including,
when occasion demands, authority in his own name to establish security
classifications.
The establishment of this position would supplant the Committee on
Declassification, The relative inactivity of this Committee, the
complexity of the problem, and the necessity for speedy handling in many
cases underscore the importance of establishing a position and designating
one person who will have responsibility and authority for performance.
Positive, direct action is a requirement for success in this work. This
applies not only to the development and application of classification
regulations and procedures but also in the conception and implementation
of steps and agreements which will expedite action and achieve the desired
goal of maximum research usefulness.
2. Establish a Systematic Program of Classification Review and
Revision to be Administered by This Officer.
The functions suggested are:
a. Develop and publish specific security classification regu?
lations as they apply to R's products. These regulations should be in?
cluded in the Report Preparation Manual recommended in Chapter VII.
They should amplify existing regulations and should enumerate the factors
of judgment, the manner of utilizing footnotes, the question of excerpt?
ing and extracting, etc., in order to present the correct and desired
V? 4
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frame of reference for use by the individual analyst and his immediate
supervisor.
b. Review the security classification assigned to each report
(at least on a post?audit basis) and take steps to revise inappropriate
report classification, especially for overclassified reports. For reports
judged to have value to psychological and information programs, the re?
view of the security classification should be performed as fully as
practicable by the branch chief prior to the completion of the report in
order to permit modifications in sources, project scope, etc., and prior
to review by the Classification Control Officer.
c. Advise analysts and their supervisors, upon request, regard?
ing the proper classification of reports in process,
d. Conduct a review or reports on their third or sixth month
anniversary date to determine the possibility of revising the classification
or declassifying entirely.
e. Act as liaison with other agencies of the Federal Government
and other parts of the State Department in classification and declassifica?
tion matters.
3. Permit the Classification Control Officer to Work Directly
With Control Officers in Other Agencies to Expedite Classifica?
tion Revision Actions.
Where satisfactory relationships do not exist with other IAC agencies,
the Classification Control Officer should take steps to improve such re?
lationships.
To this end he should deal directly with other agencies, rather than
through IAD liaison branches, to expedite action.
V ? 5
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4. Develop Field Instructions and Take Other Actions Which Will
Maximize the Usefulness of Classified Field Reports As Source
Materials.
The most important aspect of this recommendation lies in the con-
tinuity of effort rather than in the specific Foreign Service Instruction
issued. Continuing guidance and instruction should be provided to the
field (through regular non-directive publications of the State Department
as well as Instructions) in order to develop awareness to the problems and
to suggest procedures which will alleviate the problem. In this connection,
the problem of field report classification can be reviewed in indoctrina-
tion programs at the Foreign Service Institute.
In view of the importance of classified source material in determining
report classification, R/ES made several suggestions following their study
of the problem. The memorandum of January 31, 1951, includes the following
suggestion -
For example; a Foreign Service Instruction could be
issued requesting all posts to indicate, in the body
of despatches, any material which could be extracted,
declassified, and used for propaganda purposes. The
posts could also be requested, in such cases, to
specify whether or not the source of the material
may be disclosed. Possibly other intelligence agencies
would be willing to issue similar instructions to their
representatives in the field."
5. Require That the Analyst Justify Report Security Classification
on the Work Jacket.
The justification should include:
a. The reason(s) for the classification applied and the con-
ditions under Ahich the report may be declassified. This is suggested
in order to permit classification review by the branch chief and to
guide the Classification Control Officer in his work.
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b. The analyst's opinion as to the reasonableness of the
classification applied to source materials used. This will permit action
on the part of the Classification Control Officer in those cases where
source material (in his judgment, as well) is overly classified.
c. The data when, in the opinion of the analyst, the classifica?
tion should be reviewed. In those cases where timing or changing situations
govern, this information will assist the Classification Control Officer in
rapid revision action.
6. Train the Analyst in the Factors Governin the Proper Application
of Security Classifications to His Re orts.
A formal training program of seminar?type discussions ? led by the
Classification Control Officer ? will do much to highlight the problem,
indoctrinate the analysts in desired procedures and standards of judgment,
and reveal classification problems to management requiring attention and
action.
This formal training is considered to be a necessary adjunct to the
written instructions and the review procedures recommended earlier in
this chapter. Such training should be incorporated into the analyst
training program covered in Chapter VII of this volume.
Summary of Recommendations
The complexity of the classification problem permits no easy solution.
The application of the following measures will permit a gradual but
worthwhile improvement&
1. Establish a Classification Control Officer with individual authority
(to be used when conditions warrant) to establish the security
classification of a report.
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2. Establish a systematic program of classification review and revision
to be administered by this Officer.
3. Permit the Classification Control Officer to work directly with
control officers in other agencies to expedite classification
revision actions.
4. Develop field instructions (and utilize other published media)
to increase the usefulness of classified field reports as intelligence
source materials.
5. Require that each analyst justify the security classification he
assigns to his reports and to provide other information helpful in
downgrading or declassification action.
6. Institute a seminar-type analysts' training program in the proper
application of security classification.
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VI. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
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VI. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
A previous study of the subject has identified current intelligence
as being relevant comment on a "pin-pointed" current or coming event Or
situation, made against the background of the fullest available informa-
tion and knowledge. It has been recognized also, that such comment "may
interpret, assess, and estimate or it may provide perspective or insight."
OIR produces current intelligence in both verbal and written forms.
The verbal form includes (1) various briefings) the provision of which
is largely on a regularized basis) and (2) the responses given to spot
inquiries made by various consumers. OIR produces current intelligence
in written form as (1) Intelligence Briefs (IBgs) and Daily Intelligence
Comments (DIC1s), which are given broad distribution, and (2) Special
Papers, or memoranda, which are usually directed to a specific consumer.
In addition) there are Daily Development Briefs (DDBgs) produced within
one or two Divisions for internal utilization primarily.
The current intelligence produced by OIR is of fundamental value to
the Special Assistant (R)) who has a responsibility to keep the Office of
the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary level of the Department properly
informed. It is also of appreciable value within the R Area itself, as
in keeping the EG fully apprised of the implications intelligence-wise of
significant current events or situations.
The value of OIRgs current intelligence to the other areas and
Bureaus of the Department) although not wholly recognized by the latter,
lies in the fact that OIRgs interpretation or comment stems from a
foundation of greater basic research and is less subject to influence by
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policy commitments. This emphasizes the essentiality of there being an
adequate background of basic research as a prerequisite for the derivation
of sound current intelligence in either written or verbal form.
A - FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTS AND THE METHODS OF PRODUCING THEN
1. The Products
As previously mentioned, the current intelligence of OIR is produced
in oral and written forme, each of which is discussed briefly in the fol-
lowing paragraphs:
a. Servicipa Spot Inquiries. This is the most informal and
irregular, though ever recurring, current intelligence load on the R Area.
All OIR branches handle spot inquiries from day to day, the volume depend-
ing largely on the degree of activity in the region concerned. Although
May such inquiries call for simple reference data or information, there
is often an implied if not expressed need for comment or interpretation
with respect to a particular current event or situation. Mbst inquiries
are from the desks and offices of the Bureaus. However, there is
variance between branches in the degree to which their Bureaucounter-
parts call upon them for current intelligence in this form.
b. Current Intelligence Briefings. The principal briefings
have been those given on a daily basis to the Special Assistant (R), and
those given by DRS to the Under Secretary's meeting weekly, to P/POL
weekly, and to the Ptychological Operations Coordinating Committee on
an irregular basis.
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? All branches are subject to participation in giving briefings,
depending on the degree of activity in their respective regions of the
world. This means that a very few carry the major load, and others are
contributors to the briefings only occasionally) if at all. The Current
Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS is responsible for planning and coordina?
ting the afternoon briefings of Nr. Armstrong, and is occasionally refer?
red to in connection with the morning briefings. The afternoon presenta?
tions are frequently derived as much from basic intelligence research as
from current intelligence.
One OIR division has a short daily intradivisional briefing
session to which each branch sends representation. Another stimulates
the production and exchange of information through almost daily meetings
on a less systematized basis.
c. Intelligence BriefILLIAILLITAllagagjally_Intelligeml
Comments (DIC,$). These are the most formal current intelligence
products of OIR. The DIG is a special (short) type of IB) encompassing
one or more brief items relating to various topics and countries. All
branches produce IBIs and DIC items in varying measure in accordance with
the opportunities presented. These products generally originate with an
analyst who has identified the need or opportunity for an IB or DIC item.
Sometimes) they are prepared after being suggested by the branch or
division chief) or by the Current Intelligence Officer for the division.
After preparation) they are cleared at the branch and division level.
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The division chief's responsibility in this regard is in some instances
discharged by him personally, in other instances delegated to a member of
his staff or to the branch chief concerned.
The "Daily Developments of Significance for Propaganda", prepared
each afternoon under the direction of the Coordinator of Psychological .
Intelligence and transmitted via teletype to the Ilk offices in New York
and Washington, is a farm of written current intelligence akin to the IB
and DIC, but dealing exclusively with psychological warfare and prepared
solely for the support of the IIA program.
d. Paily Development Briefs. One division (DRS) requires its
analysts to produce, in a few lines daily, a digest of significant
current events together with pertinent comments on each. These
serve to alert the Division Chief and the Director of OIR, and to keep
the Division Current Intelligence Officer informed with respect to item
from which IB's or DIets and briefing material may be developed. The
DDBIs are distributed only to the Division Chief and Director of OIR. It
was a recommendation of a previous survey of OIR current intelligence
activity and a decision of the EG that each OIR division establish the
procedure of preparing DDS's. It was given a trial, but failed to
establish itself. In DRW, for example, although 59 DDBis were written
during the first two months, only 12 were issued in the next two; and by
the end of the fifth month they had ceased to appear. DDBIs proved of
little use for increasing or improving current intelligence output. It
appears significant that this procedure has proved practical only in DRS,
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the majority of whose output is current intelligence, and has not been
retained in divisions which give substantial attention to basic intelli?
gence research. In one branch of DRN, a GS-7 analyst prepares the DDB
on a daily basis for the branch. In still another, a summarization of
current developments is prepared by a junior analyst (GS-7 or 9). Those
briefs, however, are for branch and division chief information rather than
for the analyst,
ee aftp.A2.1.121tm_mil_Memoranda. All branches produce current
intelligence in the form of Special Papers and memoranda arising out of
working relationships with the Bureaus and other requestors in the Depart?
ment as well as within OIR itself.
2. The Organizational Elements
There is at the present time an analyst in each division designated
as Current Intelligence Officer for that division. The duties of the
Current Intelligence Officer relate primarily to the formal written prod?
ucts, IBIs and DICIs, but also include assisting in the arrangements for
and presentation of the daily briefings of R. The principal functions
appear to be those of (1) stimulating analyst identification of and inter?
est in current intelligence, (2) expediting IB and DIC preparation and
clearance within the branch and division, and (3) as a member of the
Current Intelligence Committee, sitting in review and consideration of
IBIs and DICfs brought before the Committee at its daily meeting. Each
of the Current Intelligence Officers spends an average of from 4 to 5 hours
a day on the above duties?
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The Current Intelligence Committee, consisting of the Current Intel-
ligence Officers of each division and chaired by the ?IR/PCS/CIO, audits
IBIs and DIC items with respect to substance, style, and classification.
The DIC items being very short, are reviewed in committee and, after clear-
ante, are typed by PCS, reproduced in PCS/IDR, and distributed promptly.
An IB, which may cover a few pages, is normally circulated in draft farm
to the several Current Intelligence Officers in advance of the daily com-
mittee meeting at which review and clearance is sought. These must be
typed in the divisions, and are less expeditiously processed for distribu-
tion. An exception is made to the IB pre-audit procedure of the Current
Intelligence Committee as regards "Trends in Soviet Communist Tactics",
which is produced weekly by DRS and post-audited by the Committee.
B - 1ROBIE16 OBSERVED
Our study of current intelligence production in OIR at the present
time has indicated only minor problems with respect to the verbal product.
Periodic and special briefings are being provided to meet the requirements
of the Special Assistant (R), the P Area, the Bureaus, and others upon
request. Spot inquiries requiring responses in the nature of current
intelligence are being serviced by all OIR branches, the only difficulty
being that they impose numerous interruptions on the key analysts in
most of the branches. As regards the written products, however, there
appear to be several significant problems, each -of which is discussed in
the following paragraphs:
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10 The Present Scheme of Organization and Procedures for Producing
IBts and DICts does not Provide an Aggressive Central leadership
to the Identification and Production of Current Intelligence
The Current Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS is not in a position to
exercise strong central leadership with respect to the identification and
production of current intelligence. Nor are the divisional Current Intel-
ligence Officers in such a position. In the first place, all are in staff
positions without any authority over the analysts who might contribute to
current intelligence production. Secondly, the Current Intelligence
Officer in OIR/FCS holds a staff position within a staff activity which
itself lacks a clear mandate as to its function. Thus, the Current Intel-
ligence Officer in OIR/PCS is more a vehicle for coordinating and expe-
diting effort within the Current Intelligence Committee, than a respon-
sible and authoritative leader in bringing about identification and action
on items worthy of current intelligence production. Furthermore, there
is need for a clearly defined relationship of liaison and coordination with
the current intelligence responsibilities of the Coordinator of Psycholog-
ical Intelligence (CPI). Under present circumstances, there can be no
assurance that items initiated as DIC's by regular program analysts and
items contributed to "Daily Developments of Significance to Propaganda"
by IIA support program analysts will be coordinated.
As a result of the circumstances described above, there is a tendency,
identified by several analysts, for slack periods to breed current intel-
ligence products of marginal value. In contrast, the "heavy" periods
introduce a strong possibility of overlooking a topic of significance.
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2. It is Questionable Whether the Use Of IBIs and DICIs Justify
the Relative IMuortance and Attention Given Their Production
In the first place, there is a lack of agreement among those within
the R Area as to the objective and as to the "target" users of the IB's
and DICIa. Each is given a rather broad and general distribution and with,-
out clear indication as to whether directed primarily to bureau desks, out-
side agencies, the general interests of the peripheral reader, or others.
Distribution to those without need of the product has engendered irritation.
An assumption on the part of many in OIR that the top levels in the Bureaus
are primary users of IBIs and DIC 's was not borne out by this survey. The
fact is that few such products get read beyond the working levels in the
Department. Even at those levels, the DIC 's, in particular, are subject
to appreciable criticism as being of marginal value. The fact that a
consumer must review each DIC in its entirety, before knowing whether
there is an item in it of direct concern to him, is a disadvantage.
In the course of the demand and use survey conducted during this
study, the so-called "target" users of the DICIs and Mos were found to
have generally lower regard for these products than for other products of
the R Area. Seventy-five percent of the IB's are returned to the distribu-
tion point in R after receipt by those to whom distributed. This is in
accordance with standing instructions. However, only 40 percent of the
Iftle are returned. This may be due in part to the fact that the IBIs are
being read and dispensed with more promptly. On the other hand, the
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disparity in percentages raises a question as to whether OIR is providing
current intelligence "of information and interest" to operations and policy
execution.
In weighing the value of the IB's and DIC's produced in the R Area,
consideration must be given to the fact that these are in competition with
other. publications. The CIA produces a daily digest of current intelligence
through its Office of Current Intelligence(OGI). This same activity, holds
a weekly meeting on Tuesday to consider current intelligence items that
are to be brought before the IAC Watch Committee at the latter's Wednesday
meeting. In the State Department itself, R's products of current intel?
ligence compete for readership with summaries produced by the Bureaus and
by the Secretary's Policy Reports Staff, as well as with the current intel?
ligence material stemming from the CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force, including
some of the field commands. We were also advised during the consumer
reaction survey that the IB's and DIC's frequently add little to what the
desk officers read in Embassy despatches or even in the NEW YORK TIMES,
3, Insufficient Effort has been made to Evaluate the Current
Intelligence Produced by OIR
The current intelligence products, especially those in written form,
lend themselves readily to evaluation on a "hindsight" basis. Systematic
comparison of the comments,. interpretations, and estimates set forth in
IB's and DIC's with the facts revealed and knowledge eveloped in the
course of subsequent history, can provide sound basis for appraisal of
the analytical ability and judgment of OIR analysts and, to some extent,
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can aid in identifying shortcomings with respect to intelligence acqui-
sition. To date very little has been dons in the way of such evaluation.
A recent OIRACS spot check, via the divisional Current Intelligence Officers,
on the accuracy of the current intelligence output, provided some interesting
information and was a start in the direction of worthwhile evaluation. How-
ever, it was neither planned nor represented as a thoroughgoing effort.
44 Actual and Implied Responsibility for Current Intelligence
UnnecesearilY Burdens All Analysts and Detracts from Their
Ability to do Intelligence Research
Sixty-ons percent of the test group of analysts interviewed in the
course of this survey stated that current intelligence interfered with more
important daily work. Twelve percent of the average analyst's written
product time is expended in the production of IB's, DIC's, and DDB0s. In
particular, analysts expressed a substantial reluctance to produce DIC's.
Moat analysts resent the interference it causes to their other work, and
furthermore question the validity and worthwhileness of the contribution
that the average DIC makes.
Every analyst has a natural desire to keep abreast of current events,
but resists having to translate rapidly into written DIG'S or'IB's his
thinking with respect to these events. In some instances, analysts feel
under compulsion to develop a certain number of DIG 'a and IB's over a
given period of time. As a result, many are produced which are not
justified from the standpoint of their adding something of significance
that is new, or that contributes something different to the understanding
which principal consumers already have.
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Inclusion of current intelligence in the responsibilities of each
analyst reinforces his natural tendency to spend more time than should be
essential in reading the "daily take". Whereas it is true that research
analysts must regularly add knowledge of current events to their reservoir
of background information on a given country, or region, their feeling of
responsibility for alerting operating officials to the implications of
current events provides a too ready rationalization for overzealousness
in wanting to see everything that comes in, much of which is of peripheral
or casual interest only. Furthermore, to the extent that the analyst must
safeguard a responsibility for preventing any failure in the alerting of
operating officials, his painstaking reading of the "daily take" assumes
a defensive character. Our studies would indicate that as analysts turn
their attention to the identification of current intelligence subjects,
their reading load increases substantially, time is consumed out of pro?
portion to the value derived, and a distraction is caused which is
prejudicial to the timely accomplishment of intelligence research.
5. There is Need for Establishment of a Daily Working Relationship
Between the Current Intelligence Function in OIR and that in
the CIA
The Office of Current Intelligence in CIA produces a daily, digest,
the primary purpose of which is to inform the personnel of CIA and,
particularly, its top directorate. The only distribution given in the
State Department is that made to OIR. CIA/OCI relies heavily on State
Department cables for its raw material, and supplements that information
with further comment and interpretation solicited orally from the desk
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officers in the Bureaus. This liaison with the State Department does not
-include coordination and liaison with the current intelligence function
in the R Area. CIVOCI officials indicate that OIR has been a slaw source
of judgment and appraisal with respect to current intelligence.
C COMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
PRODUCTION OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
It should be the purpose of the OIR current intelligence organiza?
tion and procedures to effect,
? Prompt and accurate identification of subjects worthy of
treatment as current intelligence, and of the target audiences
for such products.
? A correct and timely presentation of each subject in the form
of an oral or written current intelligence product.
? Accomplishment of the foregoing with minimum necessary pre?
emption of analysts' time for reading of the "daily take",
and minimum disturbance to the basic research efforts.
To these ends the following recommendations are made:
ls Eatablliel a "Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a Member of
the Estimates Group
It is recommended that the position of Current Intelligence Officer
in the Production Control Staff be elevated to that of a Current Intel?
ligence Coordinator reporting directly to the Director of Intelligence
Research, and with responsibility for providing strong central leadership
to the recognition and production of useful current intelligence through?
out the organization. To give the position suitable statures and to
interlink current intelligence with basic research in an appropriate
fashions the proposed Current Intelligence Coordinator should be a member
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of the Estimates Group. The close liaison thus provided between him and
the "Intelligence Consultants" (division chiefs) mould be beneficial both
in identifying the current intelligence needs and interests of the principal
consumers and in bringing pressure to bear in the branches to satisfy those
needs. Liaison with the CPI at this level would provide opportunity for
satisfactory coordination of that current intelligence which overlaps the
regular and UP', support programs,
The proposed Current Intelligence Coordinator would exercise the
authority of the Director of OIR in providing identification and instruction
to the branches with respect to the subjects on which current intelligence
should be developed, and the deadlines therefor. In addition, he would
act for the Director of OIR in giving final content and style clearance
to written current intelligence products, after initial clearance at the
branch and division levels. Although normally the majority of IBIs mould
be initiated from the branch level, the Current Intelligence Coordinator
would request the production of an IB on a subject when in his judgment
it was required.
2. Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the Branch Level, and
Eliminate Such Officers at the Division Level
It is proposed that in lieu of the divisional Current Intelligence
Officers there be designated in each branch a senior analyst as a Current
Intelligence Officer with the following responsibilities (which mould
encompass a full?time job in the larger or more active branches and a
part?time job in the smaller branches):
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a, Close daily surveillance of incoming intelligence materials
of a current nature, and the identification of subjects justifying treat-
ment as current intelligence.
b. The production of necessary current intelligence in his branch,
including the correct and timely preparation of current intelligence papers
on subjects identified by him as well as those selected by the branch
chief or division chief, or requested by the Current Intelligence Coordinator.
As an objective, it would appear desirable for the Coordinator to prepare
many of these papers, drawing upon specific analysts for essential back-
ground comment and interpretation.
c. Preparing or supervising the preparation of current intel-
ligence requested by the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence, or other
support program coordinators. He would relieve analysts of some of the
reaction and "roundup" reports required for the CPI.
d. Constantly staying abreast of current intelligence develop-
ments and keeping the branch chief and division chief (as desired)
informed thereof; assisting the branch chief in providing or directing
the provision of all current intelligence required of his branch in
verbal form (briefings and spot inquiries).
e. Minimizing the "In-box" load on the other analysts by giving
a high-grade substantive review and screening to the "daily take" of cur-
rent documents in the course of his close daily surveillance of incoming
current intelligence materials. Thus, in the course of carrying out his
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current intelligence responsibility, the branch Current Intelligence
Officer would route each current document in accordance with its subject
and significance and the respective assignments of the various analysts,
In so doing, he might indicate, by a suitable mark, whether the particular
piece seems to warrant (1) the analysts direct attention, (2) review and
summarization by a research aide, or (3) simply being cataloged for filing,
Since many documents would fall in the last two categories and others would
justify being destroyed without routing, the flaw to the individual analysts
would be measurably reduced, and without any disadvantage to him.
Delegation, to one senior analyst, of the responsibilities listed in
paragraphs a through e above, would release appreciable time in the daily
routine of the other analysts of the branch. In the first place, they
would be relieved of primary responsibility for current intelligence iden?
tification and thus for devoting much of their time to careful perusal of
the incoming material. Further, the volume of incoming material would be
reduced by the routing procedure proposed. Secondly, since the branch
Current Intelligence Officer would be responsible for the production of
necessary current intelligence in his branch, and would personally prepare
a major portion of it, the other analysts would be free to suggest and
assist but would not be under compulsion to initiate intelligence of this
type. These analysts would be able, therefore, to assume greater respon?
sibility to produce on regular assignments in a timely manner. The well?
qualified review performed by the Current Intelligence Officer would
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protect the analysts from much of the documental flow and would wean them
away from excessive reading time and much of the daily pressure to which
they subject themselves by reason of feeling responsibility for current
intelligence.
It can be recognized readily that the satisfactory discharge of the
above-mentioned responsibilities necessitates the assignment of a well-
qualified senior analyst at the Current Intelligence Officer in each
branch. In effect, the position should be placed at the level of an
assistant branch chief, and recognized as a development point for poten-
tial branch chiefs.
3. Give Consideration to Issuing Single-Topic IBla for Pinpointed
Distribution, and to Discontinuing the Delay Intelligence
Comment (DIC) Series.
The DICle can be eliminated as a separate IB series, inasmuch as
they are found to be of significant value at only a very limited number
of the many points to which distributed. In lieu thereof, it is suggested
that individual topics of importance be treated as IBls and given selective
distribution to those known to be concerned. Likewise, it is recommended
that IBls be confined to truly significant subjects on which there is
comment that adds something new, or contributes something different to
the understanding of the consumers to Whom directed.
4. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a Formal
Instrument for the Development and Processing of Written Current
Intelligence Products.
In connection with the recommended establishment of a Current Intel-
ligence Coordinator at the EG level and the proposed designation of branch
Current Intelligence Officers in lieu of the existing positions at the
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division level, it is suggested that the present current Intelligence
Committee be dissolved,
Well?qualified attention to the selection and treatment of subjects,
the elimination of DIC's, and the limitation of 113"s to truly significant
items with more selective distribution should reduce the necessity for
formalized committee action in producing current intelligence within OIR.
Under the proposed plan, TB's would receive branch and division clearance
as at present and would be subject to final review and clearance by the
Current Intelligence Coordinator in the name of the Director of OIR. The
discontinuance of the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal institution
would not preclude the Current Intelligence Coordinator availing himself
on an ad hoc basis, of such group advice and counsel as he may find bene?
ficial from the branch Current Intelligence Officer level, or even the EG.
5, Provide a Plan for the Periodic Evaluation of the Current Intel?
ligence Production of OIR.
It is proposed that the comment, interpratation, and estimates pro?
duced by OIR as current intelligence be subjected periodically to review
and appraisal in the light of knowledge subsequently gained. This review
should include evaluation with respect to timeliness and coverage, so as
to indicate oversights in recognition of significant topics, as well as
errors in treatment of the topics covered.
It is recommended that responsibility for this evaluation be a
function of the proposed "Intelligence Evaluation Officer", discussed in
Chapter XIV,
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6. Eliminate the Requirement for Production of DDB' s Except Where
Pronounced Benefit Can Be Derived.
In recognition of the experience to date with respect to the utiliza-
tion of the DDB system in OIR divisions, it is recommended that its use be
Wholly optional to the divisions (or branches), and not be undertaken
except where the nature of the unit's activities permits substantial bene-
fit to be derived.
7. Explore the Relative Roles of OIR and CIA/OCI with respect to
the Production of Current Intelligence in State Department's
Fields of Dominant Interest.
It is suggested that a study be made to establish more clearly the
relative roles of CM and CCI in regard to the production of current
intelligence in State Department's fields of dominant interest, and to
establish an appropriate daily working relationship between the current rn
intelligence functions in the two agencies. If, for example, the CIA/OCI
should assume "lead" responsibility for such current intelligence pro-
duction, then State Department might be relieved of the burden of regular
current intelligence production. 'While 'MR would then act primarily as
a current intelligence source for the State Department, it should retain
the right and obligation to supplement, or to add additional or different
interpretations, to the products of CIA/CCI. The feasibility of such a
division of responsibility would depend upon the development of procedures
and safloguards to assure that the views of each agency were known to the
other, in order to avoid any by-passing of the State Department in the
reporting of interpretations and estimates to the NSC on political sociol-
ogical and cultural matters.
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With respect to daily liaison relationships, the feasibility of col?
laboration between OIR and OCI in the publication of a daily summary suit?
able for List II distribution should be explored. This could be accomplished
through a close working relationship between the Current Intelligence
Coordinator in OIR and the appropriate point in OCI, particularly as regards
the identification of key topics of significance.
Summary of Recommendations Regarding Current Intelligence
Seven actions have been proposed in this connection:
1. Establish a "Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a member of the
Estimates Group.
Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the branch level, and
eliminate the part?time officers at the division level.
3. Give consideration to issuing single?topic IB's for "pinpointed"
distribution, and to discontinuing the DIC series.
4. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal
instrument for the development and processing of written current
intelligence products.
Provide a plan for the periodic evaluation of the Current Intel?
ligence production of OIR.
6. Eliminate the requirement for production of DDBts, except where
pronounced benefit can be derived.
7. Explore the relative roles of OIR and CIA/Cd I with respect to
the production of current intelligence in State Department's
fields of dominant interest.
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VII ? STYLE AND FORMAT OF WRITTEN PRODUCTS
The written report is the primary vehicle for the transmission of
intelligence to R's total audience. The form of the report, its appearance,
and other features which contribute to its readability are all important to
the task of transmitting intelligence, because neglect of these features may
discourage or fail to invite the desired readership. In short, it is not
what the reader can read that counts; it is what he does read.
But there is another reason for laying greater stress upon the read?
ability of R's products--the expenditure of man?hours required of the reading
audience. By way of illustrating the substantial "cost" to Government, it
is estimated that 4,875 man?hours per month are devoted by this audience to
the reading of R's written output.* This calculation serves to highlight
the obligation upon the producers to conserve the time of? an audience which
is already overburdened with the daily flow of materials to be read or, scanned.
A ? OBSERVATIONS INDICATING THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR IMPROVED READABILITY OF II'S PRODUCTS
1. =Comparison with Other Forms of Adult Reading
The very complexity of R's subject matter demands writing which will
fall at a reasonably difficult level of readability. In addition, the educa?
tional level of its audience is unusually high. However, when the "reading
ease" score of Rls products is compared with other forms of adult reading
including three highly technical magazines, graphic evidence of the present
* Based upon average monthly distribution of 234,000 pages requiring an
estimated 2.5 minutes of reading time per page,
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level of difficulty is revealed.
Magazine
Chemical Engineering
Machine. Design
Mechanical Engineering
AVERAGE
Fortune Magazine
Average of BR reports
Reading Ease Score*
37.1
46.8
39.7
41.2
48.7
Rating
Difficult
Fairly difficult
Difficult
Difficult
Fairly difficult
19.36 Very Difficult
2. Complexities in Structure, Vocabulary and Style
Our inspection of a large sampling of R's reports reveals some of the
reasons why its writing scores at the "very difficult" level:
Long words are used. An average of 184.8 syllables per 100
words as compared with 169 syllables per 100 words in the
three engineering magazines mentioned above.
- Long sentences are used. An average
sentence as compared with 22.6 words
3 engineering magazines.
Long paragraphs are used. One of 18
431 words was observed; another of 9
427 words was encountered.
of 30.8 words per
on an average for the
sentences containing
sentences containing
- Unfamiliar words are used. A list of 20 words was selected
from R reports and submitted to two customers. Many of the
words were not readily understood. Examples are: coopt,
jacquerie, pluripersonal, consanguinity.
- Topic outlines to guide the reader through the text are
sparingly used in R's reports. In many cases, page after
page revealed no break in the text through topic outlining.
* The Reading Ease rating system is described in "The Art of Readable Writing"
by Rudolph F. Flesch, PhD., Harper & Brothers, New York. The Reading Ease
score range is as follows: 0 ? 30 Very difficult; 30 ? 45 Difficult;
45 ? 60 Fairly difficult; 60 ? 70 Standard; 70 ? 80 Fairly easy; 80 ? 90
Easy; 90 - 100 Very easy.
VII - 2
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3. Variations in Format
Considerable variation in report style and format was observed. Although
rigid format (i.e., organization) is not a criterion of readability, the
degree of variation observed appears excessive and is an indication of opportu?
nities for improved presentation of R's products. As an example of these
variations, a review of 11 pamphlet style 1111s (all dated October 1951 or later)
revealed that ?
Only Had
6 A Table of Contents
2 Statement of Problem
8 An AbstraCt
4 An Introduction
1 Basic Orientation
1 Assumptions
3 Conclusions
1 A Bibliography
1 Notes on Sources
1 Discussion following the
Conclusion.
A review of 12 letterhead style IR's (all dated October 1951 or later)
indicated that ?
Only Had
7 An Abstract
5 An Introduction
1 A Conclusion
4. Absence of Style Manual
A Style Manual is not in existence. Some elements of format and typing
are covered in the OIR Analysts' Manual, but guidance or training is not pro?
vided for report organization, use of graphics, punctuation, spelling,
capitalization, etc. Paragraphing instructions are not uniformly followed.
style manual was produced at one time which gave promise of some assistance.
VII ? 3
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However, this was never completed or published. It is entitled "Style Hand-
book for Use in the Division of Europe, Near East, and Africa Intelligence -
Preliminary Edition, I March 1946." PCS now has a draft copy.
5. Variations in Editorial Attention Applied by Divisions
The degree and quality of editorial guidance and review varies widely
between research divisions.
a. The number and grades of divisional editors varies:
Rag. Prog. NIS Program
Division Grade Grade
DRA None 08-9
DRF 08-7 08-9
DRN 08-12 (part time) 08-9, G5-7
DRS 05-12 None
DRW 05-9 08-9, 08-9
DFI None None
BI GS-11 None
b. Branch chiefs and division chiefs pay varying attention to
format in their review of written products, a fact which was clearly brought
out in our interviews with the analysts. Most indicated that the chain of
review paid slight, if any, attention to format or text sequence. This mos
normally the responsibility of the division editor, if there was one. The
division editor, of course, reviews only after the report is finished. This
gives rise to considerable irritation if substantial report modifications are
made.
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B ? PMN OF INFROVENENT
The elements of report writing discussed above are often incidential or
trivial to the author who, properly, is most concerned with the thought con?
tent and the accuracy of expression. This fault is undoubtedly evident in
the writing of the authors of this report. We hasten to add that we make no
claim to mastery of the art of "readable writing", and are thus placing our?
selves in the position of prescribing for others the application of skills
which we are yet in the early stages of acquiring. With this apology in mind,
we would like to illustrate some of the elementary techniques which produce
more readable writing and to suggest steps whereby R analysts can achieve
progressive improvement.
1. Identify at Once a Set of Simple Techniques Which 1111 Improve
Textual Display, Pointedness of Presentation, and Ease of Reference
to Reports.
Volume I of this report illustrates a series of experimental revisions
made in 1R5769, "Prospects of Japanese Trade with the Republic of Korea."
These changes, while individually simple, effected measurable improvement in
reading ease as reflected by the fact that
? Two users of the original report (one the requestor)
independently estimated that readability had been improved
20%0 and subsequent reference 40%.
? The "Reading Ease Score" of the revised version is 26.7
as compared to 10.0 in the original.
The full text of the original and revised versions appears as Appendix A to
Volume II. In summary the following principles were found to be important
in achieving improvement:
a. "Headline style" abstract, consisting of several short para?
graphs; abbreviated sentences; underscored lead sentences. The eye catches
principal thoughts at a glance.
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b. Concise enumeration of conclusions, in contrast to the long
paragraph which lacks emphatic separation of main points.
c. More "finding aids" in the body of the text--achieved by the
use of underlined captions bringing out the arrangement of the information.
d. More pleasing display of text in the body of the report--
achieved by (1) shorter paragraphs, (2) more subparagraphs for subordinate
or supporting points, (3) use of tabular presentation when applicable in
lieu of line-for-line enumeration, (4) improved arrangement of tables to
secure meaningful sequence and pleasing presentation.
e. Simpler writing--including fewer words, simpler or more common-
place words when appropriate, shorter phrases.
These revisions are illustrative of the changes which may improve readability,
rather than an exhaustive statement. Actually the number of possibilities in
any given case is dependent upon the imagination of the reviser and the time
available in which to perform the "polishing up." It is our conclusion, how-
ever, that a few "musts" can be agreed upon at once and uniformly adopted,
allowing additional refinements to develop. The first four revisions described
above are believed to fall in the category of "musts."
2. Publish The Techniques Immediately to All Analysts, Supervisors and
Editors and Supplement them with Frequent Bulletins illustrating
Current Cases of Good as well as Undesirable Practices
'Rile ultimately a thoroughly developed report preparation manual should
be published, substantial immediate progress should be obtainable through a
series of short-range steps, such as the following:
a. Issue a brief memorandum af instructions to all who write or
edit reports, outlining the techniques adopted as standard practice. Delegate
this task to the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator (Chapter I/).
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b. Follow this bulletin with a series of bulletins (at weekly or
biweekly intervals at the outset) citing good and poor examples drawn from
current reports.
c. Delegate responsibility to division editors to assure the
application of the standard techniques to all reports, including the authority
to revise or rewrite abstracts and conclusion statements, and to insert topic
headings in the text when the analyst fails to follow the standard technique,
or would prefer to leave this step to the editor.
3. Appoint a Well?Qualified Editor in Each OIR Division
The third step in order of immediate importance is the creation of a
corps of division editors through whom the application of approved techniques
can be attained. Regular program editors are needed in two of the seven
divisions (DRA, DFI). Positions of higher rank are believed desirable in
two (DRF and DRW). The need in ])FI is subject to check.
The continuing function of each editor should be to secure full applica?
tion of approved standards of style and format. In addition, each should ?
a. Participate in the development of the "Report Preparation
Manual" (See recommendation 4 below) and prepare additional specifications
peculiar to the products of the division.
b. Work with analysts from day to day as an advisor and assistant
in planning format and style features of reports in process.
C. Participate in the conduct of training and laboratory clinics
in report writing, directed at both analysts and report typists (See
recommendation 5 below.)
VII ? 7
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d. Conduct similar on-the-job training in report typing standards
for branch typists.
In those instances where the editor's substantive background permits, an
even broader participation in quality control can be permitted, as is now the
case in DR&
4. Develop a Report Preparation Manual as a Long-Term Project (4 to 6
Months)
The publication of the Report Preparation Manual would supplant those
portions of the present Analysts' Manual now devoted to report format, typing
instructions, etc. The coverage of the proposed manual should be approximately
as follows:
Part I - The Importance of Readable Writing.
Fart II - The Standard Techniques of Readable Writing.
Part III - Types of Reports (with examples of each).
Part IV - Report Format
Cover Conclusion
Table of Contents Bibliography
Abstract Appendices
Body of Report Footnotes
Part V - Construction of Tabulations, Charts and other Graphics.
Part VI - Security Classification Regulations and Procedures.
Fart VII - Text Specifications (margins, headings, page number-
ing, typing details, etc.).
Part VIII - Style Guides
Spelling and Capitalization
Numbers, Numerals, and Dates
Punctuation
Abbreviations
Part IX - Distribution Guides and Procedures.
VII -
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The last three chapters would be of primary concern to typists and
stenographers, but all analysts should have a complete copy of the Manual.
The Report Preparation Manual should conform as closely as possible to the
specifications contained in the NIS Editorial Instructions in the interest
of uniform practice.
5. Conduct Systematic Training in Report Preparation Both for Analysts
and Typists
As soon as the "Report Preparation Manual" is developed it should be
presented to all interested personnel through a series of discussions and
practice clinics:
a. Analysts--the proper selection of report media, the proper
organization of material, the principles outlined in the Style Manual, the
effective use of exhibits, etc. Attendance by junior analysts should be
compulsory; optional for senior staff.
b. Typists and stenographers--training in how to set up and type
reports) rules of punctuation, abbreviation, etc.
It is the experience of those who teach writing techniques that
successful training not only improves the readability of the product but
assists the author to perform better analysis through sharpening the clarity
of thought. Thus the training sessions planned for the analysts should
seek to stimulate interest in the importance of clear thinking as a pre?
requisite of clear expression. In this connection exploration is suggested
to two current sources of training materials:
The booklet "Effective State Department Correspondendel"
published by the Foreign Service Institute in collabora?
tion with the Secretary's Correspondence Review Staff.
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- 0-2 where a writing course entitled "Report and Summary
Writing" is now being conducted.
6. Improve the Readability andthe Attention-Getting Value of R's
Reports by Continuing Attention to Physical Appearance
Some specific suggestions are:
a. Discontinue the hectograph process for formal reports prepared
by R.
b. Where schedules permit, use the multilith (offset) process for
printing the cover for IR's. The schedule for a large proportion of the IR's
produced permits sufficient time for the cover to be designed and printed by
CS/R for delivery to IDR and later collation with the mimeographed pages of
the report. The use of a printed IR cover will improve appearance, gain
attention, and assist in future reference on the part of the user. CS/R
indicates that they can absorb the additional workload without difficulty.
c. Continuing attention should be paid to report typing. Periodic
practice training in stencil and duplimat typing should be provided to typists.
The use of electric typewriters should be extended as new and replacement
equipment is purchased. In this connection immediate experimentation with
new typewriter type faces is recommended to evaluate the potential improvement
in appearance which may result. Two type faces are suggested for trial use
and consumer reaction test:
Larger style - Code 26, Secretarial Type;
available on executive model typewriters.
Smaller style - Code 47, Text Type; available on
executive model typewriters.
Specimen pages prepared from each style are illustrated in Appendix B.
VII- 10
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Summary of Recommendations
A six?step program designed to improve the readability of R products has
been outlined in the foregoing. Administration of this program should be
delegated to the Consumer Relations Coordinator since this officer has the
most immediate and continuing interest in the "merchandising" of R's services:
1. Identify at once a set of simple techniques which will improve the
textual display, pointedness of presentation, and ease of reference
to reports. (See Appendix A for actual illustration).
2. Publish these techniques immediately to all analysts, supervisors
and editors and supplement them with frequent bulletinS illustrating
current cases of good as well as undesirable practices.
3. Appoint a well?qualified editor in each OIR Division.
40
5.
Develop a "Report Preparation Manual" as a long?term project.
When the Manual is completed, conduct systematic training in report
preparation both for analysts and typists.
Improve the readability and attention?getting value of R's reports by
continuing attention to physical appearance.
vu?il
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VIII. 'TECHNIQUES OF REVIEWING THE UTILIZATION
OF THE ANALYSTS
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VIII - TECHNIQUES OF REVIEWING UTILIZATION OF THE ANALYSTS
111 all productive efforts, whether they be research for the produc-
tion of ideas or manufacturing for the production of things, the most
precious asset lies in the skilled manpower available and in its proper
utilizationa
Several techniques and specific steps for improving the utilization
of analysts are described in other chapters of this report. These
include:
Chapter IX - which develops immediate steps to conserve
the time of analysts through the proper introduction of
research aides and the provision of more adequate
facilities.
Chapter XI - which outlines a comprehensive program of
professional development, including group training,
inspiration guidance discussions with R's leaders, a
revised plan of performance rating, and long range
objectives with respect to field trips, Bureau assign-
ments, and executive development.
Chapter XIII - which proposes a method of work planning
which will provide an orderly scheduling of each analyst's
time based on realistic man-hour allowances and completion-
date schedules.
Supplementing these techniques should be still another device - the
comprehensive appraisal of the analyst - through which management can in-
ventory the ideals, attitudes, interests, and work habits of the analysts
on a periodic basis.
The Comprehensive Appraisal of the Analyst
It is recommended that at least once every two years an outside
consultant, preferably a recognized figure in the field of social
science research, be retained by the Department to conduct a systematic
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appraisal of R's professional staff through direct interview with a
cross-section of its staff. The procedure suggested is as follows:
1. The consultant should choose a panel of analysts representa-
tive of every part of the OIR organization and of the principal
disciplines required in the performance of its tasks.
2. A personal, confidential interview should be arranged with each
analyst selected, approximately one-half day being allowed for each.
3. A prepared interview outline should be used to elicit full in-
formation regarding
- The analyst's qualifications
his tasks.
and suitability for
- The method of his selection; job attractions and
career plans.
His opinion regarding training and training programs.
? The methods he follows in performing professional work.
The principal obstacles he finds.
- The demands on his time and his comments on his current
assignments.
His knowledge of the degree to which his product is
used; his morale.
The extent and satisfactoriness of his relations
with customers.
- His opinions and suggestions concerning supervision,
_report style, intelligence acquisition, supporting
services, and R's over-all effectiveness.
An outline, based upon our experience, is enclosed as Exhibit VIII-]..
4. The findings of the confidential interviews should be fully
analyzed and compared with those of this and previous inquiries, in
VIII - 2
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order to evaluate the trends found as well as to set forth findings
warranting immediate attention. The questionnaries themselves should
be filed, after all personal identification has been removed, for
reference at the time of the next biennial appraisal of the professional
staff.
5. The consultant should conclude his inquiry by a reassessment
of the techniques currently employed in R to train its staff, provide
incentives for high quality performance, and minimize restrictions
on the use of the analystsl highest skills. To the extent feasible)
the consultant should make comparisons with practices of other in?
telligence agencies.
It is estimated that 4-6 weeks will be required to complete such
a study at biennial intervals.
VIII ? 3
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EICHIBIT VIII ? 1
Suggested Interview Outline for a Comprehensive
Appraisal of the Intelligence Analyst
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EXHIBIT VIII- 1
ANALYST INTERVIEW OUTLINE
A.
IDENTIFICATION DATA
Name
Grade
Place of birth
Branch
Country or area handled
Discipline
Age
Date
Sex
Division
Months on this job
B.
PREVIOUS WORK EXPERIENCE
In R
Other government
Non-government
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C, ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL DATA
Degree(s) held
Academic history
Present study and study plans
Professional activities
Language ability
2.
3.
4.
5.
Read*
Speak* Write*
* Rate as ? poor, fair, good, or excellent.
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D. JOB ATTRACTION AND CAREER PLANS
Haw were you recruited and what attracted you to the job?
When was yOur last promotion?
Do you consider promotions adequate?
If not, why not?
Do you personally see good career possibilities in R?
What are your awn career plans?
What is the biggest single irritant in your job?:
Do you feel that over?specialization is dangerous?
Why or why not?
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E., TRAINING
Which of the several training courses offered by R or the Foreign
Service Institute have you found of benefit?'
What kind of training if any, do you consider desirable?
Have you visited your area since coming to R?
How frequently and under what conditions are field trips desirable?
4 ?
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F. JOB FACTORS
lbat do you feel are the most important factors in your job? ie. what
elements "make or break" your job?
?
Do you get a feeling of satisfaction from your work? lNhy
Do you have any comments regarding the performance rating system?'
Do you feel that your time is being used to its best advantage?
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G. ANALYST QUALIFICATIONS
What would you say were the five most important qualifications which
an analyst must possess?in order of importance?
Hew well do you feel the analysts in R meet these qualifications?'
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H. KNOWIEDGE OF PRODUCT USE
Do you feel that your reports are used?
That they are helpful?'
HOW much of your intelligence production do you believe makes an important
and direct contribution to the target user or users? In terms of percentages
of your total production, rate its contribution to target users as follows:
Contribution Which IS
, Important and direct
e Subsidiary, but real
3} Of some help
4 Relatively minor
50 Don't know
Total
Remarkst
/MO
MO.
of Products
100%
Did you have any specific reports or events in mind when you replied to
the last question? Mich?
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I. DETERRENTS TO PRODUCTION
What are the most important deterrents you encounter in trying to do a com?
plete.and timely job of intelligence research?
Do you have any suggestions as to how these may be overcome?
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J. CUSTOMER RELATIONS
Who are your principal target users?
Do you have frequent contacts with them?
How frequent?'
Do you think you should have more? Or less?
Do you consider your relationships good?
Who is your most important contact?
Why do you think so?
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K. SUPERVISION AND REPORT REVIEW
On major research projects, your supervisor should assist you in*de?
fining project scope and objectives and in planning the research.
Do you feel that you need more assistance in this?
Are estimated project man?hours and deadline dates realistic?
Is guidance provided) when needed, to help you produce good intelli?
gence research?
Is the review of your report) both for substance and format, accom?
plished quickly and effectively?
Do you concur in most of the revisions made?
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L. THE REPORT STYLE; DISTRIBUTION
What is your opinion of the style, format, and organization standards
specified for R's reports?
Are improvements possible in order to improve readability and to better
convey research findings to the users?
Do your reports get to the right people?
Could report distribution be improved?
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M. OPINION ON RIS OR-ALL EFFECTIVENESS
Po you feel that the Intelligence organization, as a whole, is perform-
ing its mission and fulfilling its obligations effectively?
What changes, if any, would you suggest?
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N. WTI INTELLIGENCE DATA
Are you able to do any advance planning in respect to your raw data
needs?
Are these requirements fulfilled?
In general, is the quality and timeliness of incoming data adequate
from your posts?
Do you have any suggestions for improvement?
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O. ADEQUACY OF SUPPORTING SERVICES
Certain supporting services and conditions of work have been established
to assist you in your job as an intelligence research analyst. Do you
find them to be adequate? Do you have any ideas as to how they can be
improved?'
Typing
Clerical Assistance
Research Aide
Library and Reference Service
Incoming document routing
Desk Area
Files
Biographic information
Report duplicating
Research Services Unit
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? EstimaI21_17
P. DISTRIBUTION OF TINE
the applyAl_jmel_m_Alvical month
% of
Total Time
ITEM
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MISCELLANEOUS WORK
Personnel and security details, clerical and filing
work, etc.
BACKGROUND STUDY (Not for a specific project).
Reading or screening despatches, telegrams, press,
etc.; marking for file; basic data acquisition
planning and liaison; i.e., reading the "daily take..."
--
PRODUCTS (Substance output)
TOTAL TIME
?
100%
% of Total
Product Time
TYPES OF SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCT
ORAL PRODUCTS; briefings calls, etc.
REVIEW OF WORK OF OTHERS
WRITTEN PRODUCTS
TOTAL PRODUCT TINE
100%
% of Total
Written Product
Time
KIND OF WRITTEN PRODUCT
NIS
NIE
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
IE, IR,: SIR,. SP '
TOTAL WRITTEN PRODUCT
TINE
100%
REMARKS
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Q. DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT TIME
__SEstimated b the analys_DA2tLaRga.A2, ?ical IR
of Total
Pro"ect Time STEPS IN PROJECT PRODUCTION
1. RESEARCH (PROJECT) PINNING s Receiving assign?
ment, determing project scope, objectives,
man?hours required, and required deadline date;
outlining.
2. SEARCH FOR DATAs Checking files; identifying
information gaps; ordering material; etc.
3. ANALYSIS AND REPORT COMPOSITIONS Reading, study,
extracting, consultation, writing, checking own
work, draft preparation, etc.
4. OFFICIAL EDITINGI Revisions, restudy, consulta?
tion, rewriting after official editing for re?
port substance and format.
TOTAL PROJECT TINE
REMARKS AND COMMENTS1
16
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0 o
H erN
0 GI
8-1 CV Cir's
0-S 0
r-I CV er1
0 0
H CV rn
e ? e
H CV Crl
4 4'
0 0 0
ri re)
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S. OTHER SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS
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IL IMPROVED USE OF THE TIME OF ANALYSTS
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IMPROVED USE OF THE TIME OF ANAIYSTS
The analysts, as a group, represent 60 percent of the total
employment and 0,148,875 in annual payroll costs. In the R
Organization, as in other organizations, the proper utilization
of these cost elements represents the most challenging and
potentially most rewarding aspect of the major administrative and
human relations problems lacing it.
A ? EVIDENCES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING
,ATTENTION TO THE USE OF ANALYSTS' TIME.
The high level of skill possessed by the analysts can be
guaged, in part at least, by their high academic attainment,
their foreign language abilities, their actions for self?improve?
ment, and their experience in intelligence research work.
Civil Service requirements are quite specific and require,
for the beginning grade of 05-7 ($4,205), completion of a 4?year
course in an accredited university in international relations or
related specialities plus one year of graduate study (5 years of
progressively responsible experience may be substituted for the
educational requirement).
In terms of "self?defined" qualification requirements,
the analysts consider education and research experience, writing
ability, and intellectual honesty (objectivity and perspective)
as important in addition to a high general intelligence level,
enthusiasm and drive, and an ability to work with others,
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These factors, plus others enumerated below, point up the
importance of conserving professional time and directing it into
the most productive channels.
1. Analyst Recruitment is Difficult and Selection and Place-
ment is a Slow Process.
Many difficulties are encountered in recruiting qualified
analyst personnel. This was reported to us on several occasions
and emphasized by the special recruiting trips which have been
found to be necessary.
The difficulty in _employing new analyst personnel because of
the delay in the security clearance process adds a serious problem.
A period of from 3 to 6 months is generally required, after selection
of the individual, to get the person on the payroll and at work.
This undesirable delay aggravates the recruitment and selection
problem still further by discouraging many potentially good analysts
who accept employment elsewhere.
2. The Task of the Analyst is a Complex One.
The analyst must divide his time between many responsibilities,
tasks, and allegiances - some of which are indicated on pages 17
and 18 of the Summary Report. A composite of the many tasks facing
the typical analyst may be outlined as follows:
- The Identification and Interpretation of Current
Intelligence.
Preparing Written Reports. This involves the de-
fining of the scope and objectives of the problem;
outlining the project; identifying and searching
for necessary data; analyzing, writing, and editing
his awn work; and participating in the editing
function after he has completed his draft.
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- Attending Conferences and Meetings.
Providing Oral Information and Advice ? either factual
or evaluative to fell= analysts as well as customers
and representatives of other agencies. This is accom?
plished by telephone or through oral briefings.
Background Study. The analyst must keep abreast of
current developments for his country or area of
responsibility by reading despatches, telegrams,
periodicals, newspapers, reports, etc.
? Reviewing the Work of Others. This involves collabora?
tive effort with fellow analysts, the formal review of
written products, the offical review of NIS sections,
etc.
- Administrative and Miscellaneous Functions. These
cover security details, routing of documents incorrectly
addressed, filling out time?use sheet, etc.
The result of this diversion of effort and time is that, for regular
program analyst, lees than 16 hours per week is available for the pro?
duction af written products. Time available for analysis of data and
report composition is only about 8 hours per week when time required
for research planning, searching for data, and official editing is sub?
tracted.
3. The Analyst's Attempt to Devote a Maximum Amount of Time to
Productive Work is Complicated by the Fact that He Encounters
Many Interruptions.
Page 17 of the Summary Report graphically illustrates the many
starts and stops (50) encountered by a GS-13 political analyst in a
typical week. The following table indicates the interruptions en?
countered by six analysts and was derived from 5?day daily diaries
maintained by them.
Ix -3
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RESEARCH INTERRUPTION STUDY
NUMBER OF START AND STOP PERIODS PER WEEK
Ecqpgpists
GS-9 (NYB) GS-11
Written Products
10
Oral Products
0
Background Study
4
Review tethers, Work
0
Adm. and Other
10
Interruptions Per Meek
24
Av. Inter, per day
5
4
16
11
1
a
41
8
Political,
GS-11 0S-13
. Biographic
GS-9
GS-11
15
11
7
8
5
9
18
9
11
18
10
16
2
4
1
0
2
8
10
_2
35
50
46
42
7
10
9
8
In other terms, the average analyst can expect to spend less than
1 hour uninterruptedly on any one phase of his work. This is strikingly
out of keeping with the research atmosphere one might expect to find
in the R organization and one which might be conceived to be the most
conducive to the most productive research.
40 The Analysts Themselves Recognize the Need for Better
Utilization of Their Time.
During our interviews, the analysts were asked haw the quality
and quantity of their research might be improved. The replies to this
question were extremely revealing. The essence of the replies indi-
cated that the analysts wanted:
First, fewer interruptions;
Second, more assistance on routine tasks, and
Third, better planning and supervision.
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This attitude and judgment on the part of the analyst is
indicated by several of their specific comments:
"Too much time is required to read the daily take."
"Interruptions to my work hamper production and frequent
project priority changes slaw results."
umy production could be improved if I was able to reduce
the diffusion of my time."
