NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 5 JULY 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 5, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Situation Report
i :i.caraqua o 0 0 o e a 0 0 0 0 0 o a 1
F 11
riets and Comments
Ghana Drifting Toward Chaos o o a
USSR: CEMA Meeting P
7
East Germany: Berlin Representatives o o a o 8
West Germany: Strauss Selection. o 0 0 0 0 0 9
Zambia-Zaire: Rail Problems. . A o 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
St. Lucia- Victory for Pro-Cuban Left. o 0 0 11
Nigeria: Increased Ownership of Oil Companies. 12
Jordan=France: Major Aircraft Purchase a a a 12
Special Analysis
Nigeria: Elections for a Civilian RuZe
Government ? 0 0 0 0 0 0? a o o?
Overnight Reports. . . . .
The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the
final section, will often contain materials that update
other articles in the Dai Zy
i Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
?Matagalpa
'tam
g 0--
MANAGUA *
1l~asayad
fJioialnhao .
Kilormers
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Major fighting continues in most parts of the coun-
try. The relative balance of the opposing forces makes
it unlikely that the tide will shift either way suddenly,
unless outside forces intervene or President Somoza de-
cides to resign.
Military Developments
The Sandinistas continue to make slow but steady
gains in the northern and eastern parts of the
country.
President Somoza has delayed for another day or two
sending a new task force to recapture Masaya.
suggests that the troops may be undergoing ami iariza-
tion training on their new M-16 rifles. Nevertheless,
the Guard is planning to use this force of new recruits,
elements of the elite General Somoza and 1st Armored
Battalions, and Managua police units to retake Masaya in
a week, Leon in two weeks, and thereafter Diriamba and
Matagalpa.
--continued
Top Secret
5 July 1979
25X1
25X11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
The Guard's timetable appears unrealistic because
Guard morale is beginning to sag under the strain of the
five-week-old offensive, and because the guerrillas are
putting up a stiff fight. The Sandinistas, moreover,
appear to be brin in in small rou s of fresh forces
regularly
A Colombian
guerrilla who sought asylum in the US Embassy in Costa
Rica estimated that 10 of his countrymen were arriving
there every eight days to join the Nicaraguan guerrillas.
Political Developments
The Nicaraguan Congress obtained a quorum on Tues-
day and convened in the security of Managua's Intercon-
tinental Hotel. The Congress is dealing with routine
matters, but will be immediately available to take its
cue from Somoza--should he decide to resign--and initiate
the succession process.
The primary moderate organizations in Managua are
increasingly reluctant to mount a political challenge to
the Sandinistas' provisional government. The Broad Oppo-
sition Front, which has tentatively approved of the pro-
visional government, asked on Sunday only that it broaden
its base, either by expanding the five-person junta or
by allocating 12 of 30 seats on a council of state to
the moderates.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
GHANA: Drifting Toward Chaos
Ghana continues to drift toward political and eco-
nomic chaos. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council re-
mains without an acknowledged leader and has ZittZe au-
thority outside of Accra. The economy, which has suf-
fered from years of mismanagement, is experiencing
triple-digit inflation and shortages of food, petroleum,
and other essentials.
The surface calm that had prevailed since the exe-
cutions last week of two former heads of state and four
other senior military officers was broken briefly on
Tuesday by student demonstrations in Accra and Kumasi,
including a march on the US Embassy. The demonstrators--
led by the National Union of Ghana Students, a small,
far-leftist group--called on the Council to resume the
executions of former government officials. The students
alleged that the US was attempting to frustrate the
Council's plans to eliminate government corruption and
improve the country's living standards.
We do not know what prompted the demonstrations or
who was behind them. There is speculation but no sup-
porting evidence that the Soviets and Ethiopians are in-
volved. The US Embassy in Accra believes that despite
their small number, the students are fairly well organ-
ized and may be able to take advantage of the political
vacuum to pressure the Council to accelerate the time-
table for carrying out its reforms.
Efforts continue among leading Ghanaian politicians
to establish some alternative to the Council. The two
front-runners in last month's inconclusive presidential
election--Hilla Limann and Victor Owusu--are attempting
to form an interim coalition government or presidential
commission
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
USSR: CEMA Meeting
The Soviets and the East Europeans failed to ease
tensions over energy supplies at the session of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow Zast week.
