THE BERIYA-MALENKOV STRUGGLE FOR POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR
50X1
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for
Power
rt~p
!Wq
This Document contains information affecting the Na
tionai Defense of the United States. within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 798 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its conten~ s
to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Se prohibited.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
24 Aug. 1953
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Attached is a copy of report
Comment: Throughout the attached report, read Mingrelian for
Migrelian and Beriya for Beria.
STATEEV
4
# ?)
(Notes Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"i Field Distribution By
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SECRET
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT The BERIA-MALENKOV Struggle for Power
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
EN
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE REPORT NO.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.30
s3
NO. OF PAGES 5
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEM
T TO
DATE OF INFORMATION
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1.
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the struggle between MALENKOV and WOOTA 1.a-
of 1951. This struggle was Dense oy the end
Georgian quite apparent as reflected in local
origin, because
r
for GeoLan
Union affairs.
2. not believe that at any time STALIN had the intention.of
appo nting BERIA his successor. There had always been considerable
resentment among Russians about STALIN'S Georgian origin. STALIN
himself was well aware of this fact, and he certainly would not
cherish the idea of creating a permanent Georgian dynasty in the
USSR. On the other hand, it would be sound to assume that; BERIA,
as a very ambitious man, had been obsessed by such an idea for
years. His position:of MGB head was an excellent spring-board for
a USSR dictator. In this connection, it is of interest to follow
the strengthening of the MGB position and the expansion of the MOB
at the expense of the MVD in the period from 1948. Prior to this
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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time, the USSR Militia, the State Department for the Fight against
Misappropriations and Speculations, the Passport Offices, and many
other state agencies were under MVD jurisdiction. From 1948 on,
all these functions, including the USSR Border Guard Service,
were gradually transferred to the MGB. After this re-organization,
the only responsibility left to the MVD was the operation of
prisons and forced labor camps, which certainly did not give this.
ministry very much power and influence in the government.
The strengthening of BERIA's position, of course, could not be
achieved without STALIN's consent, but it is hard to say whether,
during the post World War II period, STALIN was whole-heartedly
supporting BERIA's rise to power. One may fairly safely assume
that BERIA had at least succeeded in persuading STALIN of the
necessity of the reorganizations mentioned above and of strengthen-
ing the MGB position. STALIN's support, however, continued only
for a limited time, and during the last few years, and in 1951
especially, there was a noticeable cooling of STALIN-BERIA
relations. In order to understand this properly, we must go back
to Georgian local politics, especially during the period preceding
STALIN's death.
6.
It should be kept in mind that L.P. BERIA Is a Migrelian in origin.
This Georgian, national group, although it numbers only 150,000
people, has its own language, and its members in general are very
intelligent, clever, sly, and predisposed to politics and political
intrigues. Most Migrelians are clannish and help each other to
higher positions whenever they can. After serving as President of
the Georgian Cheka (later renamed NKVJD) BERIA became the Secretary
of the Communist Party of Georgia, in which-position he remained
until 1938 when, it is rumored, he was earmarked to be arrested in
the course of YEZHOV's purge. He went to Moscow to see STALIN and,
instead of being arrested by YEZHOV, he himself became the USSR's
NKVD boss. BERIA had never forgotten his clan and, after this
time, he started promoting Migrelians not only to local government
and Party positions In Georgia, but to positions throughout the USSR,
especially to positions with the NKVD in Moscow. During World
War II, BERIA was appointed Deputy President of the USSR Council
of Ministers and Member of the National Defense Council. In this
capacity he was entrusted with the organization of defense of the
Caucasus, and he used his extraordinary powers to strengthen the
Migrelian positions in Georgia and in the national MGB.
The first check to the practically sovereign power of BERIA in
Georgia came in 1947 when his personal friend and henchman, A.N.
RAPAVA, the MGB Minister of the Georgian SSR, was dismissed for
misappropriation of several million rubles during the USSR, currency
devaluation reform. With BERIA's assistance, RAPAVA escaped
arrest and eventually was given a less important position in the
Georgian Government, namely the position of Minister of Justice.
The MOB Ministry of the Georgian SSR was given to N.M. RUKHADZE,
who allegedly came from the Army and was not a BERIA man.
Although a blow, this was not enough to shake BERIA's position
in the USSR Government, as he was supported by large numbers of
adherents he had planted in Georgia and in the MGB agencies
throughout the country.
