NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 29 SEPTEMBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81T00368R000400020090-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: September 29, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
1, Central
" Intelligence
ILLEGIB
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
29 September 1979
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Contents
Briefs and Comments
Cuba: Castro's Speech. 0
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Greece-USSR: Karamanlis Visit? 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 .
Saudi Arabia - Libya: King Khalid's Visit.
Israel-Syria-USSR: Aftermath of Air Clash?
Iran: Defeat for Bazargan 0
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Kampuchea: Famine Relief Program
Zambia: Domestic Politics.
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China: Party Plenum Concludes. 0
Special Analysis
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Panama: President in Jeopardy. . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Overnight Reports. 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 .
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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the
final section, will often contain materials that update
other articles in the Daily?
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Top Secret
BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
CUBA g Castro's Speech
In his first public remarks on the subject, Cuban
President Fidel Castro denied the presence of a Soviet
combat brigade in Cuba, accused President Carter of de-
ception, and asserted that the Soviet unit was involved
only in training activities. According to one Western
press account, Castro claimed that the number and func-
tion of Soviet military personnel to train Cuban sol-
diers has not changed since the 1962 missile crisis.
Castro's criticisms of the Carter administration
were a sharp departure from previous Cuban practice. In
the past, Havana had always avoided direct criticism of
the US President. Even during the Shaba incident in
Zaire last year, Castro described the President as being
"misled" by some of his advisers. According to the Cuban
news service, Castro followed a similar approach yester-
day, but he also directly accused the President of trying
to deceive the international public.
The Cuban leader also demanded the dismantling of
the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay?
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GREECE-USSR: Karamanlis Visit
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis will begin a visit
to Moscow Monday to advance Greek-Soviet economic ties
and to normalize political relations, which historically
have been te id.
Karamanlis' visit is the first by a Greek Prime
Minister to the USSR and will be balanced by a visit to
Beijing in November. It will cap an effort begun after
the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974, when Kara-
manlis legalized the several Greek Communist parties and
signaled an interest in improving ties with Moscow.
These had long been strained by the legacy of the Greek
Communist rebellion of the late 1940s and the staunch
anti-Communism of successive Greek governments.
Greek officials have confirmed that economic cooper-
ation initially will be limited to Soviet provision of
an alumina plant and electrical and possibly other types
of energy in return for Greek agricultural products. The
Greeks also point out that the "political document" will
be no more than an anodynic joint declaration similar to
those endorsed by several other Western European states.
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Top Secret
SAUDI ARABIA ? LIBYA: King Khalid's Visit
King Khalid's visit to Libya this weekend is in-
tended to secure Libyan leader Qadhafi's support for
faltering Saudi efforts to mediate the Western Sahara
dispute,
The Libyans have been pressing Khalid to visit for
some time, in part to enhance Libya's standing in Arab
ranks, but probably also to give the impression of Saudi
support against Egypt. Crown Prince Fahd told US of
this week that the Saudis had only reluctantly
agreed to the trip and that Khalid will try to convince
Qadhafi to support a negotiated settlement of the Western
Sahara problem. Qadhafi has long provided aid to the
Polisario guerrillas who are trying to wrest control of
the territory from Morocco, and the Saudis probably do
not expect Khalid to succeed.
Fahd acknowledged that Egyptian President Sadat may
point to Khalid's Libyan trip as support for his public
charges that Libya and Saudi Arabia are conspiring to
overthrow Sudanese President Numayri. Fahd angrily denied
Sadat's charges,
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ISRAEL-SYRIA-USSR: Aftermath of Air Clash
Defense Min-
ister Weizman has acknowledged to US officials in Tel
Aviv that the downing of even a single Israeli fighter
would be a major psychological victory for Syria.
It is unclear what additional losses the Syrians
are willing to sustain, and their willingness to engage
in air combat could be boosted by their belief that they
did better in the air actions than US or Israeli informa-
tion would indicate. For example, according to a source
of the the Syrian Air
Force commander was "euphoric" over reports that the Syr-
ians had hit an Israeli aircraft during their attempt to
intercept a reconnaissance mission on 19 September.
If the Syrians are willing to continue to sustain
losses in order to maintain a more aggressive policy, the
chances are at least even that they eventually will shoot
down an Israeli aircraft. Should this occur, the Is-
raelis would likely want to react strongly, which could
result in more aggressive operations by them over Lebanon
that possibly could carry over into Syrian skies.