"I should be relieved of all administrative work."
"The application of analyst time can be made more pro?
ductive by securing the proper Allocation of time to the most
important tasks."
Two out of three of the analysts stated that current intelligence inter?
feres with basic research and their production in general.
Eighteen of the twenty?four analysts indicated that their time
could be conserved by providing research assistants so that significant
portions of their time could be delegated and performed by someone at a
lesser rate of salary.
Others indicated that research production could be improved by
improving supporting services of typing, reproduction document flow,
and library service.
In respect to over?all guidance and supervision, the analysts
were explicit in indicating the need for a clearer picture of respon?
sibilities and assignments; the danger in spreading professional talent
too thinly; the production difficulties caused by split allegiances to
line supervisors and program supervisors; the need, in many cases, for
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better immediate project supervision (particularly early in the project);
and other similar comments.
Several of these items are discussed further in other chapters of
this Volume and, in particular, Chapters VIII, Xs XI, and XII suggest
improvement actions regarding periodic reviews of analyst time and talent
utilization, the problem of a heavy reading load, factors in professional
development, and improved working facilities for the analysts.
B ? PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT
The challenge presented to R's top management by the need for
improved use of the analysts' time indicates that the solution or improve?
ment lies in the imaginative application of principles of job analysis
which will identify those elements of the job which justify the full
application of the analyst's highest skills versus those which can be
done for him or under his supervision.
Our studies indicate strongly that the analyst will welcome and
cooperate in the type of action suggested. In general, he recognizes
the importance of the problem and he wants to use his time to the best
advantage of the R organization and thus, to the best advantage of
himself.
Accordingly, six suggestions are offered which are designed to
increase the productive use of professional time.
1. As a Continuing ObJective. Provide Analysts With Research
Aides (GS-7) to Permit Maximum Utilization of the Analysts'
Special Skills
We have found that a significant portion of each analyst's time
is spent performing tasks which do not require the full utilization of
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the talent and experience which he possesses. Thus, valuable professional
time is being spent on work which less?qualified and less?experienced
people could perform.
The following table indicates those tasks which can be delegated
to Research Aides.
Analysts!
Time Now
Function Required
Estimated
Tasks nigh Could Be Delegated Analysts'
Time Saved
to Research Aides
Background Reading "daily take" and screen?
Study 3202% ing out significant .items for the
analyst; marking for file when
required; reading and clipping
foreign press; liaison work in
data acquisition. etc,
Searching
for Data
10.0%
Searching branch or section files;
marking pertinent items; searching 6%
LR catalog; visiting other
libraries; etc.
AdMinistra? Daily security checks; instruct?
vale tive Tasks 9.0% ing new clerical personnel in
files, forms, and procedures;
etc.
2%
Reviewing Conduct preliminary review and
Work of 8.7% list specific statements of
Others fact or opinion for review by
analyst; develop additional
facts required for review; etc.
4%
Official Following official editing,
Editing 5.5% search for necessary data,
develop tables or charts as
necessary; revise draft for
typist.
3%
Analysts' time Analysts' time
now required ? 65.4% saved ? 33% (est.)
are?,
The advantages which would accrue from the use of research aides
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a. Professional time is freed for professional work;
b. Active projects are dispersed over fewer senior analysts and
are better controlled and supervised;
c. A reservoir of new, vigorous analyst talent is built;
d. The research aides, because of the variety of tasks and
supervision assigned, receive excellent on-the-job training;
e. The present allocations of Reference OiTicers to the
research divisions could be eliminated; and
f. The contemplated plan of establishing IAD liaison
officers in the research divisions would not be necessary.
In terms of salary cost, approximately a 10 percent advantage
accrues. Since there are 180 analysts at GS-11 through OS-13 and
computing salaries at grade minimums:
- 60 analyst-equivalents saved (33% time saving) = $4260800
- 90 GS-7 research aides required (ratio 1:2) $?378.450
Potential annual salary advantage 48,350
The ratio of one research aide to two analYets is considered a maximum
ratio. In actual practice, a ratio of one research aide to three analysts
is probable. This is accounted for by country groupings and present
analyst strength, existence of lower-graded analyst personnel in the
branch at present, reluctance of some analysts to delegate duties, etc.
On the basis of a 1:3 ratio, the research aide could supplant a
fourth analyst at an annual salary advantage of $21908 (difference
between average G5-11-13, salary of $71113 and GS-72 salary of $4,205)
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would occur on epproximately 45 occasions. Thus, an annual maximum pay?
roll saving of $130,860 is possible, assuming that 1/3 of the time of a
research aide can supplant 0 of the time of an analyst. Since analyst
supervisory time would be required, the net annual payroll saving is
probably more accurately half that amount, or about $65,000.
It should be emphasized that it is not intended that research
aides be assigned to branches purely on a ratio basis. This determina?
tion should be made as explained below. Implementation of this recom?
mendation must be geared to an increase in personnel ceiling, or on a
gradual basis, take place as vacancies occur.
2. Inau urate a Pro ram of "Personnel Requirements Analysis" to
Develop Branch Staffing Patterns, and to Determine the Proper
Placement of Research Aides
As stated earlier, a prime objective of RIB Administrators must be to
secure the maximum utilization of personnel in relation to workload and
work quality. In order to determine the proper placement of research
aides in the organization, it is recommended that a plan of "Personnel
Requirements Analysis" be instituted as outlined in Exhibit IX-1 and as
described below
a. Purpose of the Personnel Requirements Analysis. The plan
has two basic objectives first, to determine the number of research
aides required under existing workload in each segment of the research
organizations and second, to establish a schedule for the periodic
review of staffing in relation to workload.
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b. Responsibility for the Personnel Requirements Analysis.
Responsibility should be centered in the Division of Executive Services.
However, surveys should be conducted as a joint effort by the following:
A Management Analyst, Division of Executive Services; the Administrative
Officer, branch being audited; An Analyst, branch being audited.
c. Method of Study. Survey techniques should be developed by
the Division of Executive Services, and a uniform technique should be
used in all surveys. Principal elements of a survey technique which is
an adaptation of one used successfully in studies of other governmental
activities consists of six steps (see Exhibit IK-1).
Step One ? Inventory of Work Performed.
In Step One, the survey team becomes well informed with the
work being performed by observation of work methods, organiza?
tion, and work plans at firsthand. Specifically:
(1) All analysts in the branch are requested to maintain a
daily diary for five days. These diaries would show the
time spent for all tasks performed by the analysts.
(2) Personal interviews are conducted with at least 50 per?
cent of the branch analysts concentrating on the senior
analysts but including juniors. Selections of pertinent
questions may be made from the Analyst Interview Outline
included in Chapter VIII but it is not intended that this
be as comprehensive an interview. Two principal objectives
should be paramount in these interviews ?
(a) What tasks now being performed by the analyst can be
done through central service facilities; and
(b) What tasks now being done by the analyst can be done
by research aides under the supervision of the
analyst.
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NNW"
PURPOSE:
CONDUCTED BY:
STEP ONE
STEP TWO
OUTLINE OF A "PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS"
To determine the number of research aides required under existing workload conditions and to develop a
schedule for periodic appraisal of staffing.
A three-man team consisting of a senior management analyst from the Division of Executive Services,
the Administrative Officer of the Division being surveyed, and an analyst designated by the branch
being surveyed.
INVENTORY OF WORK PERFORMED
All branch analysts maintain a 5-day diary.
Personal interviews conducted with 50% of the analysts.
Listing of principal branch functions and special program participation made.
Records secured showing workload current, deferred, and contemplated.
Statistics secured concerning document volume, typing volume, editorial schedules, over-
time work, etc.
APPRAISAL OF WORK METHOD
AND WORKLOAD.
"POLICY" AND METHODS APPRAISAL
Question essentiality of all work being per-
formed; reassess organization structure;
consider improvements in document, typing,
filing procedures, office layout, etc.
JOB ANALYSIS
STEP THREE
STEP FOUR
STEP FIVE
STEP SIX
From the analyst interview notes and daily
diaries, tabulate and assess time devoted
to specific tasks and search out all possible
opportunities for performing the work of the
analyst more economically; consider in-
creased central services and placement of
research aides; analyze current and impend-
ing workload by analyst.
FORMULATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations are developed regarding
procedural improvements, use of additional
central service facilities, use of research
aides, functions or programs susceptible
to effort adjustment, etc.
All recommendations are "priced" and
cost comparisons developed.
RECOMMENDATIONS CLEARED AND ACTION AGREED UPON
Recommendations discussed with Branch Chief.
Adjustments made, if necessary.
Recommendations, in whole or in part, referred for comment to all or selected analysts.
An agreement is reached on desirable actions.
PLAN OF ACTION DEVELOPED
Branch Chief approves a schedule of actions and designates individuals responsible for
action.
The management analyst indicates action intended on items falling outside branch.
INSTALLATION OF THE STAFFING PLAN
Division Chief reviews and approves plan and secures such other approvals from top
management as may be necessary.
Specific approvals received for 1) Increase, 2) Decrease, 3) Reassignment of personnel,
4) Establishment of research aide positions, 5) Procedural improvements, 6) Further
actions necessary.
Definite actions taken.
SCHEDULE FUTURE STAFFING AUDITS
SEMIANNUALLY ANNUALLY
To reassess staffing requirements
when future workload is not firmly
establish ed. completed.
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Regularly for all branches providing
an interim staffing audit has not been
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( 3 )
(4)
( 5 )
Principal branch functions and responsibilities are
recorded and special program participation measured.
This line of inquiry should cover - authority for
functions performed, staffing by program and country,
effort devoted to serial publications, staffing for
administrative clerical, and other services, etc.
Planning and control records are examined to inventory
projects in process and their status; information is
secured regarding projects and programs contemplated
and projects deferred.
Statistics are developed reflecting documents handled,
number of and time consumed in briefings, typing volume,
overtime work, editorial delays if any, etc.
Step Two - Appraisal of Work Methods and Workload.
During and following the above inventory of work performed,
the survey team as a group appraises findings in three phases
(in actual practice the management analyst will perform much
of this work subject to the review and commehts of the other
team members)&
(1) Policy and methods appraisal: The purpose of this initial
appraisal is to eliminate unnecessary work, improve
necessary work, assess organization structure and program
emphasis, and to set the stage for the more intensive
analysis which follows.
(2) Job analysis: Categories of analysts' tasks are devised
(many would be standard for all branches) so that time
allocations from the daily diaries may be compiled and
studied. Initial findings are checked with the personal
interview notes. Tentative conclusions are developed
regarding the use of professional time.
(3)
Formulation of recommendations: Recommendations are de-
veloped and each is "priced" and' cost comparisons prepared.'
Recommendations would concern themselves with -
(a) Procedural improvements;
(b) The advantages of using additional central research
services;
(c) Use of research aides - their placement, functions,
and qualifications;
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(d) Elements of workload susceptible of accomplishment
by adjusting personnel assignments; and
(e) Any other observations of the survey team con-
sidered to warrant attention.
Step Three - Recommendations Cleared and Action Agreed Upon.
Recommendations developed by the survey team are discussed with
the branch chief. All or selected recommendations, depending
upon their nature, are discussed with selected analysts or
distributed to all analysts for comment. Recommendations made
by the survey team are adjusted, if necessary, and resulting
agreements are carefully evaluated in terms of salary and other
costs. Agreements and cost comparisons are made a matter of
record.
Step Four - A Plan of Action is Developed.
Responsibility for action on the various recommendations is
established by the branch chief and a schedule of action is
prepared. In the course of the survey, problems affecting
other offices (questions of document routing service, library
service, planning and control records, distribution policies,
etc.) would be the responsibility of the management analyst
to define and schedule action for.
Step Five - Installation of the Staffing Plan.
The plan of action is submitted to the division chief for
approval. Agreements are reached with respect to increase,
decrease, reassignment of personnel, methods changes, and the
establishment of research aide Viositions, other items requiring
additional study or investigation are identified and responsi-
bility for further action fixed. Specific actions are then
taken.
Step Six - Scheduling Future Personnel Requirements Analyses.
A definite plan is made at the completion of each Personnel
Requirements Analysis as to the date when a reappraisal of
methods, workload, and staffing will be made. A re-audit,
following the steps cited above, should be made annually for
each branch, but a review in 3 - 6 months may be indicated.
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d. Time and Staff 42guired to Conduct the Personnel Req2LEt7
guirements Analysis. It is estimated that the survey proposed above
can be accomplished for the average branch in about three calendar
weeks with full-time participation of the management analyst and half-
time participation by the branch members. Accordingly, a schedule should
be established for the Personnel Requirements Analyses based upon existing
vacancies and immediate staffing needs. The employment of two senior
full-time management analysts on the staff of the Division of EXecutive
Services is recommended so that two surveys may be conducted simultaneously
and so that "across-the-board" improvements may be properly handled.
NOTE: In this description of proposed survey procedure,
emphasis in examples, description of review factors)
etc., has been placed upon the research divisions.
This is occasioned by the prime objective of the
survey - which is to identify means whereby analyst
time can be conserved and research aides properly
employed.
However, the Personnel Requirements Analysis may be
applied to all segments of the R organization. In
the case of branches of the Office of Intelligence
Services and the Office of Production Coordination,
greater stress should be placed upon volume statistics
(i.e., number of telegrams, despatches, circulation
requests, airgram clearances, number of reports and
report pages, etc.) in reviewing workload in relation
to staffing requirements. Similarly, recommendations
would place greater stress upon procedural improvements,
timeliness and degree of service, clerical functions,
and conformance to assigned responsibilities.
3. Special in a Small Number of Specialists
in Each Branch.
The interruptions to concentrated research work encountered by most
analysts are serious elements in any consideration of the quality and
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quantity of research produced. The analysts themselves give more than
passing comment to this factor in respect to their productivity. The
Summary Report and paragraph 3 of the introduction to this Chapter re?
flects the degree to which interruptions take place.
Obviously, ideal conditions for the performance of intelligence
research cannot be obtained. However, it is suggested that continuing
attention be paid to the unproductive influences of interruptions to
research and that certain remedies be constantly applied. The planning
and control procedures recommended in Chapter XIII have, as one of their
primary objectives, periodic assessment of workload and analyst time
obligations in order to permit an assignment of work to each analyst
which will be in balance with time available with a minimum of start
and stop situations.
In addition, Chapter VI, 'Current Intelligence Products," proposes
the concentration of current intelligence work in one individual in each
branch in order to relieve the other analysts in the branch of this
important element of interruption and, secondly, to reduce the compulsion
for detailed rebding or scanning of the "daily take." This latter
factor is an interruption to applied research time because the analyst
feels he auk devote part of each day to current intelligence reading.
Other interrupting factors as represented by special project or
special program work should be similarly concentrated in one or two
individuals in each branch in order to further relieve the analysts of
this element of research interruption. Standard patterns for the
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application of this principle cannot be set forth here but one illustra?
tion of this principle is contained in Chapter VI where hA functions are
suggested for assignments to the branch Current Intelligence Officer.
It will be necessary to consider size of staff, nature of special
program and special project work, capacities of individuals personality
requirements to satisfactorily handle this kind of work, etc. The
individual designated might be able to assume additional urgent, short?
term assignments on an "ad hoc" basis which tend to interrupt the regular
intelligence research effort of the branch.
4. Establish Realistic Nan?Hour Estimates and Project Deadlines.
Realistic man?hour estimates and project deadlines are an important
aspect of the problem of analyst time use. The problem is pointed up
by the report of several analysts to the effect that they had worked ex?
ceedingly hard to complete their projects on time and then found their
completed drafts lying around awaiting supervisory review for weeks. The
reaction, of course, is the determination never to take project deadlines
seriously in the future.
Each analyst needs to know realistically how much of his time is to
be allocated to the preparation of the project and by what tire it must be
completed. Otherwise, the tendency of research people to strive for per?
fection may seriously impair the final usefulness of the project and, per?
haps, relegate other important projects to a secondary position in terms
of time and effort.
Chapter XIII outlines planning and control procedures which will
cause the branch chief to reviam workload by analyst and to consult
regularly with the analyst in respect to the manner in which his
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effort should be applied. Thus, the analyst is introduced to a regular
reassessment of his available time and his established demands. This
reglaar review also permits the raising of the question as to which
projects may be deferred or cancelled, thus relieving the mind of the
analyst who may be trying to accomplish 4 or 5 projects simultaneously
- each of them in difficulty and each destined to be late.
This kind of planning and the establishment of realistic man-hour
estimates and project deadlines also emphasizes the importance of early
data requirement planning and the institution of early steps for data
acquisition. It is at this point that the kind of data searching and
compiling assistance provided by the research aides will be valuable.
All producers will produce more effectively when extent of effort
is defined and a delivery date is established. This does not imply an
under-estimation of the difficulty in correctly assessing man-hour re-
quirements for research production nor the difficulty in controlling
the many factors working to obliterate the established delivery date.
But man-hour estimates can be applied to research, estimates can be
revised to correspond with realities, and analyst effort can be guided
and limits set.
The realiatio management of man-hour estimates and project dead-
lines promises much in increased production, both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
5. Amply Clearly Defined Elements of Project Management.
An important element in the analysts' list of suggestions as to
haw their research can be improved, is the necessity for "better planning
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and supervision." It is our interpretation, based upon the manner in
which the suggestion was made, that the analyst was not attempting to
avoid his true responsibilities. The principal need felt was for
better project planning at the initiation of a project rather than at
the end when many new avenues of research might have to be opened and
many hours of research might have been wasted.
In the course of our analyst interviews, we found that 16 percent
of the analysts received no supervision at the beginning of a project
(some, however, were senior analysts) and that an additional 10 percent
received branch chief review of the project only if they, the analysts,
sought such guidance and advice, or if the project required 3 days or
more of the analyst's time.
Our studies indicate that there are several key points in project
management which may be set forth as vital to the proper direction of
analyst's time as well as being vital to the production of quality in?
telligence research. These are depicted in Exhibit IX-2.
It is felt that the analysts can profit by the application of the
elements of project management in several ways:
a. New analysts can become more productive sooner by being
more quickly indoctrinated in the kind of research performance expected.
b. More experienced analysts (on large projects, urgent pro?
jects, or inter?branch or inter?division collaborative projects) can be
more productive by securing guidance in respect to amount of effort that
should be applied, extent to which collaborative projects should be
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scheduled in the branch, etc.
c. The Assistant Division Chief (Production) should discuss
elements of project management with branch chiefs from time to time and
relationship with planning ard control established.
d. The Assistant Division Chief (Production) should audit,
periodically, the consistency with which these elements of project
management are applied.
NOTE: In both paragraphs c. and d. immediately above, it is
stressed that the Assistant Chief (Production) is not
in the position of the branch chief's superior but as
the individual most concerned with the application of
these elements to secure their imaginative use for
planning and production.
The following elements of project management are outlined in further
detail in Ekhibit IX-2:
a. Project Definition
b. Project Outline Review
c. Preliminary Abstract Review
d. Preliminary Draft Review
e. Review of Final Report Draft
f. DiSCUBS Project Performance with the Analyst
6. Provide Adequate SupportinR Services to Conserve the Time of
the Analysts.
Thirty percent of the analysts consider LR service inadequate.
Regular program analysts state that only 9 percent of the data used
in their research is secured from La.
The failure of La to perform adequately ? at least in the minds
of the analysts ? has an effect throughout the entire analyst organza-
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PURPOSE: To provide optimum guidance and systematic research project supervision to the Analyst.
RESPONSIBILITY:
STEP ONE
STEP TWO
STEP THREE
STEP FOUR
STEP FIVE
STEP SIX
(1) Primary; the Branch Chief or first-line Supervisor.
(2) Secondary; Assistant Division Chief (Production).
PROJECT DEFINITION
1. Project scope and objectives; what is reason for the project; what project is designed to
answer; what factors should be covered.
2. The audience; who will read;' should factual data be in detail; should graphs, charts,
maps, etc. be used; security classification desired.
3. The data sources; outline special data sources.
4. Responsibility; who is responsible for substance and timeliness; who should participate
and to what degree; necessity for special final reviews; etc.
5. Effort and time limits; man-hour allocation estimate(s) and scheduled completion date
established.
6. Follow-up; establish date for review of preliminary project outline.
Analyst makes survey of data available and required; prepares preliminary project outline,
PROJECT OUTLINE REVIEW
1. Review; check completeness of intended project coverage versus project scope
and objectives; check report organization as evidenced by preliminary outline;
check necessity for and timeliness of special data acquisitions intended (if any).
2. Forward copy of revised project outline to division editor for review as to in-
tended format sad report organization.
3. Reconsider project deadline and estimated man-hours; adjust, if necessary, or
revise project scope and objectives.
4. Follow-up; establish date for review of preliminary report abstract.
Analyst collects data, excerpts, analyzes, arrives at tentative conclusions, prepares rough draft
preliminary abstract, i.e., develops the "solution in principle."
PRELIMINARY ABSTRACT REVIEW
1. Review, with the analyst, the preliminary report abstract to determine the degree to which
the Analyst will be able to satisfy project scope and objectives.
2. Consider, if necessary, special data acquisition to correct any deficiencies noted, or the
application of additional manpower.
3. Follow-up; establish a date for the review of preliminary draft.
Analyst secures additional data (if required), completes research, and writes the preliminary draft.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT REVIEW
1. Review preliminary draft; discuss key points with Analyst; advise Analyst if any changes
required to make report more readable; cheek security classification applied; establish
desired means of reproduction and distribution list; establish typing priority.
2. Follow-up; establish date for review of final draft (this may not be required and depends
upon acceptability of preliminary draft).
Analyst makes necessary corrictions; retypes if necessary
REVIEW OF FINAL REPORT DRAFT
1. Review and revise final draft, as necessary; return to Analyst for typing; establish typ-
ing priority.
2. Review, with Analyst, status of other assignments.
Analyst completes reportI
Iand secures distribution
DISCUSS PROJECT PERFORMANCE WITH ANALYST
1. Complete the "Analyst Performance Rating Form", (illustrated on page 45 of the Summary
Report),rating the Analyst's performance on this project in terms of -
-Planning the Study
- Fact Finding
Analysis
- Report Preparation
- Consumer Relations (if applicable)
2. With a copy of the final draft of the report at hand, discuss the rating with the Analyst;
present suggestions as to how performance may be improved; solicit suggestions for the
better utilization of his time, discuss success of any collaborative research efforts; etc.
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tion in the form of individually accumulated reference books at the
desk of the analyst, the accumulation of newspapers and periodicals on
shelves, the seeking out by each analyst of contacts with other data
sources such as the Library of Congress, etc.
In respect to typing support 29 percent of the analysts consider
typing support inadequate. In most cases, extremely urgent work is
done on time, but the necessity for negotiating typing priorities
and the general difficulty of being assured immediate typing support
has an effect upon the analyst's attitude toward producing timely
products. It likewise causes hand copying of excerpts from books,
periodicals, documents, etc.
Although clerical support ? primarily for filing purposes ? is
considered to be reasonably adequate, we found that the analysts, on
the average, spent 1.3 percent of their time personally filing docu?
ment material. This small percent, however, represents a salary cost
of $41,000 per year, or a potential waste of 250 analyst man?hours
per week (the equivalent of 6.2 full?time analysts). Another study
conducted in DRN showed that regular analyst personnel spend 12 per?
cent of their time in filing, which indicates that our figure of
1.3 percent may be substantially understated.
We were also impressed with the amount of work which the analysts
feel could be done by uncleared personnel; i.e., those who have been
selected for employment but who are awaiting security clearance.
The analysts report that a large amount of work can be done by such
personnel in the reading and marking of foreign newspapers and
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periodicals; the analysis of propaganda trends through reading of the
foreign press; the extracting and excerpting of information from
unclassified sources; the proofreading and editorial review of un?
classified reports; and similar matters. It would be necessary, of
course, to have the uncleared personnel in one room under immediate
supervision. This room should be in SA-1 in order to permit easy
access by the analysts. This procedure is used by another IAC agency,
and serious consideration should be given to its application by R.
Chapter XIV of this Volume enumerates the expanded functions
and responsibilities envisioned for the division Administrative Officer.
The Administrative Officer should take aggressive steps to assure the
proper support of professional analyst personnel in order to conserve
their time and to avoid wasteful "service?seeking" and "self?performing"
time.
The technique which should be used for the determination of
proper clerical and typing support is the "Personnel Requirements
Analysis" described earlier in this Chapter. This technique will also
provide an insight into theadequacy of other administrative and
service activities.
The provision of adequate LR support to meet analysts' needs
should be the personal concern of the top management of IA.
Chapter XVIII provides additional details and makes several suggestions.
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Summary of Recommendations
1. Provide Research Aides (03-7) to support the work of the analyst
and to permit the most productive use of professional time.
2. Determine the proper placement of Research Aides in the organiza?
tion by a regninr program of "Personnel Requirements Analysis."
3. Concentrate special program and special project work in a small
number of specialists in each branch. This suggestion is advanced
in order to minimize interruptions to the regular production of
timely research by the rest of the branch analysts.
4.
5.
6.
Recognize the
estimates and
Apply clearly
supervision).
Provide adequate supporting services to the analysts so as to
eliminate the use of professional time for clerical or administra?
tive functions, and improve LR service.
strong incentive provided by realistic man?hour
project deadlines.
defined elements of project management (first line
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r
X. READING RATE IMPROVEMENT
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X - READING RATE IMPROVEMENT
Throughout government and industry, the demands upon professional and
executive time because of the increased reading load is mounting steadily.
In the R organization, the reading load upon both professional and super-
visory personnel is extremely heavy. It exceeds the reading load imposed
upon personnel of most other organizations which we have encountered.
Reading enters into most aspects of the analyst's daily work. An
estimate of the time spent reading indicates that the average analyst
spends 80.4 percent of his time in tasks which include a substantial
amount of straight reading time. If time devoted to writing, conferences,
oral briefings, ostudy-type" reading,
reading for information of 37 percent
is apparent.
The magnitude and importance of this factor is
etc., is
of total
removed, a net time spent
time or 15 hours per week
emphasized when the
percentage of time spent in straight reading is expressed in terms of
full-time analyst equivalents---174 analysts engaged every day, all day
in the process of reading.
A - EXPERIENCE WITH READING RATE
IMPROVEMENT TRAINING HAS BEEN GOOD
A solution to the problem of a heavy reading load has been found by
many organizations and individuals in training called "Reading Rate
Improvement." The increasing number of organizations, both government
and private, with organized applications of this training attest to the
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growing success of this type of training.
In our efforts to determine the desirability of the application of
this training to the reading time problem in the R organization, we
encountered the following experiences:
- The U.S. Naval Intelligence School Reports - "results
indicated that every person, whether a good or a poor
reader, will benefit from this program. The result
depends, also, upon the interest and effort put forth
by the student. It is believed safe to assume that
any willing student can increase his reading speed by
50 percent, and can concurrently attain improved _com-
prehension and retention of subject matter."
- CIA Reports - "30 percent increase in reading speed
with no loss in comprehension."
- Department of the Army. AdJutant General - "Program in
operation-since August, 1950. 155 students from GS-3
to Lt. Col. in an eight weeks course, one hour per day.
Reading speed improved 100 percent with no loss in com-
prehension at lower grade levels and some improvement
in comprehension at higher grade levels."
- Department of Agriculture. PMA - "60 people trained in
20 one hour sessions; students were GS-12 through GS-14.
Reading speed increased 98 percent with no loss in com-
prehension in any group and some increased comprehension."
In one group at the Department of Agriculture:
Beginning Rate
211 words per minute
82.6% comprehension
After-Training Rate
420 words per minute
91.4% comprehension
They also found that age (50-60 years old) did not
adversely affect the degree of improvement. Follow-up
interviews and observations of production some months
after training substantiated test scores as to the
magnitude and benefit of the improvement.
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- Private Industry: Many companies have instituted Reading
Rate Improvement training for their executives and middle
management personnel because of the need to read fast.
Training plans are aimed so as to increase reading speed
by at least 100%. with no loss in comprehension. Among these
companies are:
Koppers Co.
U.S. Steel Export Co.
Motorola, Inc.
Acme Steel
Ryerson Steel Corp.
Chicago Title and Trust Co.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. ?
Average reading speed is about 250 words per minute, The
goal is to improve this to 650-700 words per minute.
-National Institute of Technology, Washington, D. C.
(Reading Improvement Clinic) estimates reading rate improve-
ment at 80-150% with a 10% increase in comprehension.
- The Following Also Have Reading Rate Improvement Programs:
The Air Force
Marine Corps
Navy Department
Bureau of Ships
Bureau of Ordnance
George Washington University
YON.C.A. (Adult Education Program)
? B. ELEMENTS OF A READING RATE
IMPROVEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM
Reading Rate Improvement training seeks to improve ability to perceive
with speed, accuracy, comprehension, and retention. Studies on the subject
of reading speed and comprehension and experience with several approaches
to reading training indicate that the following elements are important in
reading rate improvement training.
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1. Several Factors are Related to the Degree to Which Reacang Rate
Improvemmt Can Be Introduced.
These factors are:
- Mental capacity
- Previous training
- Present skills
- Visual capacity
- Difficulty of material
- Individual initiative
- Bckground of information
2. It Has Been Found That Ten Key Factors Account For Improved
Reading Speed.
These factors ares
- Widened perceptual span
- Read phrases and thought units
- Develop visual discrimination
- Decrease duration of fixation pauses
- Eliminate inward speech
- Reduce regressions
- Improve powers of concentration
- Appraise material as to level of difficulty
- Develop flexibility in reading
- Continue developing a versatile vocabulary
3. The Training Method Which Has Proved Most Popular and Successful
Revolves Around the Use of Mechanical Training Equipment.
The several items. of equipment and training methods used with a
brief description of their purpose are as follows:
a. Testing Equipment; The OphthaImograph, which makes a film
strip recording the movement of the eyes while reading, and the Telebinocular,
which determines visual skills, are frequently used to test the student at
the beginning of the training course in order to identify poor reading habits,
to expose visual deficiencies, and to determine the existing level of visual
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skill. The purchase and use of this equipment is not an essential, however,
and most Government installations have not included this type of testing
equipment.
b. The Tachistoscope: This is a small projector which flashes
digits, digit and letter combinations, and phrases in variable speeds of
1/1000 1/50, 1/25 and 1/10 of a second. The National Institute of Technol-
ogy, 710 14th Street, N.W., Washington 5, D. C., sells the "Renshaw
Tachistoscopic Trainer" at $65.00 f.o.b. Chicago. Other types of similar
equipment are available on the market.
c. The Reading Rate Controller: This is a pacing device which
"paces" practice reading in order to automatically develop desirable
reading habits and reading speed.
unit from the above company.
d. Comprehension _Examinations:
Equipment is available at $85.00 per
Frequent examinations are
given throughout the course to check the degree of comprehension for the
reading undertaken at varying rates of speed. Examinations for compre-
hension also take place at the beginning and end of the course in order
to check whether comprehension has been sacrificed for the increase in
reading speed. Commercial tests for preliminary and final testing may be
obtained from:
(1) Education Test Bureau, 3334 Walnut Street,
Philadelphia 4, Pa. -"VAN WAGENEN Diagnostic
Examination of Silent Reading Abilities, Senior
Division"
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(2) Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio -
"ROBINSON-HALL Test of Reading Ability"
(3) Cooperative Test Service, American Council on
Education, 15 Amsterdam Avenue, New York 23,
N. Y. - "COOPERATIVE ACHIEVEMENT TEST Reading
Comprehension (Higher Level, Forms S and T)"
e. Class Work and Instruction: Typical class room work
consists of:
- Introduction to Reading Rate Improvement; theory,
principles, methods of instruction and training,
introduction to equipment used, purpose of course,
normal reading speeds, etc.;
- Initial Testing; construction of reading "profile";
- Group or Individual Work with Tachistoscope; practice
in reading (and recording on test sheets) words, phrases,
and digits at increasing rates of speed;
- Practice Reading at Controlled Speeds; class reads
selected material within set time limit and rates
own speed;
- Study of Training Materials; articles on "skimming"
and other training materials on reading speed used;
- Lectures by Instructor on Faulty Reading Habits;
these are usually brief and spaced throughout the
COUTE18.
NOTE: Training officials of the Bureau of Ships, Navy
Department; CIA; Production Marketing Administra-
tion, Department of Agriculture; and the Adjutant
General, Department of the Army, mill be willing
to provide details of their training program.
f. Laboratory Work: Excellent results have been experienced
in courses which have been organized so that a laboratory or "reading
rate clinic" is established in conjunction with the formal training
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sessions. Thus, students may practice individually using the tachistoscope
and the reading rate controller.
4. A Training Course Organized on the Basis of 24 One-Hour Sessions
Appears Most Desirable.
The 24 sessions of training are generally supplemented with about
three hours of comprehension testing. The 24 one-hour sessions may be
divided -
12 weeks with two one-hour sessions per week,
8 weeks with three one-hour sessions per week,
or
5 weeks with five one-hour sessions per week.
Maximum individual success will undoubtedly be experienced with the
12-week course but one of the faster courses will be necessary in order
to accommodate the large number of analysts and executive personnel who
could profitably use this training in the R organization.
The training program should also include a refresher course of two
weeks training with three one-hour sessions per week about twelve months
to eighteen months after each student has completed the initial course.
In addition, the laboratory facilities should be available to students
for additional optional practice after they have completed the initial
course.
C - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT
We found, in the course of our investigations Of this subject that
the Foreign Service Institute already has some of the necessary training
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equipment and that it has been their intention for some time to inaugurate
a reading rate improvement course in the Department of State. Accordingly,
two simple steps are indicated in order to secure these benefits for the
R organization.
1. Formally Request the Foreign Service Institute to Establish a
Reading Rate Improvement Course as Quickly as Possible.
The Foreign Service Institute indicated that they would welcome such
a request and that this would help to inaugurate the program in the near
future. Further, the Foreign Service Institute will welcome assistance
in the organization of the course.
The CIA has had several years experience with the course and will
undoubtedly be glad to cooperate in establishment of the course at the
State Department. The R organization may wish to participate with the
CIA in one of the CIA training sessions in order to acquaint itself with
training methods, training results, etc. This information can then be
passed on to the Foreign Service Institute.
The National Institute of Technology in Washington, D. C., may be
milling to assist the Department of State in establishing such training
and could provide the experienced and trained instructor required
initially to get the program off to a good start.
2. Organize Ills Participation in the Reading Rate Improvement
Course.
It is considered that the R organization should plan their partici?
pation in the training program as follows.:
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R executives ? optional.
Senior analysts (Gs-.]3 and above) 7 optional.
Analysts (05-12 and below) ? mandatory on a scheduled basis.
Others where reading speed is important ? mandatory on a
scheduled 'basis.
Exampless Document clerks, Editors, Routers, Idbrary
reference personnel, some clerical personnel,
etc.
It is suggested that the Foreign Service Institute be requested
to accommodate 20 students from the R Organization at all times.
D ? ASSESSMENT OF ADVANTAGES
The evidence from other users of this type of training indicates
that a conservative estimate of improvement of 50 percent in reading
rate could logically be expected. The existing high level of educa?
tion and extensive research experience would indicate that R
analyst personnel would be very apt students.
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The advantage to the R organization is indicated in the following
analysis of reading time:
ANALYSIS OF READING TIME - REGULAR PROGRAM ANALYSTS
TASKS WHICH INCLUDE
READING TIME
TOTAL TIME ;FENT ESTIMATED TIME SPENT READING
% Hrs/Week % Hrs/Week
Background Study
32.2
12.8
25
10
Written Products
39.5
15.8
10
4
Reviewing Work of Others
8.7
_2,5.
2
0.8
TOTALS
80.4%
32.1
37%
14.8*
Estimated reading rate improvement - 50%
Time saving - 7.4 Hrs/Week
The above tabulation and analysis has been based upon the time
allocations of regular program analysts. NIS analysts spend 91.7
percent of their total time on the three tasks enumerated above of
Which approximately 34 percent of their total time or 13.6 hours per
week is spent in reading. Thus, it can be assumed that the magnitude
of time-saving applies about equally to NIS analysts.
If a reading rate improvement of 50 percent can be achieved,
approximately 7.4 hours of analysts' time will be saved each week.
*The reading time estimated here is the relatively continuous informa-
tion-seeking type of reading which is the type of reading most subject
to improvement through reading rate training. The "study-type" of
reading, although subject to similar reading rate improvement, has been
excluded in the estimate in order to present a conservative reading
time base. Time spent writing, conferring, etc., has also been
excluded from the "Estimated Time Spent Reading."
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This is a saving of 18.5 percent of the total time spent by the analysts
and represents an extremely significant gain. Thus, a substantial
advantage accrues in the conservation of professional time for uproducing"
activities rather than Hintakeu activities. Or, it can permit a sub?
stantial increase in the amount of information which each analyst can
handle within the same time.
A similar advantage applies to the many administrative and professional
supervisors who are faced with a large reading problem although no attempt
is made here to estimate the time advantage.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Formally request the Foreign Service Institute to establish a
reading rate improvement course as quickly as possible. Assist the
FSI in organizing the course.
2. Organize Ris participation in the training program so that twenty
people are undergoing training at all times.
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XI. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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XI - PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The title of this Chapter - Professional Development - is not in-
tended to be synonymous with training in the rigid, classroom, lecture
sense. Rather, professional development as envisioned for the R Area
includes - establishing a climate of professional opportunity) developing
means for providing adequate motivation, permitting and encouraging an
interchange of professional doctrine, carrying out plans for personal
consultation and individual guidance, organizing a systematic program
of on-the-job training, and recognizing the varying needs and interests
of different groups according to discipline, area, grade level, or
intelligence research experience.
Recent studies in human relations have emphasized the importance
of a feeling of participation as fundamental to motivation.
It is this concept of professional development for which we pro-
pose several specific actions. They are based, in the main, upon our
studies and upon our analyst interviews.
- SEVERAL FACTORS POINT TO THE NEED
FOR A PROGRAM OF PROFESSIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT.
We have already spoken of the high degree of professional zeal
and career interest which exists among R's analysts and their super-
visors. But other facts and opinions were called to our attention
which we believe require consideration in connection with professional
development and motivation.
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1. Regular Program Analysts Feel that Only About 29 Percent of
Their Products Make Contributions Which are Important and
Direct.
Almost half (42%) of what the regular program analyst produces, in
his mind at least, makes a relatively minor contribution to those who
receive his work. But, more significantly, represented in this figure
are one?third of the analysts who don't know haw much of a contribution
their work makes. The figures,for NIS analysts are even higher. Page
19 of the Summary Report provides further details.
This can have nothing but an adverse effect upon morale and,
perhaps, a long?term lessening of the drive and interest we have observed.
The analyst has relatively few contacts with the bureaus and some
feel strongly that their work suffers from "insulation."
2. More than Half of the Analysts Feel That the Bureaus Get
Better Data Than They Do, or Get it Faster.
This impression, linked with other time?using factors of processing
and review, seems to account for much of the adverse feeling encountered
regarding the production of current intelligence.
Although administrative action may be indicated to solve problems
of processing time, speedy document routing and delivery, etc., there
is also the problem of making certain that the analyst understands to
what extent a delay does exist (if at all) and to what degree this does
or does not affect the quality and timeliness of his research.
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3, The Great NaJority of the Analysts (86%) Feel that Field Trips
Are an Important Factor in Good Research Performance.
Our sampling among the analysts indicates that very few (less than
10%) have actually visited their area of research responsibility since
being employed in the R organization. This is considered to be a very
law average considering the nature of the responsibility and the fact
that the average analyst has spent about 3 1/4 years in the R organiza?
tion.
We recognize that an affirmative answer can be expected to the
question, "Do you consider field trips to your area to be important to
your researcher However, we encountered a very realistic set of answers
which makes us believe that the response is based upon more than simply
personal desire for travel abroad.
The analysts, as a composite, considered that a trip to their area
each three to six years for a period two to three months would be adequate
although more frequent field trips if a specific situation required it
would be entirely acceptable and welcome.
4. Understanding of the Foreign Service ? Civil Service Amalgama?
tion Program is not General.
In our interviews with the analysts, one?third admitted that they
do not understand the Foreign Service?Civil Service Amalgamation Pro-
gram. Further, of the two?thirds who said that they did, at least
20 percent had to qualify their description of the program with
"vaguely," "partially," etc.
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The degree of misunderstanding concerning this program is indicated
by the following quotations from the response of the analysts when asked
his understanding of the programs
- "Go to the field and then return to OIR."
- "FP wants all positions under the Foreign Service."
"I really wasn't informed."
- "The Department wants more billets in Washington, D.C.,
for the Foreign Service."
- "It will put the Civil Service under the Foreign Ser-
vice."
- "The Civil Service would become the Foreign Service
Reserve."
Only one-third of the analysts who had an opinion concerning the
program considered that the program was a good one.
The potential impact upon the R organization by the Foreign Ser-
vice-Civil Service Amalgamation Program would appear to be an important
one. Accordingly, the analysts as a group should understand the pro-
gram's objectives and the procedure intended to be followed - at least
to the degree that the top management in R is informed concerning these
factors.- In any event, the analyst should understand what R's official
position is in the matter. In addition, the analyst should have an
opportunity to raise questions concerning any program of this sort which
could have an important influence upon his career plans.
5. A Majority of the Analysts (54%) Consider a Formal Training
Program Desirable.
This is considered to be a significant response: first, because
no specific training plan was presented for comment; and, secondly,
because the analysts corps has already completed a considerable amount
of formal education. Thus, it would be expected that their experience
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in research work and their active participation in outside study would
condition their minds against a formal training program in the R organ?
ization.
Nevertheless, the majority considered that formal training of some
sort was necessary and listed the following, in order of importancet
a. Professional training.
b. Seminars on research methods.
c. Haw to write reports.
d. Seminars on relationships problems (with the bureaus).
e. Indoctrination in top policy determination (State Depart?
ment).
Many of those who expressed the opinion that no formal training
program was necessary also expressed the opinion that "on?the?job" train?
ing was the best kind and should be pursued more actively.
B ? A PLAN FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Other chapters of this Volume propose formal training programs
which should be considered in connection with a program of professional
development. These chapters are ? Chapter VII, which proposes training
in the writing of readable reports and Chapter X, which proposes a
training program to increase reading rate.
By way of preface, several considerations apply to all of the
specific proposals which will follow:
First, emphasis in any kind of a formal training pro?
gram should be on the "seminar?type" rather than the
"lecture?type" of training. An opportunity for the ex?
change of views and free discussion is an important
consideration.
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Second, full use of the advice, facilities, and existing
and planned curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute
should be made in order to speed program development,
secure facilities and equipment readily, and to permit
the interchange of ideas between those being trained
for post duties and those from the Intelligence Organiza?
tion. It should be noted that the Foreign Service
Institute courses, although frequently announced as
somewhat restricted in eligibility for attendance, are
frequently not actually so restricted and that opportunities
exist for many people of the R Organization to attend.
Third, R should secure a large conference?training room
in order to conduct its awn training sessions. The room
should include blackboard, easel, and visual projection
equipment in order to conduct well?organized sessions.
In order to organize, develop, and implement a productive program of
professional development, nine program action steps are set forth for
consideration.
1. Establish a Committee on Professional Development.
This Committee should be appointed immediately and should be responsi?
ble for organizing a program of professional development for the R Organi?
zation. It is proposed that this Chapter be provided to the Committee
as the initial document upon which to base their deliberations and from
which to develop a program.
It is proposed that the Committee consist of a member from each re?
search division, one member from the Office of Production Coordination,
two from the Office of Intelligence Services, and that the Secretary of
the Committee be the Training Coordinator ? organizationally on the staff
of the Division of Executive Services.
The Committee membership should reflect the several disciplines
represented in the R professional staff, the biographic analyst, the
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specialist in intelligence acquisition, and administrative management.
Memberships should be for two years on a staggered basis. Subcommittees
may be appointed to develop the several elements of the program.
A subcommittee should be established to organize a training program
for junior analysts and research aides. Suggested elements of this
program are ?
a. An organized plan of "on?the?job" training.
b. Junior analyst seminars in research methodology and pro?
fessional doctrine (each session led by a senior analyst of the R
Organization).
c. Carefully selected job rotation to broaden perspective of
the junior analyst.
d. Through the cooperation of local universities, the establish?
ment of off?campus credit courses in State Department space.
It is recommended that the Committee be appointed in July, 1952, and
that the major actions for professional development be organized scheduled,
and announced by September 1952 for the next six?months' period. There?
after, schedules should be developed six months in advance.
2. Establish the Position of Training Coordinator on the Staff
of the Division of Executive Services.
The individual selected as Training Coordinator should be an analyst
chosen for his understanding of and evidence of effective leadership and
enthusiasm for a program of professional development.
The responsibilities proposed for the Training Coordinator are as
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follows:
a. Conceive, organize, develop, and implement training pro-
grams for all employees of the R Organization, including organized "on-
the-job" training programs.
b. Arrange for all necessary training materials, training
facilities, and instructors for approved training programs.
c. Act as secretary for the Committee on Professional De-
velopment. In this connection, provide an agenda in advance of each
meeting, record meeting decisions or arrange that they be recorded for
the full committee or subcommittees, report periodically to top manage-
ment on the status of committee actions, and maintain such committee
records as shall be necessary.
d. Act as liaison for the R Organization with the Foreign
Service Institute and with training officials of other agencies and
organizations.
The Training Coordinator, a full-time job*, would provide the
imaginative leadership required for the far-sighted planning and de-
velopment of a successful professional development program. His
responsibility includes not only professional training but the administra-
tion of training for administrative and management personnel, supervisory
personnel, and clerical and support personnel.
The professional development program we visualize requires, at a
minimum, the full-time services of one individual. If departmental
policy regarding the centralization of training administration in
the FSI legislates against the establishment of this position, the
responsibilities outlined should be assumed on a part-time basis
with more active participation by the FSI.
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3. Institute Regular Branch Staff Mtfttiags in Each of the Branches
of the R Organization.
It is recommended that the R Organization adopt a policy of encouraging
and assisting branch chiefs in conducting regular branch meetings on a
weekly or biweekly basis. Each of these meetings should be preceded by an
agenda so that all attending will be advised as to the subjects and in-
tended coverage of each meeting. For most meetings, the time limit should
be established as one hour.
The primary purposes of the branch staff meetings would be to inform,
to train, to improve common understanding of branch objectives and pro-
cedures, to provide a device for the motivation of employees, and to im-
prove relationships within the branch and division and with the users of
branch research.
To these ends, topics suggested for branch staff meeting discussion
are:
Selected branch analysts present an important research
project in terms of its origin, its planning, its cur-
rent status, its expected impact upon policy and State
Department action, the problems encountered in its
performance, the techniques used in its development,
etc. All branch personnel would discuss in the typical
"case history" approach to training. Emphasis in the
discussion would be placed upon consumer relationships,
research techniques, data acquisition problems, and
report organization and readability.
Present evidences of the value of the branch's research
output as garnered from conversations with bureau of-
ficials, written remarks concerning branch reports,
evidences of use in State Department official actions,
etc.
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Discuss administrative matters of the branch and of the
R Organization as they affect the individual. This
would include a discussion of the Foreign Service ? Civil
Service Amalgamation Program, space, research support
services, the research program for the branch, the branch
"on?the?job" training program, etc.
Discussion by a representative of one of the users of
the branch's research concerning problems of his office,
the current situation in his area, the needs visualized
for intelligence research, specific illustrations of the
use that has been made of the branch's research in the
past, criticisms or suggestions that can be offered, etc.
Relative adequacy and timeliness of data receipt should
be discussed. This should be accomplished by inviting a
representative of the geographic or functional bureau to
participate in the meetings no less frequently than
quarterly.
? Discussion by a representative of R's top management.
These visits by R's top management, scheduled to occur at
least quarterly, should be designed so as to present
briefly the latest happenings and then permit questions
and answers concerning the official's responsibilities,
programs, etc. Representation should rotate between
the Office Directors, and Division Directors of the Office
of Intelligence Services and Office of Production Coordina?
tion,
4. Establish an Organized Program of Professional Seminars.
It is recommended that professional seminars of three types be
organized, with sessions for each type held on a quarterly basis. The
curriculum of the FBI should be used to a maximum extent but subjects of
interest, if not covered by the FSI, should be arranged by R. The three
types of seminars suggested are as follows:
The General Interest Seminar: This series is intended to
be of benefit to all analysts regardless of discipline,
area, or length of service in the R Organization. As
contrasted to the following two types of professional
seminars proposed, it is intended that, in general, the
responsibility for subject matter presentation, panel
organization and panel participation, etc., should be
borne by personnel of the R Organization.
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The International Relations Seminars These seminars should
be organized for the political analyst in the R Organization
although attendance should not be so restricted. The major?
ity of the sessions should be led by an outstanding in?
dividual in the political science or sociological field who
will command the respect and attention of the political
analysts.
The Economic Seminar: These should be organized for the
interests of the economists of the R Organization but attend?
ance should not be restricted to economists alone. Out?
standing individuals in the economic field should be in?
vited to participate, particularly in panel?type seminar
discussions.
As illustrations of the type of subject matter intended to be covered
by these several types of siminars? the following lists are presented:
a. The General Interest Seminar.
- Principals of Research Techniques (several sessions
followed by smaller groups for individual discussions;
also, more detailed discussion during branch staff
meetings..)
The Organization for Intelligence Research in the
United States,
- The Organization for Intelligence
in G-2, A-20 and
Intelligence Research as Practiced in Foreign Govern?
ments.
? Techniques of Conference Leadership.
? The Responsibilities of R Organization.
The Responsibilities of Geographic Research Divisions.
? The Responsibilities of a Research Analyst.
The Network for Intelligence Acquisition and its
Organization in Support of Intelligence Research.
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b. The International Relations Seminar.
? Recent Advancements in the Political Science Discipline.
Sociological Studies of Importance to Research in
Foreign Areas. ?
The Contribution of Universities to Political Science
Research.
Colonialism and Nationalism.
Communism throughout the World ? Strategy and Tactics.
- Buddhism in the World.
The Political Science Programa of Various Foundations.
c. The Economic Seminar.
Systems of Social Accounting.
The International Monetary Fund.
- The Gold Problem.
The Applications of Standard Economic Research Techniques.
- The Future of the Sterling Area.
- Economic Developments in Foreign Countries a series).
- Methodology in Production Indexes.
The Economic Problems of Under?Developed Countries.
5. Adopt a Scheduled Program of Personalized and Inspirational
Guidance for Senior Analysts..
The professional seminars proposed immediately above provide, to
some degree, exposure of the analysts at all grades to presentations and
discussions concerning the responsibilities of the R Organization and
other intelligence activities. However, as a factor of professional
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development for the senior analysts of the R Organization, it is felt that
scheduled discussions by the top officials of the R Organization in-
dividually with senior analysts is necessary and highly desirable from
several viewpoints.
First, top management of the R Organization can receive
opinions and impressions directly from the producers of
? the R Organization which will be useful to condition
their viewpoint in. the administration of the organiza-
tion.
Secondly, the analyst is exposed to the top administrative
individuals in the organization who are, for the most part,
distant bodies whose functions, personality, and plans he
cannot visualize or appreciate.
Thirdly, it provides an opportunity for the senior analyst
to make known his own personal hopes and plans in respect
to his contribution to the mission and objective of the
R Organization.
Loalillyj top management personnel can provide guidance and
assurande to the analyst which, if properly presented, can
be a real factor in encouraging him to maintain production.
This program must be organized in such a manner that the interviews
are not conducted in an off-hand or perfunctory manner. Although experience
with the interviews will best indicate the proper sequence and scope
of subject matter, it would seem that a discussion concerning the senior
analysts area of responsibility, his recent accomplishments and dis-
appointments, his relationships with customerS, his place in the R
Organization, his personal career plans, his open questions concerning the
usefulness or impact of his work, etc., would seem to be logical opening
subjects. In general, about 30 to 45 minutes would be required in order
to first permit RIs top management official to understand the analyst and
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his position and secondly to then express his awn views and experiences
as a guide to the analyst. Suggestions would be solicited from the
analyst concerning ways in which his awn and the organization's program
and production could be improved.
It is proposed that the Special Assistant, Deputy Special Assistant,
Director of Intelligence Research, Director of Intelligence Services, and
Director of Production Coordination, each spend 30 to 45 minutes a week
in consultation with one senior analyst. In this manner, all senior
analyst would see a top official of the R Organization at least once
each year.
The results of the interview should be made a matter of record
through a "memorandum for file". This record should be closely held and
provide first, a starting point for the next top management official who
will see the senior analyst the following year, and secondly, a means
whereby tabulations of opinions and comments from senior analysts may be
secured.
6. Install a "Project Performance Rating System" to Rata Analyst
Performance.
The great majority of the analysts recognize that the present
performance rating system does not truly rate performance nor act as
a device for the motivation of quality research work.
It is proposed that a more realistic and meaningful plan of
performance evaluation be instituted whereby analysts are provided a
performance rating following the completion of each major research
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project. This should, in normal circumstances, permit the rating of
project performance of each analyst at least three times each year.
These "project performance ratings" would serve as the basis for the
annual or semiannual official performance ratings specified by the
Department of State.
Page 45 of the Summary Report illustrates the Analyst Performance
Rating form intended and the principal factors suggested in developing
and discussion performance with analysts. Chapter IX proposes, in
connection with project management, the use of the Analyst Performance
Rating form at the end of each major project.
7. Develop a Program of Field Trips on a Scheduled Basis.
The importance of knowing a foreign area first-hand cannot be
underestimated in the performance of quality and time intelligence
research. We found the analysts quite conservative as to their
estimates as to the amount of field travel which they considered
desirable.
It is recommended that a schedule of trips abroad be adopted so
that analysts in grade GS-12 and above can be expected to visit their
area for a two to three months' period at least every five years.
Although it may be necessary to assign a specific research project for
development in the foreign country and under the supervision of the
Post in that country, it is recommended that a large part of the time
available to the analyst be left free for such investigation and
study as he deems best in order to supplement his knowledge and under-
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standing of the country, its government, its economy, and its people.
His program for this independent study should, of course, be reduced
to writing and approved by the Division Chief and the Director of
Intelligence Research prior to the start of the trip.
In addition, a full report should be required of the analyst upon
his return.
8. Organize a Program of Bureau Assignments for Analysts of the
R Organization.
One of the complaints which we encountered on the part of some of
the analysts was the feeling that their work "suffered from isolation".
In addition, other portions of this Volume and of the Summary Report
have referred to the lack of knowledge on the part of the average
analyst as to the extent to which his research contributes to operating
problems and policy determinations.
We have found that relatively few of the analysts have the opportunity
to work with and in the geographic or functional bureaus directly.
It is recommended that a program of bureau assignments be adopted
so that senior analysts of the R Organization may assume and learn
bureau operating duties and problems. These should be planned in
consonance with bureau desires in the matter but, if possible, should
be of 3 months' duration for each assignment. Shorter, specific work
projects would be acceptable in many instances. During the course of
our "consumer interviews" this thought was advanced in several instances
and a favorable response received. Considerable improvement in "consumer
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relations" can be expected as a by-product of this program.