Premier Kosygin was probably engaging in semantics when
he announced that the USSR planned to increase its energy
exports to other CEMA members by 20 percent during the
next five-year plan. On other issues, there is no indi-
cation that the Soviets succeeded in pushing through
changes that would give CEMA a supranational character.
If we interpret Kosygin correctly, he meant that
total Soviet energy exports to other CEMA members during
the 1981-1985 period will be 20 percent higher than total
energy exports during the five years beginning in 1976--
to date a period of sharp growth in such exports. This
would mean that the outlook is for negligible growth--
less than 2 percent per year--in actual Soviet energy
exports to Eastern Europe after 1980. With Soviet natu-
ral gas exports scheduled to rise rapidly, the implied
low growth rate in overall energy exports points to a
decline in Soviet oil deliveries after 1980.
The most significant results of the session were
agreements on a major upgrading of transportation lines
connecting CEMA's European members and on cooperative
production of equipment for nuclear power plants. There
were reports of "problems" over the latter with respect
to assigning responsibilities. Czechoslovak Premier
Strougal emphasized the burden imposed on Czechoslovakia
by its obligation under the CEMA nuclear power program.
There is no indication that the Soviets succeeded
in pushing through structural changes in CEMA that would
give the organization a supranational character. Kosy-
gin's speech and the communique confirmed that "clarifi-
cations" were made in the charter for the more "effective
operation" of CEMA's work, but Romania's apparent ap-
proval of the charter changes and Kosygin's comment that
"much remains to be done to improve" CEMA cooperation
u)J ly19 9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
indicate that they were not the major changes in voting
procedures and external representation that had caused
the Romanians concern.
Nearly all of Moscow's major clients in the Third
World attended, including Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan,
Mozambique, Iraq, and South Yemen. South Yemen was named
an observer, but Afghanistan and Mozambique, which also
attended for the first time, were not. Vietnam, elevated
from observer to member status at the session last year,
was extended the kind of special aid measures for less-
developed CEMA countries that Cuba and Mongolia enjoy.
North Korea and Heng Samrin's Kampuchean Government
were conspicuous in their absence. North Korea had at-
tended nearly every CEMA session since 1972
Romania also had threatened not to
attend if the Heng Samrin delegation did. It appears
that the Soviets gave in to last-minute pressure to ex-
clude Kampuchea. By then it was too late for the North
Koreans to arrange to attend.
5 Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
The Dutch decision on theater nuclear force modern-
ization and arms control will have a significant effect
on NATO's ability to reach agreement on the subject and
on the future nuclear capability of NATO. Dutch Defense
Minister SchoZten has told the US Ambassador in The
Hague that the Dutch will delay their decision until
after the US Senate acts on SALT II.
Prime Minister van Agt's government in principle
supports theater nuclear force modernization, including
Dutch involvement, but the government is hamstrung by a
large and effective antinuclear movement and by nervous-
ness over US policies on nuclear weapons. If the effec-
tiveness of the antinuclear campaign is to be blunted and
a positive decision made, the government will have to
build a major base of public support and convince skep-
tical, bickering, and intimidated politicians of all
stripes to support such a NATO policy.
Van Agt's hand would be strengthened by clarifica-
tion of the US position on theater nuclear force moderni-
zation, specifically the administration's views on what
it expects from the Dutch and other Europeans, and by
assurances that the US will link modernization of the
force with future arms control negotiations. The Dutch
will take their cue from the fate of the SALT II Treaty,
and a defeat in the US Senate almost certainly would set
back support for future theater nuclear force moderniza-
tion in The Hague.
If the Dutch ultimately take a negative stand, not
only would it seriously weaken their contribution to
NATO but it would also have deleterious repercussions
beyond Holland's borders. West Germany is insisting
that, if new nuclear weapons are to be placed on its
soil, other countries on the continent must also accept
such weapons. Belgium and Italy--the other possible
hosts for new nuclear weapons systems--are watching the
Dutch with intense interest.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
EAST GERMANY: Berlin Representatives
An amendment to the East German election Law, ap-
proved by the VoZkskammer on 28 June, eliminates any dis-
tinction between East Berlin deputies and other members
of the legislature. This assertion of East German sover-
eignty defies the Western Allied position on Berlin and
violates the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. The action,
which can be assumed to have Soviet approval, represents
retaliation for West Berlin participation in the European
Parliament.