5
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IRAN: Defeat for Bazargan
The firing yesterday of National Iranian Oil Company
chief Hassan Nazih strengthens Ayatollah Khomeini's con-
trol over Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional govern-
ment but could lead to a disruption of oil production.
Nazih has long been an outspoken critic of inter-
ference by nonexperts in the economy in general and the
oil industry in particular. In a speech shortly before
the firing was announced, Khomeini reportedly threatened
to have Nazih tried for treason. While there are con-
flicting reports on the extent of support for Nazih among
the oil company's managers and workers, his departure
could cause demonstrations that could disrupt oil produc-
tion.
Nazih's removal is a defeat for Bazargan, who
strongly supported the oil company chief earlier this
week when rumors of Nazih's imminent firing began. Addi-
tional cabinet changes, including the naming of close
Khomeini confidant Moustafa Chamran to be Minister of
Defense, further strengthen Khomeini's control of
government affairs.
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KAMPUCHEA: Famine Relief Program
Despite the recent tentative agreement between in-
ternational relief agencies and the pro-Vietnamese Heng
Samrin regime on a famine relief program for Kampuchea,
the regime's continued public opposition to allowing sup-
plies to go to the population controlled by the rival
Pol Pot forces suggests that the arrangements could be
interrupted at any time.
The agreement, announced Thursday, runs for six
months with the option to renew at three-month intervals
thereafter. The program is designed to reach "all seg-
ments" of the Kampuchean population--presumably including
people in the western part of the country where Pol Pot's
forces are strongest.
Although the agreement provides for resident Red
Cross and UN Children's Fund representatives in Kampuchea,
Red Cross officials apparently waived earlier require-
ments for a thorough survey of conditions, precise moni-
toring of distribution, and strong guarantees for per-
sonnel security. The agencies agreed to launch the $100-
million program before a formal agreement is signed, al-
though they will seek such a document.
International public opinion accusing Vietnam of
fostering genocide by allowing famine in Kampuchea might
cause Phnom Penh to ignore--at least for the time being--
supplies going directly to Pol Pot forces. In any case,
widespread destruction of Kampuchean communications sys-
tems will impede the program.
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Top Secret
ZAMBIA: Domestic Politics
Zambian President Kaunda, long distracted by his
country's deepening involvement in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian
war, is trying to mend his political fences at home. In
southern Zambia and in the Copperbelt, where Kaunda re-
ceived an embarrassingly high proportion of "no" votes
in last December's presidential election, he has sent
cadre to identify ineffective party officials, who will
be replaced during a national party conference next month.
He also plans changes that will tighten the party's con-
trol over the electoral process. Organizational and
personnel changes, however, will not check the growing
antagonism towards Kaunda in southern Zambia and the
Copperbelt stemming from continuous commodity shortages,
rising prices, a slump in the mining industry, and the
presence of large numbers of Zimbabwe African People's
Union guerrillas. Kaunda fears that these problems will
lead to a resurgence of deeply rooted tribal and regional
rivalries, which he has kept under control since opposi-
tion political parties were banned in 1973.
CHINA: Party Plenum Concludes
According to the communique of the Fourth Plenary
Session of the 11th Central Committee that closed
yesterday after a three-day meeting, the main items of
business were the election of two new members to the
Politburo and 12 to the Central Committee, approval of a
major speech by party Vice Chairman Ye Jianying to be de-
livered today on the 30th anniversary of the People's
Republic, and approval of an agricultural plan. The new
members bring the Politburo membership to 28. Zhao
Ziyang, head of the Sichuan Province party apparatus and
strong supporter of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, was
elevated from an alternate to a full member of the Polit-
buro, Peng Zhen, former mayor of Beijing and a prominent
victim of the Cultural Revolution, was restored to the
Central Committee and the Politburo. Eleven other re-
cently rehabilitated senior officials were restored to
the Central Committee. The extent to which these addi-
tions affect the balance of political forces in the
leadership depends upon the composition of the all-impor-
tant Politburo Standing Committee. The communique did
not mention changes at this level.
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
PANAMA: President in Jeopardy
Panamanian President Royo, who will preside over the
canal transition ceremonies on Monday, has become polit-
ically isolated and in danger of being ousted from office
because of his efforts to gain a greater share of power
from National Guard Commandant Torrijos. Although Tor-
rijos probably would prefer not to incur the potential
political costs of Royo's removal, there is little doubt
that he could accomplish the maneuver. In the meantime,
Royo--not Torrijos--draws criticism for the government's
domestic policies. The continuing rumors of a govern-
ment shakeup and a possible share of government spoils
for the opposition also are helping Torrijos to co-opt
his political foes.