9. Institute a Long-Range Program of Executive Development for
Senior Analysts who are Considered Potential Supervisory
Personnel.
The problems of supervising research are many and complex. The
principal difficulties encountered by research individuals in assuming
supervisory positions is in questions of personnel administration,
morale motivation, budget compilation and justification, space,
program planning, and other similar problems of administration,
It is necessary that the professional analyst recognize the
importance of these factors and be able to deal with them once he
has assumed a supervisory position. Accordingly, it is proposed that
a tailored" Executive Development Program be instituted.
,Selected senior analysts (considered to be potential supervisory
personnel) should be exposed, through actual practice or direct
observation, to the major administrative problems that beset super-
visory personnel. This can be accomplished by job rotation to the
bureaus and to AAS, CS, DP, DB, etc., and by observation and
study in the R administrative organization itself with particular
emphasis upon tours of duty in the Office of Intelligence Services
and the Office of Production Coordination. Certain specialized
courses are also available through the Foreign Service Institute.
Individual guidance should be provided each candidate in the
program in respect to training necessary or desirable scheduling
assignments, developing work and training plans, and arranging for
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rotating assignments or direct observation of work operations. Each
"training plan" would be specifically tailored to the requirements
of the individual.
For branch chiefs, tours of duty as Assistant Division Chief
(Production) will provide an important technique of executive develop?
ment.
The development and administration of this plan should be the
responsibility of the Training Coordinator. The program should
operate on a highly selective basis.
Summary of Recommendations
In recognition of the high level of professional skill possessed
by the analyst corps but in further recognition of the need for con?
tinuing attention and effort to personal development, nine action
steps in a program of Professional Development are proposed.
1. Establish a permanent Committee on Professional Development.
2. Establish the position of Training Coordinator in the Division
of Executive Services.
3. Institute regular branch staff meetings throughout the R
Organization.
4. Establish an organized program of professional seminars, of
three types:
- General Interest
? International Relations
? Economic
5. Adopt a program of personalized and inspirational guidance for
senior analysts. Do this on a scheduled basis.
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6. Adopt and use a "project performance rating". system for analysts
to supplement the regular State Department performance rating.
Use the proposed system to recognize and encourage good performance
and to suggest specific performance factors subject to improvement
by the analyst.
7. Develop a program of field trips for senior analyst's to improve
country and area knowledge and improve professional skill and
research performance.
8. Organize a program of bureau assignments for analysts,
9. Institute a program of executive development specifically
"tailored" to the needs of senior analysts selected as potential
supervisory material.
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XII. 'IMPROVED FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH ANALYSTS
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XII. IMPROVED FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH ANALYSTS
It is fortunate that the R area has cooperative personnel interested
in their work, and willing to adjust themselves to the physical aspects
of a working environment which leaves much to be desired. We believe,
however, that there is an immediate and cumulative effect to inefficient
working conditions which evidences itself in a lessening in quality of
work, lowered morale, increased turnover, poor housekeeping, and the
expenditure of time and effort beyond that which should be required.
Research work, in particular, requires a set of working conditions
and attendant working facilities which are conducive to the application
of concentrated mental effort.
It is recognized that office space conditions throughout Washington,
D.C., are not good. It is our thought, however, that the problem requires
a planned program of action so that each opportunity may be seized promptly
and so that an atmosphere and set of workingconditions which aid and
supplement the research effort will be built up. We recognize that this
cannot be done overnight but propose that several initial steps be taken
towards this objective.
4 --. SEVERAL FACTS AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION BEAR
UPON THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE RESEARCH FACILITIES.
1. Adequate Working Facilities are Important to the Analysts.
Thirty?eight percept of the analysts consider physical facilities
inadequate to the proper conduct of their research. However, fifty
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percent had objections to their space and desk arrangements even though
not willing to categorize them as completely "inadequate".
In our analyst interviews, one of the principal lines of inquiry con?
cerned the obstacles which the analyst found in performing his research.
One of the analysts listed "noise and interruptions" as the prime obstacle
he found in planning the research project. Twenty percent of the analysts
interviewed considered "noise and interruptions" as the prime obstacle
to the conduct of analysis and the preparation of the report.
The inadequacy of space conditions for the conduct of research was
also brought hone to us during our analysts interviews by the fact that
we were unable to talk to most of the analysts selected for our interviews
at their desks because of the constant interruptions, the lack of privacy,
and the general noise level that obtained.
2. There is a Wide Disparity in Space Allocations.
Considering total floor space and total employment in the R Area
(SA-1 and SA-2 only), an average of 126 square feet per person is
obtained.
There is, however, a wide disparity in the allocations of floor
space to the research divisions as indicated in the table immediately
below:
Sq. Ft.
Space
Sq. Ft. Per
Person
Sq. Ft. Per Person After
Files Area Subtracted
OIR/OD
10,408
165
152
DRA
4,430
130
107
DRY
10,445
119
101
DRN
7,735
103
89
DEW
10,985
122
108
1:41S
7,330
90
76
DFI
5,815
12].
105
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In addition, we observed, in our visits to the R office spaces and
during our interviews with the analysts, a considerable disparity in the
allocation of office space to individuals. It is recognized that the
State Annex No. 1 building does not lend itself readily to efficient and
equitable space allocations because of the lack of large open office areas.
However, the extremes in accomodations are striking. One encounters either
excellent office and desk arrangement because of privacy; or the complete
lack of efficient working environment, with little in between.
3. The Present Space Condition and the Lack of Aggressive Space
Management have Resulted in Several Safety Hazards.
TN did not make a complete inspection of all office areas of the R
organization. However, observations of many offices and several escorted
inspections revealed safety conditions which should be corrected.
?Several instances of open file drawers projecting into
main aisle areas were observed.
? Shelves and bins were observed not secured to the wall and
not strong enough to hold weight applied safely. Some of
these shelves were observed with material stored so high
that a chair had to be used in order to reach the top
shelves. One set of da elves could be made to sway at the
touch of the hand (GT/ Branch).
? Electric extension cords were observed running across aisle
. areas, or desk access spaces.
? Newspapers and periodicals, yellowed with age, were stored
on open shelves. This would appear to be a fire hazard.
? Floor loading seems excessive in a number of localities.
4. The General Office Noise Level is High for Research Production.
In 9 noise level test readings in two office areas (Rooms 526 and
616) throughout 2 successive days, an average ncise?level rating of 60.4
decibels was secured. These test readings were taken at approximately
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one minute intervals within each 15-minute test period. It should be
noted that the 616 test area is carpeted and thus the general noise level
readings understated in this samplingo
This survey places the general noise level in SA-1 above the noise
level of an average office (rated at 55 to 60 decibels) and well above a
private office (rated at 35 to 40 decibels).
These tests were not intended to be extensive or conclusive. Even
though limited, however, they tend to prove our initial observation that
the noise level exceeded that of the average office which, in our opinion,
would be too noisy for the research type of work expected of R analysts.
As a minimum, the average noise level in open office areas should not
exceed 50 decibels.
More distracting than the general noise level is tl-e more aggrava-
ting and work-destroying factor of interruptions - both oral and visual.
These are very frequent and caused by file drawers closing, chairs being
scraped, neighbor's phone ringing, neighbor's talking on the telephone,
people walking past the desk, people getting up from adjacent desks,
conference at next desk, etc.
Tests of the effect of noise on fatigue and production indicate
that the more highly skilled subject is adversely affected by noise to
a greater extent than the less efficient worker. Of particular interest
to R because of the large reading load, are findings when tests were
made on various subjects reading a paragraph. "On the introduction of
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noise, there was an increased articulation on the part of the readers
in an attempt to concentrate on their work. This occasioned an increase
in respiration, and finally a decrease in the speed of reading due, in
this case, both to physical effort and mental strain",
Other professional opinions based on long and exhaustive study of
the effects of' noise on the individual are ?
"Noise lowers all of our faculties. It slackens and dulls
our mental processes? It clouds judgment, reduces the
precision of our action., and decreases general efficiency".
Dr. J,? L. McCartney, Pennsylvania Medical Journal,
"Noise exacts even a greater toll upon the nervous systems
of mental workers and others who are noise sensitive".
Dr. Vern O. Knudson, Dean of Graduate Division, U.C.L.A.
? "Noise is in the same class with bad ventilation and poor
lighting in its effect on human efficiency". Dr. Paul E.
Sabine, River Bank Laboratories,
5, Dictating Equipment Would Prove of Value for Many Analysts.
Noting the absence of dictating equipment in cur early visits to
the office areas, we inquired of all analysts interviewed during our
analyst study whether or not they would consider a dictaphone a useful
tool in their work, The replies indicate that 25 percent of the analysts
will use dictating equipment without urging and would like to have it
now. And that an additional 25 percent would make partial use or might
find regular use for it with sane experience in its proper application.
Those who replied affirmatively were usually quite enthusiastic
and replied ?
? "A good idea."
? "It would increase my output tremendously."
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Those who were in doubt as to its value replied as followst
- "I could use it perhaps for simple letters."
- "I can't say at the moment. I have never used one."
- "I can't say since I have never used one although it would
help for rush cases and first drafts."
We Observed, in discussing research methodology with the analysts,
that much of their time was required to extract and excerpt from
documents, periodicals, newspapers, etc. We also observed that many
of the analysts laboriously prepared first drafts in long hand or by
typewriting. It appeared to us that a large percentage of this work
could be done much more rapidly and possibly much more completely
(thereby improving research and analysis) if this were done by dictating
equipment.
B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT
1. Install the "Unit Office Plan" of Office Layout for Research
Areas.
relatively recent trend in office layout, embodying new principles
of furniture design and arrangement, is the unit office plan which we
propose for installation in the research areas of the R organization.
The Summary Report illustrates the principal features of the plan.
The equipment illustrated, known as "Technipaan", is manufactured and
installed by the Globe-Wernicke Company. This company assisted us
by preparing the sample floor plan attached as Exhibit XII-1.*
*Other manufacturers are able to offer packaged office units. The model
illustrated has been chosen to illustrate the features recommended and
to test the probable cost of such furniture.
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Illustration of Application of Unit Office Plan
Space pictured is Rooms 524 and 526, SA-1
Prepared by Globe-Wernicke Co., Washington, D.O.
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? The advantages of the unit office plan is that it not only saves
floor space but it also provides additional desk top area, a desirable
degree of privacy and freedom from visual and oral interruptions, and
conveniently located book shelves. These features, in all respects,
are ideal for the research type of operation which we have observed in
the R Area. Exhibit XII-1 on the, next page presents an isometric view
of one of the existing areas in one of the research divisions re?
engineered in accordance with the unit office plan.
"Techniplan? equipment will cost about $440 per analyst. Some
savings on this figure are expected if Globe-Wernicke office layout
engineers are permitted to make detailed surveys rather than work solely
from blue prints of existing space. Thus, if approximately 300 analysts
can be placed in the category of requiring improved desk and space
arrangement, the cost mould be $132,000. This is not considered to be
excessive in terms of the benefits that may be expected to be derived
through increased production, improved morale, better quality research,
and lower turnover. It should also be pointed out that the equipment
permits maximum flexibility in adjusting office layouts and yet retains
desirable elements of economical usage of floor space, maximum desk area,
reasonable privacy, etc.
As an initial step, it is recommended that one branch or section be
completely equipped with unit office plan furniture ? specifically DRS
space in Rooms numbered 518 through 526. This space condition is in
urgent need of improvement and mould subject the installation to a
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real test. This test installation, with equipment for both analysts and
typists (27 people), would cost about $12,000.
The unit office plan recommended above does not appear on the standard
specifications for Government furniture at this time. However, the Federal
Supply Service (responsible for the development and administration of
Government stanaaros for office furniture) has been experimenting with
this kind of equipment is interested in its application to Federal
Government office layout problems, ani indicated that they would welcome
an opportunity to put it to practical use and subject it to test. To
accomplish this, it will be necessary for the Department of State to write
to the Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service, Department of the
Treasury, outlining the intended installation and its relative advantages
and request a decision whether or not such a olan would be in conflict
with any existing or proposed standards for Federal Government office
furniture.
2. Establish a Report Writing Roan in Several Locations in SA-1
E9uipped with Unit Office Plan Furniture.
As a minimum measure to improve facilities and as a further test of
the advantages offered by the unit office plan, establish Report Writing
Rooms in approximately 4 locations in SA-1. It is noted that DRW has
plans under way for the establishment of such a room in order to over?
come the problems enumerated throughout this Chapter.
The Report Writing Room, equipped with unit office plan furniture,
should afford a maximum of privacy and should include, in each space a
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dictating machine so that the analyst may prepare rough drafts and
organize his data and facts efficiently and expeditiously.
3. Provide Dictating Equipment for those Analysts Who 1111 Use
such Equipment ? and Encourage its Use.
The relatively high interest in the advantages offered by dictating
equipment has been indicated earlier. Some of tae analysts were under
the impression that di ctating equipment was re served for the higher
echelons of the R orga.nization.
It is recommended that dictating equipment be secured, that analysts
be indoctrinated in its use, and that it be made available to those who
indicate a desire to use the equipment. One of the frequent objections
to the use of dictating equipment is the lack of privacy that now exists.
However, modern dictating equipment does not require more than a. modulated
speaking voice.
Branch typists should be provided with transcribing machines to
service the analysts. However, as use and volume expands, consideration
should be given to economies that might result from the establishment of
a small Stenographic Pool in the Division of Executive Services to handle
peak loads and lengthy, low priority dictation. This pool can start out
small and expand as the use of dictating equipment expands.
A short training course for both the dictators and the transcribers
should be instituted (the company manufacturing the equipment will assist)
and specific problems of mechanical dictation involving the spelling of
foreign names, etc., should be dealt with at that time.
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Consideration should also be given to establishing dictating equip-
ment in LR so that the analysts using the ready reference service may
dictate extracts and excerpts.
As an indication of equipment costs under full implementation of
this proposal, and in accordance with our finding that about 25% of the
analysts could make immediate use of dictating equipment -
- 100 dictating units (Edison Voicewriter)
at $397.50 4 39,750
- 25 transcribing units (Edison) at $376.30 9.407
Full Implementation Cost $ 49,157
4, Management the R
In line with a previous observation concerning the need for a
definitive plan of facilities improvement, it is recommended that an over-
all plan be developed which would incorporate the following elements:
- A statement concerning the objectives of the R Space
Management Plan, i.e., to provide apace, facilities,
and equipment conducive to productive intelligence
research. This should be supported by specific state-
ments of actions. These might be:
a. The installation of the "Unit Office Plan' in one
branch of DRS;
b. The establishment of 4 Report Writing Rooms;
c. The establishment of a training-conference room in
SA-1;
d. The installation of dictating equipment in LR;
e. The reduction of the use of open shelving;
f. The improvement of lighting;
g. The improvement of ventilation;
h. A plan of periodic space surveys (in connection
with the "Persornel Requirements Analysis");
i. Etc., etc.
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? Schedule of action: the above specific actions should be
scheduled in terms of the date by which initial action and
final action should be taken.
? Institute a vigorous housekeeping program; this program,
inaugurated by an R Office Instruction, and supplemented by
periodic inspections is aimed at improving appearance by
reducing the cluttered appearance of tops of file cabinets,
bookcases, tables, shelves and binning, etc. The problem
of housekeeping cannot be solved except by continued effort
on the nart of the Space Officer.
? Provide floor plans and furniture templates: Maximum
assistance should be provided to the administrative officers
and branch chiefs in developing efficient office layouts
by the ready availability of floor plans and furniture
templates so that alternate space layouts may be developed
on paper prior to space moves and building alterations.
? Floor plans and templates are available now but apparently
the supply is not adequate. One administrative officer was
observed using crudely?drawn floor plan and marking desk
arrangements by pencil and not to scale.
The important element of the proposal enumerates abousis the setting
out of space objectives, actions, and schedules so that space management
personnel of the Department of State maybe continually appraised of the
needs of the R organization and will incorporate these requirements in
their budget estimates and in their program planning.
5. Expand the Responsibilities of the Space Officer (Division
of Executive Services).
A program of space management, in consonance with other administra?
tive programs, requires the establishment of responsibilities and
authorities and the exercise of imagination and leadership. The Space
Officer, proposed here as a member of the staff of the Division of
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Executive Services, should have authority to disapprove proposed space
arrangements and to develop alternate layouts when, in his judgment,
these layouts are more efficient and effective arvi more in keeping with
the space policies of the organization.
The Space Officer should have the following responsibilities:
a. The development and maintenance of the space management
plan for the R organization.
b. The scheduling of space and facility improvement actions.
c. Maintaining liaison with and representing the R organization
with space management personnel of Central Services, Department of State
and the Public Buildings Administration.
d. Advising and assisting operating officials in the development
of office layouts.
e. Reviewing and approving (or disapproving) office layout
plans submitted by operating officials in the R organization; and the
development of alternate and improved layouts.
f. Establishing and maintaining, through inspection, a house?
keeping program to enforce desirable standards of office appearance.
g. Developing and providing, upon request, floor plans and
furniture templates.
h. The development of office layout standards as they apply
to the R organization and the indoctrination of administrative officers
in their application.
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Summary of Recommendations
1. Install the unit office plan of office layout in one branch
of a research division as a test installation. Expand the
use of this equipment following appraisal of the test
installation.
2. Establish report writing rooms in several locations in SA-1
with unit office plan furniture and dictating equipment.
3. Provide dictating equipment for those analysts who will
demonstrate effective use. Establish a short training
course for dictators and transcribers to assure proper
operation and maximum use. Establish a Stenographic Pool
to provide transcription service when volume demonstrates
need. Consider placing dictating equipment in LR for
analyst use.
4. Develop a space management plan for the R organization
including:
a. A statement of Objectives and implementing
actions.
b. A schedule of action
c. A vigorous housekeeping program.
d. Regular assistance in developing efficient
office layouts.
56 Expand the responsibilities and authorities of the Space
Officer (Division of Executive Services).
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XIII. TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL
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XIII. TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL
Planning and control are salient features of sound administration
in any field of endeavor. The more suitable and effective the techniques
employed for planning and control the more efficient administration can
be made. The administration of intelligence is no exception. In fact,
,it is our conclusion that the highest contribution which administrative
skill can add to the professional standards and achievements of R is
the invention of tal techniques of planning and control. By way
of background to the presentation of the techniques developed during the
course of this study, consideration should be given to (l) the meaning
of these techniques in the context of Ills work, and (2) evidences
of the need for their application.
A - THE MEANING OF PLANNING AND CONTROL IN THE R AREA
The planning of R's work is concerned, in simple terms, with fore-
casting of the work to be accomplished, both self-initiated and user-
requested, for a future period. In its full development, planning should
encompass the identification of specific projects and services to be
performed both known and anticipated, and the estimation of requirements
in terms of manpower and information needed to support these activities*
Such forecasting and estimating must obviously occur in order for R to
function at all, though its timing can vary from a day-to-day basis
to projections into several months in the future; and its methodology
may vary from informal, unrecorded thinking to clearly-written, well-
documented statements*
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The control of RIB work is concerned with scheduling of the plan
regulating the rate and cost of production, and maintaining the quality
and usefulness of the final product. Control is represented by those
efforts applied by management in executing a work plan, which seek to
maintain standards of timeliness, cost, quality and utility; and which
search out failure in these respects in order that future improvements
can be made.
Obviously, ever- supervisor of R now plans and now controls his
work in some manner and in some degree. It is the purpose of this
chapter to assess the results of the efforts found, and to suggest
specific improvements in the most important area of R's work - the re-
search programs conducted in +DIR.
B - EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR IMFROVEL
PLANNING AND CONTROL
The need for improvements of this t-Te were expressed through
every avenue of appraisal employed during this study:
-Through the eyes of RIB consumers - In the Bureaus it was learned
that timeliness was the principal criticism of OIR production
generally. This reflects a weakness in scheduling output realisti-
cally and in meeting deadlines once established. From another
viewpoint, a majority of consumers strongly advocate closer work-
ing relationships so that the forward planning of UR!s work will
be more directly related to consumer interest and needs. (See
pages 9 and 13 of Volume I.) In the CIA, concern was expressed
not with the quality of Rfs NIS product but with the continued
Erficulties experienced in securing these products at an agreed
upon rate and man-hour cost.
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- Through the eyes of producers (the altITILL - Several strong
ications of the need were found. The uncertainty of the analyst
respecting the use made of his products would be materially allevi-
ated if, as fully as appropriate, R's products were planned to
meet user needs and delivered in time to contribute to ops rating
and policy deliberations. The overwhelming desire for fewer inter-
ruptions is another indication of the need for work planning which
will reduce the dispersion of tasks among the research force,
Several of the analysts interviewed spoke of the importance of
more precise definition of project scope and of more care in set-
ting realistic deadlines (factors which are closely related).
- Through the eyes of R's administrators came a variety of indica-
tions of the problem. Those responsible for budgets are aware of
the existence of unmet demands, well beyond the capacity of exist-
ing staff, but thsy have been unable to secure documented evidence
to support this need, since branches have not developed recorded
work plans and forecasts. The Special Assistant's Office has been
pressing for the introduction of comprehensive program planning
for two years. IVES has been endeavoring to develop a control
device in the form of the monthly Program Reporting Book, but has
found its product of doubtful value because of the lack of a
formulated plan for, and schedule of, work to be done against
which to measure accomplishment. PCS has endeavored to maintain
a central project control record but this record has not proved
to be a useful tool of control because of the partial compliance
of the research branches.
- Finally.: among those who pass upon budgets, both in the Department
and in the Bureau of the Budget? concern was found because there
is a lack of precisely stated work plans which give clear evidence
of full use of R's staff to meet valid requirements.
These expressions of dissatisfaction become significant when one
scrutinizes factually the results of present planning and control ef-
forts. It has been found that only one type of control is fully and
properly applied; that is, control over quality of written products.
In other respects planning is incomplete, and control is neglected.
A detailed discussion of present techniques is presented in Appendix
F from which the following observations are drawn:
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1. Program Planning of an Effective Type Is Now Performed for
Only a Portion of the Over-All Research Program in OIR.
Although the estimates and major studies coming under the surveil-
lance of the Estimates Group, and the production of the NIS progran,
are being planned for periods ahead, the remainder of the program of
intelligence production in OIR is devoid of a formal or clear scheme
of program planning and control. A substantial part of the research
program in R is thus without central or coordinated guidance. The
division and branch chiefs do a minimum of recorded planning. Most
meetings and reports throughout OIR, and even to the R level, appear
informational rather than action-getting in character. The-Program
Planning Guide does not substitute for specific advance planning on
the part of the OIR branches and divisionE. No effective effort is
made to plan the allocation of OIR's resources arainst the myriad of
requirements of varying nature: i. e., basic papers versus current
intelligence, intake versus output of intelligence, written versus
verbal product, etc. The same is true with rc?spect to the absence of
planning for the purpose of equitably allocating the resources of OIR
against the requirements of its several consumers, both within the
State Department and without. Except for the NIS activities, program
planning at the division and branch level is done primarily on an ad
hoc basis. Essentially, this means that it is carried in the head of
the branch chief, that it is governed more by expediency than judgment,
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and that there is a strong tendency to assume an obligation to produce
more than is possible with the resources at hand in terms of analysts,
man-hours. Lastly, the progress reports now prepared at the branch
and division levels have limited value as far as planning is concerned.
2. Production Control is the most Neglected Aspect of R's
Management.
This condition is revealed by the lack of attention to accurate
scheduling and vigorous expediting of OIR production, even with respect
to the NIS.
- During January the records of all open projects shown on the records
of PCS/IDR were examined. It was found that of 158 projects re-
corded: 55% were already behind schedule; 41% specified no scheduled
completion date; only 4% were not yet due. It is recognized that
some of the projects showing on these records may have been revised,
deferred or cancelled, but the absence of a current record is it-
? self an indication of a basic weakness in the functioning of RIB
project planning and control.
- During February a direct inventory of projects in process was taken
by PCS at our request. One hundred twenty seven items were reported,
but research divisions were able to report complete status data
(man-hour estimate and target completion date) for only 42% of the
projects (53 in total), again reflecting the lack of conscientiously
and consistently maintained production controls.
- For these 53 projects the "cost" estimate at the outset of the work
had been 186 man-hours (average for group). At the time of the
inventory, percentage completion was checked and it was found that
the present rate of production, the final expenditure will average
almost 360 man-hours - indicating that original estimates were
understated by 48%.
- The history of production under the NIS program reveals constant
failure either to establish realistic production objectives or to
meet objectives once established. The chart displayed on page 27
of Volume I shows that not once in 33 months has the production
quota been met (despite downward adjustments in quotas), and that
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percent of accomplishment by year has ranged from a low of 36.5% in
1950 to a high of 68% in 1951. A decline to h1.5% occurred during
the first nine months of fiscal year 1952. It is noteworthy that
this performance has occurred in a part of the program which is,
ostensibly, thoroughly planned and scheduled. The failure upon
analysis is found in the absence of management follow-through.
This 48 fully attested by the weak position in which the NIS Coor-
dinator finds himself - lacking clear authority to take action to
bolster production, and lacking participation along with other R
exec.2tives in the weekly senior and divisional staff meetings with
the special Assistant.
The fact that the planning and scheduling of Ris complicated work
program cannot be done by memory would appear self-evident from the
simple statistics of units of work produced (1,200 OIR written
products per year). The complexity of the task becomes even more
apparent when more detailed analysis is made of the highly variable
demands placed upon RIs productive capacity. At the division level
in OIR, and even more at the Director level, it becomes impractical
to have precise knowledge of the capacity available in each branch
or its ability to assume new projects or to produce those already
in process. The illustration appearing on page 27 of Volume I
compares the allocation of anal-st man-hours among four branches
where studies were made in collaboration with the branch chief.
Variations of over 300% were found in the percent of capacity
allocable to various functions (for example, the Northern and
'.lestern European Branch is currently allocating 17% of regular
program hours to NIB% an Mb while the African Branch is allocat-
ing 4%, DRS Foreign folitical 9%1 and Northeast Asia 13%).
3. The Forward Planning of Raw Material Requirements is Similarly
Incomplete Today.
The burden of responsibility for requirements planning must fall
in the first instance upon those who have the requirements; namely,
the OIR Divisions. But in the absence of adequate planning of end-
products to be accomplished in the future, relatively little require-
ments planning is being done by OIR. Few needs are anticipated. There
is no plan, scheme, or established technique by which OIR analysts
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are required (1) to think out their needs of the near or more distant
future in terms of program objectives, and (2) to list these needs in
order of relative importance. As a consequence, great reliance is
placed upon the routine flow of foreign reporting and publications pro-
curement from the field.
This statement is in no wuy a disparagement of the efforts being
made by the IAD Requirements Staff, CAB, CLE, LR, R/ES, and ENS, but
rather a clear indication of the basic handicaps under which all of
these efforts are being conducted. (DI in general appears an excep-
tion to this condition.)
Other evidences of the problems found in requirements planning
and the adequacy of acquisition results are:
- Deficiencies in foreign reportIng (many not susceptible of ready
solution), such as (1) insufficient and weak reporting on popular
attitudes and reactions; (2) inconsistency and lack of continuity
in reporting engendered by turnover of reporting officers; (3)
inadequate reporting in depth due either to lack of interest or
appreciation of its importance; (4) information too much from
capital city sources and higher government and social levels.
- The limited coverage of the Periodic Reporting Guide Program.
To date only 16 posts are being covered out of the approximately
70 to 80 which it would be advantageous to cover.
- Lack of definite or comprehensive evaluation programs for political
and sociological reporting both as regards individual posts and re-
ports.
- The fact that some information of significance received by Bureau
officials in conversations or official informals does not reach
OIR. This is recognized by bureau officials and personnel of the
S/S-Re
- The present Sensitive Room procedure, which deprives analysts of
some material.
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- The fact that publications procurement at various Foreign Service
posts requires more specific representation and improved coordina-
tion of efforts, so as to provide better follow-up on standing
procurement req:irements and more diligent procurement of general
publications (phone books, '.00k lists, official gazettes, etc.) on
a self-initiative basis.
C - RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FOR PLANNING
AND CONTROL
The direction and content of the research program must be governed
by some form of advance planning if the R organization is to anticipate
needs and respond adequately to valid demands. The tempo of research
and production of intelligence must be stimulated by the application
of realistic schedules. The progress of the research program must be
identified through current
formance reviews which can
by management. Attainment
control reports of a useful nature and per-
serve as the basis for
of these objectives is
corrective action
essential if R is
to develop greater stature and maturity and demonstrate an ability to
be as competent in "administrative" performance as it is now in pro-
fessional performancc.
With respect to planning and control, attainment of these objec-
tives poses several basic requirements which are summarized below:
1. Devote Attention to Production Planning and Control which is
as Vigorous and Competent as that Now Applied to the Profes-
sional Aspects of the Work.
From the point of view of sheer complexit-, the building of work
plans for research and which involve: pre-anal-sis of each project to
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define its scope and man-hour cost; the setting of an attainable com-
pletion schedule which is neither too tight nor too loose; and the
continuing evaluation of production progress require as high a degree
of creative imagination, of judgment, and of mental effort as does
the management of the professional aspects of the research task. In
fact, to the average professional mind these "necessary evils" of man-
agement may prove even more difficult, because they are foreign to
his skills or because they must be developed by trial and error. Thus,
unless R is milling to invest some of the time of its top executive
talent, substantive as well as non-substantive, little hope can be
held for improvement upon the incomplete or ineffective devices which
now exist. Chapter XIV will complete in detail the organizational frame-
work which we consider appropriate to Eta needs in relation to the
present size of the organization. At this point three of the elements
of the organization plan should be stressed:
a. Most important to the long-range success of strengthened
planning and control is the inclusion in each research division of a
top official who is fully and continuously responsible for applying
techniques of planning and control throughout his division. The posi-
tion is designated Assistant Chief (Production) in Chapter XIV,
b. Next is the need to invent and test techniques, to train
operating executives in their use, to inspect compliance with them,
and to report to management those obstacles which impair timely and
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economical performance at the branch and division level. It is pro-
posed in Chapter XIV that a substantively qualified officer be detached
from research responsibilities for an extended periodland assigned to
perform these creative tasks. This officer, occupying a top staff
position, will be known as the "Program Ylanning Coordinator."
c. Third, is the need for a top staff officer to devote
similar creative attention to devising the means by which more current
and detailed planning of raw data requirements can be accomplished and
to pioneer in the exploitation of new sources, including external re-
search. This officer, whose position is described in Chapter XIV, is
designated the "Requirements Planning Coordinator." Both he and his
associate on program planning will work primarily with and through the
Assistant Division Chiefs (Production).
Within the framework of organization established to provide tlis
more vigorous attention to planning and control should be included the
FIS Coordinators.
2. Install, as Quickly as Pilot Testing Has Been Conducted, a
Complete Production Planning and Scheduling Procedure.
Substantial time has been directed by our survey staff to the final
design of procedures and forms considered suitable to implement work-
able planning, scheduling, and progress reporting. Due to the detail
involved in this presentation it is separately presented as Appendix
G to this Volume. For ease of over-all understanding a description of
the plan is cited below, following the master flow chart appearing after
page la of Volume I.
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The full cycle of production planning and control has three distinct
phases:
- Phase One - Develoment of the Work Plan. It is proposed that once
every six months each branch chief be responsible for projecting
(1) his anticipated resources in terms of net analyst man-hours
and (2) the anticipated work load in man-hours. The work plan will
be supported by detailed schedules of individual projects and work
items to the fullest extent known and anticipated, and will include
necessary contingency allowances for such work as cannot be accurately
foreseen. In the development of the work plan, the branch chief
will have as his guides: directions from the Special Assistant,
the EG Program Planning Guide and other instructions, "support
program" commitments, and established commitments to customers.
To these will be added the branch chiefs anticipations of both
self-initiated and user-requested products and services.
fhaReTH2_:_lle2ifIL_Adly.p_tlfnt? and Approval of the Plan. Follow-
ritan-Lya-aa---compliationof the six-month branch plan, a regular
scheme of reviews should occur leading to final approval by the
Special Assistant or his designated representative. The review
procedure should bring to bear three viewpoints. First, the
?
consumer(s) should be consulted regarding the specific components
of direct interest, and should be given a perspective of the total
demands upon the branchls time - this should include "consumers"
within R itself, including DFI, CPI, etc. Second, management should
be presented the plan as, finally recommended by the branch chief.
For this purpose, it is suggested that a meeting of the Estimates
Group be set aside to review the plan with the branch chief con-
cerned. To this meeting should be invited the Deputy Special As-
sistant, the Chief of IAD, and one or more of the top staff officials
concerned with production planning techniques. Finally, then, the
plan as approved by the Director, OIR? should be submitted to top
management for approval.
- Phase Three - Administration of the Plan, The first two phases
will take place in the month immediately preceding the beginning
of the period covered by the plan. In total time, it is antici-
pated that the branch chief will spend approximately one day in
preparing the plan and one more in the approval stages. To stagger
the work of management in approval stages, it is proposed that a
schedule be established which will bring one plan up for approval
each week.
The work plan (for which all forms are illustrated in Appendix G)
provides the basis for focusing the thought of all interested people
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on the work' to which the branch should address itself during the
coming six months, and for resolving in advance any anticipated
priority conflicts, it will lead also to steps required to resolve
staffing problems (surpluses or deficits) in advance. After ap-
proval by top managewent, the branch chief is provided a concrete
basis for applying meaningful controls to his work output as ex-
plained below.
3. Develop From the Approved Work Plan e Specific Man-Hour
Objective and Time Schedule foi' 1:ach Project.
The approved work plan produced from the above efforts may fare
no better than present NIS work plans, or become little more meaningful
as a production control than the Program }laming nuide if, at this point,
it is filed. Thus, an immediate translation of the plan into a form
suitable for week-to-week produe,uon control should be accomplished by
the end of the first week of the new 6-month period. To this end, the
branch chief with the assistance and advice of the Assistant Division
Chief (Production) should take the following steps:
a. Prepare a project schedule showing for each identified
project - (1) the approximate starting date and the target completion
date for the project and (2) a reasonable estimate of man-hours to
be expended, based (in so far as possible) upon the specific analyst(s)
to be assigned. In this connection, Appendix 0 suggests the use of a
scheduling guide from which the net man-hours available for written
products, by analyst, may be determined.
b. The above decisions, based upon realistic consideration
of the scope of the project and the difficulties which may be encountered
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in its execution, should then be recorded on the CIR Work Jacket illustrated
in Appendix G. This jacket should take the form of a simplified card
record which can be filed for fast reference in a visible book-type
file.
c. Each week the branch secretary or other clerical assist-
ant designated should obtain from each analyst a report of man-hours
expended against each project. These data will be posted immediately
to the record sheet of the project work jacket, and the complete record
of each project made available for review-by the branch chief. In this
manner, immediate knowledge will be obtained of the progress being made
against the initial man-hour objective and target completion date. As
quickly as it becomes apparent that either of these objectives cannot
be met, the branch chief should act to revise the objectives in con-
sultation with the analyst, or take other steps to recover the lost
time.
d. At the end of each month, a simple summary of project
status visualizing projects which are .falling behind schedule, those
which have been deferred, as well as those which have been added to
the original plan, should be compiled and furnished to the Assistant
Division Chief for study. In accordance with the plan described and
illustrated in Appendix 0, this report should likewise be furnished
for information purposes to higher management levels,
e. Once each quarter, the branch chief should compile a
summary report of performance against the approved work plan and compute
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ratios of effectiveness to reflect the extent to which both man-hour
and completion date objectives are being met on an over-all basis.
This report should likewise be furnished to higher management where
one of its uses will be the preparation of consolidated branch compari-
sonsfbr studybythe Director, OIR? and the Special Assistant.
The above steps (b. through e.) will le continuing and will cause
the branch chief to focus attention at least once each week, each month,
and each quarter upon the accuracy and realism of his production plan-
ning. It should be stressed that while top management will be given
new channels of meaningful communication with the producing organiza-
tion, the most important benefits of the control will be achieved at
the branch and division levels where prompt action should be taken to
correct poor performance as well as to recognize good performance.
4. Utilize Work Planning and Control Data in Developing Budget
Presentations and in Allocating Rts Manpower and Financial
Resources.
Rts budget presentation has apparently been excellent, as the
response in the Legislative Branch has demonstrated. We believe that
this presentation can be bolstered still further following the intro-
duction of production planning and control:
- The story of production planning and control can itself offer
dramatic proof of the judicious use of funds. The long experience
of business provides ample evidence of the effectiveness of plan-
ning and scheduling as a tool of cost control. This benefit
arises from the same principle which Government had long applied
in the setting of ceilings covering manpower and expenditures.
The control plan adopts this principle by applying a time ceiling
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to R's production and recognizes the fact that any individual or
group will achieve a higher e.andard of performance when a clearly
established goal, capable of attainment, is set by management and
strongly administered.
Work load projection based upon the experience of work planning
should provide a more exact basis of demonstrating the resources
required to meet valid demands, as well as to reveal the extent
of unmet demands.
It is therefore urged that the Program Planning Coordinator col-
laborate closely with those responsible for budget preparation and
presentation, so that his knowledge of work load requirements and pro-
duction capacity can be appropriately reflected in budget planning.
Similarly, it should be found that, at shorter range, top manage-
ment decisions regarding the most logical division of R's resources
within established ceilings can be developed from the more precise
knowledge of work load. Such data will be divulged from approved work
plans and current status reports. Here again the Program Planning
Coordinator should be called upon to furnish top management with state-
ments of known and projected work load, thus providing one important
basis for reaching final determinations with respect to the allocation
of resources. (It should be emphasized that the Program Planning Co-
ordinator does not make such decisions as these, but simply contributes
useful information for the guidance of management.)
5. Utilize the Approved Work Plan as a Primary Basis for the
Forward Planning of Raw Intelligence Requirements in each
Branch.
A significant problem in OIR is expressed by the opinion of one
branch chief who stated to us, "The average ?IR branch neglects the
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field posts on specific things with respect to projects anticipated,
until it is too late to get the information needed." Another recom-
mended that more emphasis be placed throughout OIR on advance planning
of requirements in order that branches will know, "What they have and
what they are asking for."
Our analysis demonstrates that these recognized weaknesses spring
from the absence of simple procedures which require that a systematic
approach be taken to anticipating requirements and initiating requests
in specific terms, well in advance of the need. Our work with branch
chiefs, in testing the work planning technique described earlier, in-
dicates that the foundation for requirements planning will not exist
in precise terms until a regular cycle of work planning in each branch
has been inaugurated.
In concept, a workable scheme of raw intelligence requirements
planning based upon approved work plans should proceed as follows:
- Within 30 days after approval of the six-month work plan,
statements of foreseeable raw materials needs should be in the
hands of IAD.
- To accomplish this objective, each analyst should be requested
to develop in rough outline a statement of the basic material
required for each future project tentatively assigned to him.
- Using this rough outline as a guide, the analyst or his research
aide should conduct promptly a review of holdings to identify gaps
or the need for bringing information up to date. This review would
be directed primarily toward branch files but should not be re-
stricted thereto, since IR, CAB, CLB and external research resources
(as examples) may afford some of the data required,
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- Upon completion of this review, "desiderata lists" should be pre-
pared and forwarded by the branch chief to IAD, with suggestions
as to sources. (It should he noted that needs must be tailored
to the source by framing requests in accordance with the capabil-
ities of individual sources and the relative availability of data.
In one location data may be easily obtainable, which in another
requires extensive research. A program for the training of analysts
in this aspect of acquisition might be an important responsibility
of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.)
6. Delegate to the Requirements Planning Coordinator Responsi-
bility for Continuing Study of New and More Productive Devices
TOT-Planning and Procuring Ray Material Requirements.
The introduction of procedures designed to produce specific lists
of requirements, at intervals of at least 6 months, is the most import-
ant first step in overcoming present problems. In this step the Require-
ments Planning Coordinator is concerned only with perfecting procedures
and issuing instructional material to the branches. He is not concerned
? with the direct procurement nor should he be in the flaw of requirements
requisitions between the branches and IAD.
However, a number of important efforts now under way in R should
be integrated under the jurisdiction of this top staff officer and
brought to a higher degree of usefulness. These include:
- Continuing study should be made of desiderata lists and the basic
continuing requirements of each branch to identify types of needs
which may be more economically or adequately satisfied from external
research. While a policy has existed with respect to permitting
the exploitation of external research for NIS production, we have
not found a concerted effort to implement it. While our knowledge is
insufficient to support a conclusion as to the fruitfulness of this
resource, the fact of its small use by RI and the decided lack of
interest encountered among the research branches, causes us to
feel that a better organized exploration of its potentialities
should be made.
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- An appraisal of the periodic reporting guides and the report eval-
uations now prepared by the branches and transmitted by IAD should
be undertaken, with the view to extending their coverage and utility.
- A periodic appraisal of the adequacy of reporting by posts should be
conducted by the branches under the sponsorship of the Requirements
Planning Coordinator. These evaluations, similar in content to
past excellent but linited efforts, should be transmitted to the
cognizant Bureaus by the Coordinator, whose task it should be to
work with appropriate Bureau officials in strengthening weaknesses
revealed.
- The present program regarding Foreign Service relations, now lodged
in R/ES, should be continued under the direction of the Requirements
Planning Coordinator.
- An effort should be made to secure the designation at each major
post of a person responsible for specific attention to, and coordina-
tion of, publications procurement.
Summary of Recommendations
Concerning Planning and Control
1. Devote attention to production planning and control which is as
vigorous and competent as that now applied to the professional as-
pects of the work.
2. Install, as quickly as pilot testing has been conducted, a complete
production planning and scheduling procedure, as outlined in detail
in Appendix G.
3. Develop from the approved work plan a specific man-hour objective
and time schedule for each project.
14.
Utilize work planning and control data in developing budget presenta-
tions and in Allocating Ris manpower and financial resources.
5. Utilize the approved work plan as a primary basis for the forward
planning of raw intelligence requirements in each branch.
6. Delegate to the requirements planning coordinator responsibility
for continuing study of new and more productive devices for plan-
ning and procuring raw material requirements.
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XIV. THREE APPROACHES TO STRONGER ORGANIZATION
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XIV - THREE APPROACHES TO STRONGER ORGANIZATION
The task of managing the R Area is among the most complex which
has been encountered in studies of organizations of all types. This
results not only from factors of physical size and the diversity of
tasks performed, but from phenomena which are present in highly pro-
fessional environments. These characteristics are worth noting as'',
a preliminary to the discussion which follows:
- First, the R organization is staffed preponderantly by profes-
sional personnel - mature minds having a high level of individual
competence. Such personnel does not require nmanagementil in the
conventional sense of highly structured organization, where the
physical flaw of work is the most important attribute.
- Second, by the very reason of the individuality of his work
habits and the level of his professional competence, the profes-
sional naturally resists the regimentation of organization and
of a highly routinized atmosphere. This is merely to say that
the art of managing professional groups must first allow a maximum
of initiative and autonomy to the individual and still find ways
in which to regulate the administrative aspects of the work so
that they will be conducive to timely and economical performance.
- Third, those who attain positions of management, being themselves
professionals, are inclined to disdain the administrative para-
phernalia due to the obviously secondary role of such devices
in producing the end product.
- Fourth, the techniques of managing professional organizations
are perhaps the least developed since the engineers and technicians
of management have concentrated their efforts on the more obvious
and solvable problems of large industrial and office-type opera-
tions.
With this background of understanding it must be observed that
the top management of the R. Area has achieved remarkable results in
maintaining an esprit de corps and & quality of production of which
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more readil,, malaged enterprises, either in government or outside,
would be justly proud.
A - EVIDENCES OF TIP. NEED FOR STRONGER ORGANIZATION
Revisions which have been found desirable in the R organization
are concerned only in minor degree with questions of organization
structure. The hard core of the organization - represented by its
nine divisions and their component branches - is considered sound
and logical. Shifting and regrouping of functions within this basic
framework will take place from time to time, but these are adjustments
of a routine charlcter which internal management is usudly more com-
petent to prescribe than managementanatrsts. They represent, with
few exceptions, areas of small consequtnce in this inquiry. The
locale of this dircussion is thus in the upper reaches of the organi-
zation, where the issues to be resolved revolve around the objectives
and functions of individual executives. In essence, then, we are con-
cerned with the matters to which the executives devote their time,
and with the relative Triority which has been attached to the individ-
ual drties performed. The basic findings of this report reveal a
series of needs to which insufficient priority is now attached:
- The need to improve consumer relations. This is revealed dramat-
ically through our interviews with 224 departmental customers,
and through more limited contacts in outside a-encies which arb
users of RIB products (CIA, Military, PSB, etc.). The oppor-
tunities for improved service are impressive in every Bureau.
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B's management team currently provides no central executive to devote
continuing attention to this vital aspsct of top management.
- The need to im rove the napsentationn and distribution of Rfs
products, Closely related to the first need is that for more
firsthand study of techniques through which the readability of
the product can be increased, and its utilization improved through
more accurate distribution and seourity classification practices.
- The need to improve the use of the time and skills of professional
staff. The branch level, s the basic producing organization, re-
quires an intensity of current scrutiny by top management comparable
to that which production management in an industrial concern main-
tains over its plant and key production facilities. This means fre-
quent contacts by firsthand Observation of operations and the nopera-
tors.n Due to the absence of such participation by top management,
conditions now exist which unnecessarily dissipate the time and
energies of the professional staff. In view of the scarcity of
? trained analytical skill, such conditions should not be tolerated.
It must be constantly recalled by top management that were it not
for its professional staff, R itself could not exist.
- The need for workable techniques of work planning, production
scheduling and control. With the exception of the top priority
program and the NIS (where strong compulsion of an external nature
exists) formal procedures of planning, scheduling, and controlling
output have not been devised. In this sphere of management there
has been an obvious restraint, due perhaps to an unwillingness
to "interfere" in the opera-ions of the branches, or to impose
controls which might cause Irritation or which might result in
meaningless and time-consuming routines. Controls in the profes-
sional atmosphere are necessarily dependent upon unusual judgment,
imagination, and versatility of administration. They require
time and exceptional ingenuity to apply. The present management
organization does not make such time available. The absence Of
production controls is the principal contributing factor in the
tardiness of Rfs work, and underlies many of the complaints voiced
by consumers, analysts, management officials in R and budget execu-
tives.
These points are developed at length and with documentation in
Volume I of this report and in the applicable chapters of Volume II
(especially Chapters II, III, TV, V, VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIII).
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B - THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
Before attempting to prescribe the stein believed necessary to
satisfy the foregoing needs, it is advisable to inquire more deeply
into the conditions which permit these needs to go unanswered in the
present organization. The specific conditions cited are obviously
symptoms of basic weaknesses in Rs present approach ,to? and philosophy
of, top management. Fundamentally, we believe that there are three
root causes of the problem.
1. The Role of Staff Executives Has Not Been Given Full Recog-
nition in the Top Management Organization.
Upon analysis it has been found that the tasks of top management
in the R Area are of four types, two of which must be exercised by line
command, and two of which are staff in nature:
- Policy Management (line) is that direction which must flow from
the Special :.ssistant based upon his continuing personal contacts
with the principal policy officials of the Department of State and
the IAC agencies. It is the prerogative and responsibility of
those responsible for policy direction to specify, in broad terms,
what is to be done, for whom, and in what general order of priority,
TETE setting the objWaives and defining 'the mission of the organ-
ization.
- Professional Management (line) is that direction which dictates
the specific content of work to be undertaken, decides when, haw,
and 121 whom it shall be accomplished, and apprises haw well tEr
professional task is performed. It must be the prerogative of
professional management to govern completely the selection of pro-
fessional staff and their assignments. It is only this level of
management which can exercise final approval over the specific
nature, and p4ority of performance, of individual products and
services.
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- Control Management (staff) means the planning and introduction of
techniques required to develop meaningful work plans; estimates
of man-hours required for the completion of individual projects;
calendar date completion schedules.' standards for the presentation
and distribution of products; procedures for the formrd planning
of raw material requirements; and constructive plans for the ex-
ploitation and cultivation of raw material sources (including
foreign posts and external research). Control Management is gen-
erally concerned with how useful is the product, and how adequate4.
are Fits resources being employea in relation to the demand for and
use of its products and services. It must be the prerogative of
Control Management to develop and test techniques and procedures,
and, after their approval by policy and professional management,
to conduct continuing study of their use, to ascertain their work-
ability and evaluate the adequacy of compliance of working level
supervisors. It must also be the responsibility of Control
Management to ascertain, by appropriate survey, the usefulness of
Rts products, and to search out means of improving their usefulness.
It is not, however, within the prerogative of Control Management
to make or control decisions regarding the content of the work pro-
gram or to appraise the quality of workmanship beyond its form
and style.
- Services Management (staff) means the administration of all of
those functions which support the research function, as well
as those which support policy and operating officials elsewhere
in the Department and outside of the Department. It is not only
the obligation of Services Management to administer the service
operations themselves in the full line sense, but also to take
leadership in identifying ways in which support services can render
more valuable and time-conserving support to the research divisions*
These services include those concerned with (1) intelligence ac-
quisition and distribution, including publications, (2) library
and reference services, (3) executive-type services including
budget, personnel, reproduction, and general housekeeping.
A study of Rts top structure reveals that Policy Management
and Professional Management are the most strongly implemented, al-
though there are opportunities for stronger relationships with top
policy officials, and leaders in the Community, with respect to plan-
ning and assessing the major program of research and estimates.
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It is in the area of functions performed by the so-called staff
executives that weakness is encountereds
a. Control Management in the regular program area is not
formally applied. The staff which is presumably responsible (PCS) lacks
stature, support, and acceptance. As a consequence there does not exist
a current record of all research work in progress, nor do the branches
themselves hare up-to-date facts available regarding the status of in-
dividual projects, or the time required to complete them. Forward
planning is accomplished primarily through the informal device of the
"branch chieffs memory."
In the case of the NIS program the machinery of control has been
highly developed under the compulsion of an external agency, however,
follow-through suffers from lack of line management support and the
inability of the NIS Coordinator to insist upon compliance with
schedules.
b. Services Management) while completely covered in the
top structure, suffers from two handicaps: (1) responsibility is di-
vided among three staff executives (R/ES, OLI and PCS), (2) since these
efforts do not receive complete support and acceptance at the level of
the research branch, they tend to function (in varying degrees) more
as fiends in themselvesn rather than in intimate support of the end-
producers. Our intensive interviews with research analysts divulged
the fact that contacts with the services area are remote, and that
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there is insufficient recognition of their mission as providers of direct
support. Similarly, the administrative officers within the divisions tend
to move in a very restricted management sphere being identified more with
the "red?tape" aspects of governmental administration than with their
role as contributors to the essential work program of the branches.
In summary, then, it has been found that line management (policy
and professional) has not recognized sufficiently the vital part which
staff management (control and services) should play, and has placed
those responsible for control and service in positions which deprive them
of proper standing and acceptance. This results in an underutilization
of the capacity of those occupying, top staff positions and reduces their
contribution to the full utilization of the professional staff. If this
situation is allowed to continue, it may cause a progressive deteriora?
tion in the vigor of these functions.
2. The Impact of Both Iine and Staff Management is Weakened
by the Loose?Knit Structure of Top Management, and by the
Excessive Demands of Duties Other Than Those Concerned with
Supervision of Subordinates.
Our analysis of the daily diaries kept by key executives for
one week* reveals the paucity of time available for the conventional
management task of working directly with subordinates. It was found
. that on an average no more than 20 percent of total executive effort
is assignable to this participation. In the case of the two top
*While one week represents a brief test period, the principal finding
cited has been confirmed with the executives concerned as being an
important lack in the present organization.
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executives, even this time must be spread thinly over special management
matters in the "front office" not directly associated with the administra-
tion of the three office Directors. It was next found that the most
important Office Director (OIR) is overburdened with 14 direct reporting
relationships, all of which are producing functions, and that his
calendar currently leaves little time available for that phase of
management described above as Control Management. It was found that
the demands which consume his time are largely in the phase described
as Professional Management.
The Director of IVES exercises his impact largely at the Office
level except as his line of communication with administrative officers
gives him an entre into the divisions. Since, however, the administra-
tive officer tends to operate in a circumscribed sphere, this line of
communication becomes rather tenuous at the branch level.
The Director of OLI finds himself in a somewhat more fortunate
position in top management in that he has three manageable and well-
supervised divisions reporting to him, none of whose work programs
approaches the complexity of those found in OIR. However, his impact
at the "end-production level" - the research branch - is also 1s
than desirable because his divisions do not enjoy uniform acceptance
among the research branches.
The reality of the above comments can only be appreciated by an
outsider who has enjoyed the unique opportunity afforded us of
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developing an intimate acquaintanceship with the key personnel of the
branch organizations.
3. The Channels of Communication Among Rts Top Management Do Not
Stimulate a Collective Awareness of Current Problems or Compel
Attention and Action.
As indicated in Volume I (pages 28 and 29) every component of the
top management structure can make a broader or more effective contribu-
tion to R's basic work progran. Particular attention is called in Volume
I to nine components:
- The Special Assistant's Office
- The Director, R/ES and Staff
- The Director, OIR
- The Director, OLI
- The Estimates Group
- The NIS Coordinator
- The Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence
- The External Research Staff
- The Production Control Staff.
None of the comments cited in this inventory are new since each was
called to our attention by one or more members of the top management
team. However, a long-range program of actions to take advantage of
these opportunities was not found. The reasons for this seeming omis-
sion became apparent when the top management structure is observed
at close range:
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- There is missing in the top echelon a "firm hand" with time and
opportunity to keep intimately-but objectively informed of the
strengths and weaknesses at the Office level and below. The
physical separation of the Special Assistant and his Deputy from
SA-1 creates a break in the channel of communications which weakens
the intensity of Policy Management and in large measure places the
"front office" on a rather remote pinnacle. To a lesser but none
the less distinct degree, the sixth floor of SA-11 where the Of-
fice Directors are concentrated, has a similar aura in the eyes
of the divisions and branches.
- Devices of communication have not been perfected to overcome
the factors of distance and separateness. The two weekly staff
meetings and the reports to R appear to serve more to inform the
Special iLssistant, and perhaps to reassure him that "all is well,"
than to cast up problems of which top management should have
knowledge in order to plan and direct corrective action.
- Despite the harmony and democratic 'partnership atmosphere" in R
top management, there is too little challenging of policies and
practices, too little of the sharp "intramural" debate over better
methods of management which fosters improvement in the successful
business partnership. The avoidance of the possible conflicts
which a forthright policy of self-improvement might engender is
an incongruity in the philosophy which the R Area brings to its
substantive tasks. Here there is no lack of articulation in
challenging the validity of facts and in taking sharp issue with
conclusions which appear incomplete or inaccurate.