Volkskammer deputies from East Berlin, in contrast
to deputies nominally elected in East Germany, have so
far been chosen by the East Berlin city assembly, and
their legislative powers are supposedly restricted. Sim-
ilar limitations are applied at Western Allied insistence
to Bundestag members from West Berlin. Thus the amend-
ment foretells elimination of yet another vestige of Ber-
lin's special status when the next Volkskammer election
is held in 1981.
The East German move has stimulated considerable
concern in West Germany, where it raises questions about
the Allied ability to ensure the inviolability of the
Quadripartite Agreement. It also undercuts the govern-
ment's Ostpolitik policy. The architect of that policy,
Egon Bahr, has urged Bonn to consider responding by
making West Berlin delegates full members of the Bundes-
tag. This would be unacceptable to the Allies, and Bahr
has been widely criticized in West Germany for suggest-
ing a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.
The West Germans want some response, however, to
ease their frustration and minimize the appearance of
Allied impotence. The Allies had publicly asked the So-
viets to restrain the East Germans and will deliver a
strong protest to Moscow this week. The US postponed in-
definitely the signing of a consular convention with East
Germany; the French Foreign Minister reportedly will can-
cel a scheduled visit to East Berlin this week; the Bel-
gian Foreign Minister has postponed a visit to East
Germany; and Bonn is reducing routine East - West German
official contacts.
Too Secret
5 July 1979
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
The selection on Monday of Franz Josef Strauss as
the conservative parties' chancellor candidate in the
1980 elections by the joint Bundestag caucus of Christian
Democrats and the Bavarian Christian Social Union reflects
a strong desire for interparty unity following months of
bickering. Some Christian Democrats, who expect ChanceZ-
lor Helmut Schmidt to win the next election, see the de-
cision as a way to end Strauss's relentless drive for
conservative leadership.
CDU leader Helmut Kohl's position now is severely
shaken because of his weak leadership and failure to pre-
vent Strauss's selection as chancellor candidate.
Strauss's campaign also has left a residue of bitterness
in the CDU, which will hamper the party's effort on his
behalf. The government undoubtedly will seek to exploit
Strauss's somewhat ominous image. Strauss is a tireless
and persuasive campaigner, however, and will probably
aim for and quite-possibly achieve a more moderate public
image.
Strauss's nomination reduces the possibility of a
fourth political party in West Germany, a concept he had
promoted mainly to bring pressure on the CDU. The
greater prospect of conservative unity this implies will
aid Schmidt in his efforts to enforce solidarity on the
Social Democratic leftists.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
YAOUNDE
Lake
Tanganyika
c* LUANDA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Zambia has stopped all rail traffic in and out of
Zaire's copper-mining Shaba Region for the past 11 days.
The stoppage has cut off all Shaban exports and such
critical imports as coal, coke, corn, and mining explo-
sives. Behind the embargo is the Zairian Government-
owned railroad's failure to pay some $4 million in trans-
portation charges to the railways in Zambia and Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia. The rail closure could aggravate an already
tense situation in Shaba.
Zambia had threatened in late May to cut off ship-
ments to Zaire for nonpayment. At the time it was esti-
mated that Shaba's mining towns had about a two-week sup-
ply of corn--the region's staple food. The giant
Gecamines mining company estimated that it had coke
stocks for two months and coal supplies for eight days.
Although shipments continued last month, there probably
has not been any buildup of stocks. Without coke and
coal, Gecamines would be forced to stop production of
blister copper and copper wire bar.
Gecamines attempted to find the money either from its
own resources or the government. Finally, in early June,
Zaire reportedly paid Zambia about $1 million in hard
currency on the debt. The partial payment forestalled
the threat of closure until now.
Zambia, however, alleges that it has not received
the $1 million and is insisting on payment in full be-
fore it will allow traffic to resume. The Zambians may
be delaying acknowledgment of the partial payment in
order to use all of the rail capacity for their own
trade, especially imports of corn which are expected to
be in short supply this year. If Zaire is unwilling or
unable to pay, Gecamines will request permission to make
the payment wi.th.company foreign exchange--a practice
the Central Bank and Zaire's creditors, including the
International Monetary Fund, frown on.