Royo has been in a difficult position ever since
Torrijos handpicked him for the presidency a year ago
before ostensibly "retiring" to the barracks. The new
President had no domestic constituency, and the Cabinet
and bureaucracy were staffed largely by holdovers from
Torrijos' 1972-78 term as Chief of Government. Royo
thus faced the likelihood of being circumvented and
ignored.
The former Education Minister, who has long been
loyal to Torrijos, has been unable to bridle his own
ambition or accept a figurehead role. Royo sought to
carve out a power base in the only two areas not already
claimed--the newly formed government political party
and the emerging Panamanian bureaucracy that will assume
some of the functions of the Canal Zone government after
1 October.
For months, Royo was in the forefront of party
activities, leading a highly successful registration
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drive and laying the base for his campaign for the party
presidency. These activities soon brought him into di-
rect conflict with the acting party secretary general,
former Vice President Gonzalez, who was Torrijos' choice
for the party leadership. In late August, Torrijos put
an end to the wrangling by ordering Royo to drop his
candidacy. At this month's party congress Gonzalez was
confirmed as secretary general, and the party presidency
was left open for Torrijos.
Royo's success to date in trying to install his men
in key positions within the nascent Panama Canal Author-
ity has been outweighed by the enemies he has made
within the bureaucracy. The President's attempts at
empire-building have brought him into conflict with Cabi-
net ministers--most with their own private lines to
Torrijos--who are determined to protect their vested in-
terests.
Relations with the National Guard
More important, Royo's efforts are further damag-
ing his relations with the National Guard General Staff,
which remains uncomfortable with him because of his
past leftist activities. Royo made matters worse by
removing relatives of the military from government pay-
rolls and by taking steps to reduce kickbacks, moves
that pinched the Guard's revenue. The Guard also views
Royo as indecisive and holds him responsible for pro-
tests over the cost of living, sporadic strikes, and dis-
satisfaction with leftward-drifting educational reforms.
The military has a natural preference for the situa-
tion that prevailed when Torrijos was Chief of Government,
when the President was a nonentity and lines of authority
were clear-cut.
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Despite this wide array of critics and enemies,
Royo's fate rests in Torrijos' hands. Meetings between
Royo, the Guard, and Torrijos in late August led to an
alleged settlement of differences, but Royo's continued
maneuvering in the Canal Authority--in effect directly
challenging the Guard's authority even on defense
matters--has roiled waters again. A teachers' strike
that began three weeks ago, which has gathered widening
support, has been an added irritant.
Torrijos has demonstrated his ability to force a
"resignation" from anyone in government. While he does
not need support from the opposition for such a move,
it would help provide a face-saving backdrop. Torrijos
has long had the notion of forming an all-encompassing
Mexican-style party and government, and the national
accord may fit in with one of his grander, if still
vague, schemes.
Even if Torrijos decides to do nothing, rumors of a
national accord serve him well. Torrijos is adept at
co-opting the major opposition parties, and the prospect
of possible Cabinet posts virtually assures at least
passive cooperation from them for the time being. For
his part, Royo--if he stops trying to play a major polit-
ical role--can probably still get back in Torrijos'
good graces.
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Top Secret
OVERNIGHT REPORTS
(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the Intelligence Community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from the
production offices of NFAC.)
Iran
Reuter reports that the successor to the dismissed
National Iranian Oil Company chief Hassan Nazih is Ali-
Akbar Moinfar, who has served in the Bazargan government
as head of the Planning and Budget Organization. Moinfar
was also named head of the Ministry of Petroleum, the
creation of which Bazargan announced yesterday.
(See related Brief on page 7.)
South Yemen - North Yemen
The Libyan news agency reported from Beirut yester-
day that unnamed Arab sources said that South Yemeni
Prime Minister Muhammad will visit Sana next week to
meet North Yemeni President Salih in connection with
discussions on the merger of the two countries.
Burma
Foreign Minister Myint Maung told the UN General
Assembly yesterday that Burma was disillusioned with the
Nonaligned Movement and had decided to withdraw from the
organization. He said Burma had moved at the NAM Summit
in Havana to set up a committee to define the Movement's
principles and the qualifications for membership, but
the motion was ignored. Although Burma has no intention
to organize another movement, the Foreign Minister said
he would consider joining a community of nations willing
to commit itself to clear princi les of nonalignment if
such a group should be formed.
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