Thus, as fundamental as any of the causes of R's organizational
problems is the absence of a philosophy which compels continuing self-
appraisal, designed to give forceful recognition to current problems
and to seek out sound and sufficient correctives. These observations
can be made in greater or lesser degree of the majority of organized
groups. One is caused to make them with greater emphasis regarding
R because this organization has so abundantly, within itself, the com-
petence to achieve and maintain a superiority of performance not ex-
pected of the average.
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In reviewing the steps which can be taken to strengthen the organ-
ization of R to overcame the picblems presented, three types of im-
provement have been found worthy of consideration: First, strengthened
Control Management; second, strengthened Services Management; third,
maximum participation of Pll management elements. Each of these approaches
is considered separately in the following:
FIRST APPROACH:
STEPS TO STRENGTHEN CONTROL MANAGEMENT
The greatest immediate benefits to the R Area, and its customers,
will result from a series of simple steps leading to the introduction
of the machinery of control and to its diligent application by the best-
qualified members of management who can be made available for these
tasks. At the outset, and for a period of one to two years it will
be necessary to apply top substantive talent to these tasks because
they will involve acts of creativeness beyond the ken of those who
have not demonstrated their prowess as substantive producers, and be-
cause there is a deep-seated skepticism, and resulting inertia, due
to past failures in the application of controls.
Five principal steps are recommended:
1. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the Top Program and Quality
Control Arm of the Director of Intelligence Research.
The Professional Management side of Ills structure has been found
strong and effective, with no dearth of attention to quality control
from the Office Director himself to the branch chief level. Several
refinements have been identified which, it is felt, will contribute
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still greater strength to the excellent performance of the Estimates
Group:
a, Appoint all of those who serve in the capacity of "In-
telligence Consultants" to membership on the Estimates Group, as dis-
cussed in Chapter II. This will include a31 present division chiefs,
plus the consultants designated for the functional areas, (S/P, El
P, IIA, TCA). This additional function of the substantive leaders of
the R Area should bring to the Estimates Group much more direct,
current, and authentic knowledge of top policy views and intelligence
needs.
b. Devote one meeting period of the Estimates Group each
week to review and discussion of a branch work plan as described in
Chapter XIII. We agree wholeheartedly with the view of the Director,
OIR, that "planning is a live thing that must feed continuously on
operation, and distill continuously from the minds of active staff
practitioners, not from sideline staff observers." We thus urge
that each work plan, as developed by the branch and division chiefs
immediate17, concerned, be brought before the full EG - which for
this purpose will convert itself into a "Program Review Group" - so
that the experience of the complete corps of "active staff practi-
tioners" can be applied with intensity to the formulation of the work
program of each branch. This additional use of the EG should involve
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.??????
little if any more effort by the division chiefs as participants on
the EG and it should in no way approach the establishment of a "think-
box" remote from operations.
c. Assign the Current Intelligence Coordinator to the Estimates
Group, for the reasons discussed in Chapter VI. Since this is a sub-
stantive control which should exercise stronger, rather than less,
leadership and coordination of current intelligence production, its
stature should be substantially enhanced by inclusion as a component
function of the EG. This does not mean that current intelligence
products should individually be reviewed and discussed by the assembled
staff of the EG but rather that the EG now will become a staff with
more than one vehicle of action: the assembled group for program re-
view and estimates production; the Current Intelligence Coordinator
as an individual coordinator of this particular phase of production.
It would appear logical and desirable for the Coordinator to partici-
pate with the assembled group during its review of the branch work
plans.
d. Consider the establishment of a new staff function on
the Estimates Group to be performed by an "Intelligence Evaluation
Officer." This Officer would devote his principal efforts* to test-
ing the accuracy of R's estimates, projections and major interpretations
*It is difficult to foretell the time required to perform this func-
tion. Hawever? it is not considered to require a full-time incumbent
on a continuing basis. This might be an additional responsibility
of the EG Secretary and the Current Intelligence Coordinatar.
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from anhindsight" point of view, and to reporting his findings to the
assembled EG from time to time. In this manner R can constantly look
for errors of interpretation and judgment in its most important products
and profit by the lessons of experience.
e. As a final step in strengthening participation of the
EG? consideration is suggested to creating the post of "Vice Chairmaa"
whose duties would include those of Deputy Director, OIR? and Intelli-
gence Consultant to the S/P. This combination of duties would, it is
believed, achieve a more realistic and productive assignment of responsi-
bilities than that which now prevails.
2. Establish a New Staff Su lantin PCS to Devel Techni ues
?
and Proc;-?ures for Work lanning and Scheduling, and to Keep
TeirThmeffi.oUiningler Continuing Scrutiny.
Control Management in an organization such as R is weak because
practical mechanics of planning, scheduling, and progress reporting
have not been perfected in professional organizations Fenerally, nor
in many industrial operations where the end-product is custom-made
(job shop operations often suffer from this same weakness). There is
one simple explanation for these failures. The assumption has been
made by professional and craft groups that because their skills are
unique and personalized, and because so many work variables are present,
the adaptation of planning and control techniques, such as those used
in production-line operations, is impractical. With the qualification
expressed in this assumption (production-line techniques) there can
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be no disagreement, in our experience. However, experience has proved
that the assumption in other respects is incorrect and that the very
existence of variables makes a planned approach to research production
all the more essential, in order (1) to minimize the impact of these
variables on meeting deadlines and on performing the admittedly diffi-
cult act of research with a minimum of wasted effort, and (2) to
assure that manpower resources are uniformly applied to the import-
ant aspects of the program.
The starting point in R for developing a successful plan of Con-
trol Management is the creation of mechanics which will make possible
the preparation of meaningful plans and schedules by line management.
A discussion of the principles and the format of planning mechanics
has been presented in Chapter XIII. This chapter (Chapter XIV) is
concerned with the contribution that organization can make to this goal.
In summary, it is proposed that an integrated staff be created, as
illustrated in the accompanying exhibit (XIV-1), consisting of
^ The Director of Production Coordination (a position partially
represented by the Chief, PCS).
- The Program Planning Coordinator (a position partially represented
by the Program Planning Officer of PCS).
- The NIS Coordinator (an existing position).
- The Requirements Planning Coordinator (a function which is present
today in partial form in IAD, ERS, and the IL/ES Foreign Service
Relations Program).
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- The Consumer Relations Coordinator (a position presumably provided
among the responsibilities of the Intelligence Advisers).
In more detail, the functions of these top-level staff officers should
be as follows:
a. The Program Planning Coordinator working directly with
research divisions, will (1) prepare the final formulation of the work-
planning procedures outlined in Chapter XIII; (2) maintain a consoli-
dated file of approved work plane in order to prepare comparisons and
analyses of the distribution of analyst man-hours by branches and
composite statements of surplus and deficit man-hours by branch; (3)
receive information copies of the prescribed monthly and quarterly
branch performance reports in order to draw observations regarding
recurring cases of missed deadlines and inaccurate man-hour estimates;
ana also to produce consolidated summaries in a form resembling the
"Program Reporting Book;" (4) develop yardsticks for the guidance ar
branches in establishing meaningful man-hour estimates and completion
date schedules; (5) devote continuing attention to the mechanics (forms,
files, reports) used in planning and scheduling in order to maintain
simplicity but assure utility; (6) collaborate with budget officials in
planning budget presentations and assist top malagement in developing
plans for the allocation of manpower and finalcial resources. This
Officer should have assistance at least equivalent to that now assigned
for the preparation of the Program Reporting Book. It is desirable
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CHANGES PROPOSED IN PRESENT STAFFS
1. Disband PCS and
A. Transfer Current Intelligence Coordinator to EG
B. Transfer IDR to RIES
C. Transfer ticker room to IAD
D. Transfer Distribution and Classification Control to
Consumer Relations Coordinator.
E. Supplant Program Planning Officer by Program Planning
Coordinator
2. Disband ERS and
A. Transfer Contract Coordination to IAD
B. Transfer Index Record to LR
C. Transfer promotional work and Development of research
projects to Requirements Planning Coordinator.
3. Transfer foreign service relations program from RIES to
Requirements Planning Coordinator
THE STAFF OF THE PRODUCTION COORDINATOR
DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF PRODUCTION COORDINATION
1. Gives creative guidance to the four coordinators.
2. Conducts regular meetings with each Assistant.
Chief (production) to examine in detail the application
of planning, scheduling, reporting.
3. Attends weekly EG program review meeting to audit
work planning, scheduling, reporting procedures.
2
PROGRAM PLANNING
COORDINATOR
1. Designs procedures, forms and
instruction material covering work
planning, scheduling and progress
reporting.
2. Makes consolidated comparisons
and analyses of work plans and
progress reports and submits monthly
to management.
3. Develops yardsticks for project
estimating and scheduling.
4. Makes continuing studies of most
suitable forms, files and reports for
planning and scheduling.
Coordinator (1)
Reports Analyst (1)
(Clerical Staff)
4
NIS COORDINATOR
Performs present functions without
change. If not included in the
office of Production Coordination,
the NIS Coordinator should be
treated as another "production"
activity by the Director of Production
Coordination.
Coordinator (1)
Deputy Coordinator (1)
Chief Review Officer (1)
Graphics Coordinator (1)
(Other Staff)
ASSISTANT DIVISION
CHIEFS FOR
PRODUCTION
4
REQUIREMENTS PLANNING
COORDINATOR
1. Develops procedures, forms and
instruction material for the
conversion of approved work
plans into "desiderata lists"
of future needs.
2. Analyzes lists to identify need
? for new or more adequate sources.
3. Studies reporting guides and report
evaluations to develop improved
techniques Sponsors annual
appraisal of reporting from each
post.
4. Continues foreign service relations
program.
5. Cultivates sources of external re-
search and continues efforts to
apply to R's needs.
Coordinator (1)
Assistant, External Research (1)
Assistant, Techniques, Guides
and Evaluations (I)
Assistant, Foreign Service Relations
Program (1)
(Clerical Staff)
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CONSUMER RELRTiONS
COORDINATOR
I. Conducts periodic audits of con-
sumer reaction to evaluate ac-
ceptance and sufficiency of R's
services to customers.
2. Works with line management in
improving services.
3. Administers audits of the classi-
fication and distribution of individ-
ual reports, and works with Bureaus
to secure proper distribution.
4. Establishes standards of style and
format and prepares instruction
material to guide editors and
analysts.
Coordinator (1)
Classification Control Officer (1)
Distribution Review Officer (I)
Editorial Standards Officer (1)
(Clerical Staff)
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that he be a professionally trained research andyst selected for imagina-
tion in the administrative aspects of rese4rch production.
b. The NIS Coordinator is the present staff in its entirety.
Its present functions, including those of a substantive review and pro-
duction character, are included as part of the Control Management for
two reasons: (1) The primary problem found in the administration of
NIS has been continued weakness in production control - missed dead-
lines, inaccurate man-hour scheduling, and unrealistic completion
dates, (2) The substantive aspects of the program appear of minor con-
cern to the Director, OIR, today. If it is concluded by the Special
Assistant that the NIS coordination function should remain under line
management, it is then proposed that the staff be treated as a produc-
tion organization and subjected to the same techniques of planning,
scheduling, and progress reporting as those developed by the Program
Planning Coordinator for other production efforts.
c. The Requirements Planning Coordinator. As discussed
in Chapter XIII, the missing element in the present efforts of IAD
and ERS is not lack of recognition of the need for planned procurement
or failure to assign qualified specialists to the planning task.
Rather there does not exist a practical methodology for accomplishing
this planning regularly, systematically, and imaginatively. Neither
IAD nor R/ES can actually do the planning of requirements in a com-
plete and systematic sense because requirements must flow from the
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research people themselves - the consumers of raw intelligence. But
the research people today lack a method of planning and communicating
their plans to IAD and ERS. It is the task of the Requirements Plan-
ning Coordinator and his staff, working with the research divisions,
to devise the methods for filling this gap and seeing that these
methods are employed with good results. To accomplish this objective,
the Coordinator with the three assistants shown in Exhibit XIV-1 should
(1) Perfect the procedures explained and issue instruc-
tional material to the branches;
(2) Establish realistic schedules for the preparation
of periodic "desiderata lists;"
(3) Receive information copies, of all such lists and
study them from the viewpoint of finding new or
more adequate sources;
(4) Study the periodic reporting guides and report
evaluations (prepared by the branches and trans-
mitted by IAD) to develop improved guidance tech-
niques;
(5)
Have annual appraisals of the adequacy of report-
iig by posts developed by the branches, and
counsel with Bureaus with respect to action upon
these evaluations;
(6) Continue in its entirety the present Foreign
Service Relations Program now lodged in R/ES;
Assume that portion of the responsibility of
ERS (the function of the Chief himself) which
is concerned with cultivating sources, giving
guidance to external sources and (most important
potentially) finding ways of exploiting external
research for direct use in the research program
of the R Area. The remaining functions of ERS
(7)
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should be assigned to IAD (contract coordination)
and LR (index of research projects and correspond-
ence related thereto).*
d. The Consumer Relations Coordinator is a new staff officer
whose various functions have been suggested in Chapters I, TI, III, IV, V
and VII. This officer, supported by a Classification Control Officer, a
Distribution Review Officer, and an Editorial Standards Officer mould
perform the following essential functions:
(1) Conduct periodic interviews with a cross-section
of R's customers to secure their reactions to the
quality, timeliness, and sufficiency of Ms products
and services;
(2) Prepare reports of findings from these studies,
and work with line' management at all levels in
taking steps to overcome complaints or improve
the use of services;
(3)
(4)
(5)
Plan programs of user indoctrination and assist
in their administration;
Develop style and format standards and conduct
training to improve the "reading ease" factor,
appearance, and reference utility of R's written
products;
Promulgate instructions stating standards for the
security classification of reports; review, at
least by post audit, the security classification
or reports; and conduct a periodic review and re-
vision audit of report classification;
(6) Work with outside agencies on security classifi-
cation matters;
*
During this study it was found that a current conflict in the cultivation
of outside research sources has been encountered between ERS and the Divi-
sion of Historical Policy Research (RE). The tasks of R and RE are so
distinct as to present no worthwhile basis of integrating them organiza-
tionally. However, careful correlation of their mutual contacts with uni-
versities, foundations, etc., must be maintained to avoid confusion on
the part of such outside organizations, and embarrassment to the Depart-
ment.
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(7) Maintain continuing inspection of distribution poli-
cies (limited, normal, and general) and distribution
lists, including a periodic audit of the lists es-
tablished for serial publications;
(8) Work with Bureau 2xecutive Directors in assuring
accurate and timely distribution of R's products.
The Consumer Relations Coordinator should be a thoroughly trained R
executive with a talent for consumer relations contacts and a keen
sense of *merchandising,' as applied to research products.
e. The Director of Production Coordination should be a top
executive of Office Director calibre who will bring comprehensive and
creative leadership to the full range of staff functions described
above. He must also be a respected graduate of the OIR organization
with unquestioned acceptance among division and branch chiefs. His
time should be apportioned equally anong the four Coordinators at the
outset, but should include two regular additional duties:
(1) Attendance at the weekly EG meeting which con-
siders the branch work plan, to act as an
auditor (not as a producer or approver of the
plan) in Tiger Tat he may secure continuing
insight into the adequacy of the techniques
and the methodology developed by the four Co-
ordinators, as well as to report to the EG the
findings and recommendations which grow out of
the continuing studies of the four Coordinators;
(2) Regular meetings with each Assistant Division
Chief for Production (discussed later) and the
four Coordinators, to examine in detail the ap-
plication of rlanni-g, scheduling, and progress
reporting techniques in each branch for which
the Assistant Chief is responsible. (BI should
be treated as one of the research divisions
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for this purpose after the control program is
in operation in the present Oil?, divi-
sions).
3. Establish in Each Division An Assistant Chief (Production)
EFT3EFET,Tate Upon All Aspects of Control.LEELetamt.t.
The Directors of OIR and R/ES have for some time recognized the im-
portance of appointing in each division an Assistant Chief for "planning
and control." Lack of funds is reported to have prevented the establish-
ment of these posts at an earlier date. There is no reservation in our
thinking regarding the importance of filling these positions. However,
to create these openings in the absence of methodology based on tested
techniques - such as those to be developed by the staff described
above - would create a vacuum to which would doubtless flow an assortment
of duties of a quality control and production nature. Furthermore,
it has been found that the requirements in each division differ at this
time, some requiring an additional position, others having the position
already available and filled. It is therefore proposed that these
positions be activated concurrently with, or shortly after, the imple-
mentation of the program of the Director of Production Coordination,
as follows:
a. The duties of the Assistant Chief (Production) should
parallel in every respect those of the Director of Production Coor-
dination, with one important exception:
Instead of being responsible for methodology, the Assistant
Chief should have line responsibility, by delegation from the
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division chief, for the actual application of work planning, re-
quirements planning, scheduling, and progress reporting. There
should be lodged under his direction the division NIS Coordinator
and the Division Editor. He should also collaborate with the
Consumer Relations Coordinator in preparing materials (kits,
project lists) for consumer reaction surveys, and in following
through on the findings of these studies.
b. The philosophy of operation employed by the Assistant
Chief (Production) should be that of assisting the branch chiefs in
accomplishing Control Management, rather than that of sitting in the
position of a superior executive. In fact, this position should be
viewed as being coordinate in rank with the position of branch chief.
To firmly establish this fact, it should be the objective to rotate
branch chiefs in the position of Assistant Chief (Production) at inter-
vals of approximately I year, except in those cases where an incum-
bent prefers a longer tour in this capacity. Furthermore, service as
Assistant Chief should not be considered as preferred experience over
branch chief service in selecting future division chiefs.
c. The Assistant Chief (Production) should be completely
responsible to his division chief, and look to the Director of Pro-
duction Coordination only for guidance in carrying out planning and
control procedures which the division chief himself is obligated to
apply at the direction of the Director of Intelligence Research.
* The practicability of rotation will, of course, depend upon the
availability of an acting replacement for the branch chief during
his tour as Assistant Chief. This rotation principle will offer
an important technique of executive development both for the As-
sistant Chief and the acting branch chief.
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d. At the outset, the following actions are considered necessary
to create the position of Assistant Chief (Production):
- In DRA designate a full-time Assistant Chief to fill this requirement.
- In "ORF appoint an Assistant Chief (Production) to support the
present Associate Chief who is performing most of the duties
of division chief.
- In DRN an authorized vacancy apparently does not exist for an
Assistant Chief.
- In DRS it may be found necessary to create a new post since
the present Assistant Chief shares substaltiaLly in the duties
of the Chief. If this is found necessary, it is suggested that
consideration be given to constituting a position which en-
compasses, 'cinder an Assistant Chief (Production), both the
Control Management responsibilities of the Division and the
Services Management responsibilities of its administrative Of-
ficer.*
- In DRW a revision in chief ship should be considered which
would transfer the present Chief to the suggested role of
Vice Chairman of the Estimates Group and replace him by a full-
time Division Chief. When this is done the position of Assist-
ant Chief should become that of Assistant Chief (Production).
- In DPI the present Staff Assistant, a G8-13 who likewise func-
tions as Administrative Officer, is considered competent to
assume the role of Assistant Chief (Production). This role in
? DPI may be of lesser complexity due to the heavy coordinating
responsibilities of this division in contrast to research pro-
duction.
- In DI the Chief of Functional Services Unit is performing most
Of the duties which in research divisions Would be the responsi-
bility of the Assistant Chief (Production).
*As suggested later, this device should be given consideration in any
situation -where the Assistant Chief is? interested in and competent
to give leadership to Services Management.
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I. Place Functional Coordinators in the Division of Functional
Intelligence.
In realigning staff functions now directly responsible to the
Director, OIR, it is proposed that those concerned with interdivisional
coordination be lodged administratively in DFI. This move is believed
to be in keeping with the essential role of DFI and would achieve a
more realistic administrative arrangement, inasmuch as the Director,
OIR? is unable to provide adequate supervision to these functions
which in themselves are substantive producers. The following would be
transferred to DFI: The CPI staff, the Special Assistant for Central
Asia Committee, the Special Assistant for Sociological Affairs, the
Geographer*, and such future staffs as may be established in connection
with TCA and EDAC. It should be noted that, in the case of the CPI
and of such others who may be designated as Intelligence Consultants,
each will in addition hold membership on the Estimates Group.
S. Eliminate Divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence
and Support Programs by Desipating Analysts with Primary
Responsibility in Each Branch.
As discussed in Chapters VI and XVI, more effective participa-
tion by the Current Intelligence Officers can be achieved if their role
is reconceived as carrying responsibility for document-flow control.
It has already been proposed that the divisional Current Intelligence
*GE has the least important relation to the R Area of all of the com-
ponents of the present organization. Its total removal from R would
present no problems. However, the scope of this study does not per-
mit us to propose a more suitable location for GE elsewhere in the
Departmental structure.
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Officer be superseded by a designated senior analyst in each branch who
will assume primary responsibility on behalf of the branch for the ident-
ification of current intelligence topics and the production of current
intelligence papers under daily leadership from the Coordinator assigned
to the Estimates Group Staff. It has also been suggested that this
branch Current Intelligence Officer perform the initial substantive
review of the total daily take of current documents, in order to mini-
mize the review time of other analysts.
In addition to these two steps, it is suggested that a designated
analyst assume coordinating responsibility, where this is desirable at
the branch level, in connection with support programs. For example,
in the case of present IIA support, it may be practicable for the pro-
posed Current Intelligence Officer to serve as branch IIA support of-
ficer. (Or this task may justify a separate branch officer where the
total program in connection with psychological intelligence is of such
magnitude.) This is in keeping with the recommendation in Chapter IX
that specialized tasks be concentrated, to the maximum possible extent,
in order to prevent dispersing such efforts among all analysts and to
reduce further the interruptions which analysts now experience.
SECOND APPROACH:
STEPS TO STRENGTHEN SERVICES
hANAGEMENT
The second approach to improved utilization of top management
talents comprises those steps which will achieve a more vital
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contribution of the services of IAD, LR, and R/ES to the end-producers in
research branches. Three steps are proposed as follows:
1. Create an Integrated "Office of Intelligence Services" to
Administer All Functions Uhich Provide Supporting Service
to the Research Orpnization, to the State Department, and
to Other IAC Agencies.
It is our conclusion that while the functions assigned to the Direc-
tor, Executive Staff, and the Director, OLI? profit from the skill and
competence possessed by present incumbents, still greater benefits to
R would result from single administration of the entire group of functions
by a strong management team. Either of the functions taken separately is
obviously of lesser stature than that of the Director, OIR, who alone is
responsible for two thirds of RIs personnel and for all of its research
production with the exception of BI. An amalgamation of OLI and R/ES
would go far toward correcting this imbalance in respect to the general
magnitude of management responsibilities.
It should be stressed that the practicability of this combination
resides in the fact that the essential skill needed in both jobs is one
of administering office-type operations, with special ability in those
fields of administrative management which are concerned with matters of
personnel administration, budget administration, methods and procedures,
and general office management.
2. Establish Pour Divisions Within the Office of Intelligence
Services, Transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence
Research.
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The components of the proposed office, as illustrated on page 67
of Volume I, should be as follows:
a. An integrated Publications Division to' assume full responsi-
bility for the procurement cloy gift, exchange or purchase), receipt,
check-in? and distribution of all books and publications. This
Division, described in Chapter XVII, will be composed of the present
Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD and the Selection and Records Section
of LR. The combination has been found desirable to secure closer_ con-
trol over procurement and faster completion of distribution, as well
as to eliminate duplication equivalent to Tproximately 7 positions.
A separate Division has been found advisable since both IAD and LR are
served by its operations.
b. The Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division
whose functions will remain the same as the present IAD except for the
removal of CAB. It should be noted that the Requirements Planning Staff
of IAD will remain intact, but that its effectiveness should be in-
creased through the results produced by the planning procedures designed, and
tested by the Requirements Planning Coordinator. Thus, IAD will con-
tinue to supervise the preparation and transmission of periodic report-
ing guides as well as the requirements coordination functions exercised
through its CIA and Military Liaison Branches. It will assume the Con-
tract Coordinating Function for the Department of State now lodged in MRS,
and in the future will assume contract administration for such regular
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programs of external research as may be developed through the developmental
efforts of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.
The distinction which Should exist between the IAD acquisition
planning responsibilities and the functions of the Requirements Planning
Coordinator is:
The Requirements Planning Coordinator should pioneer and experiment
with new programs and techniques, turning them over to IAD for
administration if, and as soon as, they have proved successful as
regular acquisition procedures. Use of external research as an
established means of securing usable raw research product is still
in the pioneering stage for the R Area. Thus, unless and until
regular usage of a particular source or type of external research
has been established, the full program should remain the responsi-
bility of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.
c. The Division of Library and Reference Services will perform
the functions of the present LR Division with the exception of the pro-
curement and distribution function recommended for transfer to the new
Publications Division. However, as recommended in Chapter III, LR should
take the initiative in producing a more suitable bibliographic approach
to Rts products and principal holdings, through the medium of "tailored
bibliographies." It is further suggested in Chapter III that the Chief
of LR undertake firsthand study of the reference needs of Bureau offices,
in order to identify means of expanding LR's reference services, with
corresponding relief to those research analysts who are now called upon by
the Bureaus for fact servicing of a character which LR is competent
to handle. Finally, it has been concluded that the maintenance of
the card index of external research projects, now lodged in ERS, could
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be as appropriately handled in LR, including correspondence related
thereto.
d. The Division of: Executive Services would perform all of
the functions of the present Executive Staff, with the single exception
of the Foreign Service Relations Program which is considered more closely
allied with the functions of the proposed Requirements Planning Co-
ordinator. Three additional efforts have been recommended for this
Division:
(1) The conduct of the "Rprsonnel Requirements Analysis"
outlined in Chapter IX, as a basis for the proper
introduction of research aides;
(2) The planning and administration of programs of
professional development and executive development
outlined in Chapter XI;
(3) The planning and administration of a thorough-
going records management program, outlined in
Chapter XIX.
Implementation of these new efforts will require strengthen-
ing of the present management staff, the designation of a Training Co-
ordinator, and the designation of a Records Management Officer.
Among these functions it appears illogical to include the Division
of Biographic Intelligence since this Division is a primary producer of
written products and services for the same customers served by the OIR
Divisions. .BI is likewise a recipient of the support services, just as
are other research divisions, and should benefit from the application
of planning, scheduling and reporting techniques similar in principle,
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if not in exact form, to those devised for the research divisions. It is
felt that the tendency to maintain BI under the jurisdiction of OLI
may be based more upon supporting the "office" status of OLI than upon
the nature of the work performed. Significant opinion was found among
analysts in both BI and OIR that organizational proximity to the research
divisions would improve the status of BI, and perhaps open broader op-
portunities for the promotion of BI analyst personnel. We are firm in
the belief, however, that any merger of BI functions with research branches
would prove deleterious to biographic production, add a burden to present
branch chiefs, and make more difficult the achievement of economies such
as those discussed in Chapter XV.
3. Revise the Functions of the Administrative Officer in Each
bivision to Those of a Ftll Counterpart of the Office or
Intelligence Services.
There now exists in the divisions a corps of staff officers who
are primarily responsible for the range of functions performed or co-
ordinated by R/ES. In OIR Divisions these positions are graded at GS-11,
except in DFI where a position at 05-13 (Staff Assistant) ha e been es-
tablished. In OLI Divisions the positions are graded at GS-71 except
in LR where a GS-9 position is established.
As previously noted, the Administrative Officer in the research
divisions has been restricted to a rather narrow sphere. With the es-
tablishment of the integrated Office of Intelligence Services, it is
felt that an improvement in the scope and contribution of these positions
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should become possible, in the following respects:
a. The Administrative Office should, under the line super-
vision of the Division Chief, assume responsibility and initiative for
seeing that all supporting services (Publications, IAD, LR and Execu-
tive) are provided effectively, and in accordance with the needs of
individual branches and sections.
b. This will involve not only the conventional budget ad-
ministrabions personnel administration, filing, t:Tings record keeping
and housekeeping services, but in addition:
(1) The utilization of library and reference services,
(2) The administration of the ?Reference Service Unit"
for the divisions
(3) The transmission and follow-up of publication orders
and requests,
(14)
The collaboration with IAD in the development of
work flow Lrocedures affecting both the transmis-
sion of requests to IAD direct from the branches,
and the physical receipt and transmission of
materials within the division.
c. With respect to the expanded program of executive services
within the division, the Administrative Officer should collaborate in:
(1) The ?Personnel Requirements Analysis" leading to
the introduction of research aides, outlined in
Chapter IX,
(2) The tratning coordination effort outlined in Chap-
ter XI,
(3)
The installation of improved office facilities and
dictating equipment, outlined in Chapter XII,
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(4) The records management program outlined in Chapter
XIX.
As suggested in an earlier recommendation, the functions of the
Administrative Officer may be placed under the Assistant Chief (Produc-
tion) in any case where (1) the Assistant Chief has an interest in
and competence to provide leadership to this function, or (2) the Ad-
ministrative Officer, as in DPI, is in fact of a grade and calibre to
provide leadership to the planning and control program.
THIRD APPROACH
STEPS REQUIRED TO SECURE MAXIMUM PARTICI-
I0 I 1i 1 GDY DO- D' Di 3: POL
T-ROFESSIONALI COOL 1.0 SERVICES.
As illustrated on page 65 of Volume I, the steps proposed to
strengthen Control Management and Services Management can be taken
without change in the present participation of the Special Assist-
ant and the Deputy Special .4.ssistant. Under the simplest concept,
the Production Coordination Staff could be created under a Deputy
to the Director, OIR. Similarly, the Office of Intelligence Serv-
ices could be created as an arm of the Director, OIR. Neither of
these arrangements is considered a sensible distribution of the top
management load since (1) they might substantially impair the ability
of the Director, OIR, to capitalize his highest skills which lie
clearly in the realm of Professional Management as defined earlier;
and (2) despite the best intentions of the Director, OIR, under slch
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an arrangement, he would be unable to provide the time and leadership
which these two major staff arms must have if they are to "pay their
way" in the R Area. Recognition of this fact has led us to the con-
clusion that the following steps should be taken to perfect the or-
ganization of Ills top management:
1. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a Fully Func-
tioning Over-All Manager of the R Area.
If the present loose-knit character of top management is to be
overcome and a "firm hand" be applied from the top echelon, regular
personal participation by the Special Assistant or his Deputy is
essential. It is therefore proposed that the arrangement of duties
in the "front Office" be so revised that the Deputy Special Assist-
ant can regularly spend an average of 50 percent of his time giving
personal supervision to the work of the three Office Directors* To
this end:
a. The Deputy Special Assistant should have an office in
SA-1 to be occupied by him for a regular period each day.
b. He should plan to hold daily consultations with the
Office Directors, and from time to time with their immediate staffs.
c. He should be a regular participant at the EG meeting
which considers branch work plans.
d. He should exercise, on behalf of the Special Assistant,
final approval of all work plans, as provided in Chapter XIII.
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e. He should make, as delegated by the Special Assistant,
final determinations regarding the distribution of Rts manpower and
financial resources, taking into account approved work plans and recom-
mendations of the Office Directors.
2. Revise the Present System of Meetings, Reports and Instruc-
tions to Reflect the Organization and Control Programs
Previously Outlined.
With the full implementation of the proposals in this and the
preceding chapter, the two weekly staff meetings of the Special Assist-
ant, the biweekly and monthly reports and the Program Reporting Book
should be replaced by the following recommended basic plan of communica-
tion:
a. The biweekly and monthly reports for he attention of
the Special Assistant and his Deputy should be superseded by a consoli-
dation and analysis of the status reports submitted to the Program
Planning Coordinator (monthly and quarterly). This compilation should
be accompanied by a clearly-worded, well-documented interpretation of
strengths and weaknesses in the time and man-hour cost performance
of each branch.
b. Quarterly, or twice yearly, each division chief should
prepare for the record a narrative sunmar- of production and accomplish-
ments, to serve as an item of historical interest and to provide sup-
porting material for budget justifications. At the same intervals,
the EG should render a report of its production and a "hindsight" eval-
uation of the accuracs; of current intelligence and estimates.
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c. Directives and instructions, other than special manuals
and guides, should be integrated into a single "R Instruction Manual."
Local division or branch instructions should be included as a supple-
ment to this manual after clearance by the Division of Executive
Services, which should have responsibility for the preparation and
maintenance of the manual.
d. The regular weekly meetings should be superseded by the
?
daily consultations between the Deputy Special AFsistant and the Of-
fice Directors. This is considered desirable in order to provide a
maximum delegation of authority-to-act to the Deputy Special Assist-
ant, and to avoid the meaningless routine which sometimes sets in
when regularly scheduled meetings, primarily informational in character,
are provided. In lieu of this practice, the following suggestions
are offered:
(1) The Special Assistant should make frequent op-
portunities for joining the Deputy Special As-
sistant in his daily consultations, and no less
often than monthly attend the weekly meeting
of the EG at which a branch work plan is discussed.
(2) At intervals of approximately once each month
a dinner meeting of all branch and division chiefs
with the Office Directors, the Special Assistant
and his Deputy should prove a profitable means
of bringing the entire management group together
for fellowship and discussion of a topic of
mutual interest.
(
The program of inspirational guidance to senior
analysts, involving approximately 30 minutes .
each week of the time of top executives, should
be instituted as proposed in Chapter XI.,
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(4) Individual ad hoc consultations between R executives
and the Special Assistant should be continued as
specific need dictates.
3. Renew Efforts to Strengthen the Teamwork on Intelligence
Research Planning at the Top Policy Level in the Department
and Among Leaders of the IAC Agencies.
Our study of the NSC Directives, supplemented by brief conversa-
tions with leaders in the Intelligence Community, has raised three basic
questions regarding State Department's role in the Community:
- Should the Department take more active steps to exercise coordina-
tion and provide leadership in the fields of its dominant inter-
ests?
- Should the Department seek more guidance from the Director of
Central Intelligence with particular emphasis upon assessing
the adequac:,,of its production in relation to Departmental and
national needs?
- Should more satisfactor- means of securing guidance to R be pro-
vided by the Department's top officials including the Counsellor,
the Deputy Under Secretary (G), the Director, Policy Planning Staff,
and the Assistant Secretaries?
It is recognized that formalistic approaches to the cultivation
of top level guidances often prove unproductive and possess the faults
of routine committee-type activities. It is felt, however, that from
time to time benefits would accrue, as discussed in Chapter II, from
calling meetings of such groups for the purpose of discussing a well-
prepared staff paper which (1) outlines the forward research program,
and (2) poses a series of challenging questions to elicit guidance-
thinking from such officials.
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Summary of Recommendations Concerning
Organization
1. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the top program and quality
control arm of the Director of Intelligence Research.
2. Establish a new staff, supplanting PCS, to develop techniques
for work planning and scheduling and to keep their functioning
under continuing scrutiny.
. Establish in each division an Assistant Chief (Production) to
concentrate on all aspects of Control Management.
L. Place functional coordinators in the Division of Functional
Intelligence.
5. Eliminate Divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence and
IIA support by designating a single analyst with primary responsi-
bility for these functions in each branch.
6. Create an integrated Office of Intelligence Services to admin-
ister all functions which provide supporting service to the
research organization, to the State Department, and to other
IAC agencies.
7. Establish four divisions within the Office of Intelligence
Services, transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence Re-
search.
8. Revise the functions of the administrative officer in each division
to thoseof a full counterpart of the Office of Intelligence
Services.
9. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a fully-functioning,
over-all manager of the R Area.
10. Revise the present system of meetings, reports, and instructions
to reflect the organization and control proposals previously out-
lined.
11. Renew efforts to strengthen the teamwork on intelligence research
planning at the top policy levels in the Department and among
leaders of the IAC agencies.
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XV. PROCESSING OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA
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XV ? THE PROCESSING OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA
BI's mission is to provide intelligence information on foreign
personalities to meet the needs of the State Department and to fulfill
its role in the Intelligence Community.
Two principal functions result in order to fulfill this basic
objective. The first is to acquire, process and maintain a collection
of information on all foreigners of current or potential significance in
political, cultural, and sociological fields. The second is to produce
and disseminate evaluated biographic intelligence to the Department of
State, Foreign Service, CIA, and other agencies of the Government.
1. Quanization to Process Biographic Data.
To carry out its responsibility, BI is organized, as shown on
Exhibit XV-1 on the following page, into seven geographic branches
and one Functional Services Unit.
The seven branches, including two sections, have responsibilities
which include:
To review, select, and mark documents routed to their
respective areas for items of biographic importance.
To prepare 4x6 cards and maintain biographic files,
including the BI Dossier files; and to prepare cards
for post agreements.
To provide biographic intelligence information about
people from the files and from other sources in written
and verbal form.
The functional Services Unit acts as a coordinating and directing
unit for projects which cut across branch lines and:
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Controls over?all projects in progress in the various
branches and receives and distributes documents re?
ceived by the Division.
Edits written reports, prepares correspondence, and
maintains certain central BI files.
2. Procedures-Employed to Process Biographic Data.
The maintenance of biographic data is accomplished principally through
the process of reviewing all incoming documents to identify items of bio?
graphic importance and the typing of this information for permanent record
on 4x6 cards. These cards are then filed alphabetically by name, by country
for future reference. Complete documents, on a selected basis, are also
filed directly to individual dossier folders maintained in legal size
file cabinets.
The basic steps in the present procedures is shown on pages 54 and
55 of Volume I. A detailed flaw chart is shown in Appendix D of this
Volume.
a. Routing at the Division level. The Documents Clerk,
assigned to the Functional Services Unit, receives about 600 documents
and publications each day. This material is screened and routed to the
geographic branches. All material is routed to the geographic branch
chief, except for direct routing to the analyst in the case of the Near
East and Africa, and American Republics Branches.
b. Analyst Review and Marking. The analyst reads each incoming
document to identify pertinent biographic information. If the item is
about a person as an individual, or expresses his views (and not just the
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EXHIBIT XV ? 1
PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION DIVISION
CHIEF, BA.
(Acting)
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER
1-Acting Administrative
Offices
1-Secretary to Division
Chief
1-Clerk
N.I.S.
COORDINATOR
1-31.1.5. Coordinator
SPECIAL
ASSISTANT
1-Special Assistant
EDITOR
1-Editor
AMERICAN
REPUBLICS BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
5-Analysts
3-Clerks
NEAR EAST AND
AFRICA BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
5-Analysts
3-Clerks
CHINA AND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
4-Analysts
2-Clerks
WESTERN EUROPE
BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
3-Analysts
2-Clerks
BRITISH COMMON-
WEALTH SECTION
4-Analysts
2-Clerks
NOTE: Personnel figures obtained from chart prepared by B.1. dated 12/12/51
EASTERN EUROPE
BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
4-Analysts
3-Clerks
SATELLITES
SECTION
5-Analysts
2-Clerks
NORTHEAST ASIA
BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
2-Analysts
2-Clerks
CENTRAL EUROPE
AND
SCANDINAVIA BRANCH
1-Branch Chief
5-Analysts
3-Clerks
FUNCTIONAL
SERVICES UNIT
1-Chief, F.S.Unit
1-Documents Clerk
2-Clerks
PERSONNEL SUMMARY
li
I CHIEF
ADMINIS-
TRATIVE
OFFICER
SECRE-
TART
EDITOR
N.I.S.
BRANCH
CHIEFS
ANALYSTS
CLERKS
1
TOTALS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
1
2
1
1
1
6
FUNCTIONAL SERVICES
UNIT
1
3
4
AMERICAN REPUBLICS
BRANCH
1
5
3
9
NEAR EAST AND
AFRICA BRANCH
1
5
3
9
CHINA AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA BRANCH
,
1
4
2
7
NORTHEAST ASIA BRANCI-d
i
1
2
2
5
WESTERN EUROPE
BRANCH
1
3
2
6
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
BRANCH
4
2
6
EASTERN EUROPE
BRANCH
1
4
3
8
SATELLITES SECTION
5
2
7
CENTRAL EUROPE AND
SCANDINAVIA BRANCH
1
5
3
9
TOTALS
I 1
2
1
1
1
a
37
25
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interpretation of a policy or the views of another l then the item is
considered significant to BI.
The analyst marks the significant paragraphs to indicate to the
typist the item to be typed on the card. If it is impossible, because
of length, to type the item on one card, then the document is filed
directly in the individual's dossier folder.
Usually the analyst personally maintains the category files cover-
ing incumbents of foreign government positions and other important
offices. The analyst also participates personally in the preparation
of cards. During one 20 man-day study, 5 analysts produced 279 cards,
amounting to 33 percent of the total cards prepared. During this
same period 5 clerks produced 561 cards.
0. Card Preparation and Filing by the Clerk-Tuists. In
accordance with the instructions on the marked documents, the typist
either prepares a card or files the document directly to the BI dossier
files.
Markings containing only one name will be typed on a plain card,
To avoid re-typing the text, if more than one name is within the marking,
the clerk will use either a 3-part carbon card or hectograph master to
produce extra copies. The forms in use for 4;6 card filing are:
- Plain cards - one card
- 3-Part Carbon Cards - two to three cards
- Hectograph Masters - four or more cards
Envelope Cards for inserting clippings
- Cut and Paste Cards - plain cards for attaching
clippings
- BF Cross Reference Blue Cards - for indicating
- folders in dossier files
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A.? EVIDENCE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE
PRCCESSIM OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA
Intensive study of the processing procedures employed, plus valuable
comments offered by the analysts themselves, indicated opportunities to
reduce cost and simplify procedures employed in maintaining biographic
data. These points are worthy of consideration.
1. The Rate of File Growth is Considerable.
Last year 148,000 documents and publications were processed by the
Documents Clerk to the analysts. From these documents 420,000 cards were
added to the card files. In addition 35,000 dossier folders were added
to the BF dossier files.
The 92 card cabinets contain about 2,700,000 cards. Last year's
additions indicate an annual growth of about 15 percent. The 155,000
dossier folders, located in 217 file cabinets, experienced a growth of
over 22% during the same period.
2. The Largest Proportion of Effort Involved is Directly Related
to the Maintenance of the Files.
The equivalent time of 6.7 analysts and 15.4 clerks is devoted to
typing and filing.
Ten BI analysts estimated they spent 63.5 percent of their time on
files maintenance with 45.3 percent devoted to reading and processing,
and 18 percent to typing and filing. There was a total of 37 analysts
in BI at the time of the survey.
Five clerks estimated that 70 percent of their time is spent on
BI file maintenance with 51 percent devoted to typing and 19 percent to
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filing. There are 22 clerks assigned to the branches.
On the basis of the time estimated by the analysts and clerks as
being devoted to card typing and filing, it costs about 329 cents for
each card added to the file. In addition to this cost factor, delays
occur since the typist is not able to stay abreast of the current card
typing workload. In the German Unit, the backlog of marked documents
amounted to 3 file drawers and work had to be sent outside. Further,
biographic data are not being recorded as evidenced by the fact that
in BCH, the section was carding only what the typist could normally
handle during one work day letting the rest of the biographic informa?
tion go uncarded.
3. The Method Employed to Prepare Cards is Completely Manual.
In terms of the total volume, four types of cards are now prepared
by the clerk and analyst--all on a manual typing basis.
- Plain Cards ? straight typing for one name cards. The
volume of single cards typed last year amounted to about
222,000.
- Cut and Paste ? paragraph,-type markings which can be
lifted and taped or glued to 4x6 cards after card head?
ings are typed. Last year this volume amounted to
21,000 cards*
- Standard Carbon ? used for 2 and 3 card requirements.
In one study the average use was 2.2 barbons. These re?
quired about 10,000 original typings.
- Hectograph Masters ? The liquid process is used where 4
or more cards are required. The same study indicated
that about 6 cards are reproduced from each master. Of
156,000 cards reproduced from masters last year, these
required about 261000 original typings.
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4. Biographic Files are Basically Inactive Files.
The 2,700,000 cards in the files cover almost 900,000 names. Most
of the cards are on names about whom very little biographic informa-
tion is recorded. One sample, of over 2000 cards, indicated that 85
percent of the names contained 3 cards or less.
In contrast, a review of 90 completed Special Activity Reports re-
vealed that 75 percent of the names requested had 4 cards or more. This
indicates the large proportion of files maintenance effort which is de-
voted to persons who have a very law customer demand.
Furthermore, the ratio of names requested to names in the file was
not over 4%. Roughly 35,000 names were supplied on Special Activities
Requests and in Biographic Reports. The proportion of names requested
to cards in the file was
In effect then, BI is devoting a large proportion of its total
effect to maintaining files which are relatively inactive. This
emphasizes the importance of reviewing the method employed for
maintaining the files and processing biographic data.
B - THE CHALLENGE - THE EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF RECORDS
The costs encountered in the processing of biographic information
from source documents to file cards is one that BI management has
recognized for many years. The opportunity to simplify this process
is a real challenge.
At one extreme, there is the system by which the files maintenance
cost is at a minimum, but with which the files use cost, conversely,
is high. At the other extreme, the exact opposite is true. The
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maintenance cost is high, but the use cost is at a minimum.
This system has several weaknesses ? the most compelling being that
the job of assembling all of the basic documents from a central source
imposes such a time?consuming task that reference is cumbersome and timely
service extremely difficult.
In contrast, the system employed by BI is at the other extreme.
Here records are organized on the basis of the highest immediate use?
ability. Each item of retention value is manually copied from the basic
document to a separate card. The carded item is filed in as many places
as necessary, after which the basic document is destroyed. This system
involves a high files maintenance cost, as reflected by the large
proportion of time devoted to the files task in BI.
Accordingly, our studies ware directed to a realistic examination
of the way in which effort is directed, in relation to the use of these
records. Fundamental guide posts in our considerations merer
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The 59 analysts and clerks combined devote 65.5% of their
total effort to the maintenance of the files, and 23.3%
of their effort to producing information from these files,
with the remainder spent on administrative matters. Thus,
2.8 times as much effort is used to maintain the file as
is devoted to using the information. In terms of the huge
volume of material stored in the files, the reference rate
(or turnover) is less than 4%. From a records management
viewpoint, the files are basically inactive files.
C ? PROPOSED METHOD FOR PROCESSING BIOGRAPHIC DATA
The many alternative systems explored for processing of biographic
data included: expanding to an 8 x 5 card to permit more complete cut
and paste operations; the use of Photo?Clerk and/or Dexigraph photostat
equipment for 4x6 reductions of the basic documents; additional copies
of documents for more straight filing in dossier files; and the
possibilities of cross?referencing to an expanded A?Z folder file on
names with 3 cards or less, and carding after they become more active.
Each of these was found to have specific limitations.
1. Adopt the Microfilm Unit Card Plan as a Rapid and Inexpensive
Method for the Maintenance of Biographic Files.
The system found to have a desirable cost balance between files
maintenance cost and files use cost (plus several by?product advantages)
consists of microfilming the source page containing biographic informa?
tion and inserting the film strip into a single card for filing. A
picturization of the procedure recommended with illustration of cards
and equipment appear on pages 56 and 57 of the Summary Report.
The procedure incorporates these principles
? The substitution of a microfilm image for manual
copying of text.
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PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING BIOGRAPHIC DATA
SEVEN AREA BRANCHES CENTRAL PRODUCTION UNIT
DISTRIBUTION
mmamavm01.-
ANALYST
FOR CARDING
Reads for biograph.
ic information, de-
termines to card,
discard, or file.
DOSSIER FILING
Dossier
files
CLERK
CLERK-TYPISTS
If category card
required, obtains
card from file and
adds items or
makes new cate-
gory card.
Regular pickup and
delivery by central
production.
Files aperture
cards to 4 x 6
trays, documents
to dossier folders.
ACard files
Approved For Release 200
CENTRAL
PRODUCTION
TYPISTS
CAMERA
OPERATOR OPERATOR
For each name
marked on docu-
ment obtain aper-
ture card, index
name, category
code, country and
date.
Sort geographically by
country and deliver to
area desks.
Seriae=ce c.rds
to shots on reel.
Microfilm page
containing B I
item - one shot
for each name,
place tag number
on page, shoot,
attach number
card to aperture
card.
Photograph exchange
peripheral cards on
separate reel.
iName COufltrIII
Date
FILM
MOUNTERS
Filed docmments
destroyed after
proofing reel.
CENTRAL
SERVICES
iDevelop microfilm
Insert reel in
mounter, check
frame number, re-
move glassine,
insert card and
mount.
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EXCHANGE
CARDS
ENLARGER
Use roll or single
frame enlarger.
TO POSTS
4 x 6 prints 50%
reduction.
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The continuation of the 416 unit card system.
The consolidation of files through the space?saving
features of microfilm.
The procedures, as set forth in this section, require certain new
operations. The most important of these would be handled through the
creation of a Central Production Unit to perform the job of receiving
the marked source document from the analyst and producing a finished
card ready for filing.
The steps to be employed are presented in Exhibit XV-2 on the
following page. The discussion to follow is presented in accordance
with the steps outlined in this flaw chart.
a. The Analyst. The analyst will continue to read and review
incoming documents and publications. It is expected that certain docu?
ments will continue to be marked for dossier filing and other discarded
as having DO value. However, a large proportion of items formerly
sent to the dossier files may be photographed and placed in the 4x6 card
files.
When marking paragraphs and lists the use of a black crayon to
mark the boundaries on the page will speed up locating the item when
later referred to in the microfilm reader. When extra prints will be
required for exchange programs, the analyst should mark the document
with a special code, i.e. "P-10?" indicating that 10 copies of this item
will be required for the field posts.
To record items in the Category File, the analyst would set these
documents aside for typing by the branch clerk?typist. Documents
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awaiting microfilming processing would be picked up by a clerk from
the Central Production Unit.
b. The Central Production Typists. The marked documents will
be received by the typing pool in the Central Production Unit for index?
ing (i.e., typing name, etc.) on 4x6 microfilm aperture cards. The
Film In File Corporation (represented by Filmsort Co. locally) offers
a suitable aperture card with a 7/8" x 7/8" opening in the card. A
sample aperture card is illustrated on page 57 of the Summary Report.
For each name marked in the document, the clerk will index one card.
To decrease locating time after the card is in the BI file, it is
suggested that the name be placed in the upper left?hand corner of
tlae card. In the center, on the same line, can be recorded the category
code number as indicated by the analyst. In the right corner would be
typed the country, and below that an abbreviation of the classification
symbol and the date.
These cards would be typed in the order of the names marked in
the document. The cards would be affixed to the document and forwarded
to the Camera Operator.
c. The Camera Operator. Each page containing a marking and
each name on the marking will be photographed once. That is, if five
names are on the marking, the page would be photographed five times.
Before each page is microfilmed, the operator would place a small
(1" x 1") serial identification number on the document. These would be
pre?printed on card stock and re?used. After the document has been
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photographed, the camera operator would clip the serial number card to
the aperture card for that name. These would be sequenced in the order
in which the names were photographed to simplify the matching of the
film strip to the cards during the mounting operation.
Since each 100?foot reel contains 1200-35 mm, exposures, it may be
desirable to develop partial reels to keep material flawing into the
files.
d. The Film Mounters. After the film is processed and re?
turned to the Central Production Unit, the film will be mounted on aperture
cards.
The mounting machine, designed to take a full or partial reel of film,
has an electric light encased in the frame to permit easy check of the
identification number on the frame to the number on the card. Each
aperture card has a glassine cover over the adhesive surface.
This is
removed and the card is inserted into the mounter. The handle bar on
the mounter is-Iowered and automatically cuts and mounts the frame to
the card.
Cards would then be sorted geographically (most would already be
in geographic branch sequence) and delivered by Central Production to
the branch file clerks for filing.
e. The Analysts ? in Using the File. In order. to read the
microfilm card it will be necessary to place the card in a Microfilm
Reader.
The reader recommended for use in BI is the type which permits
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the card to be placed on a moveable bed?plate such as the model offered
by the Diebold Corporation. This model speeds the locating of specific
images when using the reader.
The completed aperture card will contain typed name, category,
country, classification symbol, and date, but the microfilmed textual
material itself will not be readable to the naked eye. Although insertion
in the microfilm reader is rapid, it may be desirable to assist the
analyst in his use of the cards, without magnification, by preprinting
a columnar "identification list" on the blank space of the card. This
list, which would be x?ed by the Central Production Unit when typing
the aperture card based upon the analyst's designation, might include:
A.
General
1.
Biographic Report
B.
Political comment
2.
Biographic Sketch
C.
Career
3.
Article
D.
Offices
4.
Who's Who
E.
Organizations
5.
F.
Personality
6.
G.
7.
H.
8.
IIMIMINM.11111
An analysis of the Special Activities Reports would assist in
establishing the best "identification list."
Precise solution to the problem of identification cannot be presented
without trial and error and without experience in the use of the micro?
film reader. It is considered to be entirely possible that no identifica?
tion list at all will be required, or that the analyst can best "key"
the card when and if he uses it, or that the analyst will write a key
word or two on the card as he uses it for report production or to answer
a spot inquiry.
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2. Produce Field Exchange and Peripheral Biographic Cards as a
By?Product of the Microfilm Unit Card Plan,.
The unit microfilm card system offers a simple and inexpensive
method for providing BI information to the posts.
This would be accomplished by microfilming peripheral and exchange
documents on a separate camera, at the same time it is photographed
for BI file purposes, and printing 4x6 photoprints on lightweight
card stock in a rapid, roll type enlarger from this separate microfilm
image.
? A second camera head may be provided for the flat bed
camera. The two camera units may be quickly inter?
? changed. Photograph all "non?exchange" documents with
one camera and all exchange and peripheral documents
wi.th the second camera head.
Microfilming all exchange and peripheral cards on one
reel will permit low cost production of 4x6 facsimile
prints on a roll enlarger. These prints, at a fifty
percent reduction to 4x6 size could be indexed and
forwarded to the posts. The 4x6 prints produced are
easily read without magnification. V?mail roll
printers exist in the Government. Arrangements may be
made to obtain 4x6 prints on a reimbursable basis.
Commercial firms, such as Recordak, provide prints
at about 3 cents each.
3. Consolidated isting Biographic Card and Dossier Files Through
the Use of the Space?Saving Features of the Microfilm 'Window
Jacket Card.
Page 57 of the Summary Report illustrates a microfilm window
jacket or "multiple aperture card," These cards permit the consolidation
of ten single aperture cards into a single card. If all names with 3
cards or more were microfilmed and inserted into window jacket cards, the
present files could be condensed by 50 percent.
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A regular BI files consolidation procedure may be employed. It
is visualized that whchever one individual has 10 single aperture cards
these cards would be sent to the Central Production Unit where the
microfilm frame in the individual cards will be inserted into one window
jacket card. Consolidation can take place at an earlier stage, if found
desirable.
Similarly, and with the further advantage of eliminating two separate
files, the contents of the BF dossier files may be microfilmed and placed
in 4)6 window jacket cards. Most of the 217 file cabinets now occupied
by the dossier file could be eliminated*
D ASSESSMENT OF COST AND SAVINGS
Estimates on the basis of anticipated material and labor costs in?
dicate that each card produced under the new system would cost approxi?
mately 8 cents. On the basis of present payroll costs, the manually?
prepared card now costs about 19 cents.