The lack of food and jobs resulting from the rail
shutoff could cause a violent reaction in the volatile
Shaba Region. Gecamines may feel forced to pay the debt
in order to keep the lid on in Shaba.
10 Top Secret M
5 July 1979 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
ST. LUCIA: Victory for Pro-Cuban Left
The landslide election victory of the Labor Party
on Monday continues the trend favoring the rise of
younger political leaders who are friendly toward Cuba
and wary of the US. The loser was a widely respected
moderate leader of the eastern Caribbean three-term
Prime Minister John Compton>
The new Prime minister is the aging titular head of
the Labor Party, former Judge Allan Louisy. Real power,
however, will be held by the dominant radical wing of the
party, headed by trade union activists George Odium and
Peter Josie. While they have indicated that the new gov-
ernment will remain on a moderate course and on good
terms with the US, they have called for tighter state
control of the economy and for a nonaligned foreign
policy favoring closer relations with Cuba and neighbor-
ing Grenada.
Odium and Josie are part of a new generation of West
Indian leaders generally sympathetic toward Cuba and
often suspicious of US political and economic influence
in the Caribbean. Since the coup in Grenada on 13 March,
three other heads of government--in Saint Kitts - Nevis,
Dominica, and now St. Lucia--have been replaced constitu-
tionally by younger leaders seeking new models of social
and economic development for their economically troubled
islands.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
NIGERIA: Increased Ownership of Oil Companies
The Nigerian Government has decided to increase its
ownership of foreign oil companies from 55 percent to 60
percent, retroactive to the beginning of this month.
The Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation said the move was in line with the 1977 In-
digenization Decree, which stipulates that all oil-
related businesses must have 60-percent Nigerian owner-
ship. If the government decides to redirect exports of
the additional crude oil it will obtain, US imports
could be cut by about 100,000 barrels per day from the
current total of 1.2 million barrels per day. Lagos
also may decide to renegotiate long-term sales contracts
with the oil companies, and a downward revision in the
buy-back provisions could reduce the volume of US imports
of Nigerian crude even more.
JORDAN-FRANCE: Major Aircraft Purchase
New information confirms the conclusion of a $750
million contract, probably signed in late June, for Jor-
dan's purchase of 36 Mirage F-1 jet fighters from France.
The agreement calls for the Jordanian Air Force to re-
ceive 17 F-lCs, 17 F-lEs, and two trainers beginning in
late 1980. We do not know complete terms of the sale,
but Amman will pay 20 percent in advance. French arms
sales generally require a downpayment, with the remain-
ing portion payable over five to seven years at a nomi-
nal interest rate. There is a strong possibility that
Jordan, which expects to receive payments arranged at
the Baghdad summit of almost $1 billion a year, may have
been asked to pay cash for the planes, and there is some
indication that Iraq and Saudi Arabia may provide addi-
tional funds for the package. The F-1 package, which may
be followed by an order for French long-range ground sur-
veillance radar, is Jordan's first major arms order from
France.
Top Secret
5 July 1979
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
NIGERIA: Election Schedule and Requirements
7 July -- Federal Senate
14 July -- Federal House of Representatives
21 July -- State Houses of Assembly
28 July -- State Governors and Deputy Governors
4 August -- Runoff elections for State Governors if required
11 August -- Federal President and Vice-President
18 August -- Runoff elections for Federal President, if required
1 October -- Inauguration of new government
Election Requirements
For a first-round victory, presidential aspirants face a stiff
constitutional requirement--intended to force political parties
to be national in character and to put together broad ethnic
coalitions--that they receive a majority of votes nationwide
and one-fourth of the votes in 13 of Nigeria's 19 states.
Failing that, the choice between the two top contenders is
decided by majority vote in the federal and all the state
legislatures. The constitution specifically states that a
runoff contest is to be between the presidential candidate
who gained the largest vote nationwide and the one with the
next highest number of votes in the greatest number of states.