Nonetheless, this case marked the start of a campaign against
BERIA's sovereignty Iin Georgia. Rumors of many arbitrary actions
of Georgian officials and the creation of a "national bourgeois
movement" in this Republic became more and more persistent? It is
believed by many people in the USSR that STALIN's trip to Georgia
in 1951 was motivated in part by these rumors. During this trip.,`
STALIN personally discovered many irregularities, cases of most
shameless favoritism, numerous misappropriations, etc., going on
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in the Georgian SSR. Following this trip, a large purge took place
in Georgia in November 1951. It was rumored. to have been directed
by MALENKOV, who allegedly acted as a special emissary of STALIN
to Tbilisi and organized the court proceedings against several of
the highest Georgian officials, all of whom were staunch BERIA
adherents. The following individuals were accused and stripped of
power in this trial:
a. The Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Georgian SSR, M.. BARAMIYA;
b. The Minister of Justice of the Georgian SSR, A.N. RAPAVA;
c. The Secretary of the Georgian SSR Komsomol Organization, T.S.
ZODELAVA
d. The State Attorney (Prokuror) of the Georgian SSR, V.Y. SHONIYA,
and many others.
They were charged with various crimes, each according to his official
position, but what was most significant, in addition to these indi-
vidual crimes, allof them were accused of promotion of at "national
bourgeois movement" in the Georgian SSR. The entire case against
the defendants was prepared by the Georgian MOB Minister, N.M..
tUKHADZE. It was also significant that the first secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR, K.N.
CHARKVIANI, who was not a Migrelian.but a Svan (another Georgian"*
clan), escaped the purge and retained his position.
The events of November 1951 in Georgia not only shook BERIA's
position in Georgia and the MOB dictatorial power throughout the
USSR, but they may be considered the first open clash between MALENKOV
and BERIA for future supremacy. This fight, once started, continued.
,
8. In April 1952 BERIA, quite unexpectedly, arrived at Tbilisi, it
was rumored that the main purpose of his trip was to reinstate his
friends who had been purged in November 1951. Nobody knows what
went on behind the scenes, but it was apparent that BERIA failed in
this effort. it would be logical to assume that the reinstatement
of highest Party functionaries who had been deprived of their
positions by a court verdict could not be done without STALIN's
approval and that BERIA did not succeed in getting this approval.
It was generally felt in Georgia that, after. STALIN'S trip to this
Republic in 1951, BERIA's star in STALIN's orbit began to wane.
Although he did not succeed in accomplishing his purpose in Tbilisi,
BERIA did succeed in forcing the dismissal of the first secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR,
CHARKVIANI, for letting down his associates. Officially, CHARKVIANI
was fired for pocr leadership, as proved by the November 1951
purge. But this was the only success of BERIA's trip to Tbilisi,
for he was not permitted to give CHARKVIANI's
I. of
his men, and the position of first secretary was s given position iven toto. .anv
MGELAD', who was a very ~..
pronounced STALIN man, hated by Migrelians.
9. At the time of STALIN'S death on 9 March 1953, BERIA's position,
although shaken to a certain extent by the events described above,
was still enormously strong. In this initial period MALENKKOV was
certainly not strong enough to eliminate BERIA right away. Having
become a member of the USSR triumvirate, one of the first of BERIA's
steps was to initiate a complete reinstatement of his Georgian
friends. convicted in the November 1951 trial. The victim now was
RUKHADZE, who was arrested for staging the trial and bringing out false
accusations against the highest Georgian officials. And so ZODELAVA
became Deputy Minister President of the Georgian SSR, BARAMIYA
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
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Georgian SSR, RAPAVA Minister of State Control, of the Georgian
'SSR, and many others of BERIA's purged friends were appointed to
similar high positions. The only man of whom nothing was heard
in the reinstatement process was the former Georgian State
Attorney '.Y. SHONIYA, who, it is rumored, was liquidated in the
meantime. A certain v0N. BAKRADZE, a close friend of BERIA,
was appointed President of the Georgian Council of Ministers.