Because of limitations of time, completely detailed and verified
cost comparisons were not computed. However, certain elements of cost
can be set forth to aid in evaluation of the proposal.
1. Equipment Costs.
Quotations were obtained from the manufacturers as follows:
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Equipment Cost
Readers
35 Diebold Unit System Readers or
Equivalent Card Reader at $375 each 13,000
Microfilm Cameras
Recordak Model D or equivalent 2,285
Second camera head for separate
microfilming of exchange cards 900
Mounters
Two Film In File Mounters 700.
&larger.
Recordak or equivalent 425
Total Costs $17,310
On a conservative five?year amortization schedule, annual equipment
costs would be $3,462.
2. Estimated Labor and Material Costs.
The following estimated labor costs were obtained from two in?
dependent sources and reflect typing, filing, and other operating costs
based upon actual office production figures. Material cost was secured
from the supplier.
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Operation Costs per Year
(1) Cost of Aperture cards
$6,000
400,000 cards per year
4x6 card stock, 7/8" x 7/8" aperture,
heavy weight glassine, in lots of
100,000 at $15.00/M
(2) Cost to Index 61600
type name and country at 100/hr
(3) Cost to Photograph
Cost of film for 400,000 frames-
1200-35mm frames per 100 ft.
roll at $5.72/roll 1,910
Labor to photograph on operating
basis, 240/hr 2,750
Sequence cards to shots, 360/hr 1,830
(4) Cost to mount at 150/hr 4,400
(5) Sorting time at 180/hr 3,660
(6) Filing time at 100/hr 6,600
Total Costs $33,750
(Labor Costs - $25,840)
(Material Costs - $7,910)
Data on present materials costs were not secured nor were directly
comparable labor costs secured.
3. Estimated Payroll Savings.
The payroll savings reflected in the table below were obtained by
computing the time saved the analysts by eliminating the self-performed
typing operations and through the savings in clerk-typist time by sub-
stituting microfilm processing for manual typings of biographic cards
and forms. Clerical and production personnel salaries were computed
from GS-4 beginning rate and analyst salaries from 05-9 beginning rate.
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Salary
Staff
Proposed Present
Proposed
Present
Savings
Production
7
0
$ 22,225
$ 0
$-22,225
Analyst
31
37
156,860
187,220
30,360
Clerical
8
22
25,400
69 850
44,450
46
59
$204,485
$257,070
$52,585
A savings' of 13 people is estimated.
4. Estimated Net Savings.
As an indication of potential savings ?
Estimated annual payroll saving $52,585
Less: Equipment costs $3,462
Material costs 7,910
Incidentals -2121/
Net annual saving (est.) ?
15,085
$37,500
5. Costs for Conversion of Existing Files ? on a Partial Basis.
In order to establish a uniform file and to take advantage of space
saving features, a program of converting present files to the microfilm
unit card plan is recommended. Conversion should take place for all or
most of the 120,000 most active names. This cost can be estimated as
follows:
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Operation Cost
1. Cost of window jackets
140,000 4x6 jackets, 2 acetate
windows, holding about 10 frames
per card at $96.35/M (includes 20,000
extra jackets)
2. Cost to Index Cards
Type name and country on 140,000
jackets at 100/ht
Cost to photograph
Cost of film for 1,500,000 frames
1200-35 mm frames per 100 ft roll
at $5.72/roll
613,500
2,310
7,150
Labor to photograph 7,270
Production basis at 350/hr
4. Cost to Mount
Film strip inserted ? about
190,000 manual insertions.
Checking frames at 250/hr 1,254
Cutting and matching at 250/hr 1,254
Inserting at 120/hr 2.612
Total Costs 05,350
E ? PLAN OF INSTALLATION
Due to the basic departure from the present typed card and the
desirability to test costs, usage factors, etc., it is proposed that
the unit microfilm card system be adopted in one branch for a trial
period of several months, as experience is gained and procedures are
further refined, a complete installation then could be undertaken.
1. The Pilot Study.
A small scale pilot study should be installed in one of the
branches for a sufficient period of time (3 ? 6 months) to permit an
appraisal, both as to cost performance and adaptability. Imaginative
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and aggressive supervision of this Pilot Study will be necessary to
identify and to develop any revisions that might be required and to
guide the system through this initial stage.
The designated branch would be provided with a flat bed microfilm
camera, film, 4x6 aperture cards, a mounter, and a microfilm reader
for each analyst? One clerk mould be selected to operate the camera
and should be transferred to CS for several weeks of microfilm training.
The procedures described for the system as a whole would apply
equally for the Pilot Study. During this period any exchange cards
could be enlarged using CS facilities. An installation of this size
would provide the experience necessary to locate production problems
and to gain a sampling of analyst reaction to working with microfilm
although initial reaction should be discounted until adequate practice
is obtained.
The system may be installed with relatively little cost, since
most equipment may be obtained on a rental basis and no conversion
costs need be incurred. A three?months' trial period should cost
not over $5,0001 including salaries and is based on the following costs:
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1 Camera (rental) $75/first month, $50/Month
thereafter $225
1 Mounter (rental) $20/first month, $16/Month
thereafter 68
4 - 5 Readers (Purchase) Procure, $375 each 1,500
Film-20,000 frames at 1,200 frames per reel at
$5.72 per 100-foot reel 98
Cards - 20,000 aperture cards at 017.50/M 344
Salaries - 3 people for 3 months at $3,300/year 2,500
Total cost for Pilot Study $4.735
2. Method of Full Implementation.
For complete implementation, establish a Central Production Unit in
the Functional Services Unit to produce the unit microfilm card. The
Central Production Unit would require seven people.
Two typists would be required for indexing, one to operate the
camera, two to mount the film and two clerks to assist as necessary in
the above operations and for delivering documents and cards to the
branches.
It is recommended that a partial conversion of the present files
be accomplished to reduce the present files size by about 50 percent
and to make the present files as uniform as practicable. There are
about 120,000 names covered by 1,500,000 cards which are ideally suited
for consolidation into the window jacket cards.
The daily workload on the microfilm camera would amount to about
6 hours per day for regular processing of incoming documents. Con-
version would be obtained by using this camera on a part-time basis,
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and renting another until the conversion job is completed.
The files, one country at a time, would be forwarded to Central
Production for microfilming. The camera operator would photograph only
those names having 3 cards or more.
The remaining 780,000 names and 1,200,000 cards, mostly marginal
names, would remain in the files. Eventually, when 10 cards are obtained,
they would be condensed into window jacket cards.
The steps in daily processing are described in paragraph 0-1 above.
F ? OTHER ADVANTAGES OFFERED
The discussions above have centered primarily upon the element of
costs for files maintenance. However, other advantages present them?
selves which should not be ignored in an evaluation of the proposal.
1. Elimination of Transcription Errors.
The present system because all card text is typed reading from the
original document, is subject to typographical error. The microfilm
image will present an error?free copy.
2. More Complete Information.
At present, only that portion of the document text which is marked
by the analyst is typed on the card. With the system proposed, the
entire document page appears although pertinent paragraphs are marked
for ease in finding on the microfilm reader.
3. Copies of Carded Material, At Any Time.
Under the plan proposed, any size enlargement may be made photo?
graphically from the BI microfilm unit card.
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4. Compact Data.
With the conversion of dossier file material to microfilm (con?
solidated in a window jacket) and the filing of this material with
carded material, all available data on an individual will be in one
place for ready use by the analyst.
5. Setter, More Complete Information.
Some useful biographic data are not now captured for the file
because it is contained in single copy books or periodicals which
must be routed elsewhere and because transcription cost is prohibitive.
This material could be referred to the camera operator and mounted in
cards or included in window jackets.
6. Faster Processing and Better Utilization of Personnel.
The time now required to transcribe manually to 4x6 cards delays
biographic data from getting into the files. The procedure proposed,
because of its speed, can place material more quickly into the file.
The proper staffing of the Central Production Unit concentrates pro?
cessing effort, permits detailed review and control of workload,
and should provide better over?all utilization of clerical personnel.
7. Bio? a.hjc Resortsand other Summaries ma be Included in
the File.
When Biographic Reports, Sketches, etc. are produced, one copy
can be microfilmed for inclusion in the individual's card file. Later,
photographic enlargements may be made if required. The analyst, in re?
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viewing the data or in answering spot inquiries can use such
summaries or reports quickly.
8. Files Close to the Anal.
With consolidation of file bulk, desk arrangements can be adjusted
so that all biographic files are immediately adjacent for convenient
and quick use by the analyst in handling spot inquiries.
9 Saving in Floor Space.
The card files consolidation permitted and the inclusion of
dossier files material by microfilm will permit a reduction in filing
cabinets and, thus, a reduction in floor space now occupied.
G - OTHER NOTES ON BIOGRAPHIC FILES
The advantages of rapid and automatic processing offered by the
proposed procedure may result in more Material being added to the
biographic file, perhaps of marginal value. It is not felt that this
factor can be controlled by a procedure or formula; nor should the
procedure dictate what is to be considered pertinent and useful bio-
graphic data. Analysts must be trained in what is and what is not
valuable biographic information and periodic audits of selections
and files made to review compliance and to indicate when additional
training is necessary.
The initial reaction of most non-users of microrilm is to object
to expected difficulties in the use of microfilm readers. However,
as experienced by CS and attested to by commercial firms in the micro-
film field, these objections are overcome through time and use.
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A new development in the micro-image field may deserve investi-
gation in connection with BI files maintenance and use. The system
is not yet available on the market although it has been used
successfully in several large companies in test installations. The
procedure is the same as recommended above except that direct image
readable paper prints in 16 mm size are glued to cards instead of
mounting film in aperture cards. Costs are less since plain card
stock is used. Enlargements of the microfilm may be made from the
negative but not from the direct image print at a later date. New
images would be added to a single card for each individual. Reading
of text in the reduced size is not possible although specific documents
can be identified with the naked eye. Reading is accomplished by
means of a reader operating much on the same principle as a film
reader. Hall and McChesney, Inc., P.O. Box 591, Syracuse, N.Y., can
explain in more adequate detail. Equipment will be available within
the next several months.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Adopt the microfilm unit card plan as a rapid and inexpensive
method for the maintenance of biographic files.
2. Produce field exchange and peripheral biographic cards as a
by-product of the microfilm unit card plan.
3, Test the proposed procedure and develop refinements through a
pilot installation in one branch.
4. Consolidate existing biographic card files through the use of
space-saving features af the microfilm "window jacket card."
5. Estabish a Central Production Unit to fix responsibility for
producing a finished card ready for filing.
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XVI.. THE RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS
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XVI. RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS
Over 16,000 separate documents are routed every day by IAD. These
represent multiple copies of all documents for routing within R, and
copies of CIA and Military Documents for routing elsewhere in the State
Department. Of this volume, CLI and OIR divisions receive and process
11,800 pieces daily through division, branch, and section Documents
Clerks to the research analysts.
The discussion to follow presents (1) the procedures employed and
the weaknesses observed in the routing performed by IAD and (2) similar
observations of division and branch routing procedures. Following this,
a series of organizational and procedural proposals are presented, which
aim at improved documents flow.
A - DOCUMENTS ROUTING TO THE DIVISIONS
1. Present Organization for Document Flow.
Five organizations participate directly in documents distribution
as shown in Exhibit XVI-1 on the following page. Three of these are
located in IAD, one in IA, and one in PCS.
The largest volume is processed in the IAD Message Center, which
divides this responsibility as follows:
Chief, Message Center - Receives and routes all in-
coming top secret documents from DC, maintains top
secret logs and transmittal records necessary to
meet security regulations. R's copy is sent to the
IR Sensitive Room.
Action Control Readers - Record and route 011 action
telegrams and despatches, as well as secret_documents,
on the basis of primary interest. Work of tmo people
is divided between telegrams and despatches. Daily
volume, 273 documents.
. Now
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? Reading Panel ? Receives copies of despatches routed
from DCA, and prepares and presents them to Army
Navy, and Air Force readers for their selection;
routes for other outside agencies; forwards remaining
copies of despatches to Reading Room.
? Reading Room Readers ? Distribute (1) all copies of
telegrams marked for OII information from DC, (2) all
remaining copies of OLI action telegrams received from
Action Control, and (3) all remaining copies of CLI
Information despatches received from the Reading Panel.
Daily volumes 7,809 documents.
Two other organizations within IAD also route documents. These two
units route to the entire State Department.
- MilitarE liaison Distributors ? Distribute despatches
selected for the State Department by MIE liaison
personnel from reading panels at Army, Navy, and Air
Force (ANA).*
- CIA Liaison Distributors ? Route CIA documents received
in fixed numbers through automatic distribution from
CIA. Daily volume 1,482 documents.
In addition, two other units, one in PCS and the ether in IR, are
involved in documents routing.
Ticker Room (PCS) ? Routes messages received by wire
(AP, UP, and FBIS) and selects items for daily briefing
sessions. Receives the first copy of telegrams from the
Message Center, reviews for immediate referrals or
briefings, and then routes to the branches.
- Sensitive Room (LR) ? Receives and records top secret
and sensitive documents and charges out the former.
These include State telegrams and despatches received
through IAD, as well as CIA and other agency top secret
material. Top secret documents from CIA and the Military
are routed for the entire State Department.
*Army, Navy. and Air Force, hereinafter referred to as ANA.
XVI ? 2
CONFIDENTIAL = jscaLyt. Information
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Production Control Staff
OIR/PCS
1
Ticker Roan
1. Distributes mes es
received by mire
2. leOelTe8 a disir -
butes first copy of
each telegram.
3. Selects wire cables
and telegrams for
daily briefings.
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MS= ORGANIZATION FOR DOCUMENT FlOw
Division Chief - IAD
Chief, Military Liaison Branch
2
Chief, Message Center
Receives, logs in
and routes all top
secret documents.
Action Control
r-
1. Receives, logs
in and, routes
all secret doc-
uments.
2. Receives, loge
in and routes
all action doc-
uments.
Chief, C/A Liaison Branch
3
Exhibit 1N7 -1
Library and Reference Division
A oWIR
1
MID Distributors
Reading Panel
Readers
CIA Distributors
Sensitive ROCE1
1. Receives and routes
1. Prepares despatches
1. Receives and routes
1. Receives fixed
1. Maintains required
military reports
for reading panel.
telegrams and des-
number of SO, 00
logo for top sec-
selected by the liai-
2. Reads for other agen-
patches to the R
and other CIA
ret and sensitive
son officers,
cies, including CIA,
Area.
reports.
material received
2. Routes to R and the
MTB, etc.
2. Distributes Govern-
2. Routes to R and
from DC and s/s-GE.
State Department.
3. Resolves conflicts
ment publications
the State Depart-
2. Distributes top
of distribution.
4. Distributes despatches
to Army, Navy, Air and
other outside agen-
cies.
to R Area.
ment.
secret reports from
other agencies to
R and the State
Department.
5. Routes R copies to
readers.
Amy, Navy and
Air Force Readers
1. Daily review of
despatches.
2. Selects copies
for Army, Navy
and Air Force.
Note: Members in upper right corner of boxes indicate total personnel assigned.
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2. Procedures for Document Distribution in the Message Center.
Separate processing procedures are'followed for routing telegrams
and despatches. Whereas telegrams are routed direct to the military
services by DC/T, despatches are screened and selected for the ANA by
their respective representatives at the Reading Panel in IAD. Six
copies of each despatch are made available to IAD by DC/R for selection
by the ANA representatives.
3. Weaknesses Observed in Routing Documents to the Divisions.
a. There is no established systematized plan for routing to
the Divisions. Documents are routed to them from seven separate sources,
organizationally located in five different areas. Routing is not geared
to effect continuity of routing methods. No organized routing guides
are in use. Copies routed by the Ticker Room often duplicate later
routing by the Message Center. None of the distributors are organized
in terms of the geographic requirements in the OIR divisions. Despatches
are processed through two units within the -Message Center before they
are routed to the Divisions,
All of this causes divisions, and analysts, to receive more material
for review than should be necessary; and the magnitude of the volume to
the divisions is such that better organized processing is essential to
eliminate unnecessary reading effort on the part of the analyst.
CIB processes SOls and 001s and other type documents
to R and other State areas. Last year 225,750 separate
pieces were routed to the R Organization, while 129,922
pieces were distributed to other parts of State Depart,-
ment.
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- MIB last year routed 456,000 despatches and reports
from the Military. Of this figure, 215,000 went to
the R Area.
- The Message Center routed over 2,560,000 copies of
telegrams and despatches to the R Area.
Notwithstanding the volume being handled and the many different
organizational units involved, a procedural device does not exist for
providing routing guidance to IAD based on the particular area and
subject interests of the analysts.
b. Excessive handling delays the receipt of the document by
the analyst. Despatches are reviewed by the Military Reading Panel and
the Reading Room routers before they are processed to the OIR and OLI
Despatches are held for the ANA Reading Panel daily review. This
procedure delays release to the Reading Room and causes the work to
flow in large batches to that room late in the day. At times, the
"hold period" for the Reading Panel delays despatches as much as one
full dir.
A four? to five?day backlog of despatches in the Reading Room is
considered excessive, and is attributed in part to assigning most
personnel to route telegrams (only one person is assigned full?time
to routing despatches) and in part to the procedures employed in the
Reading Panel.
B ? DOCUMENTS ROUTING BY THE DIVISIONS TO THE ANALYSTS
Interviews were conducted with all divisions and branch documents
clerks and included a large sampling of the section and unit secretaries
who process documents to the analyst.
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The OLE and OIR divisions route the 11,800 pieces received daily
on an ad hoc basis. Almost every division and branch was observed
routing incoming documents using techniques devised by the particular
documents clerk, resulting in generally dissimilar processing procedures.
1. Procedures Employed for Documents Routing.
Routing occurs at the division, branch, and section level. In
certain instances, minimum handling exists in routing direct from the
point of initial receipt (division or branch) to the analyst. In others,
documents are handled at all three levels before the analyst finally
receives them.
At the Division Level:
? One division (DRA) routes documents from the Divisional
Research Services Unit direct to the analyst...
TWO divisions (DRF and DRW) receive documents directly
in the branches.
? One division (DRS) routes to sections.
? One division (DRN) routes to branches.
At the Branch and Section Levels
? In DEP: Two branches route to the analyst and the
third routes to sections and then analyst.
? In DRNa One branch routes to two sections first and
direct to the analysts in the third; another branch
circulates everything in.foIders, Which is especially
time?consuming.
? In DRS I Documents of several different sections are
combined and routed to all analysts. Other sections
route direct to the analyst.
? In DRWI Three of the four branches route directly to
the analyst, while the fourth routes to sections.
? In DPI a The units route directly to the analyst.
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Fifty?eight various document records were observed which varied
according to procedures employed in the branch and section. Over half
the records are being maintained under the following conditionss
- On the assumption that the record might prove useful.
On the basis of the clerks not having been told what
records to maintain.
.-. As a defense mechanism for the clerk, who is between
the analyst and IAD when failure to route properly
occurs.
2. Number of People Involved.
A documents clerk or one of the branch or section secretaries is
used to process documents to the analyst. At least 58 people were
found involved in routing documents, most of them being clerks Who
perform documents functions on a part?time basis. The time involved
for the clerks, when consolidated, is equivalent to at least 23 full?
time people.
Divisions Number of Part?Time People Equivalent Number of Full?
Time People
DRA 6 3.80
DRF 15 5.46
DRN 6 2.86
DRS 11 3.84
DRW _6 2.70
DFI R 4.69
58 23.35
3, Weaknesses Observed in Routing Documents from the Divisions
to the Analyst.
a. Excessive Handling. The procedure in most divisions
necessitates excessive handling of documents in the course of their
distribution to the analyst, with consequent delay in their delivery.
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b. Insufficient ScretaLag. There is insufficient screening
of the documents flaw so as to bring to the analyst only items which
might justify his scrutiny. The various methods employed are not con?
ducive to controlling the volume processed to the analyst, nor to per?
forming a more selective job of screening the incoming documents. The
11,800 documents routed to the analysts require each day almost 1,150
hours of reading on the part of about 480 analysts. The analyst spends
as much as 30 percent of his time reading "daily take." Normally,
the clerk merely identifies the document and forwards it to the analyst.
Only 9 clerks of the 58 observed were found to be screening out documents
which were clearly of no value to the analyst. Even then, the discarding
is limited primarily to duplicate copies. Although this procedure tends
to hold payroll costs for documents clerks to a minimum, it permits
analysts' time to be unnecessarily lost in an excessive amount of docu?
ment handling and reading.
c. Subordination of Routing Responsibility. Routing of
documents is a subordinate responsibility of most of those doing it,
The vast majority are carrying it out on a part?time basis. Since
documents routing gets secondary treatment, there has been little
tendency to develop any standard routing guides or uniform routing
procedures.
d. Too Many Records., Almost 1/2 of the document records
observed could be eliminated, since they either contribute little to
the effectiveness of routing or merely duplicate a record maintained
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elsewhere. The following table lists the records identified in OIR
and indicates the potentialities for reduction in clerical time
through the establishment of uniform record-keeping procedures.
Record of
Division
NUMBERS OF RECORDS
May be Eliminated
Branch
Section
Total
Action Copy
3
0
0
3
0
Telegrams
1
4
1
6
6
Despatches
2
3
1
6
6
Serials
2
2
2
6
6
Documents
1
2
0
3
3
Newspapers
1
2
1
4
0
LR Serials
5
5
2
12
7
Top Secret
3
2
1
6
0
Destruction
1
6
5
12
0
OIR Products
3
1
0
4
4
Other
1
1
0
2
2
23
28
13
64
34
C - RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATIONAL REVISIONS IN IAD
1. Combine in the Present Message Center the Routing Functions
and Personnel Now in PCS. LR. MIB. AND CLB. to Form a Single
"Documents Distribution Unit" in IAD.
This will centralize at one point the responsibility for distri-
bution knowledge and the processing of all documents. It would
eliminate the routing of documents from five separate organizational
units. Transfer of the following functions and personnel thereof would
be required: (See Exhibit XVI-2.)
a. The Ticker Room Now Located in PCS. The practice of
sending the first copy of each telegram to the Ticker Room should be
eliminated. Each of the readers in the Distribution Unit should be
assigned the responsibility of reviewing cables for urgent items,
and telephoning the area responsible within RI or forwarding a copy
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CONTIDEMPIAL - Security Information
Ethibit XVI-2
PROPOSED DOCUMICNTS D/STRIBUT/OEFUNIT IN IAD
Division Chief - TAD
A
Chief, Documents
Distribution Unit
Ticker Room
Document Readers
Reading Panel
Sensitive Control
nigtribntee mellinsgeo
1, Prepares despatches
1, Routes despatches
1. Maintains required
received by wire,
for distribution pro-
cessing.
to the Army, Navy
and Air Force read-
logs for top see-
rot and sensitive
2. Receives copies of
2. Receives and routes
ers.
material from DC
telegrams from readers,
selects documents and
telegrams and des-
patches, including
2. Reads for other
agencies including
and S/S-CR.
2. Distributes top
wire cables for daily
secret and action, to
CIA and NFU, eta.
secret reports
briefings.
the R Area.
5. Resolves conflicts
from other agem-
3. Maintains 'watch sche-
5. Routes CIA and mili-
of distribution.
cies to R and the
dule.
tary documents to the
4. Distributes des-
State Department.
State Department.
patches to the R
3. Makes a highly
4. Routes despatches to
the reading panel
Area, Army, Navy,
Air and other out-
selective routing
of State top sec-
after R distribution
determined.
side agencies.
ret and sensitive
documents to the
RAaea.
Approved For Releasgag
1
41
Army, Navy and
Air Force Readers
1. Daily review of
despatches.
2. Selects copies
for Army, Navy
and Air Force.
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to the Ticker Room for briefing purposes. This activity should remain
in its present location since the costs involved for relocation of the
wiring would be prohibitive.
b. The Sensitive Room Now Located in I. Assigning the
Sensitive Room to the Distribution Unit would eliminate the duplicate
logs maintained for top secret control, and provide for centralized
responsibility for routing of top secret documents.
At the present time the analyst must go to the Sensitive Room
in order to review top secret and sensitive material for any that
might be of interest to him. To permit this material to reach him
directly, it is proposed that the Sensitive Room be established as
primarily a control unit for routing the major portion of top secret
and sensitive material to the analyst.
Of the total material subject to routing by the Sensitive Room,
sensitive documents would comprise the largest proportion, amounting
to 1,000 items per month0 control records should be established
which indicate the person or division receiving the document, and
with respect to top secret documents, the procedure should require
the document being returned to the Sensitive Room for destruction.
Since the files in the Sensitive Room are, in large part, a
duplicate of records in DC/R, they may be weeded to the same degree
as proposed for the Post files.
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c. The IAD/CM and IAD/MIB Personnel Directly Involved in
Routing Documents. It is recommended that the mail supervisors and mail
clerks in the CIA and Military Liaison Branches be assigned to the proposed
Distribution Unit.
A single reading unit would thus be routing all CIA and military re?
ports, as well as State Department documents. These readers, as suggested
later, should be supplied with uniform routing instructions which will
establish an integrated system of pinpointed routing in the R Organization.
The 447,000 CIA and military documents routed to R out of a total of
812,000 received last year would be routed on the same basis as the
2,560,000 telegrams and despatches handled last year by the Message Center.
The remaining 365,000 CIA and Military documents, routed to other parts
of the State Department mould be accomplished from the new Documents
Distribution Unit.
It is understood that at one stage in the history of IAD, routing of
all documents was performed from a central point. However, it is believed,
that the system did not function satisfactorily primarily because there was
inadequate knowledge of area requirements and because no routing guides
employed.
2. Organize the Readers Assigned to the Documents Distribution Unit
on an Area Basis.
It is recommended that the receipt and reading for distribution be
organized by geographic areas being served rather than by type of incoming
document. The proposed reassignment of responsibilities for documents
routing will make available a total of 10 readers in the new Documents
Approved For Rel
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Distribution Unit. By dividing the responsibility for routing on a
geographic basis, specialization of readers to match the requirements
of the OIR research divisions can be achieved.
Organizing the Documents Distribution Unit to provide at least 2
readers for each geographic area should preclude interruption in flaw
by reason of normal personnel absences.
Since a large portion of the documents handled will be despatches,
it is suggested that the area units established in DC/R, namely,
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Far East and Near East, and American
Republics, be utilized on a pilot basis in IAD. As workload statistics
are developed, further divisions or area regroupings may prove desirable.
Assigning routers on an area basis will permits
? Fixed responsibility for distribution to the branches.
? Branches to maintain liaison with a specific router.
? Readers to be assigned temporary duty in the branch
to become familiar with document requirements,
The present workload statistics of the Message Center and of
IAD/CIR. and IAD indicate that the pooling of their distribution
functions would permit a saving of from 2 to 3 full?time positions,
These savings should be re?invested in guides for improved screening
and routing to the branches, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
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D RECOMMEATED PaCCEDURAL REVISIONS IN IAD
To accomplish improved routing within the new organizational frame?
work, the following procedural revisions are proposed.
1. Install and Maintain Routing Guides to Reflect the Requirements
of the Research Divisions.
To accomplish more selective distribution, the respective require?
ments of the research divisions should be made known to the Documents
Distribution Unit. It is anticipated that the Requirements Planning
Staff recommended in Chapter XIV, Three Appraoches to Stronger Organiza?
tion, would establish the procedure by which the branches would identify
to IAD their particular interests by area and country, and by subject.
From this data it would be possible for the Documents Distribution Unit
to develop routing guides, including priorities on enclosure material.
The changing requirements of the branches should be made known to the
Documents Distribution Unit by the branch documents clerks.
A routing reference guide, such as Remington Rand's Speedac Racks,
having vertical fly?leaf cards, would serve as a fast reference device.
The cards would be set up on the basis of various subject classifications.
Those branches expressly interested in a subject would be recorded on the
card of that subject.
2. Route Documents Directly to the Branch Level in R to Reduce
Handling.
With routers assigned on an area basis and assisted by routing
guides, documents can be routed directly from the IAD Distribution
Unit to the branch documents clerk.
XVI - 12
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As previously indicated, documents are at the present time routed
directly to the branch levels in DRF and D. Hence, the suggested
practice of routing directly to the branch level would require procedural
changes principally in DEN, DRS, DFI? and B1, where documents are now
initially received at the division level. Although DRA also receives at
the division level, it routes directly to the analyst in lieu of having
branch documents clerks do so.
Routing to the lowest practicable level from IAD will not only re?
duce the handling of documents, and hence cut costs, but will require
the router to establish a more highly selective routing for the document.
3. Route Despatches to the Reading Panel After the Readers Have
Indicated the Number of Copies and the Distribution for the
R Area.
Plans are already under way to revise the present internal procedures
of the Message Center. These represent, from our observations, a step
toward the elimination of much of the backlog and delay now occurring in
despatch routing.
The basic procedural change contemplates the review of despatches
by the Military Reading Panel after distribution for the R Area has
been established. Under this plan, one copy of each despatch will be
routed first to the CLI distributors and thence to the Military Reading
Panel; the remaining copies to be filed awaiting the eventual matching
and distribution.
Certain suggestions are offered for further consideration as
follows:
XVI ? 1.3
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a. Recording and Filing Distribution of Despatches. The
distribution list can be stamped on the top of one despatch. This
copy may then be read and routing designated. After distribution has
been completed, the top 5 inches may be cut off providing an 8x5 card
for filing. This would eliminate the manual preparation of the record
card and provide a part of the document containing the title, etc., for
reference purposes. DCA uses this system.
b. Table Top Vertical Files. In connection with processing
despatches through the Reading Panel and readers, it is suggested that
a serial number be applied by numbering stamp to the first and second
copies. The despatches should be filed numerically in vertical filing
racks for later rapid matching for distribution.
E ? RECOMMENDED PROCEDURAL REVISIONS IN THE DIVISION AND BRANCHES
In conjunction with the proposals set forth in Chapter VI,
Current Intelligence Product, it is recommended that branch documents
procedures be adapted to the proposed functional relationships between
the Current Intelligence Officer, the documents clerk, the research
analyst, and the research aide.
The relationships and functions of each of these positions with
respect to documents flow is shown on Exhibit XVI-3 on the following
page. The duties of each of these positions with respect to documents
flaw are identified below:
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OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BRANCH DOCUMENTS FLOW
IAD - DOCUMENTS ROUTING
Routers in the Documents Distribution Unit (IAD) route
documents directly to the branch level.
DOCUMENTS
BRANCH RECEIPT
Branch Documents Clerk receives
all incoming materials; sorts as
to documents and publications;
and routes documents to the cur-
rent Intelligence Officer in
Branch.
PUBLICATIONS
Cables; dispatches; CIA and mai- Newspapers; serial and nonserial
tary reports, etc. publications; LR route material, etc.
DOCUMENTS REVIEW AND ROUTING
The Current Intelligence Officer receives all documents; re-
views for current intelligence content; indicates whether the
document warrants (I) close attention by the Analyst or (2)
processing by the Research Aide. Routes documents to the
Research Analyst concerned; destroys documents that are
of no possible interest to the Analyst.
EXHIBIT XVI-3
PUBLICATIONS SCREENING AND ROUTING
The Documents Clerk processes all publications; screens
as to content and routes to interested Research Analyst;
some basic research publications would be catalogued and
marked for direct filing. Maintains prescribed records.
ANALYSTS' REVIEW AND PROCESSING TO FILES
Documents and publications received at Analysts' level for review and current use or filing.
Processing and load on Analyst governed by utilization of Research Aide. Indications made
by C.I.O. serve as guide to the flow of documents. 'Three alternatives exist with respect to
use of Research Aide, as follows:
PULL USE OF THE RESEARCH AIDE
PARTIAL USE OF THE RESEARCH AIDE
NO USE OF THE RESEARCH AIDE
Material directed to the Research
Aide, who
a. Reviews and catalogues for file,
b. Refers essential material to re-
search Analyst,
c. Briefs less essential or lengthy
material for Analyst's review, and
d. Refers nonessential material to
file.
Research Analyst reviews material
and discards or refers to Research
Able for
a. Briefing and cataloguing for
file, or
b. Cataloguing for file.
Research Analyst reviews material
and discards or catalogues for
file.
PILING
Catalogued material marked for filing turned over to file
clerk. Clerk(s) pooled to serve the entire Branch.
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1. The Current Intelli .ence Officer.
In the process of accomplishing a close surveillance of incoming
current intelligence material, the Current Intelligence Officer would
perform a highly?selective routing of incoming documents to the research
analyst. Chapter VI proposes a substantive review of incoming documents
by the Current Intelligence Officer to minimize the time devoted to
daily review by the research analyst.
Documents, including telegrams, despatches, CIA reports, military
reports and others, received by the documents clerk, would be directed
to the Current Intelligence Officer for review. This review would give
suitable indication of its current intelligence value and provide
guidance to the further processing of the document. A mark might be
made to differentiate between documents which, in the opinion of the
Current Intelligence Officers (1) warrant analysts' direct attention,
(2) might be reviewed or briefed for the analyst by a research aide,
or (3) should be cataloged by research aide and routed to file. Items
identified as being of no possible interest to the analyst could be
discarded without further routing.
2. The Documents Clerkt
As reflected in Exhibit XVI-3, the documents clerk would sort out
the documents, and then screen and route publications directly to
the analyst. In addition, certain basic research information, such as
newspapers and serials, economic annuals, etc., would generally be
directed to the files without review by the analyst. This material
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should be cataloged by the documents clerk and then placed directly in
the files.
Since in most branches the documents clerk's duties will not
warrant a full?time position, the remaining time may be absorbed by
filing functions.
3. The Analyst.
The use of research aides as set forth in Chapter IK, "Improved
Use of the Time of the Analyst," proposes a flexible arrangement whereby
the amount of time devoted by the analyst to daily review of incoming
documents and publications may be conserved.
The analyst may choose, if he has time, to continue to read and
screen all incoming documents and publications. After such review the
material may be discarded or it may be cataloged for filing. Should
the analyst's time be limited, he would be able to utilize a research
aide to any one of the degrees suggested in the following paragraphs.
4. The Research Aide.
The extent to which the research aides would participate in docu?
ments processing would depend to a large degree upon the work methods
employed by the respective research analysts. The most ideal relation?
ship will exist when the research aide is used to the maximum extent
in relieving the analyst of relatively routine, continuing functions.
The minimum utilization of a research aide would involte having
the latter do the cataloging for file on all documents after the latter
had been initially received and reviewed by the analyst. A greater de?
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CONF1T/ENTIAkz_lwirttz Inf ormation
gree of utilization would be achieved by having the research aide first
receive the incoming material and perform both a cataloging and screen?
ing function. From the screening) and guided by any notations made by
the Current Intelligence Officer) the research aide would (1) pass the
material to the analyst concerned, (2) brief and summarize the material
(especially if lengthy) for review by analyst) or (3) route to files as
being of reference rather than present reading value.
5. Establish Routin Guides in Each of the Branches.
Routing guides should be developed by the branch documents clerk
in order to facilitate this highly?selective routing to the analyst*
These guides would be used to prepare and maintain the formal routing
guides previously proposed for the TAD Documents Distribution Unit.
The branch guides should be based upon the requirements of the
analysts. Each analyst should give indication to the documents clerk
what subjects or area documents he is interested in obtaining. At the
beginning of a new project either the analyst or his research aide
should transmit to the documents clerk the type of information of special
interest for the project.
To insure that these guides are current, they should be reviewed
each month with the analyst. Formal guides, such as the Speedac records
proposed for IAD) may be established or a loose?leaf notebook may be
maintained*
6. Ex.:9291tcL,L3KapatLEssmis.
Only records of demonstrated value should be maintained by the branch
documents clerk. These should include essential security records (i.e.,
XVI ? 17
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destruction and top secret).
Proposals set forth to improve LR circulation procedures recommend
that all material issued to an analyst be charged to the branch dOcuments
control clerk. To this end a charge file should be established consisting
of a copy of the circulation card accompanying the publication as it is
delivered to the branch. Charges should be filed according to catalog
number.
Recording of receipt of single-copy newspapers will be discontinued
in the proposed new Publications Division of the Office of Intelligence
Services. Branches desiring to maintain follow-up records on hard-to-
obtain newspapers should check with the Publications Division to insure
that the newspaper is received in single copy.
Summary of Recommendations Regarding Receipt
And Distribution of Documents
Six proposals have been made to establish more timely and accurage
processing of documents8
1. Combine in the present Message Center the routing functions and
personnel now in PCS, IR, NIB, and CLB, to form a single "Docu-
ments Distribution Center" in IAD.
2. Organize on an area basis the readers assigned to the Documents
Distribution Center.
3. Install and maintain routing guides to reflect the requirements of
the research division.
4. Route documents directly to the branch level in R to reduce handling.
5. Route despatches to the Reading Panel after the readers have indicated
the number of copies and the distribution for the R Area.
6. Revise documents review and routing at the branch level in accordance
with proposals governing the use of the Current Intelligence Officer
and Research Aides. In this connection establish routing guides in
each of the branches.
XVI - 18
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XVII. THE PROCUREMENT ?AND DISTRIBUTION
OF PUBLICATIONS
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XVII - THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS
OLI has two separate publications processing organizations employing a
total of 41 people at an annual salary cost of $159,000. These two are
the Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD and the Selection and Records Section
of LR.
Each of these units performs procurement and distribution functions
and, as a consequence, a close correlation of organization and procedures
is essential if conflict and duplication is to be avoided. For this
reason special study has been devoted to their present operations.
A - PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
1. Organization
A comparative chart showing the organization of the Civilian Agencies
Branch and the Selection and Records SeCtion is shown on Exhibit XVII-1
on the following page. It should be noted thata
a. In_IAD. The Civilian Agencies Branch contains 23 positions
organized to accomplish two basic functionsa
Procurement. Here 12 positions are assigned, consist-
ing of a Procurement Officer, Fiscal Clerk, four Pro-
curement Aides and a Files and Correspondence unit of
six people. Procurements are made in response to
nontitlen requests received from the R Area (that is,
when the request specifies only the subject on which
pertinent material is desired), and against specific
title requests received from other agencies. Procure-
ment is limited to foreign publications secured through
foreign posts.
Distribution. Ten positions are assigned to routing all
incoming publications to LR, OIR, State and the Intelli-
gence Community; to the maintenance of a record of
receipts; and to the initiation of follow-up action in
the case of nonreceipt.
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b. In LR. The Selection and Records Section contains 18 posi-
tions organized to accomplish the two basic functions, as follows:
Procurement. Eight positions consisting of the Selection
Officer, Searcher, Chief of Operations, and the five
people in the Order Unit perform the purchasing of all
specific titles requested (books, serials, newspapers,
etc.) by the R Area and the State Department at large.
This group places orders either direct (in the case of
cOmmercial vendors) or through IAD (when foreign posts
complete the procurement).
- Distribution. Nine positions are assigned to the routing
of incoming IR-retention publications to R and the re-
mainder of State. For these publications, records of
receipt are maintained., and follow-up action is initiated
in the case of nonreceipt,
Both La and IAD participate in the administration of funds allotted
for the procurement of publications. IR administers all State Department
funds available to R for publications procurement, suballotting a small
portion to IAD. IAD administers all funds allotted by other agencies for
the procurement of materials on individual order for them, No service
charge is made to other agencies for this function.
2. Procedure3 for Publications Procurement
A comparative chart showing the major elements of the procedures
employed in IAD and LR is shown on Exhibit XVII-2 on the following page.
It should be noted thats
Both units process specific orders; IAD for free
material and for material purchased for other
agencies through the Publications Procurement
Officers; La for material purchased for the State
Department.
IR forwards purchase orders to the Foreign Posts
via IAD. Thus IAD has a responsibility for trans-
mission and follow-up of orders initiated by LR,
as well as those initiated by itself.
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PRESENT PUBLICATIONS PROCESSING ORGANIZATIONS IN OLI
DIRECTOR OLI
IAD
DIVISION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION
CAB
1
CHIEF, CIVILIAN AGENCIES BRANCH
Supervises Branch, plans for acquisition,
signs all orders, reviews all correspondence.
PROCUREMENT OFFICER
1. Supervises publication procurement.
2. Procures for Near, Middle, Far East
and Africa.
FISCAL CLERK
1. Records fiscal obligations.
2. Processes vouchers for pay-
ment.
PROCUREMENT AIDES
1. Determine requirements, and
specific sources for publica-
tions obtainable at no cost
from foreign sources.
2. Give guidance to the PPO's.
3. Process orders from other
agencies.
4. Exercise functional responsi-
bilities for exchanges, sup-
port programs, etc.
FILES AND CORRESPONDENCE UNIT
SUPERVISOR
1. Prepares orders, correspond-
ence and follow-up for pro-
curement.
2. Files correspondence and
orders.
NOTES: Numbers shown in upper right corner of boxes indicate number of personnel assigned.
10
DISTRIBUTION UNIT
SUPERVISOR
1. Receives and distributes for-
eign publications from posts.
2. Maintains records of serial
publications received.
3. Initiates follow-up on nonre-
ceipt.
LR
DIVISION OF LIBRARY AND
REFERENCE SERVICE
S&R
CHIEF, SELECTION AND RECORDS
Supervises section, approves orders,
does some selecting.
1
SELECTION OFFICER
1. Reviews and selects publica-
tions purchased on LR initia-
tive.
2. Selects free publications re-
ceived for LR retention.
SEARCHER
1. Searches requisitions in
catalog.
2. Searches unordered items
selected for cataloging.
1
CHIEF OPERATIONS
1. Supervises units.
2. Determines vendor and price of pub-
lications.
ORDER UNIT
SUPERVISOR
1. Prepares the orders, corre-
spondence and follow-up for
procurement.
2. Files correspondence and
orders.
3. Records fiscal obligations.
4. Completes voucher transac-
tions to DF.
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RECEIVING UNIT
SUPERVISOR
1. Receives and routes incoming
publications and documents
within LR.
2. Prints catalog numbers on
books.
EXHIBIT XVH-1
6
SERIALS RECORD UNIT
SUPERVISOR
1. Receives and routes foreign
and domestic serials to State
Department requester.
2. Maintains record of serial
publications received.
3. Routes LR-retention material.
4. Initiates follow-up on nonre-
c
SPECIAL FUNDS
$66,000 ('52)
LR SUBALLOTTED
IAD/WF
JPRS
LC
DEPT. AGRICULTURE
DEPT. LABOR
OTHER WORKING FUNDS
SPECIAL DEPOSITS
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PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATIONS
PUBLICATION IS OBTAINABLE FREE
APPROVAL
Publications Procurement Aide establishes
if de request can be procured free.
Purchase requisitions for specific
title publications from other agen-
cies for which IAD administers
funds.
ESTABLISH TITLE AND SOURCE
Determines for subject requests what
kinds of publications are available.
Determines where obtainable.
FISCAL
Records obligations for
special funds only.
OPERATIONS
MEMORANDA
OF FICIAL
INFORMALS
REPRODUCED
BY CS/R
PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT OFFICERS AT THE FOREIGN POSTS
State Department requisition within R or other State, if for a specific
tide to be purchased, sent to Lit If general subject or free material,
request is sent to IAD.
I A D
OM transmitted to IAD for final prepa-
ration, transmission to field, and for
order follow-up action where required.
LR
PUBLICATION MUST BE PURCHASED
APPROVAL
Requisition approved, bibliographic
data prepared, item searched.
BOOK
ORDER
FORM
Orders placed
through the
foreign posts
EXHIBIT XVII-2
OTHER FUNDS
$74,000 ('51)
T.C.A.
F.S.I.
IE PROGRAM
LR/P
MISSION LIBRARIES
MISCELLANEOUS
PERIODICAL
ORDER
FORM
ESTABLISH SOURCE AND PRICE
Checks bibliographic citation, de-
termines vendor or source and
price of publication.
FISCAL
Records obligations for LR,
NIS, and other funds.
OPERATIONS
MEMORANDA
REPRODUCED
BY
C S/ R
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Purchase requisitions for
specific title publications 4"lir
for other State Department
funds.
AP'
COMMERCIAL
PURCHASE
ORDERS
DIRECT TO DOMESTIC AND COMMERCIAL VENDORS
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CONFIDENTIAL:-J,ficurity _Information
3. Procedures for Distribution of Publications
A comparative chart showing the distribution procedures in IAD and
IR appears as Exhibit XVII-3.
IAD routes all publications received from the posts to LR
and to other agencies. LK routes primarily on a loan basiss, to R and
the rest of the State Department. Both maintain records of item received
as the basis for follow?up action in the case of nonreceipt. The basic
procedures employed are thus almost identical.
B PROBIENS -RISING FROM SEPARATION
Our studies reveal that the separation of the two publications pro?
cessing organizations is unnecessary and undesirable for the following
reasonst
1. ?2pArAD.on i Costly.
Exclusive of the branch and section chief there are 20 positions d
voted to procurement duties and 21 positions assigned to distribution
responsibilities. Waste of manpower resultsa
a. There are nine supervisory positions out of a total of
forty?one positions. "Dual supervision" results in four casesa
Two Chiefs
Two Procurement Supervisors
Two Distribution Supervisors
Two Clerical Order Supervisors
b. Duplication exists in the recording of incoming serial
publications. Eight to ten thousand of the serials received and
recorded by CAB each month are subsequently recorded by the Serials
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Records Unit of SO. The duplication represents the equivalent of one
full?time position.
2. Separation Causes Unnecessary Steps Which Slow Down Processing.
The existence of two publications processing organizations results
In certain instances of interlocking procedural steps.
a. Publications procurement responsibilities are divided
between CAB and S&R. Although it has been established that for the
Department S&R procures specific titles, while CAB procures against
category or subject requests, there are instances where this distinction
is not possible in consummating the procurement. For examplet
If the publication is thought to be procurable free,
CAB will place the requisition on the field. If the
field cannot procure the publication free, then it
must refer the item back to CAB. CAB in turn refers
the requisition to S&R for a purchase order. This
order ia then reprocessed through CAB to the post.
CAB, although it has nine full?time Publications Procurement Officers
in the field, and a complete procurement organization, cannot initiate
the purchase of specific items for the State Department since funds are
held by /R.
b. The procedures employed create additional handling and
filing operations. S&R orders destined for the posts are processed
through CAB. CAB processes all orders from S&R, LC, CIA and all other
agencies. It was observed that 52 percent of the Operations Memoranda
processed during the month of December, 1951, originated in MR. Only
20 percent originated in CAB.
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MAIL CLERK
Sorts into respective area re-
sponsibilities of distributors
Distribution points listed
vertically. Each copy is
recorded separately by
making diagonal line.
IAD
ROUTINE
1. Locate in visible file.
2. Record number of copies.
3. Mark publication for distribution.
HOLDINGS CARD
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PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION PROCE,DURES
NONROUTINE
1. Check files to determine if item
ordered.
2. If not send to Chief for Distribu-
tion.
DISTRIBUTE
Sort and package
RECEIVING UNIT
1. Sort material for S 8z R and
others.
2- S Se R publications sorted
alphabetically.
Distribution listed on
order card. Receipt re-
corded by marking di-
agonal. Number of
copies recorded in
diagonal.
LR
ROUTINE
1. Locate in visible file.
2. Record the number of
copies received.
HOLDINGS CARD
CIRCULATION CARDS
1. L R ?route publications.
2. Prepare and attach to
publication.
NONROUTINE
1. Items not located set aside
? 3 months.
2. If receipt continues, se-
lected for L R cataloging.
L
DISTRIBUTE
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EXHIBIT XVII-3
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This division of functions increases clerical and filing efforts be?
cause S&R orders placed on the posts must be handled twice:
? Book orders. S&A prepares the OM, has it reproduced
by cs/A and forwards copies to CAB.
- Serial arders. S&R prepares the OM and sends it to
GAB, which has copies reproduced by CS/A, and forwards
copies to S&R.
- For each order, SO files two copies and CAB three
copies.
p_s_13.LiSee_o_MiLinst Effective Follow?Un
Both CAB and S&A follow?up serial publications from the records
maintained in their respective visible card files.
a. SO prepares follow?up lists for foreign publications and
forwards them to CAB. CAB reviews its record before processing the
fcllow?up memoranda to the posts. (One recent list from S&R when checked
against CAB records revealed that 50 percent of the items requiring
follow?up were shown as received.)
b. CAB states that it is not reasonable to follow up gratis
publications. One sampling indicated that 70 percent of the cards
established in the files fall into this category. This indicates that
less than one?third of the items recorded will receive follow?up action.
c. Study of CAB records revealed that:
? About one?half of the cards showed no receipt during
the previous six months. Moreover, these cards do not
completely reflect the frequency of the publication
? information required for timely follow?up.
? Observation of follow?up memoranda to the posts indicated
that when action is taken it is sometimes too late to be
effective.
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4. Separation Impairs the Administration of Funds
Both S&R and CAB a.minister funds for the procurement of publications.
(See Exhibit XVII-4.) Of the funds available, IR has control over monies
spent for State Department requirements, and CAB expends monies required
to purchase for other agencies. CAB has only $1,900 suballotted by IR
($1700 for NIS and $200 for self-initiated procurement).
Thus the principal means by which GAB procures raw intelligence in
the form of documents and publications is through the "beg" request (for
gratis copies). %%areas CAB holds the authority for instructing and guiding
the Publications Procurement Officers, and has general responsibility for
acquisition and distribution of foreign publications, S&R holds the
authority over funds for procuring this material. The distinction made
between procurement of specific titles and subject categories is frequently
arbitrary, confusing to the analyst, and wasteful of effort.
Finally, it should be noted that CAB is rendering a purchasing ser-
vice for a number of outside agencies, in return for which it receives
no reimbursement other than the cost of the material itself. Thus, the
State Department is furnishing a portion of its payroll to provide a
purchasing service for others.
0 - ORGANIZATIONAL REVISIONS
The actions suggested to correct the above problems are both
organizational and procedural in nature. Before procedural revisions
can be considered, however, it is necessary to conceive of the proper
organizational solution:
COWIDENTIAL - Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/f : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR PUBLICATIOYS PROCUREMENT IN FISCAL YEAR 1952
Administered by LR
Administered by IAD
FISCAL YEAR TO DATE-1952
LR Funds
$21,330
NIS Funds
8,300
IAD (Suballotted)
1,700
1,500
Other Funds
IE Program
$6,899
LR/P
Mission Libraries
)49790
TCA
6,139
mxoeutAanvuu
29826
nn0
41-19),7U,
*Total
$539828
? 1. TCA. orders expected to amount to $349000.
2. Mission Libraries orders expected to amount
to $35 - $45,000.
3. LR funds received from S&R are earmarked for
books ($69546) and periodicals ($139244).
4. NIS Funds are not earmarked. LR establishes
the basic division of funds 2 Books ($3,950)
and periodicals ($29835)
LR-Funds last year approximated
LR and NIS
Books
Newspapers
Periodicals
Otter (TCA, Fss)
$ 28,000
18,000
159000
$ 61,000
74,000
$1351000
FISCAL YEAR TO DATE-1952
Suballotted from LR
NIS
Regular
$1,700
200 $19900
Working Funds Apia. opriations
(Confidential, CIA-Special,
IAD/147 JPRS) 469428
Other Working Funds
PA__ e - - A ,--
kra Emy- BLI ?I
CLp rG.1: VLC; - 4-x.iluy
Medical Lib., Treasury Dept.
Library)
Procurement Under Foreign Service
Serial (Payment direct from
agency funds - including Library
of Congress, Department of Agri-
culture, Depar tient of Labor)
Special Deposits (Reimbursable
Basis) (American Chemical S oc .
Rand Corp., Stefausson Library,
Johns Hopkins University)
8,350
8,000
1,763
$ 669441
* These funds represent only partial allotments
to date.
Approved For 0026 0002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81$00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
1. Create an Integrated Publications Division to Reduce Supervision
Expense and Lay the Foundation for Overcoming Duplication.
The structure of the proposed division should follow the principles
illustrated in Exhibit XVII-5. To this division should be assigned all of
the functions, responsibilities and personnel now lodged in the Selection
and Records Section of LR and the Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD. In its
combined form the organization should serve the needs of IR, IAD, State
Department and other agencies.
The consolidation will produce several immediate advantages:
a. One procurement organization can make the decision for each
request as to the most suitable method of procurement, and control the
follow-up of procurement requests.
b. Receiving and distribution will be merged under single
supervision.
c. Administration of all funds will be placed under one
jurisdiction.
d. Only one over-all supervisor will be required. Thus, an
immediate savings of one supervisory position should result.
2. Establish in the New Division a Distribution Section
This Section should comprise a Chief, 6 Publications Clerks, 6 Library
Assistants and a Nhil Clerk. An immediate reduction of one supervisory
position should be possible.
XVII -7
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
In accomplishing this amalgamation, two objectives should be soughtt
a. Eliminate the duplication that exists in the recording of
incoming serial publications. The eight Publications Clerks of CAB during
the month of December recorded the receipt of 45,165 publications, an
average of 5,650 per person. During this same period, four positions in
the Selection and Records checked-in 16,570 publications, a monthly average
of 4,140 items. The difference in production reflects the additional
function in S&R of attaching circulation cards.
Workload statistics for the month of December (a reasonably representa-
tive month) were interpreted to determine the degree of duplicated effort.
While statistics are not maintained as to the exact number of copies dis-
tributed by CAB to S&R, estimates made both by S&R and CAB indicate that
duplicate recording now applies to 8,300 receipts per month. Rased upon
an average production rate of 5,650 pieces per month, this represents the
equivalent of almost 1.5 full-time positions.
b. Organize the distributors on an area basis. At present the
Distribution Unit of CAB is organized on an area basis, generally along the
lines of the area divisions established in OIR. The Serial Records Unit
(S&R) is organized on an alphabetical basis. It is recommended that the
new Distribution Section be organized on an area basis to secure the benefits
of area knowledge and to improve routing to the OIR branches. (The workload
by area must be evaluated to determine the most practical personnel
assignments. A domestic unit to check-in and distribute U. S. publications
should be included.)
1.V.U. - 8
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/0( : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION-PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
CHIEF
PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
CHIEF
1
CHIEF
DISTRIBUTION SECTION PROCUREMENT SECTION
13
6
DISTRIBUTORS
PURCHASING AIDES
FISCAL
FILES AND
CORRESPONDENCE
6 PUBLICATIONS CLERKS
6 LIBRARY ASSISTANTS
1 MAIL CLERK
4 PROCUREMENT AIDES
1 SELECTION OFFICER
1 SEARCHER
1 FISCAL SECRETARY
10 CLERKS
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C-IIAX LISIHXR
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
3, Establish In the New goanization a Procurement Section
A single section to select for purchase, process requisitions issue
purchase orders and beg requests, and maintain follow-up of procurement
requests can be formed by the following actions:
- Transfer the Order Unit of S&R (consisting of a Chief
of Operations, Selection Officer, Searcher, one Unit
Chief, and four Clerical Assistants) to the new
Procurement Section.'