Gubernatorial runoffs will be held in respective state Houses
of Assembly should no candidate obtain a majority of votes
statewide and one-fourth of the votes in two-thirds of all
local government areas of the state. 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Nigeria
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Chances appear better than even that Nigeria--after
13 years of military rule--will complete its transition
to civilian rule on,schedule in October. The final phase
of the transition begins this Saturday with the first of
a series of elections that is to culminate in a contest
for the presidency in mid-August. A resurgence of vio-
lence between rival regional and ethnic groups could
stilt upset the process or raise the threat of a military
coup. At this point, however, the government of General
Obasanjo is determined to see the process through.
Federal and state legislative bodies will be elected
first--on 7, 14, and 21 July. Then there will be elec-
tions for state governors and finally for president. The
legislatures will act as electoral colleges should guber-
natorial and presidential runoff elections prove neces-
sary. The legislative contests--the first real tests of
strength for Nigeria's five political parties--probably
will lead to political realignments that could affect the
outcome of the 11 August presidential contest. Most of
the parties are concentrating on the legislative races,
believing that an early front-runner might benefit from a
bandwagon effect in the presidential election.
The drafters of the new constitution--in an effort
to foster cooperation among the regions and ethnic groups
that have often fought one another--established rules de-
signed to assure that the next government has as broad a
national constituency as possible. The main political
parties must assemble wide enough coalitions from the
ethnic and regional groups to elect their presidential
slates. As they try to meet constitutional requirements,
--continued
Top Secret
5 July 1979
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
parties representing Nigeria's three main ethnic groups--
Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo--are seeking inroads into
one another's regional strongholds and the borderlands
where minor tribes live. The five competing parties are
led by old-line politicians and for the most part are
descendants of parties that existed in the early 1960s.
The National Party of Nigeria, representing the Mus-
lim north's conservative traditional establishment and
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, is considered
the front-runner by most local observers. The party is
widely perceived as the one with the strongest national
base, but its presidential candidate--Shehu Shagari--is
having trouble projecting a strong leadership image.
The Yoruba-based Unity Party of Nigeria is well-
organized in western Nigeria but has little support else-
where. Its presidential candidate, Obafemi Awolowo, is
a strong personality and administrator, but he is dis-
trusted by other ethnic groups that fear expansion of the
already considerable Yoruba influence in national affairs.
The Nigerian People's Party is based mainly in the
Ibo east. Its presidential candidate--Nnamdi Azikiwe--
has more prestige than his party, which is tainted out-
side the east by the Ibo-led effort of Biafra to secede
from Nigeria in 1967.
The other two parties appear to have smaller follow-
ings. The Great Nigerian People's Party is a personal
vehicle for the presidential ambition of Waziri Ibrahim,
a Muslim businessman from the northeast who allegedly
has some following in the military. The People's Redemp-
tion Party has some support in the north and sees its
role as a spoiler. Its presidential candidate--Aminu
Kano--was disqualified late last month, and the party
may concentrate on legislative races and throw its sup-
port to another party in the presidential race.
Should the National Party falter badly in the early
contests, political realignments aimed at forging a
16 Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
"stop-Awolowo" coalition probably would take place, since
the Unity Party is perceived as the next strongest party.
Because of the depth of anti-Awolowo feeling in the Mus-
lim north and Ibo east, these regions probably would throw
their support to Waziri Ibrahim as a compromise alterna-
tive to Awolowo. The Yoruba are resented because they
have significantly expanded their role in the civil serv-
ice and national commerce in recent years, and Awolowo
himself is viewed as far more Yoruba than national in out-
look.
There is nothing in the makeup of the leading presi-
dential candidates or their party platforms to suggest
that Nigeria would embark on radical change under civil-
ian leadership. The main parties seem to accept the con-
tinuation of a mixed economy. There is general agreement
on the broad outlines of Nigeria's present nonaligned
foreign policy, and all parties have voiced support for
the liberation struggle in southern Africa.
The restoration of civilian rule depends mainly on
whether widespread political violence can be avoided.
The depth of underlying tension is difficult to gauge,
but sectional strains will inevitably increase as the
drawn-out election process proceeds. Political violence
has increased in recent months, and student unrest in the
Muslim north has taken on antisouthern, anti-Christian
overtones. Kano's disqualification has trig ered some
disturbances by his followers in the north.