(This. was the second time that BAKRADZE was appointed to this
position. He held it first up to 1948, when he was dismissed for
misappropriations.) An excellent politician, BAKRADZE, when
making his speech reinstating the Party functionaries arrested
in the November 1951 purge, stated among other things that:
"...all these people are our Georgian flesh and blood and staunch
adherents of our glorious son L.P. BERIAD.." Other moves of
BERIA in order-to strengthen his position in the Georgian SSR
after STALIN's death were dismissal of EGNATASHVILI, since
1928 Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Georgian SSR, and dismissal of Z.N." KETSKHOVELI, President of
the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR, both personal
friends of STALIN, EGNATASHVILI was replaced by BAKRADZE and
KETSKHOVELI by Mrs. O.D,. DZHAVAIG ISHVILI, both close friends of
BERIA.
10. Considering these things that BERIA did in the, Georgian SSR in
order to strengthen his position after STALIN's death, its would
be logical to assume that he took similar steps throughout the
USSR, placing his men in key MOB positions and strengthening the
position of the MOB, endangering in this way the position of
MALENKOV.
11. The role played in the purge of BERIA by the Minister of National
Defense, BULGANIN, who was appointed after STALIN's death,
requires careful-study. BULGANIN is certainly not a popular man
in the USSR and not a military leader. The Army does not accept
him, and he cannot count on Army support if he should get the
idea of starting a military Putsch. As a matter of fact, in my
opinion, he would never get such an idea, since he is practically
unknown in Soviet polio oe1 life, it is my guess that, in planning
the final blow against BERIA, MALENKOV succeeded in getting
BULGANIN's, i.e. Armyj support against BERIA, or rather, against
the MOB which was always disliked and even despised by the Soviet
military.
12. 'It is most significant that among other crimes 'BERIA was charged
with was the "activation of bourgeois nationalist movements in
various USSR republics" w i.e. the, same crime of which the
Georgian political leaders were accused by RUKHADZE in November
1951. believe that such a movement was
actually in progress and had caused MALENKOV's counteraction as
far back as November 1951.
1.3. If the support of MALENKOV by the military in
BERIA's elimination is correct, the next question would be, what
is MALENKOV's present position as far as the Army is concerned?
Having been helped by the military, MALENKOV could hardly get
away from some dependence on the Army in the future., So long as
BULGANIN remains the nominal military chief, the Army will
probably not represent any serious.threat to MALENKOV's power.
But how long will BULGANIN hold his position? What is ZHUKOV's-
present attitude towards MALENKOV? ZHUKOV is certainly the
most popular person today in the USSR. But we should not forget
that this man was humiliated and practically sent into exile
by STALIN and that it was MALENKOV who reinstated him and raised
him to the second highest position in the Soviet Armed Forces.
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ZHUKOV? If there is, we can expect the fall of BULGAN]:N and the
rise of ZHUKOV rather soon. Even without any such intention on
the part of MALENKOV, it is not at all improbable that the Arnim
feeling its strength over the MOB and even over the USSR Government,
could force ZHUKOV's rise to power.
Is there any friendship and/or agreement b
t
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- -c - ------- r.?.,J wcw..bva vv L'LftLIy.AVV .
range as it seems, he has the reputation of being a
not ambitious, and rather easy to get along with. He isi atvery
popular person with the USSR people, being known as a typical
Russian who was never connected with any such unpopular government
action as the establishment of kolkhozy, work norms, forced
labor camps, etc.
'15. As far as the USSR people are concerned, BERIA's successor KRUGLOV
is quite unknown H i
. e s just another official of the USSR
government with no popularity at all with the people. 50X1
were staged by MALENKOV in order to give him a pretextbforsthe
Russification of many of the national republics of the USSR,
which is a necessary prerequisite for strengthening his,position
and consolidation of power.
???.?.?+.. avavnvaa
rgeo s nationalist movement in various USSR
0
t
was stiga or
all kin
all kinds of underground
was wouldip+obablyrresult
in a change of tactics, which might bring about the discontinua-
tion -of- the policy of behind the scene, activity and the replacement
of it with more legal and more normal relations between the USSR
and the West.
as the result of STALIN's death, at least~notvsoj+farVas strategy
is concerned. The removal of BERIA wh
I its. K not believe that MALENKOV will ] d th
need e s position, he will
peace for a long time to come. But even then, providing he
succeeds in consolidating his power, he would not start a war
which could never-be popular in the USSR. He would rather adhere
to the continuation of the cold war, adjusting its intensity to
the internal conditions of the USSR through the various forth-
coming periods.
V" a USSR toward) war,
the contrary, in order to canpolidat hi
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