Assign to this Section those people involved in CAB
procurement functions, including the Procurement
Officer, four Procurement Aides, and the Fiscal
Assistant. Transfer also from CAB the Files and
Correspondence Unit, consisting of six people.
This Section will require one chief. Internally its structure should
be organized along area interests. An important benefit which should be
sought is the elimination of duplicate filing and typing effort. Study
of correspondence to the field recorded by CAB for the month of December,
1951, indicated that 44 percent of the items handled originated in S&R.
Reduction in this duplicate handling should effect a savings of at least
one position.
D - PROCEDURAL REVISIONS
The remaining recommendations cover a series of procedural revisions
-which should proceed following the amalgamation of the two organization
units. See Exhibits XVII-6 and XVII-7 for proposed work flaw.
1. Merge the Serial Record Files and Create A Uniformly Complete
File Suitable for Distribution and Follow-Up
The first major procedural revision required is a merger of the
two independent records of holdings. In this connection, it is recommended
Approved For Release grAVA
XVII - 9
0002-3
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ggalgiff...4-1=A22111111Y-11fE--2011-22
that:
a. The two files be completely compared and, whenever a dupli-
cate record is found, the basic cards be merged in the file, with the CAB
check-in becoming the permanent record of holdings.
b. There be added to the CAB records such data as required to
accomplish complete distribution and follow-up from one central record.
Frequency of publication and the publisher's name and address are be-
lieved essential to time3y and accurate follow-up. All material which
is to be circulated must be so indicated in the basic record.
2 AssignFullResoibilisty for ecordiandDistributionto
? Area Distributors
? In order to expedite the processing of materials upon receipt, it
should be the objective to assign responsibility for completing both
recording and distribution determination to the area distributors. This
objective implies two changes in procedure, As follows
a. For LB-retention items which are circulated upon receipt,
the distributor who records the item should prepare and attach the
circulation card, release the serial for delivery to the first recipient,
and forward the remaining copies of the circulation card to LR for
inclusion in the charge file.
b. For items on which distribution has not been established
prior to receipt, it is recommended that the area distributor establish
distribution to the fullest possible extent instead of referring such
material to a supervisor for decision. To make this revision possible,
it will be desirable to decentralize the order files to the distributors'
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
Approved For Release zuuliumo : LAA-k01-11315009911-(000100260002-3
DECENTRALIZE
ORDERS AND DMs
ON AREA BASIS
Approved For Rele?,ipo3q0s1g19/9s:194sglaliTOASplig)%1R0011140260002-3
RECEIVING MAIL CLERK
SORT
1
AREA DISTRIBUTORS
NONROUTINE
ORDERED ITEMS
GRATIS,
CHECK ORDER
FILES
ESTABLISH
DISTRIBUTION
NEWSPAPERS
CIIECK FLEXOLINE
FOR DISTRIBUTION-
DO NOT RECORD
IF SINGLE COPY
RECEIPT
RETENTION ITEMS
DISTRIBUTION
ESTABLISHED
SERIAL
PUBLICATIONS
LR ROUTE
SERIALS
LIBRARY
RETENTION ITEMS
DISTRIBUTE
EXHIBIT XVII-6
LR STACKS
ATTACH CIRCULATION
CARD
CHECK IN PUBLICATION,
USING SINGLE ENTRY IF
ALL COPIES ARE RECEIVED
IN THE SAME SHIPMENT.
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te
PROPOSED PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
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SELF
INITIATED
FOR LR
r STATE
(including R)
REQUESTS
SEARCHED
OTHER
FUNDS
MISSION LIBRARY
TYPIST
BOOK
FORM 523
PERIODICAL
FORM 569
4
PROCUREMENT AIDES
DOMESTIC
BCR & LATIN AMERICA
CLASSIFIED BRITISH
EXCHANGE
EXCHANGE PROGRAM
NEAR, MIDDLE
AND FAR EAST
AFRICA
OTHERS
IAD/WF
ARMY MAP SERVICE
ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
LIBRARY
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
DEPT. OF LABOR
AMERICAN CHEMICAL
SOCIETY
RAND CORPORATION
STEFAUSSON LIBRARY
JOHNS HOPKINS
IE PROGRAM
L R/P
TCA
MISCELLANEOUS
EASTERN EUROPE
CENTRAL EUROPE
DETERMINE WHETHER TO BEG OR PURCHASE. DETERMINE
VENDOR OR SOURCE OF MATERIAL, AND PRICE IF PURCHASING
CHIEF
PROCUREMENT
OFFICER
APPROVES
FISCAL CLERK RECORDS
ORDER TYPIST
( Books Separate from
Periodicals)
FORM DS
228-FS
TCA
IE
COMMERCIAL
OPERATIONS
MEMORANDA
ORDERS
TO
FOREIGN
POSTS -
WESTERN EUROPE
INTERNATIONAL
AND MISCELLANEOUS
FORM DS-1
LR
FOREIGN
SERVICE
COMMERCIAL
CHIEF PROCUREMENT
SIGNATURE
1 C210,C,EISAL
ORDERS
11/4.
)
CS/R
REPRODUCED
OM's
DISTRIBUTE COPIES
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)
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S009,91R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Securit Information
desks, and to give these desks responsibility for marking receipt on
the correspondence and searching, as necessary, the Post Order Files
and the Monograph Order Book.
3. Eliminate the Present Receiving Unit in SO and Reduce the
Personnel Assigned.
The creation of a single point of receipt and distribution will
eliminate the need for a subordinate routing point in LR to control
the flaw of materials to Cataloging Section and Ready Reference Sub-
section. Thus the functions now performed in the S&R Receiving Unit
can be largely discontinued, and the remnant duties of sorting docu-
ments marking catalog numbers on publications and routing to the Post
Files assumed by the Cataloging Section itself. A savings of one to
two positions is anticipated.
4. Simplify the RecordingQf
When all Copies Arrive in the Same Shipment. _
Each copy of a publication received in CAB is checked in against
each requesting agency. In those cases where two or more copies of
the same publication are procured, CAB estimates that all copies are
received in the same delivery in over 80 percent of the cases. It
would appear possible to simplify posting in these cases by making a
single entry to indicate receipt of all copies. Partial shipments
would be recorded as at present.
A savings of 5 percent in posting effort shouIl be realized
from the above.
XVII - 1.1
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
5. Discontinue the Recording of Single-Copy Newspapers, and Rely
Upon the Ordering Division to Initiate Follow-UP Actionu
Approximately 44 percent of the items recorded in CAB records are daily
newspapers (35,000 pieces were received in December 1951). Most issues are
received in one copy only (average 1.1 copies per issue). The principal
purpose of the recording is to establish a record of receipt from which
knowledge of nonreceipt can be obtained and timely follow-up action taken.
However, the large volume and high frequency of receipt render this
approach burdensome, and its necessity is doubtful as demonstrated by the
current experience of CAB.
For example, it,was found that GAB finds it practicable
to take follow-up action at present only after several
weeks of missing issues are observed, or until a
specific request for follow-up is initiated by the
ordering division.
- Furthermore, the importance of regular receipt of such
material is of such importance to the analysts that
check-in records are likewise found within the research
divisions.
It is therefore recommended that a new approach to receipts control
be developed with the objective of reducing the posting effort in the
central Distribution Section and relying upon receiving divisions to
initiate follow-up requests in the case of missing numbers. A suggested
procedure is as follows:
a. Establish a consolidated "flexoline" type index of all
newspaper titles showing the number of copies required and the points
to which distribution is to be made.
b. For all single-copy items, limit the function of the Dis-
tribution Section to referring to the index and noting the routing re-
XVII - 12
CONFIDENTIAL - Security information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENT:CAL - Security Information
quired. In these cases advise the first recipient, or recipient with
primary interest, that identification of the need for follow-up is his
responsibility.
c. In the case of multiple-copy receipts, the present central
record should be continued for follow-up control.
A savings of one position is anticipated as the result of the above
revision.
--, 6. Institute A Systematic Follow-Up Procedure, Employing
Mechanical Aids Both for Purchased and Gift Items.
The major functions of a central serial record are (1) to control
distribution and (2) to follow-up delinquent items. The first purpose
is properly served by present records, but the second does not now re-
ceive systematic and thorough attention (a problem which has been found
in other large research libraries). Significant progress in solving
this problem is being made, to our knowledge, at the Department of
Agriculture, the New York Public Library and the library of Congress.
It is urged that the practices of these institutions be given careful
study, and that the following principles be adopted:
a. A systematic plan of "reading the files" to identify items
requiring follow-up should be inaugurated. This can be accomplished by
assigning this duty to a person who will spend full-time on the task,
or by requiring that each distributor spend regular time each week.
One device which is worthy of trial use to expedite files reading is
the use of a movable signal applied to each card for which follow-up
action should be assured. The signal is moved upon receipt of the first
issue. At intervals (such as monthly) a list is made of all titles
XVII - 13
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CONFIDENTIAL ? Security Information
against which no receipt occurred and all signals returned to the start?
ing position. The follow?up clerk then reviews the delinquent cards
and initiates follow?up action as required. While this is not a com?
pletely accurate basis of identifying delinquencies, it achieves a
regular basis of follow?up on a selective basis at minimum cost.
b. Application of the "photo?clerk" now available in SO for
preparation of follow?up notices should be completed as quickly as
possible. This application has been perfected by the Department of Agri?
culture and can be used with similar beneficial results by the State
Department. The equipment is available in S&R, and the Chief of this
Section has a plan in mind for its application as soon as materials are
available.
Follow?up of gift items should be practiced. The major
research libraries, which receive a high percent of their serial publi?
cations free, keep these titles under follow?up control just as they do
purchased titles. It is urged that the State Department adopt the same
practice. Use of preprinted form letters for follow?up of such material
is recommended, following the successful practice now employed by New
York ,Public Library.
7. Explore the Desirability of Suballotting Funds to the Field
for the Initial Purchase of New Periodicals and Newspapers
Raving Intelligence Value. .
Funds expended last year for periodicals and newspapers were limited
to the renewal of subscriptions. It is believed that the Publications
Trocurement Officers located in the area are in the best position to
learn of the availability of new publications of intelligence value.
XVII - 14
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00XEIDENTIAL ? Security Information
It therefore apipears. OlssA.Sbej,o_Set aside specific funds for use by them
in the purchase of new materials, subject t6 control by the Publications
Athrision. ,To this end an, appropriate working fund should be allotted to
,
each PPO for the purchase of initial copies or for initial subscriptions.
Subscription renewals should, of course, remain under the control of the
Publications Division.
8. Determine the Desirability of Adding a Service Charge to Pro?
curements for Other Agencies, to Cover Actual Administrative
Costs.
In order to compensate the Department for its services and provide
a more accurate knowledge of procurement costs to requesting agencies it
is proposed that the following steps be takent
a. Conduct a study of the man?hours and payroll costs (both
"Washington and field) attributable to the servicing of requests from non?
State agencies.
? b. If this cost provides sizable, determine the average cost
of providing procurement and distribution service per title.
c. Advise agencies being serviced that this fixed service
charge will be added, to all fature orders to reimburse State Department
for actual administrative costs.
d. Apply the revenue thus secured to improving the effort de?
voted to follow?up of delinquent items.
-XVII ? 15
COINIDENTIAL ? Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
Summary of Recommendations Regarding The
Procurement and Distribution of Publications
? 1. Create an integrated Publications Division to reduce supervisions
expense and lay the foundation for overcoming duplication.
2. Establish in the new division a Distribution Section.
3. Establish in the new organization a Procurement Section.
4. Merge the serial record files and create a uniformly complete file
suitable for distribution and follow-up.
5. Assign full responsibility for recording and distribution to area
distributors.
6. Eliminate the present Receiving Unit n MR and reduce the personnel
assigned.
7. Simplify the recording of publications having multiple distribution
when all copies arrive in the same shipment.
8. Discontinue the recording of single-copy newspapers, and rely upon
the ordering division to initiate follow-up action.
9. Institute a systematic follow-up procedure, employing mechanical
aids, for both purchased and gift items.
10. Explore the desirability of suballotting funds to the field for the
initial purchase of new periodicals and newspapers having intelli-
gence value.
U. Determine the desirability of adding a service charge to procurements
for other agencies to cover actual administrative costs.
Flow charts depicting the revised flaw of work appear as Exhibits
XVII-6 and XVII-7.
XVII - 16
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
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The above actions should make possible a savings of 7 to 8 positions
as follows?.
Elimination of one Section Chief 1
Eliminate Receiving Unit of SO 1-2
Eliminate one of two Procurement Supervisors 1
Eliminate one of two Distribution Supervisors
Eliminate duplicate recording (8-10,000 items)
Eliminate OM clerical due to duplicate filing of
OMs and follow?up
Discontinue recording of newspapers at a central
point by depending upon ultimate receiver to
initiate follow?up in case item fails to arrive.
Also simplify posting of multiple copy receipts
by use of single posting. 1
Total 7-8
XVII ? 17
CONFIDENTIAL ? Security Information
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
LR CIRCULATION PROCEDURES
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 ? CIA-RDP81S009N(FOOVION60002-3
CONFIDENTIAL becurit
XVIII - LR CIRCULATION PROCEDURES
The Circulation Section of La is organized primarily to provide for
the maintenance of, and the servicing of requests on, the stacks and docu-
ments files.
The Circulation Section is organized into five units:
- An Inter-library loan Unit - consisting of four people
who arrange leans from other libraries, principally the
Library of Congress. Borrowings are estimated at 900
publications per month.
A Stack Unit - consisting of eight people, located in
Old State and Old Post Office, who shelve new material;
charge, discharge and recall circulating volumes; and
maintain the name charge file to clear leaving employees.
A Files Unit.-. consisting of five people who maintain,
charge, discharge, and recall the documents stored in
the Classified Documents Files and the Post File.
A Jeep Service Unit - consisting of two people who make
delivery by jeep to and from the stack areas.
- A Binding Unit - presently inactive, whose function is
to bind newspapers and periodicals stored in La stack
areas.
The procedures employed by the Circulation Section are shown on
Exhibit XVIII - 1 on the following page. These procedures have necessarily
been adapted to the physical separation of the stack areas:
Location LUSA Storage
Old State 6 law books, Congressional serials, bound
newspapers and all J and K catalog series'.
Old Post 1 All remaining books (A-Z catalog series
except J and K) and all periodicals.
SA-1 2 Catalogued classified documents and un-
catalogued documents.
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To service the State Department buildings from these locations two
jeeps make regularly?scheduled hourly trips.
It should be noted at the outset that thepresent management of LR
has been notably progressive in taking steps to overcome certain of the
problems with which it has been faced. As a result of a recent self?
survey the following actions are now being undertaken:
Elimination of the Post file. On April 1, 1952 the
Post file was discontinued. This file will be weeded
to all but one or two percent of its contents. The
small number of field reports of retention value will
be merged into the classified documents file.
? Reliance upon DCA as the basic file of field reports
will eliminate duplication. In the future LR will
rely on DC/It files and reduce the volume of documents
catalogued in LR. In this connection DC/R will permit
enclosures, after their return, to be screened by LR
for cataloguing.
? Reduction in the classified documents file, and re?
location of periodicals in SA-1. This file will be
weeded about 50% by the elimination of field reports.
Once the weeding process has been accomplished, the
periodicals located in Old Post will be transferred
to SA-1. Plana are also underway to re?activate the
binding function and transfer this work to St-1.
A ? FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The effectiveness of LR in the eyes of the Bureaus is to a large extent
measured by the service rendered by the Circulation Section. Comment re?
ceived during our consumer reaction study, supplemented by our observations,
reveals the following problems:
1. Service is Slaw.
One study of 90 circulation requests indicates that an average of four
hours and 15 minutes is required to process a request and make it avail?
able in the Circulation Section. Approximately one hour more is consumed
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CONFIDENTIAL? Security Information
?
?
?
?1) ?
? ?
?
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CIRCULATION PROCEDURES
REQUESTS FOR
CIRCULATION
SERVICE
READY
REFERENCE
Write or receive
circulation card.
Record catalog
number.
OLD STATE DEPARTMENT BUILDING
All j and K catalog series
Same as Old Post
CATALOG
NUMBER
FILE
OLD POST OFFICE BUILDING
Periodicals plus all except J and K
STACK CLERK
Search stack for requested
publication
AVAILABLE
I
I i
I
I I
I I
TELEPHONE POSSESSOR
POSSESSOR RETURNS
FOR PUBLICATION\
RECALL VIA JEEP
I SERVICE
I
I
I
L .00
? I
? 60
",...
00"
? 0.0
POSSESSOR
DOCUMENTS ? ROOM 211 (SA-1)
Classified document files
NOT AVAILABLE
NAME
FILE
Reserve unavailable requests behind possessor's name card
Returned publication ? reserve card charged
?
?
N ? ?
CATALOG
NUMBER
FILE
REQUESTER
BOOK DELIVERED
BY JEEP
NAME
FILE
POST FILE ? BASEMENT (SA-1)
Ilocatalogued documents
Same as Old Post Same as Old Post
NOTES
I. Periodicals and documents circulated. After recording by Selection and
Records, are received by circulation (SA-l)where cards are detached
and publications are immediately forwarded.
2. Almost all periodicals and documents are received from cataloging and
S and R with circulation slips attached. Cards sent to stacks for
charging.
3. Systems employed in other stack areas similar to those shown for Old
Post Office.
4. Two jeeps, on prearranged schedule, serve 2 stack locations and deliver
to all State buildings.
5. If publication charged out, new request is placed behind name card
of possessor. Possessor telephoned for recall. Upon return,
possessor's catalog number and name card destroyed. Next circu-
lation card charged into catalog and name file.
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in delivering the publication to the requestor.
2. Break?up of Stacks is Costly and Contributes to Slaw Service.
There are 13 people, plus two jeep drivers, required to service four
basic areas from which holdings are circulated; Old Post, Old State,
Catalogued Documents File, and the Post file.
One index of the cost of the separate stack locations is observed
from the volume statistics for January 1952. These figures reveal that
the Old State Location, with 6 spaces in poor operating areas, is the
highest cost operation.
Stack or Storage location
Old
State
Old Post
Office
Documents
File
Volume
700
9,596
8,245
People
2
4
4
Unit Production
350
2,399
2,061
3. Recall is Not Vigorously Applied, and Ability to Meet Requests
is Thus Reduced.
A three?day study of 315 requests handled by the Stack Unit in Old
Post Office revealed that 37.5% could not be filled until after recall
action had been initiated. The present recall procedure is not systematic.
As time permits, one telephone cell is made to the possessor of the re?
quested item. A second or third follow?up call is not made, nor is there
provided an automatic date file for loan recalls,
4. The Jeep Service Contributes Much of the Time lost in Filling
Request,
A study of 62 circulation requests revealed that it takes 56 minutes
from the time the request is received by the Ready Reference Unit until
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it is delivered by jeep to the stack area. The same study of 35 completed
requests filled by the stack area revealed that it takes 103 minutes from
the time the stack area has finished the transaction and is awaiting jeep
pick?up, until the publication is actually received in SA-1. Thus 62% of the
time required is consumed by the process of transferring the request and
book between SA-1 and the stack areas.
? RECOMMENDATIONS
A series of steps can be taken to improve Circulation Service to the
Departments
1. Press Efforts to Consolidate All Stacks in the Old Post Office.
It is reported that present negotiations indicate that additional space
may be made available in the Old Post Office Building. Currently IR occupies
almost one?half of the first floor area and has been attempting to obtain
further space adjoining this location on the same floor. It is urged that
the A Area of the Department give active attention to this move in the
interest of improved Circulation Service and reduced operating costs. Sav?
ings of one to two positions should be possible, plus better supervision
and improved utilization of jeep equipment.
2. Move Ready Reference Unit of the Reference Division to the
Circulation Section.
Each circulation request is first received by the Ready Reference
Subsection of the Reference Section, where a circulation card is prepared
and the item is identified in the catalog. The catalog number is recorded,
and the card is held awaiting pick?up by the jeep.
If the request is not available in IR's holdings, Ready Reference
will review the holdings of other libraries, primarily the Library of
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Congress. If an outside source is located, the request is turned over to
the Inter?Library Loan Unit of the Circulation Section for handling.
It is recommended that Ready Reference be assigned to the Circulation
Section so that responsibility for the entire cycle of receiving and filling
a request can be concentrated under single supervision.
The management of La is aware of this problem and is planning steps to
correct it.
? 3. Consider the Installation of Teletype Service between SA-1 and
the Two Stack Areas.
In order to eliminate the 56?minute delay observed in delivering the
circulation request to the stack area, it is recommended that a teletype
system be installed between Ready Reference in SA-1 and the Old State and
Old Post Office Buildings.
An important feature of this equipement is that the paper printing
roll may be pre?printed with the circulation card form on both the sending?
and receiving machines. Thus the receipt of the request at the stack
location will occur simultaneously with its preparation in SA-1.
The following procedure is recommended:
a. Upon receipt of a request for circulation, the Ready
Reference Assistant will identify the catalog number from the catalog.
b. The Assistant will then type the book or document number,
author, title, and requestor on the pre?printed form (only a single copy
on the sending machine will be required).
c. On the receiving machine the message will be recorded on
a four?part set in the same form as it is being typed on the sending
machine.
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d. The circulation copy mill be removed, and the regular pro-
cedure of charging and issuing will proceed.
Under this procedure, analysts and documents clerks would be fur-
nished a pad of requisition slips (size 3x5") in lieu of the four-part
form sets which they are now asked to submit.
The cost of the teletype equipment will be approximately $100 per
month. Installation charges are $25 per machine. Monthly rental charges
are $25, plus 25% tax, for each machine, plus a line service charge each
month of $.75/one-quarter mile.
4. Establish and Enforce a Reasonable Period of loan for All
LR Materials.
LR in the past has followed a policy of permitting unlimited re-
tention of borrowed material which is not in demand. This has had an
important bearing on the speed of circulation service, requiring recall
action for about 1/3 of the items requested. In order to correct this
situation, it is considered necessary to adopt a reasonable loan period
and apply more aggressive measures in its administration. To this end,
it is recommended that a period of one month be established for books
and two weeks for periodicals, and that materials required beyond these
limits be recharged. A regular date tickler file should be established
to systematize the follow-up procedure.
5. Specialize One Jeep_in Servicinzthe R Area, by the Introduction
of a Dispatching System -to Control Jeep Movements.
Since the R Area (SA-1) borrows 55 to 60 percent of the total loans
from the stack areas, it is desirable that one jeep be scheduled so as
to give first preference to LB's principal customer.
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In order to introduce this revision without a reduction in delivery
service to other locations, it is recommended that a system of dispatch?
ing the two jeeps from the stack area be adopted in lieu of the present
fixed itinerary. Dispatching would be based upon the volume of deliveries
on hand for any particular area at the time a jeep is ready for departure.
Thus, one jeep may be assigned by the stack chief to run between SA-1
and the stack areas for a good portion of a day if the current volume
warrants. Then, if the volume drops off or shifts to other buildings,
the stack chief would issue to the driver an itinerary covering other
buildings from which calls had been received. Complete coverage of all
locations would be necessary at less frequent intervals during each day.
To control jeep utilization under the dispatch system, the drivers
should prepare a simple trip report showing: time of departure, desti?
nation, and time of arrival.
These proposals will become feasible with the consolidation of
stacks in one location, as outlined above.
6. Charge Al]. Material Circulated in OIR to the Branch Documents
Clerks.
In order to relate circulation service to the proposed plan of docu?
ments flow control (Chapter XVI), it is recommended that all material
issued to an analyst be charged to the branch documents control clerk.
The documents control clerk will then be responsible for (1) delivering
the material to the analyst and (2) maintaining .a .charge file from which
recall action can be taken. The control clerk can in this manner relieve
the analyst of all concern with recall and recharging, at the same time
XVIII ? 7
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assisting IR in securing the prompt return of material which has served
its purpose.
Sunnary of Recommendations Regarding Circulation Service
1. Press Efforts to Consolidate All Stacks in the Old Post Office.
2. Move Ready Reference to the Circulation Section.
3. Consider the Installation of Teletype Service between SA-1 and
and the Two Stack Areas.
4. Establish and Enforce a Reasonable Period of Loan for All IR
materials.
5. Specialize One Jeep in Servicing the R Area, by the Introduction
of a Dispatching System to Control Jeep Movements.
6. Charge All Material Circulated In OIR to the Branch Documents
Clerks.
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XIX. RECORDS MANAGEMENT
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XIX ? RECORDS MANAGEMENT
During the past three years records management has come to be
recognized as one of the important speciality fields of administrative
management in the Federal Government. Great impetus was given this
subject by the report of the Hoover Commission, followed by the enact?
ment of legislation on June 30, 1949, which gave responsibility to the
General Services Administration for promoting this speciality. The
State Department was quick to follow this lead, creating in 1950 a staff
(DC/RU) to carry forward this program throughout the Department. As yet,
however, the work of this staff has not reached the R Area.
During our interviews and observations throughout R, a number of
conditions were noted which illustrate the need for active, specialized
attention to the problems of indexing, filing, and disposition of
materials retained for use by the divisions.
? When measured in terms of volume alone (see Exhibit
XIX-1) filed materials present a large and ever?
growing administrative problem. Today there are
1,867 filing cabinets of material in the R Area,
an average of 2 1A cabinets for every employee.
Space?wise these cabinets occupy 15,869 squkre feet,
over 17 percent of the space occupied by the R Area.
The significance of this figure becomes even more
apparent when it is recognized that space occupied
by cabinets would house 126 additional employees.
But the accumulation has continued to mount each
year. In the twelve months ended March 1952, 122
new cabinets were added, 100 in OIR. To date efforts
to weed files or reduce the accumplation have been
made only in isolated instances, but with substantial
reduction in cabinets required.
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More important to R's professional operations than
the above is the importance of making files of
maximum use for research purposes, by assuring
proper indexing and the use of suitable filing
aids (cabinets, guides, and folders), Here a pro-
fusion of practices now exist, most based upon
"home-grown" systems. (41. notable exception is the
highly professional numeric classification system
developed by the China Branch.)
PROPOSED RECORDS MAINAGEMENT PROGRAM
Records Managements needs strong emphasis at this time because it
is to the busy producer a housekeeping task which is emu to neglect.
This tendency should be combatted, not only in the interest of economy
of space and equipment, but also because of the greater convenience to
the producer of systematically organized and uncongested files. To this
end the following steps are suggesteds
1. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a Full-Time
"Records ManagmentOfficer"liforThorohFLiarity
Ilith_Ellinka_pIlmsmABELgauipent as well as Modern Record
Retention Practices.
For a period of one to two years the accumulation of records
management problems in R will justify the continuous efforts of a
specialist. It is recommended that this officer be selected in coopera-
tion with DO/RM (if practicable, on detail from this staff) with the
possibility in view of his returning to DO/RM after a satisfactory
program has been installed.
XIX - 2
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INVENTORY OF FILING CABINETS IN TBE R AREA
Organizational
Cabinets
Unit
Number
No. Per
Person
TOTALS
R Area
1,867
2,6
R/ES
21
1.0
OIR
870
1.8
OLI
976
4.2
OIR Divs,
98
1.5
OIR/OD
DRA
92
2.7
DRF
188
2.1
DRN
122
1.6
DRW
146
1.6
DRS
135
1.9
DPI
89
1.9
OM Divs.
4
1.0
OLI/OD
BI*
309
4.6
IAD
63
1.0
IR
600
6.1
Space
Required for I % Total
Number of Cabinets
Added in One Year
12.0229 17.2
178 5.2
7,395 12.9
8,296 26,4
833 8.0
782 17.6
1,598 15.3
1,037 1304
1,241 11.3
1,147 15.6
756 130
34 - 11.8
2,626 26.4
535 7.2
5,100 39.2
* Includes 92 five-and six-drawer 4"x6" card file cabinets.
122
100
6
24
25
15
-17
47
0
22
n a
n a
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2. Inauguate under the Guidance of this Officer a Comprehensive
Attack on Ws Filing and Records Management Problems.
The following efforts should occupy the attention of the Records
Management Officer:
a. The establishment de record-retention schedules. This,
ea the first task, will necessitate a complete analysis of the cate-
gories of materials now in file and the rate at which their active
reference value declines. It should be the objective to prepare in
detail for each division an itemization of materials by classes showing,
Cor example:.
(1) Those which should be held in active files permanently.
(2) Those which can be transferred for storage to the
Records Service Center (operated by DC/M) after.
a specified time interval.
(3)
(4)
Those which can be destroyed after a specific time
interval.
Those which due to bulk and lasting importance might
better be maintained in microfilm form, thus per-
mitting the destruction of the original.
The drawing of these schedules must, of course, be accomplished
in collaboration with the professional staff. For this purpose, the
Director, OIR, might wish to designate a "Committee on Records Manage-
ment" to prepare recommended schedules for his approval the Records
Management Officer to serve as. the secretary and staff officer to the
Committee.
? b. As quickly as retention schedules are approved, the pro-
gram should move into a second phase of systematic weeding of files in
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accordance with the schedule. (Two self-conducted weeding projects
have been noted - one in DRA and another in China Branch - which have
produced significant results.)* As part of this step, regular file
weeding procedures should be developed for Continuing administration
by the administrative officer of each division. For example, one
procedural device sometimes employed is the segregation of material
of temporary value on a current basis in order to facilitate its
transfer or destruction at the agreed-upon intervals.
c. As his final major contribution, the Records Management
Officer should provide direct assistance to each branch in (1) improve-
ment and standardization of the indexing scheme and (2) the improvement
in the physical arrangement and housing of materials, particularly with
respect to the proper use of guides and folders.
3. Adopt the Plan of Replacing Non-Safe Files with Five-
Drawer Units in the Interest of Space Savings.
If all present non-safe files equipment could be replaced with
five-drawer units, a reduction of about 15% in floor space occupied by
files would be achieved. This represents an addition to existing office
space of 2,380 square feet or room for 19 more people.
Five-drawer file cabinets are designed so that very little additional
is added to the over-all height. Many government departments have
standardized on five-drawer cabinets exclusively. In the R Organization,
the top drawer could be used for the night time lock-up in many cases.
* DRAls recent file clean-up reduced file space l6%; the China Branch
saved 3 out of 38 cabinets (8%).
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It is proposed that all new file cabinet equipment be five?drawer
and that five?drawer cabinets be substituted for four?drawer on a
gradual basis,
Summary of Recommendations
1. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a full?time "Records
Management OffiCer."
2. Inaugurate an agressive records management program?
3. Adopt a plan of replacing present equipment with five?drawer units
in the interest of space savings.
XIX ? 5
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XL CHECK LIST SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
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XX. CHECK-LIST STIHURI OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A condensed statement of the findings and proposals growing out
of this survey of the R Area is presented following page 69 in the Sum-
mary Report (Volume I). Volume LI has presented further detail rele-
vant to installation and has thus brought out additional key points
which should be reviewed by management, from time to time, in assess-
ing installation progress,
A total of 110 detailed recommendations is contained in the nine-
teen chapters of Volume II. These are itemized below, with a reference
to the page on which each is discussed:
1. Conduct "market studies" of R Area products and services for
three main purposes. (See Page 1-2):
a. To identify the composition and needs of R's various
audiences.
b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the under-
standing, interest, and acceptance of self-initiated services by these
audiences.
c, To assess, periodically, the specific interests and needs
of the audiences, so that the portion of R's work which should be based
on audience interest is properly performed.
2. At least once each year analyze, by personal interview, the
reactions of those who constitute the target users. These interviews
should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the R
Area and one from the A Area, based upon (see Page 1-6):
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a. A well-chosen cross section.
b. A preplannedardtestedquestionnaire.
c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products
and lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basis, develop means of canvassing
the views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and
those in the IAC agencies. (See Page I-9).
4. Conduct spot studies of consumer attitude from time to time
to meet a particular need expressed by the BG or a division. These
will be aimed at securing views regarding a specific product or cate-
gory of products. (See Page I-10).
5. Following each survey of target users, conduct a discussion
with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of a full re-
port of findings and conclusions. (See Pape I-11).
6. Delegate responsibility for action upon the findings of
consumer reaction studies to line management, rather than to the inter-
viewer, but keep the latter informed of actions taken and enlist his
participation in their implementation when appropriate. (See Page
I-12).
7. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau,
in the form of an "Intelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secre-
tary and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.
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XX. CHECK-LIST SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A condensed statement of the findings and proposals growing out
of this survey of the R Area is presented following page 69 in the Sum-
mary Report (Volume I). Volume II has presented further detail rele-
vant to installation and has thus brought out additional key points
which should be reviewed by management, from time to time, in assess-
ing installation progress.
A total of 110 detailed recommendations is contained in the nine-
teen chapters of Volume II. These are itemized below, with a reference
to the page on which each is discussed:
1. Conduct "market studies" of R Area products and services for
three main purposes. (See Page 1-2):
a. To identify the composition and needs of R's various
audiences.
b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the under-
standing, interest, and acceptance of self-initiated services by these
audiences.
To assess, periodically, the specific interests and needs
of the audiences, so that the portion of R's work which should be based
on audience interest is properly performed.
2. At least once each year analyze, by personal interview, the
reactions of those who constitute the target users. These interviews
should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the R
Area and one from the A Area, based upon (see Page 1-6):
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a, A well-chosen cross section.
b. A preplanned and tested questionnaire.
c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products
and lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basis, develop means of canvassing
the views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and
those in the IAC agencies. (See Page 1-9).
4. Conduct spot studies of consumer attitude from time to time
to meet a particular need expressed by the EG or a division. These
will be aimed at securing views regarding a specific product or cate-
gory of products. (See Page I-10).
5. Following each survey of target users, conduct a discussion
with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of a full re-
port of findings and conclusions. (See Pare I-11).
6. Delegate responsibility for action upon the findings of
consumer reaction studies to line management, rather than to the inter-
viewer, but keep the latter informed of actions taken and enlist his
participation in their implementation when appropriate. (See Page
1-12),
7. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau,
in the form of an "Intelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secre-
tary and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.
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(See Page II-7)*
8. Reinforce this revised approach to consumer relations by a
clear policy regarding the participation of branch chiefs and senior
analysts. (See Page 11-9)*
9* Appoint a "Consumer Relations Coordinator" to conduct the
program of consumer reaction studies outlined. (See Page II-10).
10. Renew efforts to secure more interest in, and systematic
guidance to, It's major program of estimates and research on the part
of leaders in the Department. (See Page 11-12).
11. Take similar steps to secure improvements in interdepartmental
relationships. (See Page 11-13).
12. Develop a visual-oral presentation designed to introduce the
intelligence organization to new Bureau officials. (See Page 111-4),
13. Plan a continuing indoctrination program. (See Page 111-5).
14. Develop and maintain an Intelligence Bibliography for active
use by Bureau desk officials. (See Page 111-6),
15. Provide a personalized reference service for Bureau officials
based upon a survey of reference needs. (See Page 111-7).
16. Lodge responsibility for the development, coordination, and
guidance of the above programs in the Consumer Relations Coordinator.
(See Page III-8).
17. Base initial report distribution on a proper evaluation of
the "audience factor" and the "need-to-know factor" for each report.
In this connection, establish three principal distribution categories:
limited, normal, and general. (See Page IV-4)*
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18. Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with supervising
distribution policies and assuring the most suitable basis of distribu-
tion within each Bureau. (See Page IV-7).
19. Supplant the weekly and monthly lists of projects in process
and completed through the use of "tailored bibliographies" and ab-
stracts. (See Page IV-8).
20. Conduct a periodic audit of mailing lists for serial publica-
tions. (See Page IV-9).
21. Establish a "Classification Control Officer" with individual
authority (to be used when conditions warrant) to establish the secur-
ity classification of reports. (See Page V-4).
22. Establish a systematic program of classification review and
revision to be administered by the Classification Control Officer.
(See Page V-4).
23. Permit the Classification Control Officer to work directly
with classification control officers in other agencies to expedite
classification revision actions. (See Page V-5).
24, Develop field instructions (and utilize other published media)
to increase the usefulness of classified field reports as intelligence
source materials. (See Page V-6).
25. Require each analyst to justify the security classification
he assigns to his reports, and to provide other information helpful in
classification revision actions. (See Page V-6).
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26. Institute a seminar-type analysts' training program in the
proper application of security classification. (See Page V-7)*
27. Establish a 'Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a ?member
of the Estimates Group. (See Page VI-12).
28, Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the branch level
and eliminate the part-time officers at the division level. (See Pace
VI-13).
29. Give consideration to issuing single-topic lB's or "pin-
pointed" distribution and to discontinuing the DIC series. (See Page
VI-16),
30. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal
instrument for the development and processing of written current in-
telligence products. (See Page VI-16),
31. Provide a plan for the periodic evaluation of the current
intelligence production of OIR. (See Page VI-17).
32, Eliminate the requirement for the production of DDB', ex-
cept where pronounced benefit can be derived. (See Page VI-18).
33. Explore the relative roles of OIR and CIA/OCI with respect
to the production of current intelligence in State Department's fields
of dominant interest. (See Page VI-l8),
34. Identify at once a set of simple techniques which will im-
prove the textual display, pointedness of presentation, and ease of
reference to reports. See Appendix A for actual illustrations. (See
also Page VII-5)0
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35. Publish these techniques immediately to all anaiyats, super-
visors, and editor! and supplement them with frequent bulletins il-
lustrating current cases of good as well as undesirable practices.
(See Page VII-6).
36. Appoint a well-qualified editor in each OIR division. (See
Page VII-7).
37. Develop a "Report Preparation Manual" as a long-term project.
(See Page VII-8).
38. When the Manual is completed, conduct systematic training
in report preparation both for analysts and typists. (See Page VII-9).
39. Improve the readability and attention-getting value of Rts
reports by continuing attention to physical appearance. (See Page
40. Retain a recognized figure in the field of social science
research to conduct a systematic appraisal of RIB professional staff at
intervals of approximately two years. (See Page
41. As a continuing objective, pryvide Research Aide! (GS-7) to
support the work of the analysts and to permit the most productive
use of professional time. (See Page Ix-6).
42. Determine the proper placement of Research Aides in the or-
ganization by a regular program of "Personnel Requirements Analysis."
(See Page IX-9).
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43. Concentrate special program and special project work in a
small number of specialists in each branch. This suggestion is ad-
vanced in order to minimize interruptions to the regular production
of timely research by the research analysts, (See Page IX-2.3).
44. Recognize the strong incentive provided by realistic man-hour
estimates and project deadlines. (See Page IX-15)*
45. Apply clearly defined elements of project management by first
line supervision. (See Page IX-16),
46. Provide adequate supporting services to the analysts so as
to eliminate the use of professional time for clerical or administra-
tive functions; and improve LR service. (See Page IX-18).
47. Formally request the Foreign Service Institute to establish
a reading rate improvement course as quickly as possible. Assist the
FSI in establishing the course, (See Page X-8),
48,, Schedule RIs participation in the reading rate improvement
course. (See Page X-8).
49. Establish a permanent Committee on Professional Development,
(See Page 41-6).
504 Establish the position of "Training Coordinator" in the Divi-
sion of Executive Services. (See Page XI-7)0
5l, Institute regular branch staff meetings throughout the R or-
ganization. (See Page XI-9),
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52. Establish an organized program of professional seminars,
of three types. (See Page XI-10):
- General Interest
- International Relations
- Economic
53. Adopt a program of personalized and inspirational guidance
for senior analysts. Do this on a scheduled basis. (See Page XI-12).
54. Adopt and use a "project performance rating" system for analysts
to supplement the regular State Department performance rating. Use
the proposed system to recognize and encourage good performance and
to suggest specific performance factors subject to improvement by the
analyst. (See Page XI-14).
55. Develop a program of field trips on a scheduled basis for
senior analysts to improve country and area knowledge, as well as pro-
fessional skill and research performance. (See Page XI-15).
56. Organize a program of Bureau assignments for analysts. (See
Page XI-16).
57. Institute a program of executive development specifically
"tailored" to the needs of senior analysts selected as potential super-
visory candidates. (See Page XI-17).
58, Install the unit office plan of office layout in one branch of
a research division as a test installation. Expand the use of this
equipment following appraisal of the test installation. (See Page XII-6).
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591. Establish report writing rooms in several locations in SA-1
with unit office plan furniture and dictating equipment. (See Page
XII-8)0
604 Provide dictating equipment for those analysts who will demon-
strate effective use. Establish a short training course for dictators
and transcribers to assure proper operation and maximum use, Consider
placing dietating equipment in LR for analyst use, (See Page
61. Develop a space management plan for the R organization in-
cluding (see Page ?XII-10):
a A statement of objectives and actions.
b. A schedule of action.
c. A vigorous housekeeping program,
d. Regular assistance in developing efficient office layouts.
62. Expand the responsibilities and authorities of the Space
Officer (Division of Executive Services). (See Page XII-11).
63. Devote attention to production planning and control which
is as vigorous and competent as that now applied to the professional
aspects of the work. (See page XIII-8).
64. Install/ as quickly as pilot testing has been conducted/ a
complete production planning and scheduling procedure/ as outlined in
detail in Appendix G. (See page XIII-10).
65. Develop from the approved work plan a specific man-hour objec-
tive and time schedule for each project. (See Page XIII-12).
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66. Utilize work planning and control data in developing budget
presentations and in allocating Rts manpower and financial resources.
(See Page XIII-1)i).
67. Utilize the Tproved work plan as a primary basis for the
forward planning of raw intelligence requirements in each branch.
(See Page XIII-15).
68. Delegate to the Requirements Planning Coordinator responsi-
bility for continuing study of new and more productive devices for
planning and procuring intelligence materials. (See Page XIII-17).
69. Strengthen the Estimates Group as tne top program and quality
control arm of the Director of Intelligence Research. (See Page XIV-11).
70. Establish a new staff, supplanting PCS, to develop techniques
for work planning and scheduling and to keep their functioning under
continuing scrutiny. (See Page XIV-14).
71. Establish in each division an Assistant Chief (Production)
to concentrate on all aspects of control management. (See Page XIV-21).
72. Place functional coordinators in the Division of Functional
Intelligence. (See Page XIV-24).
73. Eliminate divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence
and support programs by designating analysts with primary responsibil-
ity for these functions in each branch. (See Page XIV-24).
74. Create an integrated Office of Intelligence Services to ad-
minister all functions which provide supporting service to the research
organization, to the State Department, and to other IAC agencies.
(See Page XIV-26).
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75. Establish four divisions within the Office of Intelligence
Services, transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence Research.
(See Page XIV-26).
76, Revise the functions of the Administrative Officer in each
division to those of a full counterpart of the Office of Intelligence
Services. (See Page 41.1-V-30).
77. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a fully-function-
ing, over-all manager of the R Area. (See Page XIV-33).
78. Revise the present system of meetings, reports, and instruc-
tions to reflect the organization and control proposals previously
outlined. (See Page XIV-34).
79. Renew efforts to strengthen the teamwork on intelligence
research planning at the top policy levels in the Department and among
leaders of the IAC agencies. (See Page XIV-36).
80. Adopt the microfilm unit-card plan as a rapid and inexpensive
method for the maintenance of biographic files. (See Page XV-7),
81. Produce field exchange and peripheral biographic cards as
a by-product of the microfolm unit card plan. (See Page XV-12).
82. Test the proposed BI files maintenance procedure and develop
refinements through a pilot installation in one branch. (See Page
XV-17)',
83. Consolidate existing biographic card files through the use
of space-saving features of the microfilm *window jacket card." (See
Page XV-12).
alrEaseigiaeieID, -ggai5PIPIrgagalig0
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84. Establish a Central Production Unit in BI to fix responsi-
bility for producing a finished card ready for filing. (See Page )7-'19).
85. Combine, in the present Message Center, the routing functions
and personnel now in PCS, LR, MIB and CLB, to form a single "Documents
Distribution Unit" in IAD. (See Page XVI-8).
86. Organize the readers assigned to the Documents Distribution
Unit on an area basis. (See Page XVI-10).
87. Install and maintain routing guides to reflect the requirements
of the research divisions. (See Page XVI-12).
88. Route documents directly to the branch level in R to reduce
handling and delay. (See Page XVI-12).
89. Route despatches to the Reading Panel after the readers have
indicated the number of copies and the distribution for the R Area.
(See Page WI-13).
90. Revise documents review and routing at the branch level in
accordance with proposals governing the use of the Current Intelligence
Officer and research Aides. (See Page XVI-14).
91. Create an integrated Publications Division to reduce super-
vision expense and lay the foundation for overcoming duplication.
(See Page XVII-7).
92. Establish a Distribution Section in this Division. (See
Page XVII-7).
93. Establish a Procurement Section in the new organization.
(See Page XVII-9).
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940 Merge the serial publications record files and create a
uniformly complete file suitable for distribution to designation and
follow-up for receipt. (See Page XVII-9),
95. Assign full responsibility for recording and distribution
to area distributors. (See Page XVII-10).
96. Eliminate the present Receiving Unit in S&R and reduce the
personnel assigned. (See Page X1II-11).
97. Simplify the recording of publications having multiple dis-
tribution when all copies arrive in the same shipment. (See Page
XVII-11),
98. Discontinue the recording of single-copy newspapers and rely
upon the ordering division to initiate follow-up action when necessary.
(See Page XVII-12).
99. Institute a systematic follow-up procedure, employing mechan-
ical aids, for both purchased and gift items. (See Page XVII-13).
100. Explore the desirability of suballotting funds to the field
for the initial purchase of new periodicals and newspapers having in-
telligence value. (See Page XVII-14).
101. Determine the desirability of adding a service charge to
procurements for other agencies to cover actual administrative and
handling costs. (See Page XVII-15).
102. Press efforts to consolidate all stacks in the Old Post Of-
fice. (See Page XVIII-4).
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103. Move Ready Reference to the Circulation Section. (See Page
XVIII-4).
104. Consider the installation of teletype service between SA-1
and the two stack areas, (See Page XVIII-5).
105. Establish and enforce a reasonable period of loan for all
LR materials. (See Page XVIII-6).
106. Specialize one jeep in servicing the R Area by the intro-
duction of a dispatching system to control jeep movements. (Eee Page
107. Charge all material circulated in OIR to the branch docu-
ments clerks. (See XVIII-7).
108. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a full-
time "Records Management Officer." (See Page XIX-2).
109. Inaugurate an aggressive records management program. (See
Page XIX-3).
110. Adopt a plan of replacing non-safe files with five-drawer
units in the interest of space savings. (See Page XIX-4).
Summary of Cost and Savings
As a principle, we feel that the objective of the R Area should
be to institute the improvements proposed in organization and control
()Chapters XIII and XIV) within the framework of Rus present budget
and personnel ceiling, cutting back if necessary on present overhead
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staffing. These revisions are considered essential to securing proper
use of Ills products and services, and if vigorously implemented will
materially improve the production capacity of the Area.
However, the potential recurring savings discussed in Chapters
XV, XVII, and XVIII are of such magnitude as to offset* the net payroll
increases recommended in all categories, except the use of Research
Aides. (These cannot be introduced immediately unless R finds it pos-
sible to expand its research staff or unless the personnel requirements
studies proposed in Chapter IX reveal the practicability of effecting
replacements of analysts with aides as normal turnover occurs.) This
conclusion is based upon the following:
1. Of the New Positions Proposed, Eleven Are, in Effect, Pro-
vided in the Present Organization of the Department:
a. The Director of Production Coordination is the counter
.-
part of the present head of PCS.
b. The Program Planning Coordinator is a position currently
provided for on the staff of PCS.
c. The Reports Analyst, reporting to the Program Planning
Coordinator, is currently (at least in part) in R/ES.
d. The Consumer Relations Coordinator proposed in Chapter
II will perform functions assignable in part to the present Intelli-
gence Advisers. Thus if it can be assumed that advisers will be
*After full installation requiring one to two years.
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discontinued in one or more cases, the payroll savings will more than
offset this new responsibility.
e. The positions of Distribution Review Officer and Editor-
ial Standards Officer are, in effect, successors to positions now es-
tablished in PCS.
f. The Requirements Planning Coordinator is, in large mea-
sure, a successor to the present head of ERS.
g. The Assistant for External Research is equivalent to
the present assistant to the head of ERS.
h. The Assistant for Guides and Evaluation is conedered
equivalent to one of the staff members assigned to requirements planning
in IAD.
I. The Assistant for Foreign Service Relations is currently
provided for in the organization of WES.
j. The Current Intelligence Coordinator discussed in Chap-
ter VI is the position now established in PCS.
It is assumed that existing clerical support to the above officers
is now available from within the R Area.
2. There Are Seven New Functions Recommended Which Require Some
Expansion in Present Personnel Resources (7-10 Positions).,
If all the revisions suggested are carried into effect, some ad-
ditional staff would be required. These functions in the order of
their immediate importance, are as follows:
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a. Assistant Division Chiefs (Production). At least two
divisions will require an additional position to fill the post of As-
sistant Division Chief (Production): DRA and DRN. DRW has recently
requested such a position. DFI should not require a new position if
the present Staff Assistant is assigned the production control responsi-
bility. In DRF a special problem exists; if full use of the executive
payroll were available to Ro funds would be available to support an
Assistant Chief (Production). DRS now has an Assistant Chief but a
realignment of duties would be required if his time is to be devoted
more fully to the production management responsibility*
The filling of these posts is the most essential of the ad-
ditional positions required,
b. Division Editors. Second in order of importance to the
major improvements proposed is the establishment of uniformly qualified
Division Editors. Two divisions now lack such personnel: DEA and DPI.
The latter may not require this position
Q: The Classification Control Officer is a new function,
though perhaps not a full-time one. The most suitable arrangement
might result from appointing such an officer to supplement and super-
vise the work of the Distribution Review Officer and the Editorial
Standards Officer,
d. TWO Senior Management Analysts are proposed to conduct
studies, particularly those outlined in Chapter IX,
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e. The Training Coordinator is a new function proposed for
the Division of Executive Services. This position should be full-time
at the outset, it is believed.
f. The Intelligence Evaluation, Officer is a new function
of the Estimates Group. As discussed in Chapter XIV, it may be found
that this effort can be accomplished as an additional duty of the EG
Secretary and the Current Intelligence Officer.
g. The Records Management Officer is a new function of the
Division of Executive Services. It is possible that an incumbent for
this position could be furnished by DC/RM.
A rough estimate of payroll costs arising from the above steps
indicates that between seven and ten new positions may be required,
at a payroll cost of C;57,000 to $84,C00. From the priority listing,
a decision can be made as to those functions to be deferred if funds
are unavailable. The minimum and maximum additions are:
Position
Assistant Chief
Division Editor
Classification Control
Officer
Management Analyst
Training Coordinator
Intelligence Evaluation
Officer
Records Management Officer
Minimum Maximum
2
1
1 (part time)
2
1 (part time)
(Additional Duty)
11111??
7
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4
1
1 (full time)
2
1 (full time)
(Additional Duty)
1
10
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3. Against This New e:_sseRecurinA=l_a_ArinooLlt!y00
Appear PossIble.
These savings are represented as follows:
- The merger of R/ES and OLI should result in savings of 1 super-
visory position having a salary equivalent of approximately
U0,000.
--The introduction of microfilm unit card processing in BI should
produce a net annual savings of approximately 137,500. It
is recognised that this saving will not be obtainable during
the first two years due to the cost of experimentation and
files conversion. The files consolidation offered by the
plan presents additional equipment and office space savings
not enumerated here.
- The merger of publications procurement and distribution func-
tions should release between 7 and 8 positions having an es-
timated annual value of 127,000.
- The savings which should accrue from the relocation of book
stacks located in Old State Building should produce annual
payroll savings of approximately 1,6,000.
Savings Achieved, After Providing for New Payroll Costs)
111.12LEaver a Portion of the NewFurrdEuirriiient
Expense.
Three elements of furniture and equipment expense have been sug-
gested:
The installation of teletype equipment to expedite communica-
tion with the stack areas, estimated at 110200 per year in
rental costs,
- The purchase of dictating machines, if carried to a maximum
degree, should not exceed 149,000 (based upon providing ap-
proximately one unit for each 4 analysts, and including tran-
scribers). Since the useful life of such equipment is at
least five to ten years, this investment would be on the order
of 110,000 per year.
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- The utilization of unit office plan furniture should be com-
puted on the basis of the net increase in normal furniture
replacement costs. One new and additional item of expense
which would not be thus offset is the establishment of four
report writing rooms each equipped with about five packaged
units. This expenditure should not exceed C0,000 and again
should be prorated over several years. More extensive invest-
ment in such furniture should be preceded by a sufficient
trial period to demonstrate the greater economy from the point
of view of analyst utilization which might be achieved. It
is our conclusion that one unit of 27 analysts night be pro-
vided with such furniture at a cost of C32,000 ($2,400 per
year on the basis of five-year amortization).
The pro rata annual cost of the above items approximates a figure
of -15,000. If the new payroll cost is near the minimum figure cited
above (57,000) ample savings would be available to cover furniture and
equipment expense.
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A ? ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS
IN STYLE AND FORMAT
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APPENDIX A
ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS
IN STYLE AND FORMAT
APPENDIX
(Appendix to Chapter VII)
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APPENDIX A
ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT
IN
STYLE AND FORMAT
By Improving Report Appearance
By Improving Readability
By Reducing Time Required to Read
By Assisting the Reader to Comprehend
PART I ? IR 5769? As Originally Issued
PART II ? What Was Done to Improve IR 5769
PART III ? IR 5769 ? As Revised
APPENDIX A
(Appendix to Chapter VII)
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SECURITY INFORivIAT I ON
Intelligence Report
No. 5769
.PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Intelligence Research
March 5, 1952
RZ,41/0/4. -rnir
1...3 IS INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT of DEPARTMENTAL POLICY
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CURTPTOTT
0T
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SECUR-rTY?IWORIAT I ON
This paper was based on available materials covering the period
January 1452 to Present, analysis of whibh was concluded on
March 3, 1952 by Division of Research for Far East.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT
I. PATTERN OF TRADE BENEEff JAPAN AND KOREA
II, KOREAN IMPORT REQVIREMETS AND EXPORT POTENTIAL 3
A. Requirements 3
B. Koreas Export Potential 4
C. Export Markets in Japan 6
III, JAPAN'S ABILITY TO MEET KOREAtS IMPORT
REQUIREMENTS 7
V. CONCLUSION a
This report is disributod by OIR/IDR, telephone ext. 4148
or 4149. When it has outlived its usefulness please return
it to OIR/IDR, Room ;W, SA-1.