If there is serious strife, the Obasanjo regime
would probably cancel its plan to restore civilian rule
as much to reduce the threat of a coup by middle-grade
and junior officers as to restore stability. At this
point, however, the ruling military council is united in
its desire to hand over power, and it is watching care-
fully for signs of dissent in the lower ranks of the
Army. The lower ranking officers--many of whom are
thought to be lukewarm about civilian rule--seem inclined
JuVy _1979
--continued
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
at present to let civilian government come to pass. They
expect it to fail, after which the military will again
enjoy the spoils of power.
The government's logistic preparations for the com-
plicated electoral process have been marked by ineffi-
ciency and ineptitude. Widespread administrative break-
downs by the federal electoral commission would increase
the risk of disruptions and allegations of vote-rigging.
Handling and tabulating ballots for the five closely
spaced elections will be impeded by the sheer size of
the electorate--some 47 million voters--and the country's
inadequate transportation and communications facilities.
The voters, many of whom are illiterate and voting for
the first time, may have difficulty coping with the sep-
arate elections and the large number of candidates.
Despite the difficulties that lie ahead, a number
of factors argue for a successful transition:
-- The general absence so far of serious
political disorder.
-- The regime's confidence in its ability
to handle trouble.
-- The resolve of the federal electoral
commission to conduct an honest vote,
the results of which will be acceptable
to the people.
-- The constitutional requirement for build-
ing a nationwide party coalition, which
should help moderate intemperate polit-
ical behavior.
-- The likelihood that each party will gain
control of some state governments and
win some representation in the federal
legislature.
-- The apparent desire of most Nigerians to
return to civilian rule.
18 Top Secret
5July 19 9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
-- The moderating behavior thus far of the
country's traditional leaders, who have
worked to defuse volatile situations,
and of the press, which has generally
refrained from overdramatizing incidents
of political violence.
Top Secret
5 July 1979
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
LOA-1
(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the Intelligence Community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from the
production offices of NFAC.)
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
Patriotic Front guerrillas early yesterday attacked
the residence of the Greek Orthodox archbishop in a
well-to-do suburb of Salisbury, less than two kilometers
from the residences of the President, Prime Minister,
and other top officials and civil servants, according to
a Western wire service. The attackers fled before police
reached the scene, and there was speculation that the
raiders may have meant to attack the nearby home of the
supreme military commander, Lieutenant General Wall. The
incident was the closest ever to the city's center and
was the only time since last March that the insurgents
have surfaced in the capital.
Algeria
Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first president, who was
overthrown and placed in nearly solitary confinement
after a bloodless coup 14 years ago, has been given
partial freedom, according to news agency reports. The
late Houari Boumediene, who overthrew Ben Bella and
succeeded him in the presidency, reportedly feared Ben
Bella's continued popularity and for most of his regime
kept Ben Bella in virtual isolation, allowing visitation
rights to only his wife and mother. President Bendjedid
reportedly does not regard Ben Bella, now 61, as a
possible political opponent.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
South Africa - Namibia - Angola
South African troops crossed into Angola this week
and killed 12 Namibian guerrillas, according to the South
African military commander in Namibia. He also reported
that his troops had found a cache of arms and food sup-
plies.
A Brussels newspaper published yesterday a letter
it received from the "Andreas Baader Commando" of the
Red Army Faction, in which the group claimed credit for
the attack on former NATO Supreme Commander Haig. The
letter gave precise descriptions of how the attack was
planned and executed and explained that it failed prob-
ably because of faulty timing of the manual detonation
of the explosive.
A British newspaper, citing Japanese sources, has
reported that the USSR has offered Vietnam a flotilla
including F-class submarines, minesweepers, landing
craft, and patrol boats. The flotilla would be manned
and captained by Vietnamese, but the Soviets reportedly
insist that the craft be permanently assigned to the
former US base at Cam Ranh Bay and that Soviet officers
be available to train the crews. Vietnamese Defense
Minister General Giap is said to oppose the offer be-
cause effective control of the vessels would remain in
Soviet hands.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
25X1
The Soviet Defense ministry announced on Monday
that Exercise "Neman" will be held in Lithuania from
23 to 27 July. The size and location of the exercise
fall within notification criteria established by the
1975 Helsinki Accords, and the announcement came within
the advance notification period recommended by the Ac-
cords. The US, along with several other Western and
Eastern countries, has been invited to send an observer,
only the second time the US has been included among
22 Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP81T00368R000300020007-2