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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE IIITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
ABSTRACT
Postwar trade between Japan and the Republic of Korea
has been at abnormally low levels, amountiyag roughly to
15 million each way. Prospects for an expansion of this trade
in the immediate future are dependent on whether Korea obtains
UN or other international financial assistanoe to meet its
requirements for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Should such assistance become available, Japan could play a
significant role i supplying eapital equipment, manufactured
consumer goods, coel and chemical fertilizer needed by Korea,
Apart- from an assistance program financed by outside
sources Korea-Japan trade will be governed largely by Korea 2s
ability to expand production of rice for expeet. Exports to
Japan of ores and minerals, marine products, and other
commodities can be expanded but are of much mailer importance
than potential rice exports, which would find a ready market in
Japan. Trade between the two countries might also be expanded
through the extension of long-term Japanese credits, both
governmental and private, should Korea in the future overcome
existing political and psychological blocks against dealing with
Japan. At present, however, Japan does not have strong
economic incentives to embark on a large trade-credit program
to Korea.
REST1tICTI,0
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SECURITY INFORUATION
PROSPECTS OF J.tRANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Is PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN A. KOREA
From 1910 until 1945, more than 90 percent of Korea's
total trade was with Japan pro)er. In the immediate pre-World
War II period almost all Korean trade, was within the Japanese
Empire (including Lanohuria). Total trade with Japan in 1938
and 1939 amounted to 370 and 457 million dollars respectively.
Broadly speaking, the prewar pattern of trade. consisted
of an exchange of Korean rice, marine products, minerals, and
textile raw materials for Japanese textile manufactures,
machinery, metal products, vehicles, processed foodstuffs and
beverages, fertilizers, and sundry goods. Because of Japan's
desire to industrialize Korea for the purpose of strengthening
Japan's economic base, trade in the 1930's showed a consistent
excess of Korean imports over exports to Japan. machinery,
metal manufactures, and vehicl.. imports from Japan showed a
specially significant increase each year beginning in the mid
1930's.
As a result of World War II, Korea's economy, although
. not subjected to extensive physical damage, was disrupted by
political and economic separation from Japan and by the division
of the county into northern and southern political zones. Vdth
the partition of Korea and the tightening of the iron curtain
at the 38th parallel, the southern zone became heavily
dependent on eco)mic aid from abroad.
The Republic of _Korea (RoK), which. was established in
1948 in the area south of the 38th parallel, is predominantly
dependent on agriculture and fishing, and hs only minor light
and almost no heavy industries. US economic aid brought about
a degree of recovery through reconstruction of industry and
agriculture, but with the beginning of hostilities in June 1950,
much of this progress was negated.
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About 90 to 95 percent of the value of ROMs foreign
trade during the past-47.or1d War IT period has been with the
United States. Tnis reflects the al,Aost complete dependence
of Korea on US appropriated ail imports during the period.
Postwar trade with Japan, a:al-lough second in importance to
the US, was relatively as well as absolutely at low levels,
The following table presents Japanls trade vdth the ROK in
the years 1947-51:
1947
1948 1949 1960
1951a
1.11 million US dollars)
Japanese exports
,;(3 the
ROK (f.o.b.)
Japanese 'Imports from
18.9
17.9 15.9 18.1
9.1
the ROK
2.5
6.1 3.8 15.0
5.3
Balance
16.4
12.8 12.3 2.1
3.8
Data are for the period January through August 1951; total
Japanese exports to and impoi-ts from the PDX might be
estimated to have amounteu to about ,i;13 million and $7
million respectively,
The commodity pattern of postwar trade between the ROK
and Japan has been generally similar to prewar years, although
the volume has been very much les. One significant difference,
however, has been the fact that rice exports from Korea, which
were most important in the brewaryears, were not exported
from the ROK, except in 1950. Even in that year, the ROK rice
exports to Japan totalled only about 90,000 metric tons as
compared to an annual average 'xport of more than one million
metric tons in tne prewar years. The relatively low. level
of ROrX rice exports even in 1960 and the absence of any rice
exports in the earlier postwar years has been due to:
(1) the estimated !_norease of more than one-third in the
population of the ROK from the mid-1930!s; (2) the law
production of rice. caused by decreased acreage in rice and the
lower productivity per trait of land brought on by a shortage
of artificial fertilizers; and (3) the considerable increase
in per capita conaumption of rice in the ROK, offsetting in part
the deficiency other grains which before 1945 were an
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important component of the Korean diet. Recent hostilities,
of course, have once again reduced prospects of significant
exports of rice in the immediate future.- Other commodities
Which the ROK normally has fur export :hve'lwls0,.been.affeeted
adversely.
Trade between the two countries is at present conducted
under the terms of a trade agreement concluded in March 1949
and subsequently renewod in 1950 and 1951.. It calls for the
conduct of trade on an open account basis wdth imbalances
settled in US dollars. Tho ROK deficits which have occurred
each year from this trade have been met from US aid funds,
chiefly through ECA.
II. KOREAN r PORT REqUIREMEPTS AND EXPORT POTENTIAL
AG Requirements
Based on ECA, UNKRA, and GRIN (Civilin Relief in Korea)
programs as well as on comoercial imports, Korean civilian
import requirements on an annual basis during -the present war
emergency may be estimated at 0.80 Million. The major commodity
import items are listed belag:
In millions of US dollars
Foodstuffs 05
Medical and sanitary supplies .15
Clothing, shoes, and textiles 40
Fertilizer and pesticides
50
Coal
8
Petroleum products
5
Transportation equipment
5
Miscellaneous raw materials
5
Raw cotton and yarn
10
Other_ manufactured goods
7
These esti estimated import requirements are based chiefly
on relief considerations and do not provide for large scale
reconstruction of the economy or for full employment of exist?
ing production facilities.
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Should a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation
of the economy be instituted by UNKRA after the cessation of
hostilities, import requirement for the first yearsincluding
relief import items, may be expected to be approximately
$260-$300 millionl. In the subsequent two or three years,
import requirements probably could be reduced gradually to
between $100 to $150 million a year.2 These rough estimates
are based on the miniMum imports of material and equipment
(or parts) required to restore destazed industrial plants,
coal mines, transport and public utilities necessary to the
economic life of the countryeand on minimum requirements of raw
cotton, bituminous coal, fertilizer, lumber and cement.
Furthermore in making these rough estimates consideration has
been given, on the basis of past experience, to Korea's
capacity to absorb economic aid at a rate which would not
jeopardize internal economic stability by extraordinary demands
on limited domestic resources.
B. Korea's Export Potential
Korea's export potential, even with the inclusion of rice
which is by far the most important single item, is not
significant and recent hostilities have reduced further the
immediate export possibilities. It is estimated, however, that
once an armistice is reached and rice production and collection
is improved, Korea could export substantial quantities of rice,
1. The UNRRA program, which was prepared in October 1950, for
US fiscal year 1952 roughly estimated reconstruction and
rehabilitation requirements at 4250 million. Since this
program was prepared, price increases have occurred which
would maxe a comparable program more expensive.
2. In the ECA budget estimate justification for US fiscal
year 1951, it was estimated that Korea's import require-
ments, including invisibles, might be reduced to
approximately PO million by 1954, a year in which US
aid would no longer be required. It was projected that
by that time ECA's industrialization and development
program would have substantially raised the level of
economic activities in the ROK.
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5
whioh would contribute toward, reaucing tAe need for foreign
assistance. Though rice expolts in the prewar years averaged
more than one million metric tons annually, exports in the
future cannot be expected at such a level, Because of a
larger population and higher per capita cehsumption, Koreals
ability to export rice may roach no more than 500,000 motric
tons, .Exports of this magnitude of courso, would be dependent
upon the availability of adequate quantities of commercial
fertilizer, weather conditions, and upon tie governmentls
determination to teet its balance of paymeLts deficit out of
its awn trade re iurces. Other exports of Korea, in the order
of their current importance include ores and minerals,
marine products, scrap iron, fibers and products, and
miscellaneous go)ds.
Currently Korea is in a slight food deficit position.
In the absence of rice exports, Koreats.export potential is
very low, Excluding the possibility of rice exports) Koreats
total exports in 1952 are estimated at.; follows:.
Cr-as and minerals
Marine products
Scrap iron
Fibers and products
Others
Total
?
. ? t?
?
In millions of US dollar'
3
3
There are long-range possibilities of considerably
expanding the volume of exports of some of these commodities,
but a number of obstacles must be overcome. It should be
noted, however, that even if exports of the above items should
be increased appreciably in the future, their contribution to
Koreats foreign exchange receipts would be relatively small
compared to potential receipts from rice exports,
1. A recent estimate made by the United Nations Command,
GHQ, G-4, Korean. Econoaic Aid Division, in Civilian Relief
and Econom!ic Aid, Korea, February 13, 1;52, states that
WrEh favorable conditions this Summer and Fall, Korea
might have available for export after November, about
200-300,000 tons of rice. RESTRICTED
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Korea's ores and minerals exports include tungsten,
amorphous and crystalline graphite, kaolin, manganese,
molybdenum, fluorspar, mica, and bismuth. US financial and
technical assistance has recently been instrumental in
speedily restoring tungsten output because of the strategic
importance of this metal, but mines producing other metals
and minerals are in nee of repair and are currently operating
below capacity, :f at ail. In addition, inadequate financing;
shortage of food in mining areas, inadequate supply of mining
equipment and electric power and the threat of guerrillas have
plagued tie mining industry and retarded its recovery.
Korean. marine Production can be expanded considerably,
and if markets can be developed, marine products could contribute
significantly towards increabing !Cereals forei.gn exchange
receipts. Recently, marine landings have again reached the
pre-1950 level.
Other commodities that Korea has for export are of
relatively minor importance. Scrap iron exerts may continue
to be of some innortance for the next few years in view of
current world-wide shorta.4e of scrap, but cannot be expected
to be a recurring item. Similarly other Korean exports
including heap waste, hog bristles, raw silk, cow bristles,
furs, honey wax, and cow bone would be mnall in value terms.
C. Export Aarkets in Japan
Rice, the Aost inanortant single commodity that Korea
will eventually be able to exnort, weuld find a ready market in
Japan. The Japanese prefer Korean over Soutneast Asian rice
since they imported it in substantial quantities for many years
before 1945. Furtheriaore, Japan's food import requirements are
risLig each year since the increase in population is not matahed
by an increase in domestic food production. Since the type
of goods required by Korea can be me-c in large part by
Japan, Koreas ride exports are likely to be marketed in Japan,
As long us price of other supnllers are not more attractive.
Other ieems that Inight be expected to have a ready
market in Japan are of relatively small importance as earners
of foreign exchange. Korea can export to Japan 811011 items as
manganese ore, kaolin, graphite, fluorspar,- tale, h9mp_.
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7
waste and fish oil. Marine products exports of Korea on the
other hand are not :nicely to find a ready market in Japan.
III. JAPAN'S ABILITY TO MEET KOREA'S IMPORT REQUIREMENTS -
The development of Japan' e industrial production and
foreign- trade has been accelerated since the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea. Japan's present expert potential could
meet aleiost any demand that _1dg:et be made for the supply of
manufactured consumers' goods, cement and of equipment used
in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Republic of
Korea's mines, industries and. agriculture? Japan's industrial
production index which stood at 1428 in December 1951
(1952-36 equal 100) is,diontinuing to rise while experts
during 1951 were less than 50 percent of the prewar period,
in real terms. Even with a. substantial increase in exports
to other areas in 1952, it is estimated that Japan would have
no difficulty in meeting most of the potential import require-
ments of Korea, except for .raw materials such as raw cotton and
petroleum. At present, Japan can supply a portion of Korea's
nitrogenous fertilizer requirementsc, Nitrogenous fertilizer
production in Japan, however, is rapidly increasing arid it is
estimated that larger quantities could be supplied, within the
near future. Jaan can supply the entire bituminous coal
requirement of Kerea. A -.further indication of Japan's
ability to supply ROK import requirements can be obtained from
the size of UN special procurement in Japan during the one year
period following the outbreak of hostilities in June 1950.
During that period contracts for suppliestaled 250 million,
while services totaled about 98 million dollars, ,Commodities
procured in Japan for ',iorea included textiles clothing, rubber
manufactures,.machinery, metal products, and transportation
and communication equipment. These commodities were supplied
at a time when Japan was able to aonieve a postwar record level
of commercial exports elsewhere.
Japan's ability to supply, however, should be qualified?
Although Japan's productive capacity is considerable, its
utilization will depend, among other things, upon the
availability of raw. 'materials, especially those now in short-
supply in the world, and the ability. of Japanese manufactures
to compete with other world market suppliers in terms of
quality, price, and delivery. Although prices of Japan's
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exports of steel and steel products are presently somewhat
above international levels, it is believed that mode:nization
of present facilities, fuller utilization of capacit:r,
together with larger procurement of raw materials in nearby
areas will bring prices down to internationel levels, Other.
oomaodities that Japan produces are generally competitive
at the present time.
V. CONCLUSION
Becauae of the generally corplementary nature of the
Korean and Japanase economies, trade with Japan may be
expected to continue to be of primary i4ortance to Korea.
Prospects of a more active trade between Japan and Korea on
a commercial oasis will depend to a large extent on Korea's
ability to expand production in agriculture, specifically rice,
and on the maximization of rice exports. Prospects of expanding
exports of other commodities are fairly good but their
contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts would be
relatively lass important thar that possible from rice exports
Should Korea, in the future, overcobto currently still powerful
political and peychological blocks against dealiag with Japan,
a long-range Japanese credit and investment program for
purposes of development of Korea's resources might be possible,
and thus make for increased trade between the two countries.
Japan has already made a start in this direction with the
establishment of an Export Bank which has as its purpose the
extension of credit to purchasers of Japanesc capital equip-
ment. However, even though such a development might be
desirable as a mans of reducing Korea's dependence on.US
financed imports, at this time there appear to be no particularly
strong economic ii.centives to induce the Japanese to embark
on a large trade-credit-program to Korea.
On the other hand, under a UN or US-financed Korean Aid
program, Japan is clearly in an excellent position
to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements.
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WHAT WAS DONE
(REDRAFT OF IR 5769)
IMPROVE APPEARANCE?
IMPROVE READABILITY,
REDUCE TIME REQUIRED TO READ?
ASSIST READER TO COMPREHEND ? BY
THE INTRODUCTION OF TEXT GRAPHICS:
a. Expand the topic outline?thus, guide the reader through the text.
12 outline headings instead of 2,
b. More main paragraphs, one for each principal thought?thus, assist
in comprehension.
21, main paragraphs instead of RA0 exclusive of footnotes.
4 concisely expressed principal findings in the conclusion
instead of two paragraphs.
c. More columnar text and more subparagraphing?thus, improve
appearance and assist reader to comprehend.
1 additional tabulation.
10 subparagraphs instead of none.
d. Follow paragraphing instructions of the OIR Analysts' Manual--
thus, improve readability.
e. Adopt the underlined sentence outline (key sentence first) for
the report Abstract?thus, increase readability, reduce reading
time, and assist in comprehension,
short paragraphs instead of 2 long ones.,
AFTENDIK A
PART II
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2. REDUCING SIZE AND COMPLEXITY:
a. Use fewer words, when meaning will not be lost?thus, improve
readability, reduce time required to read.
519 -words were eliminated.
b. Use simpler words and phrases, when meaning or shades of meaning.
will not be lost?thus, improve readability, reduce time required
to read, and assist reader to comprehend.
Examples:
component
negated
which has as its purpose
outbreak of hostilities
, part
- lost
7 to
7 war
inadequate supply - lack
extraordinary demands on - taxing
a degree of - some
c. Construct tables so that comparable data is used--thus assist
in comprehension.
1 table (para. IB5 - revised text) revised so that a
common annual basis is used. This also reduced the
size of the table footnote.
34 REORGANIZING IDEAS AND FACTS IN THE TEXT.
a. Make the principal fact or thought the first sentence of each
main paragraph?thus, assist reader to comprehend. (NOTE:
This is knoma as the "sentence outline" and not only assiSts
the reader but also compels specific and accurate thinking on
the part of the writer.)
b. Construct tables so that data is listed in meaningful sequence--
thus, assist in comprehension.
1 table (para. IIA2 - revised text) revised so that
import requirements are listed by magnitude.
- 2 -
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c. Remove new, factual material from the Conclusion and Place in the
body of report. This follows accepted practice and reduces size
and complexity of the Conclusion--thus, assist in comprehension.
2 new facts removed from the Conclusion,
d. Sequence facts and thoughts to strengthen presentation?thus, im?
prove readability, assist in comprehension; and reduce number of
introductory and explanatory phrases and words to speed reading
time. .
Throughout text, in several instances, facto were re?
sequenced.
RESULTS:
Improve readabillIy 165%
A. Original report ? Score of 10.081
Revised report ? Score of 26.734
(Flesch Readability Test)
B. Original report 39.65 mrds per sentence (average)
Revised report ? 18.24 words per sentence (average)
?3
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Intelligence Report
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Intelligence Research
No. 579
PROSPECTS 0 JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE .
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SA.Ivri E REPORT
March 5, 1952
/9/9/AP/x /9- - /9re7
EillIENCI _REPORT AND A %: ? .AtiMNTAL PfitICY
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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE .WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
This paper was based on available materials covering the period
January 1952 to present, analysis of which was concluded on March 3,
1952 by Division of Research for Far East.
TABLE_ OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT
I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA 1
A. Pi )rto World War II 1
B. After World Aar II 1
II. KOREAN IMPORT REQUIREENTS AND EXPORT POTENTIAL 3
Import Requirements 3
Korea's Export Potential 4
C Export Markets in Japan 5
III. JAPANS ABILITY TO MEET KOREA'S IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 6
A. Japan's Ability 6
B, Japan's Industrial Production 6
C. Other Factors 7
IV, CONCLUSION 7
This report is distributed by OIR/IDR, telephone ext 4 4148 or 4149.
When it has olTived its usefulness please return it to OIR/IDR, Room
1010 SA-1,
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PROSPECTS OF aPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC .OF KOREA.
ABSTRACT
Japan ? Republic if Korea postwar trade at abnormally low levels ?
about Sl5 million each way.
Expansion prospects depend upon UN or other international financial
helpi_Korea needs this for economic rehabilitation. Japan could play an
important role in supplying capital equipment, manufactured consumer
goods, coal, and chemical fertilizer needed by Korea.
Koroats ability to expand production of rice for euprt is the 1ga
factor, assuming no outside help. Ores, minerals, marine products, etc.,
exports can be expanded but are much less important.
Korean political and psychological blocks exist against dealing with
Japan. Overcoming these blocks might expand trade through the extension
of governmental and private long?term Japanese credits.
However, ,:rapan does not have strong economic incentives for a large
trade ? credit program to Korea.
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REPORT.
PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
I. PATTERN OF TRADE ..b..ETV4E7,1;_,..JAPAN.AND_ KOREA
Prior to, Worm War IT
1. More than 90 percent of Korea/8 trade was with Japan proper from
1910 until 1945a Total trade with Japan in 1938 was 370 and in 1939 was
457 million dollars o The pre?war pattern of trade was ?
Korean
Rice
Marine products
Minerals
Textile raw materials
For_ Japanese
Textile manufactures
Machinery
Metal products
Vehicles
Proeesed foodstuffs
and beverages
Fertilizers
Sundry goods
Korean imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to
Japan? This was due? to Japan's desire to industrialize Korea for the
purpose of strengthening Japanls economic base. Macninery, metal products,
and vehicle imports from Japan increased significantly beginning in the
mid-19301s,
B. After World War II
1. Korea's economy aLthough not subjected to extensive physical damag(
in World War II, was disrupted by ?
a. Political and economic reparation from Japan and
b, The partition of .Korea at the 38th parallel
2, With the tightening of the iron curtain, the southern zone became
heavily dependent upon economic aid from abroad.
31, The Republic of Korea (ROK). depends predominantly upon agriculture
and fishing It ha o only minor light and almost no heavy industries,
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US economic aid brought ebout some recovery through the reconstruction of
Industry and agriculture. tath war in June 1950 much of this progress was
lost.
4. About 90 to 95 percent of the value of ROK1s foreign trade since
Itorld War II has been with the US (US appropriated aid imports).
5. Trade with Japan, although second in importance to the US, has
been at low Iavels.
1947
1948 1949 1950
1951a
(in million US dollars)
Japanese exports to the ROK
(f.o..b.)
18.9
17,9 15.9 18.1
13,0
Japanese imports from the ROK
(c.i.f.)
2?5
5.1 3.6 16.0
7.0
Balance
16,4
12.8 12,3 2.1
6.0
a. Estimated from data for the period January through August 1951.
6, ROK annual deficits have been mat from US aid funds, chiefly thrall&
the ECA. Trade between the two countries is conducted under the terms of E
trade agreement conclud:A in Aarch 1949 and renewed in 1950 and 195% It
calls for the conduct L7 trade on an open account basis wlth imbalancos
settled in US dollars.
7. Rice exports from Korea to Japans which wee most important in
the prewar years, were not exported except in 195G, In 1950, only about
90,000 metric tons were exported as compared with an annual average of
more than one million metric tons in the prewar years, This law level of
export has been due to:
a. Cne.-third increase in population cf the ROK from the mid-19301:
b. Im rice production caused by decreased acreage and lower lan(
productivity per unit because of a shortage of artificlal fertilizers;
c. Increased per capita rice consumption in the ROK, offsetting
in part the shortage in other grains which before 1945 were an important
part of the Korean diet.
Recent hostilities, of course, have once again reduced prospects of
rice (as well as other normal commodity exports) for the immediate future,
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II. KOREAN IMPORT REQUIREMENTS AND EXPORT POTENTIkL
3
A. Import Ree4rements
1, Korean annual civilian import requirements may be estimated at
_
4180 million, during the present war. This estimate is based upon ECA,
UNRRA, and CRIK (Civilian Relief in Korea) programs as well as commercial
imports. .
-Fertilizers ,and pesticidesi clothing, shoes, and textiles- and
foodstuffs lea ,the list of major commodity requirements. The folowing.
estimated import requirements are based chiefly upon relief considerations.-
They do not provide for large scale reconstruction of the economy or for
full employment of eXisting production-facilities*
In millions of US dollars
,Fertilizer and pesticides
$ 50
Clothing, shoes, and textiles
40
Foodstuffs
35
Medical and sanitary supplies
15
Raw cotton and yarn
10
Coal
8
Other manufactured goods
7
Petroleum products
5
Transportation equipment
5
NiscellaneOus raw materials
$180
2. Import requirements may be expected to be about $250 ? 000 mil?
lioni, including relief import items3 should a program of reconstruction
and rehabilitation be instituted by UNKRA. after the hostilities cease.
Import requirements probably could be reduced gradually to $100?$150minior
The JNA,program (prepared in October 1950 for US fiscal year 2952)
rOughly estimated reconstruction and rehabilitation requirements at
$250 million. Price increases have occurred since which would make a
coinparable program more expensive.
the ECA budget estimate justification for US fiscal year 1951, it
w p,estimp -,(1 that Korea's import requirements, including invisibles,
mkght be reduced to about $80 million by 1954, a year in which US aid
vi9pa,c1 no longer be required. It was projected that by that time ECA's
industrialization and development prograp would have substantially
raised the level of economic activities in the ROK.
pEsTRImp
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a year in the _following two or three years.'
B. Korea's Export PotentAal
1, Korea's export potential is not significant. Hostilities have -
reduced further the immediatEvexport possibilities.-
.
2.: Korea Could export substantialquantities of rice once anAirmi-
stice is reached ane rice production and collection is improved. This
viocuid reduce ne need for foreign assistance. However, Korea may not bb
able to eXport more than-500,000 metric tons compared to the one million
metric. toh exports-of prewar years. Even this quantity is dependent upon':
adequate.quantities of fertilizer, weather conditions, and upon "Oe govern
mantis determination to meet its balance of payments deficit out of its
own trade resources. Currently, Korea is in a alight food deficit
position.
3. Korea's total exports in 1952 are estimated at $13 million, ex-
cluding the possibility of rice exports.4
in millions of US &Mari
Ores and minerals
4
5
Marine products
3
Scrap iron
3
Fibers and products
1
Others
1
Total 413
1. These rough estimates are based on (a) The minimum *Ports Of Material*
and equipment (or parts) required to restore damaged industrial' plants,
coal mines, transport and public utilities necessary to the economia:. -
life of the country; (b) The minimum requirements of raw cotton, bitu-
minous coal, fertilizer, lumber, and cement; (c) Korea's capacity,
based Uponloist experience, to absorb economic aid at a rate wtiph
roul4 not jeopardize internal economic stability by taxing limited
domestic rcsiources. ? ?
2. A regent e;..timate made by the United Nations Command, GHQ, 0-4, _Korean
4onomic lid Dividi.R11, 'in:Civpaan Relief Ind. Economic 11444 Korea,
Felpruary 13, 1952, states that with favorable conditions this Summer
and Fall, Korea might havaavailable for exportafter November, about
200 - 300,000 tons of rice.
. . .
r ?
? -
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Even appreciable increase in these exports would make a relatively
small contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts compared to poten-
tial receipts from rice exports.
4. Ores and Minerals: Mines, except tungsten, are operating below
capacity, if at all.. 'Ores and mineral exports include tungsten, amorphous
and crystallfne graphite, kaolin, manganese, molybdenum, fluorspar, mica,
and bismuth.
a. Tuhgsten output, because of its strategic importance, has been
speedily restored through US financial and technical assistance.
b. Inadequate financing, shortage of food in mining areas, lack
of mining equipment and electric power, and the threat of guerrillas have
plagued the mining industrk and retarded its recover.
5* Korean marine production can be expanded considerably* If markets
can be developed, marine products could contribute significantly towards
increasing Koreals foreign exchange receipts. Recently, marine landings
have reached the pre-1950 level.
6* Other commodities that Korea has for export are of relatively minor
importance. Scrap iron exports may continue to be of some importance for
the next few years in View of current world-wide shortage of scrap, but
cannot be expected to be a recurring item. Similarly other Korean exports
including hemp waste, hog bristles, raw silk, cow bristles, furs, honey
wax, and cow bone would be small in value terms.
pcnort Markets in Jasqii
1. Rice would find a ready market in japan* This is the most importar
single commodity that Korea will eventually be able to export. The japans:.
,prefer Korean over Southeast Asian rice since they., imported it.in substan-
tial quantities for many years before 1945. Furthermore, Japan's food
import requirements are rising each year since domestic food production
has not matched the increase in popWation. Since the type of goods
required by Korea can be metinlarge part14.'40pap?.Kereals rice exports
are likely-tobe marketed In:4panaslOngairi44i-aracompetitive.
2. Other.. items that might be expected to have a ready market in Japan
are of relatively small importance as earners of foreign exchange* Korea
can export to Japan such items as manganese orp,. Is49.44.14 graphite, fluor-
spar, talc, hemp waste and fs oLl. Marine productsexports of Korea,
hpweverl-ar0-not 114614 to 404,a.readyti.i.rket in 4pan,
lap R.WIED.
SECIOR7rINFORMATION
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III. JANNIS t1TLITY TO MEET KOREA'S III.PORT REQUIREMENTS
A. Japan's Ability
1. It is estima'ed that Japan would have no difficulty in meeting mo(
of the potential imp rt requirements of Korea, except for raw materials
such as raw cotton az 1 petroleum* This would be true even with a substan-
tial increase in expo ts to other areas in 1952. At present, Japan can
supply -
portir vr,rnmig nit (-7-....ns fertilizer requirements (pro-
-
ciar qua&tties can be supplied in the
;-.aats entire bitumi: coal rec-
,lmost any demand that mi
t, and equipment needed f(
:'tad agriculture ,1
, ,,,,,p4.11?0 .Li.uus,u.c.Lc._ e.? ... -n trade has --eler-
ated since the war in Korea. ZW-Ali'_
stood at 142.8 in December 1951 (1932-36 s,,L.-. .- .- to ri.7-:-
while exports during 1951 were less than 50 percem - ..- period
in real terms.
2. The utilization of Japents production capac4j:'
other things, upon the availa1,11ity of raw matn-J'.
true fortkose materials in sh, -Innlv in 1--1-
smonz
4glly
1. A further indicacn cf Japan's ability to bur...-0-, ROK imnor+ ? _
ments can be obtained from the size_of UN special in Japer
during the one year period following the outbreak of hob-v.. .cties in
June 1950. During that period contracts for supplies totaled 230
million, while services totaled about 98 million dollars. Commoditie.
procured in Japan for Korea incluqed textiles, clothing, rubber manu-
factures, machinery, metal products, ,and -transportation and communica-
tion equipment: These .commodities Ilera supplied at a ?time when Jnnp-,
cviumbruiu.s. eXpyrub else-
where.
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C. Other Factors
1. Except for steel, the prices of Japanese commodities are generally
competitive at the present time. Japan's present steel and steel products
prices are somewhat above international levels, It is believed that prices
will be brought down to international levels by modernization of present
facilities, f-'"sr utilization of capacity, and larger procurement of raw
materials in -Jarby areas.
2. Powerful Korean political and psychological blocks exist against
dealing with Japan. Overcoming these blocks might make possible a long-
range Japanese credit and investment program to develop Koreats resources
and increase trade.
30 Japan has established an Export Bank to extend credit to purchasers
of Japanese capital equipment. However, at this time no strong incentives
exist to induce the Japanese to embark on a large trade - credit program to
Korea.
IV. CONCLUSION
At, Trade with japan may be expected to be of primary importance to Korea
because of the complementary nature of their economics.
Bo The ability of Korea to export rice to Japan is the key to more active
trade. The export of other cemmodiLies would be far less importanta
Co Japan will probably not embark on a large trade - credit program to
Koreao
D. Under a UN or US-.financed Korean aid program, Japan is clearly in an
excellent ? position to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements*
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APPENDIX B ILLUSTRATIONS OF USE OF
DISTINCTIVE TYPEWRITER TYPE FACE
APPENDIX B
(Appendix to Chapter VII)
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APPENDIX B - ILLUSTRATIONS OF USE OF DISTINCTIVE TYPEWRITER
TYPE FACE
Chapter VII - Style and Format of Written Products - includes the
recommendation that immediate experimentation begin with new typewriter
faces,
The following two pages illustrate a sample report page typed with
typewriter type face which we recommend for consideration. These sample
pages were prepared by IBM executive model typewriters.
Page B-2 (larger style) - Code 26, Secretarial type.
Page B-3 (Smaller style) - Code 475 Text type.
Other typewriter type faces should receive consideration in the
experimentation recommended.
The potential improvements which should present themselves through
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- Improved appearance;
- Greater readability;
- The "attention - getting" value of distinctive presenta-
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REPORT
PROSPECTS OF ONEDONESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TWODON
1. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN ONEDON AND TWODON
A. Prior to World War 11
I. More than 90 percent of Twodon trade was with Onedon proper
from 1910 until 1954. Total trade with Onedon in 1938 was 370 and in 1939
was 457 million dollars. The pre-war pattern of trade was -
Twodon
Rice Textile manufacturers
Marine products Machinery
Minerals Metal products
Textile raw materials Vehicles
Processed foodstuffs and beverages
Fertilizers
Sundry goods
2. Twodon imports in the .1930's consistently exceeded exports to
Onedon. This was due to Onedon's desire to industrialize Twodon for the
purpose of strengthening Onedon's economic base. Machinery, metal products,
and vehicle imports from Onedon increased significantly beginning in the mid-
1930's.
B. After World War 11
1. Twodon's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical
damage in World War 11, was disrupted by -
a. Political and economic reparation from Onedon and
b. The partition of Twodon.
2. With the tightening of the iron curtain, the southern zone became
heavily, dependent upon economic aid from abroad.
3. The Republic of Twodon depends predominantly upon agriculture
and fishing. It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. U. S.
economic aid brought about some recovery through the reconstruction of in-
dustry and agriculture. With war in June 1950 much of this progress was lost.
B- 2
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REPORT
PROSPECTS OF ONEDONESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TWODON
I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN ONEDON AND TWODON
A. Prior to World War II
1. More than 90 percent of Twodon trade was with Onedon proper from 1910 until
1945. Total trade with Onedon in 1938 was 370 and in 1939 was 457 million dollars. The pre-war
pattern of trade was -
Twodon For Onedonese
Rice Textile manufactures
Marine products Machinery
Minerals Metal products
Textile raw materials Vehicles
Processed foodstuffs and beverages
Fertilizers
Sundry goods
2. Twodon imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to Onedon. This
was due to Onedon's desire to industrialize Twodon for the purpose of strengthening Onedon's. econ-
omic base. Machinery, metal products, and vehicle imports from Onedon increased significantly
beginning in the mid-1930's.
B. After World War II
1. Twodon's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage in
World War II, was disrupted by -
a. Political and economic reparation from Onedon and
b. The partition of Twodon.
2. With the tightening of the iron curtain, the southern zone became heavily
dependent upon economic aid from abroad.
3. The Republic of Twodon depends predominantly upon agriculture and fishing.
It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. US economic aid brought about some
? recovery through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture. With war, in June 1950 much of
this progress was lost.
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C ? INTELLIG:ENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
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APPENDIX C ? INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX C
(Appendix to Chapter III)
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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE: This appendix illustrates, in sample form, the
principal ingredients and organization intended for
the Intelligence Bibliography. In final form, the
Intelligence Bibliography should
? Be bound in 1/21, three ring binder or soft
cover binder (depending upon size)
? Have index tabs for each part, properly
labeled
? Include a brief of each report in Part III
? Correctly underline in the Index the new
items added to Parts II and III
APPENDIX C
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Division of Library and
Reference Services
INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Desk Officers, Series No,
ETHIOPIA
A Selected List of Intelligence References
and
Evaluated Intelligence Reports
U, S. Department of State
Compiled and Maintained By
and
C-2
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Division of Research for
Near East and Africa
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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introduction
To the Desk Officer for Ethiopia
This Intelligence Bibliography has been compiled for your specific
use, It will be picked up periodically by a representative of the
Intelligence Organization, revised and brought up to date, and returned
to you promptly.
This is not a typical bibliography. It not only lists pertinent
reference material you will find useful (and haw to get it), but also
the intelligence research reports that have been completed and those
maLialzalmul (and who to contact for information).
An important part of this bibliography is the Index, Part
It permits a handy and comprehensive finding device when you are in
need of facts or evaluated opinion.
It is hoped that you will find this to be a valuable working tool
in the conduct of your affairs. Your suggestions for the improvement
of this Intelligence Bibliography will be welcome.
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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECTS IN PROCESS
For information on these current projects
call on extension
PART II INDEX
Each index is dated. Those items which have
been added since the last issue of the INDEX
are underlined.
'PART III INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
This is a list of intelligence research reports,
in chronological order) completed by the
Intelligence Organization of the Department of
State.
PART IV REFERENCE MATERIALS
To secure. these items, call
on extension
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PART I
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECTS IN PROCESS
(Include here a list of current projects. The monthly Project Report and
Schedule may be used for this purpose. Shaw number, title, requestor,
starting date, estimated completion date, and a brief of project scope
and objectives.)
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References are
those from 100
the last issue
PART II
INDEX
Date
to item numberse items numbered from 1 to 99 are in Part III;
on up are in Part IV. Items underlined have been added since
of this Index.
Africa 1, 125
See also Italian colonies
in Africa
Armed forces 117
Agriculture 108, 110
ail._214.2iinphy, 118, 125
Boundaries
Africa 4
Anglo?Egyptian Sudan?
Ethiopia 113
Italian Somaliland 116
Undemarcated 111
Climate
See Weather and Climate
Coasts and coastlines 123
Colonies
See Italian colonies in
Africa
Credit 109
Economic conditions 103, 117, 126
Education 110
Egypt
view on Eritrea 2
Eritrea
adjacent areas 3
coast 123
economic conditions 100
Egypts views on 2
economic relationship to
federation with Ethiopia
foreign trade 7
gazeteer 122
independence 6
military geography 123
oceanography 121
Point four 5
technical aid 5
towns 119
USSR influence in 115
weather 122
Federation with Eritrea
Food 110
9
Sudan 2
Foreign trade 110, 106
African territories 7
Gazeteer 122
Geography 108
Gold 110
See also Mineral resources
Government 108, 117
Health 108, 110
Highways
See Roads
History 108
Hospitals 110
Industrial development 126
program 110
Industries 110, 117
Iron ore 110
See also Mineral resources
Italian colonies in Africa
boundaries 4, 111
under military control 112
Landing beaches 123
Lignite deposits 110
Limestones 110
Military geography 123
Mineral resources
collected reports on numerous
minerals 104, 105, 110, 114
development program 110
National income 1
Native races 107
Near East 1, 125
Data Book 8
Nutrition 110
See also Food
Oceanography 121
Petroleum 110
See also Mineral resources
Point Four 5, 118, 125
Population 108, 117
Railroads 110
Roads 110
Salines 110
See also Mineral resources
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Social conditions 108, 117
Soils 108
Somali tribes 107
Somaliland
economic conditions 100
boundaries 116
coasts and landing beaches
gazeteer 122
military geography 123
oceanography 121
towns 119
USSR influence in 115
weather and climate 122
Sudan
Egyptian views on 2
Ethiopian views on 2
2,
Sulphur 110
Pee also Mineral resources
? Technical aid 5, 104, 105, 114,
118,125
Technical project in Ethiopia
Towns 119
123 Transportation 110
Treaties 127
? U.S. Technical project in Ethiopia
104, 105, 114
USSR
in French Equatorial Africa 120
influence in Ethiopia 115
influence in Eritrea 115
influence in Somaliland 115
Water
groundwater resources 110
Weather and climate 124
0-7
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PART III
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
(Each of these intelligence reports was prepared by
the Division of Research for the Near East and Africa)
ITEM 1. Estimated national incomes of selected Near Eastern, Middle Eastern,
and African countries. Washington, D.C., February 7, 1947. 5p. (Intelligence
memorandum, OCL-3523.9)
ITEM 2. Views of the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments on the economic
relationship of Eritrea to the Sudan and Ethiopia. Washington, D.C.
January 21, 1948. 6p. (DRN information note 144) Secret. 382.62 AB-31625.
ITEM 3. Affinities of the western province of Eritrea with adjacent areas.
Washington, September 6, 1949. 23p. map. (OIR report 4996) Confidential.
916.35 A18564C,
ITEM 4. Unsettled boundary problems of the former Italian colonies.
Washington, January 10, 1950. 48p. (DRN division report no. 44) Secret.
914.5 BA76298.
ITEM 5. Technical cooperation (Point IV): Ethiopia. Washington, March 15,
1950. 26p. (DRN Divisional report no. 47.2) Confidential, 330.94
BE7611C.
ITEM 6. The capacity of Eritrea for independence. Washington, July 25,
1950. 22p. (OIR report 5311) Confidential. 323.2635 BH1225C,
ITEM 7. Foreign trade of most African territories. November 28, 1951.
147p. (cart no. 5583) Unclassified. Eritrea p. 125 Ethiopia 135.
ITEM 8. Data book. Near East and independent Africa. Washington, 1951.
154p. (OIR no. 5531) Ethiopia, p. 13-22.
ITEM 9. Implications of federation for Ethiopia and Eritrea. Washington,
February 18, 1952. 41p. (Intelligence report no. 5595) Confidential.
354.63 CC1825C.
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FART IV
INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE MATERIALS
(Each of these items may be secured from the individual named in the Table
of Contents. Intelligence reports prepared by agencies other than the State
Department are included.)
ITEM 100 The situation in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somaliland. OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES. Research and analysis branch. Washington, November 300
1941. 41p. (R & A report 175) Unclassified. 940053 AE5680.
ITEM 101 Primary products and their manufactures in certain strategic areast
Ethiopia (Abyssinia) TARIFF COMMISSION Washington, June 1942, lip. maps,
tables. Confidential. 338.4 AY9027C. (Preliminary).
ITEM 102 Section III, IV and V of M.I.S.Is, forthcoming strategic survey;
Ethiopia. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Washington, D.C.., July 160 1942.
95p. (It & A report no. 765) Restricted, 916.3 AN177R,
ITEM 103 The current situation in Ethiopia. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.
Research and analysis branch. Washington, D.C., October 15, 1943. 4p.
Secret. (R & A report 1380) 963 AI64645.
ITEM 104 Mineral investigation memorandum no. 1-39 U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT
IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, August 29, 1944-46, 39pts, 338.2 B}1341. Issued
as separate reports and in Commerce Department, Development of Ethiopia,
listed above.
ITEM 105 Mineral intelligence reports, no. 1-83. U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT
IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, 1944-460 83 pts. Issued as separate reports and
in Commerce Department.
ITEM 107 Somali tribes of Ogaden Ethiopia in relation to East African
sovereignty questions. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Research and
analysis branch. Washington, D.C. September 18, 1944. 4P. (R & A
report 2505A) 9630AN3465R Restricted,
ITEM 108 Ethiopia t handbook of economic information, COMMERCE DEPT.
Office of foreign economic development. June 1946. Washington, 1946.
228p. Pt, 1 The people. ? pt. 2. The economy, ? p. 3. Transportation
and communications. ?pt. 4. Finance and foreign trade. ?pt. 5. Ethiopia
in relation to Middle East supply and requirements.
C.? 9
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ITEM 109 Agreement between the imperial government of Ethiopia and Export?
import bank of Washington on granting of credit. EXPORT?IMPORT BANK,
Washington, Washington, D.C. 23 July 1946. 16p. Confidential. 33603
K206C.
ITEM 110 Development of Ethiopia. COMMERCE DEPT. Office of international
trade. Washington, 1946, 3v. in 5.
Contents. v.l. General. ?v.2. Industrial. ?v.3. Public works and
services. Referred to as Fellows report. Compiled in cooperation with
the U.S. Technical project in Ethiopia.
ITEM 111 Undemarcated boundaries of the Italian colonies and their carto?
graphic presentation. STATE DEPT. Office af intelligence collection and
dissemination. Map intelligence division. Washington, 11 April 1947. maps
(OIR report no. 4288) 27p. Restricted. e3250345 Q443R.
ITEM 112 Italian colonies, possessions, and areas under military control in
Africa and the Dodecanese. STATE DEPT. Office of intelligence collection
and dissemination. Reference division. Washington, D.C., July 17, 1947.
31p, (Bibliography no. 23) Secret, 016.3253 T17415,
ITEM 113 Geographic basis for the division or Eritrea between Anglo?Egyptian
Sudan and Ethiopia. STATE DEPT. Office of intelligence collection and
dissimination. Nap intelligence division. Washington, D.C., October 13,
1947. 22p. maps. (OIR report 4493) Secret, 916.35 AE4729S,
ITEM 114 Mineral investigation memorandum and Mineral intelligence reports,
Index. U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, 1947. 7p.
338.2 BK12740
ITEM 115 Increased Soviet influence in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. B-2619, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1948.
lp. Confidential. 335.4 AD48570,
ITEM 116 Note on the boundary between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. M-6, Washington, July 1948. 8p. maps.
Confidential. 916.3 AH4260,
ITEM 117 Strategic intelligence digests Ethiopia. WAR DEPT. GENERAL
STAFF. Intelligence division. Washington, 19480 4Pts0
Contents a Pt, 2 Sociological. ?pt.3 Political. ?pt.4 Economic ?
pt.6 Armed forces.
ITEM 118 Economic studies of underdeveloped countries & Ethiopia. STATE
DEPT. Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of
library and reference services. Washington, December 19 1949. 2p.
(Bibliographic list no. 30.12) Confidential, 016.3396 AZ77030,
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ITEM 119 National intelligence survey& Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Somalilande.
Section 25'1 towns. CENTRAL INTELIIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, March 1950.
16p, illus. maps. (NIS 55/C/Ar Army March 1950) Secret. 916.3 BJ85315
Sec. 25.
ITEM 120 Soviet activities and agents in French Equatorial Africa. STATE
DEPT. Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of acquisi?
tion and distribution. Washington, March 21, 1950. 31). (Dept. of State.
Report no. IAD?A-85) Secret. 335.4 BD7642S.
ITEM 121 National intelligence survey. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands.
Chapter IIs Oceanography. Section 21, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Washington, 1950. 32p. maps. (NIS 55?Navy 4/50) Secret. 916.3 BJ8531S
Sec. 21,
ITEM 122 National intelligence survey. Preliminary NIS gazeteers Ethiopia,
Eritrea and the Somalilands. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Official standard
names approved by the US board on geographic names. Prepared in the Division
of geography, Department of the Interior. Washington, August 1950. 498p.
(NIS 55 R Interior-8/50) Secret. 916.3 J885315 Gaz. (pr.)
ITEM 123 National intelligence survey. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands.
Chapter IIs Military geography. Section 22. Coasts and landing beaches.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, D.C. 1950. 73p, illus. maps
(NIS 55?Navy 33/50) Secret, 916.3 BJ8531S Sec. 22,
ITEM 124 National intelligence surveys Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Somalilands.
Section 23. Weather and climate. CENTRAL INTETITGENCE AGENCY, Washington,
1950. 79p. maps. (NIS 55/C/Air Force 5/50) Secret, 916.3 BJ8531S Sec, 23,
ITEM 125 Point four, Near East and Africa. A selected bibliography of studies
on economically underdeveloped countries. January 2, 1951. STATE DEPT.
Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of library and
reference services. Washington, 1951. 136p. (Bibliography no. 56) Ethiopia 49
Eritrea p p. 46-48.
ITEM 126 Ethiopia. INTERNATIONAL BANK for reconstruction and development.
Washington, 1951. 109p. (Studies in economic development no. 1).
ITEM 127 ETHIOPIA. Treaties, agreements, etc, some translated texts, inter?
national treaties binding Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 1952, JK1106.86,
C?il
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FOR PROCESSING BIOGRAPHIC DATA
APPENDIX D
(Appendix to Chapter XV)
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AND
NEWSPAPERS DOCUMENTS BOOKS
VOLUME 60/WEEK VOLUME 50-60
PER/WEEK
VOLUME 60/DAY
VOLUME 85/WEEK
VOLUME 80/DAY
VOLUME
I AS REQUESTED
50/WEEK
who
Prepared by Field, Type-Official Informals
written and mailed to BI. etc. Mailed to BI.
Who's
Miscellaneous
ECA, MSA, Others
Forwarded via
Visa and Passport
Division
Foreign and domestic
text
IAD/
IAD/
IAD/
CS /
MESSAGE
CLEs
MLB
MAIL CENTER
CENTER
Readers route on basis
of B.I. content.
ALL AREAS
IAD /
CAB
LR
AND
IAD
-I- -I- -F
LR
CIRCULATION
SECTION
DOCUMENTS CLERK
Materials received by Documents Clerk. 1 Screens material on an Area and Content
basis. Routes virtually all material to the Branch Chief except, Near East and
Africa Branch and American Republics, routes to Analyst.
AREA SORT
Branch Chief, Near East and African and 5 Analysts; Branch
Chief American Republics and 5 Analyst; Branch Chief, Eastern
Europe (Satellites) Branch Chief Western Europe, British Common-
wealth Section; Branch Chief Central Europe, Branch Chief Near
East Asia; Branch Chief China and South East Asia, N.1.5. Coordin-
ator; Officer in Charge; Administrative Editor; Functional Service
Unit and Consultant to Projects Committee.
Analysts; Near East and African;
American Republics ?
Receive all material except telegrams and
action despatches.
Action Copies of all
Telegrams and Despatches
logged in.
26
Pigeon Boles
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BRANCHES
AMERICAN
REPUBLICS
NEAR EAST
AND AFRICA
CHINA AND
SOUTH EAST
ASIA
NORTHEAST
ASIA
WESTERN
EUROPE
EASTERN
EUROPE
CENTRAL
EUROPE AND
SCANDINAVIA
FUNCTIONAL
SERVICES
UNIT
B.C.R.
SATELLITES
ANALYSTS-5
CLERKS -3
ANALYSTS-5
CLERKS -3
ANALYSTS-4
CLERKS -2
ANALYSTS-2
CLERKS -2
ANALYSTS-7
CLERKS -4
ANALYSTS-9
CLERKS -5
ANALYSTS-5
CLERKS -3
Branch Chief scans pertinent items and routes to Analysts in the Branches.
Chief
Administrator
N.I.S. Coordinator
Branch Chiefs
Analysts
Clerks
Total
TOTALS I 1
!Editor
3 1
1
8
37
25
1
76
Working Backlog
ANALYSTS
63% TO BACKGROUND
28% TO PRODUCTS
8%
ADMIN ?
ISTRATION
45.3% TO READING AND MARKING
18% TO
TYPING AND FILING
18.3% TO
WRITTEN
9.4% TO
ORAL
Analyst Receives ? May maintain a planned or unplanned backlog. The planned backlog is
maintained to perthit selection of best material on subject. Read each item to determine if
information: criteria ? If about a person as an individual; or his views then of BA.
interest ? One test indicated 77% of the items to contain B.I. information. Of these it was
estimated that 80% of the names on the pieces containing B.I. information were marked for
B.I. filing, receives 160,000 pieces per year. ? Mark paragraphs, names, lists of names.
Indicate if to folder; to be placed in category, etc. According to the working relationships
with Typist: 5 Analysts recorded their reading results for 2 days:
Total No. - Documents No. Typings No. Clippings No. Rewrites To B.F. Discarded
523 204 84 6 133 118
Per cent 100% 25A% 22.6%
Of the 272 pieces not filed or discarded 294 items were marked, for card preparation.
More markings per piece were contained in State despatches (2.33) and CIA - SO's and 00's (3.43)
PREPARATION OF FILE CARDS
ANALYSTS
CLERKS
59.7% OF B.I. PERSONNEL
40.3% OF 8.1. PERSONNEL
42% OF THE CARDS PREPARED
58% OF THE CARDS PREPARED
A 20- Man-Day study of 5 Analysts and 5 Clerks revealed that of 840 items typed or clipped
that 279 pieces (33%) were prepared by the Analysts and 561 (67%) were prepared by the
Clerical staff.
CLERKS
70% TO B.I. FILES MAINTENANCE
18%
TO PRODUCTS
12%
TO GENERAL
51% TO TYPING AND CLIPPING 19% TO FILING
3 Clerks were asked to divide their time; the results were checked with the Assistant D'vision Chief.
Typing backlog.
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HECTOGRAPH STANDARD
MASTERS REGISTER CARBONS
TYPE TO STENCIL
APPROXIMATELY 70%
LIST MATERIAL, 30%
PARAGRAPH.
SAMPLE AV
5.6 CARDS
PER STENCIL
31.8%
Duplicate required
number of copies.
SAMPLE AV
2.2 CARDS/STAND.
L _ 5'7%
Standard 3 copy
snap-out form.
To accomplish the transfer of B.I. information to cards and dossier files, the Analysts and Clerks
during the same sample study, produced 1,182 cards by the methods shown below. Certain branches
and sections, because of their specific situations, (exchanges and peripherial reporting) do not per-
form according to the sample. Satellite countries prepare SO% of their cards on Hectograph Masters to
send approximately 10 cards/name to Foreign Post B.I. files.
The card production during the 20 - man-day study were checked against typical B.I. holdings by taking
a sample of over 500 cards from the 4 x 6 Card Files.
SOURCE
20 - Man-Day Study
13.L Card File Sample
HECTO COPIES
39.8%
39.6%
TYPE TO CLIP AND
4" x 6" CARDS PASTE CARDS
TYPE TO CARD
APPROXIMATELY
80% PARAGRAPH
20% LIST.
42.3%
420,000 Cards/Yr.
ALPHABETICAL BY COUNTRY 4 a 6
CUT AND SCOTCH
TAPE TO CARDS
12.8%
CARD FILES
CARBON COPIES TYPED COPIES
7.2%
6.9%
CATEGORY CARDS
ANALYSTS NORMALLY
PREPARE OWN CARDS
2.3%
N??????????11111.
CATEGORY CARDS
2,700.000 CARDS
Amount of cards varies
between countries. Gene,
ally 1- 2 tubs on large
countries
0 900,000 NAMES
*CARDS/NAME IN FILES
1-
64%
2-
15%
3-
6%
ALL OTHERS
15%
* Above from study of 26004-cards
53.0%
53.5%
CROSS-
REFERENCE
CARDS
PRIMARILY BLUE
BF CARDS
5.1%
24,000 Cards/Year
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Generally used when item is too
large to be placed on cards.
TO DOSSIER FILES
25.4% OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF PIECES
HANDLED INITIALLY
WENT TO DOSSIER
PILES.
Sampleindicated 6.4%
of cards were blue BE.
Estimate 150,000 BF.
folders last year used
24,000 blue cards or
increasing at an annual
rate of 14%.
DISCARD
NO. B.I. INFORMATION
TO A ? Z FOLDERS
Some Analysts maintain premature
BF's. After 2 pieces, then make
BE. At same time prepare blue
4" x 6" credit card.
BIOGRAPHIC FOL ERS
22.6% OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF PIECES
HANDLED INITIALLY
CONTAIN NO B.I. IN-
FORMATION.
150,000 FOLDERS
Group
Folders
Study was made by BI March 1951 indicating 110,000 folders, plus
24,000 new Blue BE Cross Reference cards 134,000.
Group folders consists of
documents on Political, Labor
and Economic groups. Obser-
vation indicates 1/3 to 1 file
drawer per country.
Discard Classified ?
File for several months.
Send to central files for
destruction records.
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PAGE 3 OF 4
Of 33,100 names requested
1,600 or 23% could nor be
completed due to lack of B1
information
A
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PAGE 4 OF 4
DEMAND FOR CARD FILES
CATEGORY
1
CARD/NAME
2
3
4+CARDS/NAME
11+CARDS/NAME
8.8
11.2
5
75%
53.6%
A study of 90 names requested shows that only 25% of the requested names had 3 cards
or less per name.
A study of the methods of transmitting B1 information indicated that of 851 special ac-
tivities and requests; 540 were answered by phone; 57 cases the requestor came into
131 to observe the data; and in 254 cases a short informal note was written mainly be-
cause of phone security.
DEMAND FOR BF FILES
The Analyst performing the service was
asked to reconstruct the sources of data
used:
Cards only - 47
Cards+BF - 35
BF only - 1
Generally requires
research into all
available sources.
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES REQUESTS
REPORTS
10,600 REQUESTS
2400/YR
Many containing
a large number
of names.
CONTAINING 33,10 0 NAMES
OF WHICH 25,500 NAMES WERE SUPPLIED
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E ? CONSUMER REACTION QUESTIONNAIRE
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4,PPENDIK E
BUREAU DESK OFFICERS
Consumer Reaction Interview
Date Name
Office Desk
1. With whom do you work in OIR?
Name
Division
__------
Time
on Desk
Regular Irregular
What kind of services do you request or receive? (Spot informations
briefings, discussions, research)
Haw do you work with the Intelligence Adviser?
40. List all projects now in process in which you are interested.
No. Emu21n
km worm. ow mama +win. ono.ow.v.
Needed By Importance
1?????????????.....0.???????=111Mma
wimaimil??????.M.??????????....???I
.11,????????????????????
?
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5. Could OIR be of greater service to you? If so how?
6. What products do you regularly see and use (see Kit)?
Briefs and Diets
VIEls and IEts
NIS
What is your estimate of these products?
Timeliness
Quality
Readability
8. What is your attitude toward centralized versus decentralized
research?
9* Comments on DI.
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10* Comments on 1,13..
11. Other Comments
12* Kit.
Tab No.
Seen
Comment
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13, What arrangements exist to provide formal liaison with OIR research
division (attendance at staff meeting, service in bureau, etc,).,
???01110.1.,
What is the clearance procedure for products distributed outside of
the Bureau?
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F ? PRESENT TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL
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CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
APPENDIX F
PRESENT TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL
Administration within the R Area may be considered in three princi-
pal categories:
1t Techniques of management communication.
2. Techniques of 'Production,' planning and control.
3. Techniques of requirements planning and acquisition planning.
The procedures and devices utilized as techniques of planning and
control in each category are discussed in the following sections.
A - TECHNIQUES OF MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATION
Meetings, reports, and written instructions are used as instruments
of communication for administrative planning and control purposes. They
are summarized below:
1. Meetings.
The following meetings deal largely with general administration
rather than intelligence production:
- R's Senior Staff meeting, weekly.
- Rs Divisional Staff meeting, weeny.
- Weekly meeting of OIR, OLT, and R/ES Directors.
--OLI Staff meeting, daily.
- R/ES meeting, weekly.
- OIR Staff meeting, on irregular and infrequent basis.
- Monthly meeting of administrative Officers*.
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2. Reports:
To varying degrees each of the following reports to R cover
skjects of administrative as well as substantive nature:
- Monthly OIR Report to R, regularly encompassing such subjects as
(1) current intelligence, (2) cmas, (3) Psychological Warfare
Program, (4) NIS developments, (5) external distribution of Ins,
and (6) field trips by OIR personnel.
-Monthly Old Report to R4 regularly under the headings of (1) projects
in progress, (2) projects temporarily dormant, (3) continuing proj-
ects, and (4) projects completed.
- Monthly R/ES Report to R0 regularly including such subjects as (1)
budget and fiscal, (2) personnel, (3) Foreign Service Relations
Program, (4) Management Improvement Program, (5) projects temporar-
ily dormant, and (6) continuing projects.
- Biweekly Special Work Report to R, listing in some detail the major-
ity of special activities performed by personnel of OIR, OLI, and
R/ES in the period covered. It is "not intended as a complete
or detailed study, but a working paper for the use of the Special
ssistant, Intelligence, and all principal officers of the area."
It reports on both substantive and administrative activities, and
to a degree overlaps and duplicates subjects covered in the monthly
reports to R.
- Program Reporting Book, a monthly loose-leaf book maintained for
"presentation to and use by the Special Assistant." It includes
general administrative data in chapters related to (1) organiza-
tion and functions, (2) personnel and fiscal aspects, (3) personnel
utilization, and (4) security.
R/ES prepares, or has prepared by the divisional Administrative
Officers, several routine reports of a general administrative nature
(personnel, etc.).
3. Written Instructions.
The following different forms of written instructions are among
the devices of general administration in use from time to time:
F -2
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UWVIDENTiAL - oecurity iniormation
- Special Instructions, from the Special \ssistant.
? R Office Instructions, coordinated by R/ES.
-Memos to All Employees, issued by R/ES.
- OIR and OLI Office Instructions or memoranda, issued on an infre-
? quent and irregular basis by the respective Office Directors*
- Divisional Instructions, DI.
- Division Orders, Instructions, or formal memoranda (DRN, DRS).
- Informal memoranda to personnel (DRF BRA, DRW, LR and IAD)*
- OIR Analysts, Manual, coordinated by PCS.
4, Weaknesses Observed.
Essentially suitable techniques are being employed throughout R
for the planning and control of general administrative functions. How-
ever, the following observations are made with respect to what might
be considered significant, though not serious, weaknesses in the imple-
mentation of those techniques:
a. The NIS Coordinator is not included in either of the
principal weekly staff meetings of R, although the HIS Coordinator is
the senior position giving full-time attention to all the administra-
tive aspects of n program involving a major portion of Ris total person-
nel and a significant external budgetary support relationship*
b. The necessity of both the Monthly iLeport to R and the
Biweekly Special Work Report to R can be questioned. There is duplica-
tion and information is reported in widely-varying detail. Both reports
are less effective by reason of mixing, by office, subjects of general
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administrative nature with those of substantive concern.
c. Written instructions on general administrative matters
are issued in a wide variety of forms, from several sources, and without
a clear definition of jurisdiction with respect to subject. At least
seven different approaches to this device are in use, varying between
Offices. Even within OIR itself there is no uniform pattern in regard
to subject or form, governing the issuance of written instructions or
formal memoranda at the division level. This situation is confusing to
the recipients and complicates filing. More significantly, it is con-
ducive to overlap or duplication of subject? and possible conflict, be-
tween these written instructions.
B - TECHNIQUES OF PRODUCTION PLANNING
AND CONTROL
The techniques for administration of intelligence production in
R relate both to intelligence production itself and to requirements
planning and acquisition planning done in connection therewith. A
variety of different devices and procedures are presently employed in
an effort to effect a measure of planning and to provide control in-
formation at several levels in the OIR organization. They are summar-
ized as follows:
1. At the Level of the Special Assistant.
R's weekly senior staff and divisional staff meetings encompass
some consideration of production planning and control aspects. The
F- 14
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HIS Coordinator, however, is not normally included in either meeting.
The Program Reporting Book, prepared essentially for the use of the
Special Assistant, provides a monthly historical record of statistics
with respect to OIR intelligence product output, including HIS, as
well as volume records of OLI activities. Additional after-the-fact
information with respect to intelligence production is provided in the
weekly list and the monthly summary of intelligence research in progress
and completed which is issued by OTR/PCS.
2. At the OIR Level.
The Estimates Group (EG) and the HIS Coordinator are the focal
points of the principal program planning and control accomplished in
OIR. Programming and follow-up with respect to NI% SE's, 1E13 and other
EG papers receive the close attention of the EG Secretary and are under-
taken by the EG itself in its daily meetings. The EG sets forth most
of the subjects from which an annual Program Planning Guide is developed.
This Guide is not prepared as an all-inclusive program for the work of
each OIR division, but simply as an indication of the major subjects
and problems that are of particular interest to the EG. The EG Secre-
tary issues a weekly list of future PG Papers, progress on EG Papers
is reviewed regularly in meetings of the EG, and a Fortnightly Summary
of Actions is issued by the EG Secretary. In addition, the EG period-
ically reviews its production for coverage comparison with the Program
Planning Guide.
The production of NTS sections is planned and scheduled in OIR
under the direction of the HIS Coordinator, governed by basic priorities
F - 5
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set by the IAC and within the framework of master planning and schedul-
ing established by the NIS Permanent Committee, A NIS Production Schedule,
issued monthly, plans completion of specific NIS sections by month for
the fiscal year. A Monthly Report of NIS Progress provides in graphic
form a cumulative indication of production progress by month for each
NIS section. Another tabular report records production of NIS sections
by UR division, monthly and cumulative year-to-date. A monthly tabular
report records man-hours expended on NIS by both NIS and non-NIS person-
nel within each Office and Division of R. The OIR/NIS Coordinator holds
a monthly meeting of all divisional NIS Coordinators for both administra-
tive and production planning purposes.
Very little exists in the nature of techniques of planning and
control for the intelligence output not falling within the purview of
the EG or the NIS Program. The few devices and procedures employed
stem from the Production Control Staff (PCS).
The Current Intelligence Officer of the PCS plans a minor portion
of the program of daily and weekly briefings given by OIR personnel
and the Current Intelligence Committee has a part in the planning and
control of the production of Mb, including DIGS. PCS maintains project
records through the device of Work Jackets, and man-hours distribution
statistics through the monthly Time Use Reports submitted by the analysts.
It compiles and issues status reports in the form of weekly lists of
projects initiated, modified and completed, and monthly surveys of
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intelligence research in progress and completed. Much historical refer-
ence information is accumulated and reported, but no forward planning
is accomplished, and hence no measure of progress or performance is
reported.
3. At the Division and Branch Levels.
Except for the NIS activities, all program planning at the division
and branch levels is done on an ad hoc basis, governed primarily by
informal arrangements and expediency. The Work Jacket and Time Use
Report procedures are found distasteful and given only token compliance,
Reports of projects completed and/or in progress are issued period-
ically by each of the geographic research divisions, almost wholly as
a device of internal value, with little or no dLtribution outside of
OIR, These reports vary widely in almost all respects; namely, as to
period, issuing date, format, title, and content. For example, only
one shows date project initiated; most are indefinite about estimated
completion dates; only one indicates estimated man-hours involved; and
only half state report security classification.
These reports do not contribute to planning and are of very limited
value as control devices. They are often issued too late for any pur-
pose but record and reader reference. Investigation reveals that they
do not coincide with the project records as maintained by PCS/IDR from
the Work Jackets. Interviews with branch and division chiefs revealed
that these reports are not generally being used as a tool for either
F-7
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the planning or control of intelligence production. Also, the techniques
of scheduling and control established in the NIS program have not been
utilized by the effective application of corrective action from an author-
itative management level.
None of the reports of projects completed and/or in progress that
are issued periodically by each of the geographic research divisions
provide any realistic scheduling; nor are they an effective tool of
control.
C - TECHNIQUES FOR REQUIRa4ENTS PLANNING
AND ACQUISITION PLANNING
The conduct of intelligence research must be fed by acquisition
of information of both a specific and general nature and by materials
from which pertinent subject information is likely to be obtained.
This acquisition of information and materials requires that there be
(1) requirements planning, or a determination and specification of the
required information and materials, and (2) acquisition planning, or
the selection and development of sources and methods from which acquisi-
tion can be accomplished.
The burden of responsibility for requirements planning falls es-
sentially on those who have and know the requirements, namely, the OIR
divisions. Nevertheless, for either the research divisions or IAD to
have maximum effectiveness in the discharge of their respective responsi-
bilities, mutual assistance and collaboration is required. The acquisition
F - 8
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agency is often in a better position than the production group to know
what can be obtained, and therefore, what might be made a feasible re-
quirement. The research analysts, on the other hand, may for a number
Of reasons (including knowledge derived from their own contacts and re-
search) be in an excellent position to indicate to IAD the most likely
sources of most fruitful methodology for acquisition of desired informa-
tion. The Biographic Intelligence Division, being both a production
and acquisition activity, carries responsibility for identification
of its needs and for development of many of the sources and methodology
through which they are met.
OIR's requirements for intelligence information can be classified
in each of two categories as follows;
1. By the particular field of the social sciences to which they
apply, as political, economic or sociological; it being recognized
that some information overlaps more than one field and that the require-
ments for biographic information applies in all fields.
2, By the nature of the need, in terms of whether it represents;
a. Standard information which should be maintained up-to-date
on basic subjects that are normally common to all reporting posts, and
for which there can be standing specifications.
b. Specific information and/or comments on special or basic
subjects with respect to which there is a known or near-term need unmet
by intelligence at hand.
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c. Specific information and/or comments on special or basic
subjects for which there exists an immediate need.
The following observations are made with respect to the second category:
-.There is a lilt to how specific the requirements under a. can be and
still have general application to all posts.
- To the degree that needs defined by a, are not met, those under b.
and c. will be increased.
- To the extent that needs classed under a. are met, those identified
under b. and c. will not reflect gaps in coverage as much as gaps
in depth and detail.
- To the degree that specific needs are anticipated and reflected in
b., those in class c. will be held at a minimum.
At the present time, several R activities are involved in the plan-
ning of requirements and guidance or cultivation of sources. The ac-
cent, however, is heavy on acquisition and somewhat light on require-
ments planning. This stems from the absence of an established program
of production planning.
Relatively little requirements planning is being done by OIR.
Few needs are anticipated. There is no plan, scheme, or established
technique by which the OIR analysts are required to think out their needs
of the near and more distant future in terms of program objectives: and
to list these needs in order of relative importance. Great reliance is
placed upon the routine flow of foreign reporting and publications pro-
curement from the field.
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IAD is engaged in both the stimulation of requirements planning
and the carrying out of acquisition planning. IAD has had to use its
own initiative and a great deal of independent thinking in determining
requirements in lieu of any planned activity in this regard by ?IR
branches.
Aside from taking the initiative with respect to the identifica-
tion of needs (requirements plannning) and planning of the methodology
by which these needs will be satisfied, IAD functions to search out
new sources and to determine what use R can make of a possible new
source. The Requirements Staff, Civilian Agencies Branch CIA Liai-
son Branch and, to a lesser extent, the Military Liaison Branch par-
ticipate in this. IAD takes the lead in spelling out for inclusion in
the Foreign Service Manual the specifications of standard information
which should be maintained up-to-date on basic subjects that are normally
common to all reporting posts. It collaborates with the division in
preparing a comprehensive annual statement by posts of all known re-
quirements for foreign reporting. In addition, it has in the past year
developed and tested a vehicle for conveying Rts political reporting
requirements of near-term need to individual foreign service posts.
This vehicle is the Periodic Reporting Guide, preparation and issuance
of which at regular intervals is a joint IAD-OIR effort with the former
taking the initiative. These guides list specific information and/or
comments on special or basic subjects with respect to which there is
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a known or anticipated near-term need unmet by intelligence at hand.
The program is not yet completely established and has been put into
action for only a limited number of posts. The initiative with respect
to the preparation of the Periodic Reporting Guides has had to rest
with the Requirements Staff of IAD. Its maintenance, too, depends
largely on the ability of IAD to sell the research divisions on the
value of this sort of requirements planning.
The Foreign Service Program Officer in R/ES supervises a program
which, in recognition of the fact that the foreign posts are the major
source of Rya intelligence data, aims to cultivate the Foreign Service
as a source and to train its personnel to appreciate their intelligence
role more fully and to discharge this role more ably. Specific weak-
nesses attributable to reporting from most posts include the following:
- Information too much from capital city sources and higher govern-
ment and social levels. Reporting on provinces considered to be
generally weak.
- Insufficient and weak reporting on popular attitudes and reactions.
- Inconsistency and lack of continuity in reporting are engendered by
frequent shifting of Foreign Service personnel.
- Inadequate reporting in depth due to lack of interest and apprecia-
tion of its importance.
Measures designed to correct these weaknesses have taken through
arrangements for (1) briefing Foreign Service Officers prior to their go-
ing to the field, (2) briefing Foreign Service Inspectors prior to in-
spection trips, and (3) liaison with the Foreign Service Institute for
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the purpose of interjecting information with respect to the intelligence
function and its needs in the courses given at the Foreign Service In-
stitute. In addition, the Foreign Service ,rogram Officer plans and
supervises arrangements with rrspect to interchange of Foreign Service
officers with fl personnel, and the assignment of R personnel specifically
to accomplish intelligence reporting at Foreign Service posts.
The External Research Staff (ERS) is inventorying by subject and
country the social science research being done in the universities,
foundations, and other private institutions in this country and
abroad. In addition, they are indexing similar research being con-
ducted under the auspices of other government agencies. Eng also
attempts to exploit contracted research of other agencies so as to
satisfy needs which R may have. The weakness in this effort stems
from the fact that absence of forward planning by OIR and inadequate
planning liaison between OIR and ERS causes there to be little direct
utilization of external research in meeting the requirements of OM
divisions* In the opinion of most of the analysts of the OIR research
divisions, the EXternal Research Staff is not meeting a direct need as
a source of data.
Requirements planning, in terms of the identification of needs
for raw or semi.raw intelligence data, has suffered by reason of being
given so little attention and time in the OIR branches. The lack of
a recorded work plan in OIR branches has been a fundamental factor.
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Under the circumstances, IAD and ERS in particular have been seriously
handicapped in their efforts to render support service through sound
acquisition planning. The limited coverage of the Periodic Reporting
Guide Program at the present time is a further limitation on the in-
flow of desired material to the research divisions. To date only 16
posts are being covered of the estimated 60 to 70 which it would be
advantageous to cover, Additional limitations on the inflow of de-
sired material are:
- Lack of a definite or comprehensive evaluation program for polit-
ical and sociological reporting both as regards individual posts
and specific reports.
The fact that some information of significance received by bureau
officials and the S/S-R in conversations or official informals
does not reach OIR. This is recognized by bureau officials and
personnel of the S/S-R.
- The present Sensitive Room procedure which deprives analysts of
some material.
The fact that publications procurement at various Foreign Service
posts requires more specific representation and improved coordina-
tion of efforts, so as to provide better follow-up on standing
procurement requirements and more diligent procurement of general
publications (phone books, book lists, official gazettes, etc.)
on a self-initiative basis.
In the absence of a sound program of advance planning in connec-
tion with acquisition of research material req-irements, whether general
or specific, the analyst has his project at hand, or may be well into
it, before gaps in desired information are identified. It is then
necessary to rush telegrams or cables requesting the missing data, or
F 14
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to do without it when there is insufficient time available for acquisi-
tion, When the latter is the case, the analyst is obliged to compromise
the depth, scope, or accuracy (and hence the quality) of his report,
With respect to the NIS in particular, opportunities exist to re-
view basic data available against scheduled projects and to indicate
gaps, dates by which gaps should be filled, and methods to be employed.
Furthermore several analysts are of the opinion that a great
deal of reseatch? particularly with respect to NIS, could be farmed
out to the universities, This would be particularly true if R were
unable to suitably appraise the qualifications of the staff that would
do the work and, in addition, have the contract work subject to its
guidance and control,
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G ? DETAILED TECHNIQUES PROPOSED FOR PRODUCTION
PLANNING AND CONTROL
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APPENDIX G
DETAILED TECHNIQUES PROPOSED FOR PRODUCTION
PUNNING AND =gimp',
The following discussion supplements and illustrates in detail the
techniques of production planning and control discussed in Chapter XIII.
As outlined in some detail in Chapter XIV, the proposed Program Planning
Coordinator would have continuing responsibility for methodology of pro-
duction planning, scheduling, and progress reporting, Recommended pro-
cedures, forms, and instructions governing these functions are described
hereinafter.
1. The Development of a Semi-annual Work Plan
It is proposed that at intervals of once every six months each
branch chief be responsible for projecting, by program (regular, IIA,
N15? etc.) and in summary, his anticipated resources in terms of net
analyst man-hours available in the six-months' period ahead together
with his projected man-hour expenditure in each of the following
categories:
a. NIE's, IEts, and SE's
b, NIS Production
c. IRs - In Progress
- Anticipated
d. Periodic Publications
lB's and Other Written Current Intelligence
Briefings
go Spot Inquiry Handling
h. Committees, Debriefing, etc.
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i. Background Reading, Marking for File, etc.
j. Administration, including Evaluations
Form 1 portrays the suggested Work Plan Summary. For each branch
there wonli be such a summary for each program identified within it,
plus another for the branch as a whole. The projected man-hour expen-
diture would encompass consideration of work in process at the initia-
tion of the period, together with anticipated new workloads to be
applied within the period ahead. The Mork Plan Summary would be com-
piled from detailed schedules applying to each of the subject categories
listed above.,
A proposed semi-annual work plan was developed in the course of
this survey with the collaboration of the chiefs of the Northeast Asia
Branch and Africa Branch in OIR. For both of these branches, as well as
one each in DF' and DRS, a six months' work plan of this nature was
prepared and reviewed with the responsible Division Chief, IIA and NIS
Coordinators, EG Secretary, Director and Deputy Director of ()IR, and
cognizant officers in the bureaus concerned. Almost without exception
these reviews were found both enlightening and useful.
The sequence and manner in which the proposed work plan summaries
and supporting schedules ahould be developed are outlined in the fol-
lcwing paragraphs:.
a. Estimated Net Man-Hours Available. The first step in
the development of the work plan would be to forecast (using Fbrm 1A)
the net man-hours available in the 6-month period ahead, by program
G - 2
IEEN
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FORM 1
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WORK PLAN SUMMARY
PROGRAM
PERIOD
BRANCH
SUBJECT
PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
INITIAL ESTIMATE
ADJUSTED ESTIMATE
NIE s, IE s AND SE s
NIS PRODUCTION
IRs e
In Progress
Anticipated
PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS
Ws AND OTHER WRITTEN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
BRIEFINGS
ISPOT INQUIRY HANDLING
COMMITTEES,
SUB.TOTAL
OUTPUT MANHOURS
DEBRIEFING, ETC.
BACKGROUND READING, MARKING FOR FILE, ETC.
ADMINISTRATION
SUB.TOTAL
INTAKE MANHOURS
INCLUDING EVALUATIONS
TOTAL
ESTIMATED MANHOURS
AVAILABLE (From Form 1A)*
NET OPEN TIME OR DEFICIT
REMARKS:
* An Individual Work Plan is prepared for each program and supported as appropriate by detailed lists of projects showing
estimated mAt
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FORM lA
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SCHEDULE OF ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS AVAILABLE
PERIOD WORKING DAYS WORKING HOURS
BRANCH
MAN-HOURS
PERSONNEL AND MAN-HOUR ESTIMATE: MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SUBTOTAL TOTAL
REGULAR PROGRAM (persons)
REGULAR PROGRAM (man-hours)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)
ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)
X
NIS SUPPORT (persons)
NIS SUPPORT (man-hours)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)
ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)
X
IIA SUPPORT (persons)
IIA SUPPORT (man-hours)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)
ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)
X
TCA SUPPORT (persons)
TCA SUPPORT (man-hours)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)
ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)
X
EDAC SUPPORT (persons) X
EDAC SUPPORT (man-hours)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)
ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)
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and in total. This forecast should take into account allowance for
anticipated annual leave and an allowance for sick leave based on
historical record. It should include in its count all analysts,
including the branch chief.
b. Initial Estimate of Projected Man-Hour Expenditure, In
carrying out this second step, the branch chief would be assisted and
guided by the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production), as
recommended in Chapter XIV, Three Approaches to Stronger Organization.
The following program guidance would normally be available:
(1) Directives from the Special Assistant providing
broad or specific outlines of guidance to
intelligence production requirements in the period
ahead, based on his contact and liaison with the top
policy level of the State Department and in the IC..
(2) The compendium of intelligence problems of major
interest to the Estimates Group provided by the
annual Program Planning Guide, issued by the
Director of OCR.
(3)
(4)
Specific current anticipations and assumptions of
the Estimates Group with respect to the number and
subject of NIE/s, IE's, SE's and top priority IR's
that a given OIR branch might expect in the period
ahead. The close liaison of the EG with the S/P,
PSB, and CIA, in addition to its periodic review
of the Prog am Planning Guide, should provide the
basis for giving this guidance to the planning
efforts of each branch chiefs
It should be anticipated that the special program
agencies (ID., NISI etc.) would indicate, through
the Coordinators of their respective activities
in the R Area, the basic nature and relative
priority of their various intelligence needs in
the period ahead.
With the above guidance and assistance provided, the branch
chief should develop his initial estimate of the projected man-hour
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expenditures by subject, as covered by the schedules described below
and illustrated by examples at the end of this appendix.
(1) Schedule A - NIE's, 1E's? and SE's. For each type
of paper: Identification of work in progress at the
start of the period and estimated man-hours required
for completion; similarly, stated anticipations or
assumptions with respect to the papers the branch
is likely to participate in during the six-month
period; and, based on reasonable assumptions with
respect to the nature and scope or depth, estimates
of the total man-hours that would have to be
expended thereon.
(2) Schedule B - NIS Production. Identification of
sections in progress and an estimated total man-
hours required to be expended on such sections,
together with indication of percent completion to
be attained in each case; identification of sections
expected to be started within the period, together
with an estimated total man-hours to be expended
on these sections in the period, and anticipated
percent completion to be attained.
Schedule C m's in progress and anticipated.
Identification of the IR projects in progress at
the start of the period; estimation of the man-
hours expected to be applied to each in the period,
and the percentage completion to be attained.
Listing of subjects for IR's expected to be essen-
tials and others expected to be desirable but post-
ponable in the period ahead, together with estimated
man-hours for each; estimation of man-hours required
for collaboration on non-branch IR's; and, the
totalization of projected IR's in progress and
anticipated workloads in man-hours by program.
Schedule D - Periodic Publications. Identification
by program of the periodic publications produced or
contributed to by the branch on a regular basis;
projection of the number of issues and estimate of
man-hours acquired per issue, together with total
estimated man-hour requirements for the period.
(3)
(4)
(5)
Schedule E 1B's and other written Current Intel-
ligence. By program, as applicable, identification
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Of reasonable assumptions or experience factors as
to the number of IBIs, special papers or memoranda,
and other forms of written current intelligence
expected to be required, and a projected estimate
of the total man-hours involved.
(6) Schedule F - Briefings. By program, where applicable,
listing of appropriate premises or assumptions with
respect to anticipated requirements for briefings
(regnlar and special) by week or month, and projectioA
of the estimated man-hours required over the period.
Schedule G - Spot Inquiry Handling. By program, as
applicable, identification of assumptions or past
experience as regards the spot inquiry load imposed
on the branch; estimation of the anticipated man-
hour load per day or week of the entire branch over
the period ahead; projection for the six-month
period.
(8) Schedule H Committees, Debriefings, and Liaison.
By program, as applicable, projection of the estimated
man-hours to be spent on substantive committee and
liaison work unrelated to any specific one of the
intelligence products referred to in the preceding
schedules. Time allowance for preparation of
instructions for data acquisition to be included
in this category only When not related to acquisition
for a specific product. Allowance to be made for
time requirements with respect to debriefings of
Foreign Service Officers and others.
(7)
(9)
Schedule I - Background Reading, Marking for File,
etc. By program, as applicable, projection of the
estimated total man-hours to be required for the
routine. background work of analysts. This allow-
ance to cover the time for current and basic
intake of intelligence and other reference informa-
tion, the regular review of which is basic And
routine to the function of the analyst.
(10) Schedule J - Administration, including Evaluations.
By program, as applicable, projection of the time
required of the branch chief and subordinate per-
sonnel-in discharge of the various administrative
functions relative to general supervision) branch
and section planning, recruiting, performance
rating, personnel counseling, time use records,
non-substantive meetings and liaison, etc.
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During the course of preparing these schedules, the proposed
Assistant Division Chief (Production) should assist the branch chief in
referring to DFI for indication of projects anticipated to originate in
or through DFI, support program and otherwise, and requiring participation
from the geographic division. Likewise contact must be established with
the CPI, whose liaison with P and other agencies should enable him to
identify requirements for intelligence primarily, serving psydiological
warfare purposes other than those of the IIA. It would be the respon-
sibility of the CPI to refer these requirements to the proposed Assistant
Division Chief (Production) and branch chiefs concerned.
The sutra tion of the man-hour figures derived from the above
schedules, by program, *len compared with the estimated man-hours available,
will indicate the net open time or deficit in time available in the pro-
jected period of 6 months.
c. Review of Work Plan - Initial Estimates. Each branch chief
would develop his initial estimate of projected man-hour expenditures
and compare it with the estimated man-hours available. With the collabora-
tion of the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production), he would review
this work plan estimate with the principal customers for the intelligence
products of the particular branch. Die cussion of the Work Plan Summary
and supporting schedules with (1) the cognizant desk officers and Officer
Directors in the bureau concerned, (2) the EG Secretary, and (3) with the
special program Coordinators, should provoke canment with respect to
content and priorities which can be used as guidance to the branch chief
in adjusting his initial estimate to eliminate any open time or deficit.
G - 6
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It is not implied that the Bureau consumers should stipulate the adjust-
ments, but that their views should be known to and considered by the -
branch chief in making his decisions with respect man-power allocations.
Thus, the EG Secretary might make some suggestions with respect to the
initial estimates in Schedule A and the special program Coordinators
might offer comment with respect to adjustments in their respective areas
of interest. Likewise, the cognizant desk officers or Office Director
in the Bureau concerned might assist in developing priority (at least in
so far as their needs are concerned), as regards 'Vs in progress and
those anticipated by the branch chief as being (1) essential or (2) desir-
able but postponable, in the period ahead.
d. Development and Approval of Adjusted Work Plan. The branch
chief, guided in so far as possible by consideration of the review corn-
merits received, would adjust the elements of the original estimate to
bring the projected work plan within the anticipated capacity in man-
hours. No allowance should be made for overtime hours in this planning.
It would be unwise to plan the availability of overtime hours notwith-
standing the fact that some are normally available from every analyst.
Such a practice would place a very arbitrary limit on the number of man-
hours considered available for normal Performance of work. The potential
overtime hours) therefore, should merely offer a degree of flexibility
and a safeguard to the branch.
After the adjusted work plan has been developed, the division
chief would review and approve the plan, and then submit it for manage-
G - 7
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merit review at a meeting of the SG. The Director of Production Coordina-
tion, the Chief of IAD, and the Deputy-Special Assistant would participate
in the EG meeting. This review at the EG level would expose the plan to
the consideration of interested activities within R. This management
review mould clear the branch work plan for the Director of OIR to submit
to the Special Assistant and/or his Deputy, for final top management
approval. The work plan, mhen approved, would be returned to the branch
chief, and an information copy be provided to the Director of Production
Coordination.
The total elapsed time allowed for accomplishment of the fore-
going steps (from a through d) should not exceed two weeks. The proposed
Assistant Division ChiPf (Production) and the proposed Program Planning
Coordinator would each be responsible for assisting in and expediting the
development and clearance of the branch work plan.
A sample branch Work Plan Summary with all supporting schedules
follows the text of this Appendix.
2. Administration of the Plan
Obvious benefits will be derived merely from the process of develop-
ing the branch work plan. However, the greatest value lies in its being
the basis for control techniques through which, in the face of frequently
shifting world circumstances and consumer demands, the management in OIR
can have meaningful information on which to act to achieve timely pro-
duction and a desired distribution of analyst man-hours. Circumstances
inevitably will cause variations from plan, but the proposed control
G -8
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CONIUDENTIAL ? Securit Information
techniques will (1) clearly identify the variations, (2) permit them to be
analyzed as to cause and effect, and (3) equip responsible chiefs or
directors to take necessary management action.
Production control procedures recommended for use in implementation of
the approved branch work plan are discussed in paragraphs below. These
procedures should facilitate continuing effort toward (1) completing work
on time in relation to need, and (2) avoiding any unnecessary expenditure
of analyst man?hours. As stated previously, the proposed Program Planning
Coordinator would be responsible for the planning and control techniques.
However, the entire scheme recommended herein is based on the periodic
generation of control information at the branches, rather than at some
staff position at a higher level in the organization. The principal tools
are illustrated on the following sheets as Forms 12, 2, 2A, 3, 4 and 5;
and the use of each is discussed in detail in the following pages.
Project and Analyst Scheduling.. Written projects (NIEls,
TVs, IRts, etc.) in progress at the start of the period should be
scheduled to an expected deadline or completion date. Planned new
projects which are expected to be undertaken in the first three months
of the period should be given starting and estimated completion dates.
In both instances, the scheduling must take into account the following
factors:
(1) The target user's requirements,
(2) The estimated man?hours required,
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(3) The availability of the appropriate analyst(s)
for the assignment, and
(4) The average time that the assigned analyst(s)
will have available per week for work on this
project.
Consideration of all these factors may necessitate adjustments in some.
For example, the target user's requirements with respect to deadline,
when considered in the light of analyst's time availability, may make it
necessary to reduce the estimated man-hours required by curtailing the
Intiendedr-AlpthtOr-Aeome,,of the atudyi ,a_Oustrnents in some.
or examnig4ctor (4) listed above iS.nartieularlyrsignititantietIlthe,
scheduling 'procedure, -aid -LS related,,directlyftevehlia bt4.11441m4siankhu4t
tion, of *th4L ieddivid ill analyst' a it ise--hetareen.2thd rteinbfuhAeitt
of cthel-Work-PlaniSummary (Forel -:-Study has indicated that the
particular Awe ( ea ch _a nalyat in a. brame.h c rash sthat Late Atte
lie-
tribtitlon pattern, on a-weekly average, -will not thryotoraraligdieted.tit-
degree ffrom month to Month. On the ether. toireserin.,4he ttione 'Lips
trittititin patterns vary considerably between analyeteebytteastof the
fact: that -one may be handling ' a large ? volume ospot-tittqiairielvadtther
dcingtthorebrierthg, another involved_ tnm?Eet .braneiva.tkain is tra tf hinnetc.
As a means for achieving more realintiorschedulihg be4s-
pieLiri dates ? the branch chief -should,,tertalinal*y. rebordeasdnretittrethe
time diatribution pattern of his anal.yste,.. -Form N3 ienekherteecifsiendladr
device for this purpose. It is recommended' thatathir,beapretiaatilotp etc.
duplicate twice a year, at the times of preparing the-WorkInah Boirmary
-nn review the
- 10
terxied
CONFTDENTIAL Seourit;y Information
_
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- Plan 1umma ry
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FORM 3A, I 13 BASIC SCHEDULE OF ANALYST TIME
DATE
BRANCH
ANALYST NAME
PROGRAM I
AVERAGE HOURS PER 40-HOUR WEEK
AVERAGE TIME
iAVAILABLE PER
0-HOUR WEEK
4
FOR NIEs, IEs,
NIS, IRs, ETC.
PERIODIC
PUBS.
lBs AND
OTHER
WRITTEN CI
BRIEFINGS
SPOT
INQUIRY
HANDLING
COMMITTEES,
DEBRIEFING,
ETC.
ACKGROUND
& MARKING
FOR FILE
ADMIN.
& EVAL.
REVIEW
OF OTHERS
WORK
"AI
4l" Sri 1"r
01.1
A 1,111,
f 1 h 4 anestsries
.4 R.111111.4
"411"/.1111."
,ft
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FORM 2
v) OIR WORK JACKET
1. JACKET CLASSIFICATION
2A. PROJECT NUMBER
28. PROJECT TITLE
2C. PROGRAM
BA. REQUESTER (NAME AND OFFICE OR AGENCY)
3B. PRODUCINGDIVISION/BRANCH
3C. COLLABORATING DIVISIONS (BRANCHES)
4A. PERTINENT INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO NATURE AND TARGET USE OF PROJECT
4B. PRIMARY SUBJECT TYPE
ID POLITICAL
0 ECONOMIC
C] SOCIOLOGICAL
El
5. ANALYST MANHOURS REQUIRED
A. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
B. REVISED ESTIMATE
C. ACTUAL
5O. PROGRESS RECORD DATES
(I) DATE REQUESTED
(2) ORIGINAL DEADLINE DATE
(3) REVISION
6A. PROJECT CLASSIFICATION
8B. DATE OF POSSIBLE REVISION
(4)
(5)
7. REASONS FOR CLASSIFICATION
(6) PROJECT INITIATED
(7)
(8)
(9) DRAFT TO REPRODUCTION
8. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION
(10)DATE TO REQUESTER
LIST 1 D 2 3 D 4 0
0
(IODATE DISTRIBUTED
ADDITIONS OR REVISIONS:
9A. LEAD ANALYST'S NAME
98. BRANCH APPROVAL
9C. DIVISION APPROVAL
(12)REMARKS:
re PROJECT NO.
PROJECT TITLE
(Actual size 8" x 5")
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FORM 2A
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PROJECT MAN-HOURS RECORD SHEET
I. RECORD SHEET CLASSIFICATION
2A. PROJECT NUMBER
2B. PROJECT TI TIE
2C. PROGRAM
ANALYSTS ASSIGNED
PROGRAM
GRADE
JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.
TOTAL
LEAD ANALYST
ANALYSTS
MANHOUR SUBTOTALS
BRANCH CHIEF AND DIVISION REVIEWERS
MANHOUR TOTALS
_
PROJ ECT NO.
PROJECT T I TL E
PROJECT CLASS I F !CATION
(Actual size 8" x 5")
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 3
Approved For Release 2001/09/4: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
PROJECT REPORT AND SCHEDULE
STATUS DATE
DIVISION
PROGRAM
BRANCH
PROJECT NO.
REQUESTER
TITLE
DATE
BE-
GUN
COMPLETION
DATE
MANHOURS
APRIL
/IF
MAY
JUNE
FUTURE
EST.
v,
4?
,..c.,
ESTIMATED
v
,r?
41.:.
4-
ORI G.
REV.
I I 1
1 I 1
1 I i
IR 5813
c
S/P
ULTRANATIONALISTS, ETC.
2/26
5/14
4/22
150
120
115

IR 55665
NA/J
OCCUPATION MEASURES, ETC.
2/20
3/24
90
32
1///////
4
1R5812
C
E
REVIEW OF THE LABOR SITUATION
3/29
4/9
4/20
30
?
35
4
1R5724
R
XYZ ISSUE
3/25
5/11
75
20
7//////////////////,
4
IR 5817
NA
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOUTH KOREA SINCE 1935
150
//////////////////,
HILY 22
A
IE - 71
VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE
4/10
5/1
80
100
60
4
C
NIE - 97
CONTRIBUTION-URGENT
4/16
4/26
4/26
50
56
NIE - 98
CONTRIBUTION- HIGH
140
LEGEND: Scheduled Completion
f Actual Completion
4
Cancelled projects are so
Deferred or Cut Back
///////////1
Extension
marked on next report.
NET TOTAL ANALYSTS' MANHOURS AVAILABLE FOR ABOVE PROJECTS THIS PROGRAM
IN MONTH PAST: Anticipated manhours
Actual manhours
Excess or Deficit
IN MONTH AHEAD: Anticipated manhours
NOTE: If the anticipated available manhours are insufficient to meet urgent project needs
in month ahead, a memorandum should be attached hereto outlining the problem
and requesting management's consideration.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 4
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
QUARTERLY ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
PROGRAM PERIOD BRANCH
A. COMPARISON OF PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL APPLICATION OF ANALYST MANHOURS
SUBJECT
MANHOURS EX-
PENDED THIS
PERIOD
%OF
TOTAL
PROJECTED
% BY
WORK PLAN
REMARKS
NIEs, lEs and SEs
NIS PRODUCTION
IRs
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS
[Bs and other written current intelligence
BRIEFINGS
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING
SUBiTOTAL
OUTPUT HOURS
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.
BACKGROUND READING and marking
for file
SUB?TOTAL
INTAKE MANHOURS
ADMINISTRATION including evaluations
TOTAL
B. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED VERSUS ACTUAL TIME ALLOWANCES
FACTORS
PROJECTS COMPLETED
IN THIS PERIOD
PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
AT END OF PERIOD
NUMBER OF PROJECTS
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED
ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED
ACTUAL
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS
ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS
ACTUAL
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL
NOTE: All hours are for Analysts only.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 5
Approved For Release 2001/094 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
ANALYST WEEKLY TIME REPORT
NAME
PROGRAM
WEEK ENDING DIVISION & BRANCH
(Time spent on other programs should be indicated by symbol alongside of entries made below)
SUBJECT
SU
MO
TU
WE
TH
FR
SA
WEEK
TOTAL*
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS
lBs AND OTHER WRITTEN CI
(Indicate IB number)
BRIEFINGS
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.
BACKGROUND READING, ETC.
,
ADMINISTRATION & EVALUATION
WRITTEN PRODUCTS. BY NO.
NIE ?
IE ?
IR.
NIS -
DAY TOTAL
*
_
* Analyst need not compute
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For ReleatzinfARKI:, Clt ADuFr'HIS,OfInc;1R00.81?260002-3
for the branch. The original should remain in the branch and the copy
accompany the copy of approved work plan for the Director of Production
Coordination. The latter would make available to the CPI, NIS Coordinator,
etc. the Work Plan Summary sheets and analyst's time scheduling data
pertinent to their respective support programs.
The semiannual preparation of this Basic Schedule of Analyst
Time, as a step coincidental with developing an approved branch Work
Plan Summary, will materially aid the branch chief in scheduling the
written projects to more accurate completion date estimates than are now
possible. As may be seen, the right-hand column of Form 1B indicates the
man-hours of the analyst's 40-hour meek available for productive effort
on written projects, after due allowance has been made for the rest of
his regular activities. This is a key figure for project scheduling
purposes. If it indicates too little time for scheduled written projects
of high priority, three alternatives are open:
(1) Work in excess of the standard 40 hours per week will
make available added hours for the priority project.
(2) Temporary curtailment or elimination of time used
for other subjects such as periodic publications,
briefings, etc., will make available more time for
the desired project. Obviously, regularly
resorting to this practice will vary the analyst's
basic pattern and, in turn, the work plan itself
on a permanent basis unless otherwise compensated.
(3)
Assignment of more analysts to the priority project,
if that be feasible, mould increase the man-hours
available for it.
The analyst time scheduling entered in Form 1B should be cor-
related with the approved branch work plan so as to insure the allocation
G
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved Fo6Mtwricti1/0 ogg inwpfnAnnkRo ooi 00260002-3
of necessary man-hours to the various subjects covered by the plan. To
facilitate its use by a support program coordinator, in conjunction with
the subsidiary branch Work Plan Summary dealing with the particular pro-
gram, the analysts should be listed on Form 1B in groups, by program, and
their time figures subtotaled accordingly.
b. Performance Recording. Forms 2 and 2k, are recommended as
a simplified substitute for the existing OIR project Work Jacket, They
are designed for use in visible filing equipment and for recording all
essential information with respect to the identification, scheduling,
and progress of a project. In contrast with the existing form, no
provision is made for using this Mork Jacket as a record and control
sheet for such operations as final typing, stencil cutting, reproduction,
and distribution. It is suggested that the latter be served by separate
control procedure suitable for the purposes of IDR and the proposed
Office of Intelligence Services.
Form 5 is recommended in lieu of the present Time Use Report
required monthly of the analysts. This proposed Analyst Weekly Time
Report is both simpler and more meaningful than the latter. Its subject
headings correspond to those employed in the Work Plan Summary (Form 1)
and the Basic Schedule of Analyst Time (Form 1B). These headings should
facilitate the analyst's recording of time use. A simple weekly report
will be more accurately executed than was the more complex monthly report.
Furthermore, to minimize the attention requireof the analyst, it is
G -12
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81SQ0921R000100260002-3
CONMENTIAL - Security Inrormation
proposed that the branch secretary or clerk be made responsible for a
weekly visit and assistance to each analyst in connection with the execution
of this report. The same indivisual would post from the weekly time reports
(Form 5) to the Project Man-Hours Record Sheet (Form 2) of the Work
Jackets; and would assemble monthly and quarterly, from these same time
reports, the figures necessary for the Project Report and Schedule
(Form 3) and the quarterly Analysts of Performance (Form 4) discussed
in the paragraphs following.
c. Monthly_Report to Mansent. It is proposed that each
branch prepare and issue monthly to management levels in R, the special
program Coordinators, and the principal consumers or target users of R
products, the Project Report and Schedule illustrated by Form 3. This
report a? separate sheet for each program, would portray by table and
graphics (1) the action of the month past in terms of projects initiated,
deferred, cancelled, or completed, (2) estimated and actual status with
regard to man-hours expended by project, (3) anticipated commencement
of new projects, and (4) revised completion dates anticipated for
projects in progress.
At the bottom of this report there should be recorded a com-
parison between the anticipated man-hours available in the month past,
as derived from the Basic Schedule of Analyst Time (Form 1B), and the
actual man-hours available, as derived from the Analyst "Weekly Time
Report (Form 5). Hence, either from there being (1) a deficit in
CONFIDENTIA.L - Security Information
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
analyst time available, or (2) the cutback or extension of man-hours
estimated for a project, or (3) the interjection of unanticipated new
projects, it should be possible to explain variations from schedule in the
month past.
A combined report and schedule of this sort would reflect
accurately the dynamics of the workloads imposed on the branch, provide
sound basis for management analysis, and indicate realistically the
status of each project.
d. Quarterly Report to Management. It is recommended that
branch chiefs have prepared, for their owl review and that of the division
chief and R top management, a Quarterly Analysis of Performance (Form 4).
This proposed report form provides a comparison between the planned applica-
tion of analyst man-hours, as projected in the approved Work Plan Summary,
and the actual application of such time, as computed frail the weekly time
reports. Secondly, it provides a comparieon of estimated versus actual
time allowances on projeote completed in the period and in progress, both
with respect to man-hours expended and elapsed calendar days.
The Quarterly Analysis of Performance for each branch should
be distributed to the division chief, Director of OIR, Director of Pro-
duction Coordination, Director of Intelligence Services, and the Deputy
Special Assistant. Additional copies of the subsidiary sheets relating
to special programs (IIA, NIS, etc.) should be distributed to the
respective Coordinators, for review with the support agencies, as desired.
G 14
Ca?IFDENTIAL - Security Information
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
ALL PROGRAM
. Program
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
March 1 - August 31. 1952 q2alliEg-Jga
Period Branch
SUBJECT PROJECTED MAN-HOUR EXPENDITURE PER CENT
Initial Est. Adjusted Est. OF TOTAL
,40A. N1E'e; IE's and SE's - 1,000 , 7
B. NIS Production - 5,000 34
C. MI6 - In progress - 865 6
Anticipated - 1,005 7
D. Periodical Publications - 460 3
E. IBfs and other written CI 1,250 9
F. Briefings - 365 2
G. Spot Inquiry Handling - 800
_2
10,745 73
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc. - 700 - 5
I. Background, Reading,
Marking, etc. - 2,530 17
J. Administration, incl.
Evaluations
Estimated Man-Hours
Available (From Form 1A)
Net Open or Deficit
3,230 22
805
*See attached Schedules A through J for details
G-15
14,780 100 %
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 1 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
REGULAR March 1 ? August 31, 1952 SOUTHWEST ASIA
Program
SUBJECT
Period Branch
PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE PER CENT
Initial Est. Adjusted Est. OF TOTAL
*A.
NlEls, IE's, and SE's
1,200
1,000
18
B.
NIS Production
C.
IR's ? In progress
520
420
7
Anticipated
655
355
6
D.
Periodical Publications
280
230
4
E.
IB' s and other written CI
720
620
11
F.
Briefings
215
215
O.
Spot Inquiry Handling
700,
_22
11
Subtotal
4,290
3,4.30
61
H.
Committees, Debriefings,
etc.
520
470
8
I.
Background Reading,
Marking, etc.
1,380,
1,220
22
----
Subtotal
1,900
1,690
30
J.
Administration, incl.
Evaluations
520
520.
Total
6,710
5,640
100
Estimated Nhnhours
Available (From Form 1A)
Net ORpmed? Deficit
5, 640
1,070
*See Attached Schedules A through J for details.
O - 16
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 1
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
ITA March 1 - August 31, 1952
SOUTHWEST ASIA
Program
SUBJECT
Period Branch
PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE PER CENT
Initial Est. Adjusted Est. OF TOTAL
*A.
NIEts? IEts, and SE's
B.
NIS Production
C.
IRis - In progress
95
95
4
Anticipated
400
350
15
D.
Periodical Publications
260
230
10
E.
IE's and other written CI
750
630
27
F.
Briefings
150
150
6
G.
Spot Inquiry Handling
210
210
Subtotal
10865
1,665
_2
71
H.
Committees, Debriefings,
etc.
130
130
6
I.
Background Reading,
Marking, etc.
540
460
li
Subtotal
670
590
25
J.
Administration, incl.
Evaluations
105.
105
-...4.
Total
2.640
2.3604
100
Estimated Manhours
Available (From Form 1A)
2,360,
Net gpen!Or Deficit
280
*See Attached Schedules A through J for details.
0-17
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
FORM 1
NIS
Program
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SUBJECT
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
March 1 - August 31. 1952
Period
*A. NIEls, IEfs, and SE's
B. NIS Production 5500 5000 74%
C. Ials - In progress 350 330 5
Anticipated 400 300 4
D. Periodical Publications - - -
E. 'Ws and other written CI
F. Briefings
G. Spot Inquiry Handling -- -
----- ------
Subtotal 6250 5650 83
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc. 100 100 1
I. Background Reading, Marking,
etc. , 850 850 , -12-
Subtotal 950 950 14
J. Administration, incl.
Evaluations 180 180 -_,--.
TOTAL 7380 . 6780 100%
Estimated Manhours
Available (From Form 1A) 6780 6780
Net .921A-er'1Jeficit 600
Remarks:
SOUTHWEST ASIA
Branch
PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE PERCENT
Initial Est. Adjusted Est. OF TOTAL
AIMIk
MI*
ANN
????
*See attached schedules A through J for details.
Approved For Release 2001/09903 MIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Form lk
Approved For Release 2001/09/
: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
. ' 4----Y-
SCHEDULE OF ESTIMATES MAN HOURS AVAITARIE c),
1 March - 31 August 1952,v---
,-- \
ft,-'-'1. ,...-A
---,0
SOUTHWEST ASIA
Branch
March
April
May
June July Aug.
- Total
Working days
Working hours
21
168
22
176
21
168
21 22 22
168 176 176
129
1032
Personnel Complement:
Repillar (persons)
6
6
5
6 6 6
Regular (man-hours)
Q
1008
1056
840
1008 1056 1056
6024
Estimated annual leacre
320
\fp
Estimated sick leave
60
380
TbEE
NIS (permans)
6
7
7
7 8 8
NIS (man-hours)
1008
1232
1176
1176 1108 1408
7408
Estimated annual leave
480
Estimated sick leave
150
630
6778
IIA (persons)
2
3
3
3 3 3
IIA (manhours)
336
c28
504
504 528 528
2576
Estimated annual leave
160
Estimated sick leave
60
220
2356
NET AVAILABLE VAN HOURS - 6-MONTH PERIOD
14778
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
NIEls
Work in Progress
NIE - 27
NIE - 32
Projects Anticipated
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule A. - NIEls, IE's. and $E's
Manhours in this Period
Sub-Total Total
At least one more NIE
involving work on Baldonia
150
50
At least one on Whatland, either
a review of NIE 22 in the light
of the abdication, or a more
limited study of special problems 325
Contributions to possibly 2 or 3
NIE' s of broad nature, involving
other areas
IE's and SE's
Work in Progress
40. 4r
SE - 81 leCr
Pro:leafs Anticiaated
Within six months will probably be
involved in one IE on Doorland in
view of critical political situation
and its strategic importance;
possibly one the new status of
Foolia, in view of its present in-
stability and vital interest to the
Red powers.
Approximate manhours
Total Hours Projected for NIE's,
IE's and SE's
e,
.801.
3AS
Approved For Release 2001/09/OR : Cg-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule B. ? NTS Production
Manhours
Projected
Completion
Percentage
In Progress
65 (maint.)
63
52
44
43
57
53
43
300
200
Ake s-ee
4e0 3.5-0
.10/810 a 4 0
200
150
35'er30.0
100%
? 100
100
100
100
75
75
50
Baldonia Section
It
ii
It
n
Whatland Section
II
U
3.Weer
200
To be Started
Baldonia Section 57 P?erChP " 100%
46 .3rfrer 50.0 100
40 250 50
Whatland Section 65 300 75
64 150 50
51 50 25
42 ,...ja 25
/7,06
lev'
Total Hours Projected 1122",;'00e)
G ? 21
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPIE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule C. - This
Regular Program
Manhours
Projected
Completion
Percentage
In Progress
4222 (Title) 180 100%
O
5279 (Title) ico
5742 (Title) 60 100
5730 (Title) -22_ 100
-5?20"
Anticipated
(Probable Title) 50
(Probable Title)
(Probable Title)
(Probable Title)
(Probably Title)
1..ee
42f..
1(
Total Hours Projected .J26
0 - 22
100
100
100
100
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule C. - IRta
Program
In Progress
5667 Propaganda in Baldonia
Anticipated
Ethnic Group Studies
Country plan contributions
Public opinion survey
studies on Baldonia
Total Hours Projected
Manhours
G - 23
95
/7.5
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Projected
Completion
Percentage
100
?100
100
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPIE
WORK PIAN SUMMARY
Schedule C. - IRis
NIS Program
In Progress
6524 (Title)
Anticipated
Possibly a basic paper
on Wbatland economy.
Total Hours Projected
Manhours
Erojected
Completion
Percentage
350 100
350
Sari
100
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
starpm
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule D. ? Periodic Publications
Etgular Program
6111 International Whig Monthly
(probably four short and two
long contributions)
4080 Trends in X 130
(Estimated 5 hours per week
in producing or reviewing
items)
.2-817
Manhours
]).0
IIA Program
5666 Weekly Developments of Significance
(Estimated average Xi hours per
week) 4
G ? 25
t 4
jap
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule E. - IBts and Other
Regular Program
1
ID's Estimated per week,
1 long averaging 13 hours, 3
short averaging 4 hours.
Special Papers and Memos -
Expect about 10 averaging
from 2 to 12 hours.
Manhours
70
%tar
itevo
;IA Prosrag
Daily Developments of
Significance
(averageXhoure par day) .6611
Short memos or review
work for IIA 100
G - 26
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule F. - Briefings
Regular Program
1. Armstrong Morning BriefiRE
Roughly 2 hours per day in 10 of
the 26 weeks this period
2. Division Briefing (5 o'clock)
1/2 to 3/4 hour per day total
for two persons this branch
3. Special Afternoon Briefings of R
about 1 per month - 6 hours each
for preparation and delivery
IIA Program
COnsultations and briefings for
VOA, INS, and other operating
units
G - 27
100
BO
Nhnhours
215
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule G. - Spit Inquiry Handling
Regular Program
Estimated that about six hours per
day are devoted to servicing spot
inquiries in this Branch
3erf
IIA Program
Approximately 8 hours per week 210
secr-
ro
G-28
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
MORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule H. ? Committees, Debriefings, etc.
Regular Program
Branch Chief about 1C'hours per week;.
another efor section chiefs and
analysts combined
IIA Program
Approximately 5 hours per week 130
NIS Program
Committee meetings approximately
total 4 hours per week for 2
analysts
G ? 29
100
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPIE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule I. - Background Reading. Marking. etc.
Regular Program
itanhours
Allowing 1-1/K ours per day for
Branch Chief,/ ours per day for
Assistant Branch Chief (C.I.0),
and 1-1/2 hours per day for the ..,4244he
average analyst. l?ateCr*
UA Program
Allowing about 7....e2 hours per day per
analyst for intake unrelated to specific e
research projects 44Cr
NIS Pro tram
From 3/4 to 1 hour per analyst per day
in background or current intelligence
intake unrelated to immediate NIS task.
G - 30
850
__)"?36
2.1i1Cr.
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
SAMPLE
ffORK PLAN SUMMARY
Schedule J. - Administrations including Evaluations
Regular Program
Branch Chief 2 hours per day
about 1-1/2 hours for rest of
analysts combined. Evaluations
about 3 hours per week for branch.
IIA Program
About 2-1/2 hours per week on administration,
including portion of Branch Chief's and
C.I.O.'s time; 3/4 hour per week on
evaluations.
D1.15 Program
About 4 hours per weak on administration)
including portion of Branch Chief's time.
Approx. 2 hours per week on evaluations.
Manhours
520
105
180
i,m0?11..11,0
805.
?11/10?1?011
G - 3L
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Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3
Confidential
Secu ity Information
Approved For Release 2001/09
hGaRaM81S00991R000100260002-3
Security Information