REACTION (SANITIZED) TO MALENKOV'S SPEECH OF 8 AUGUST 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000200050004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 14, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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$ECUPffREFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR
SUB3ECT Reactiox
Speech of 8 August 7.953
PLACE
ACQUIRED
'DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
. DATE OF INFORMATION
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DATE DISTR. 14 Aug. 53
NO. OF PAGES 6 25X1
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
to MALENKOV'a
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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the main characteristics
e speech an its significance lie in the following:
a. Whereas the first speech given by MALENKOV after STALIN's
death, was delivered in his c acity as pn@ of STALIN's
successors, the speech of 8 August was given'by him as ?he
successor to STALIN. MALENKQV'e tone, his way of speaking
to the Supreme Soviet, made it quite clear that; at least
for some time to come, the Communist Party of the USSR and
the Soviet government ja Georgiy Maksimilianovich MAIENKOY.
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b. Except for a few parts of MALENKOV's speech directed to the West,
the speech was primarily meant for USSR internal consumption.
c. The speech outlined for the first time the political and economic
platform established after STALIN's death. Two significant moves
designed to satisfy broad masses of the USSR population stood out
clearly:
(1) To improve the position of-collective farmers and to raise
their standard of living, which until now has been the main
cause of the dissatisfaction of 120, 000, 000 rural inhabi-
tants of the USSR.
(2) To expand considerably light industry, at the expense of
d
s
heavy industry, and increase production of consumer goo
aimed at satisfying the needs of the Soviet working masses.
Scarcity anc. poor quality of Soviet consumer goods was
long one of the main criticisms leveled against the Soviet
Government. Very significant was MALENKOV's definite
statement that the USSR couldd and.wouid,by 1955 increase
production of consumer goods by 78% over the 1951 output.
2. That part of MALEENKOVs speech concerned with the improvement of
living condition6 in'the USSR contained a, new note: until the pre-
sent time the national wealth of the USSR has been used for the
expansion of heavy industry at the expense of the living standard of
the population; from now on the Party and government, according to
MALENKOV, will concentrate their attention on vatisfying the people's
needs. In a mild way MALENKOV admitted that until now, for certain
reasons, the Soviet people have been deprived of many material
benefits. From now on, this will not be the case, MALENKOV promises;
the Party and government, i.e. MALENKOV himself, will. take care of
this. The far-reaching effects of such a move should be clear to
everybody familiar with economic conditions in the USSR and the
capabilities of its highly centralized administration.
3?
among 25X1
other things, the speech was an official, answer to the Wes ern
psychological warfare campaign against the Soviet Government; a
campaign which was considerably intensified following STALIN's death.
MALENKOV even admitted that some of the West's criticism of economic
conditions in the USSR was justified.
MALENKOV's statement that the USSR has 25X1
the hydrogen bomb was the truth. Such statements place an enormous
responsibility upon a government. No government, not even the Soviet
one (deceptive as it may be),would dare deliberately to make a
false statement of such magnitude. What would be the position of
this government if in a few months it needed to use the hydrogen
bomb and did not have it? Then again, it is to be assumed that a
large number of Soviet scientists have been working on such bombs
and that they well know whether it has been produced or not. If,
MALENKOV's statement were a lie nobody, not even the Soviet police
system, could prevent these scientists from denying MALENKOV's state-
ment. They could be prevented from publishing such a denial; but
they would certainly talk, and the truth would come out. Not every-
body in the USSR is an opportunist and a "yes man". There are many
who honestly believe in.what they are doing and who would not be
afraid to stand up and tell the truth regardless of the consequences.
SEORET
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SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
If this is, true for the average citizen, it would be true even more
for people. engaged in scientific work and remote from any political
entanglements. It is preposterous to assume that MALENKOV, on such
an issue of world-wide interest, would risk being called a "dirty
liar" not only by the USSR's distinguished scientists but eventually
by the 200,000,000 people he leads. If we always assume Soviet
leaders are liars, we will be in danger of making wide misinterpre-
tations of many happenings within the USSR.
a. Why should the fact that the USSR has developed a hydrogen bomb
come as a surprise to the West? It has been proven that much
top secret information concerning the research and production
of the atomic bomb fell into Soviet hands. How can we be sure
that this was not repeated in the case of the hydrogen bomb?
What do we know of the abilities of Soviet scientists charged
with the realization of projects of national importance and
supported in this task by the unlimited financial means and
resources of totalitarian government? We should not forget that
an ultimate centralization of.oower and resources is a basic
characteristic of the Soviet government. If a high priority is
assigned to a project, the government of the USSR is in the
position to support its r aiizablon with policies which would
ha Anathema to the West.
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b.
The Soviet government has always been very' sensitive
to any aspersions cast on its position as the protector of work-
ing masses throughout the world; and unless ,for?ced, it will not
use methods of warfare which would brand its as the exterminator
of masses of civilians. This was the main reason why the USSR
in World War II did not fight to build up a strategic air force,
but left the task of the aerial destruction of enemy countries
to its British and US allies. After World War 7;: this gave the
Soviet Union an excellent propaganda weapon against the West.
.,..o~.~........,..~ r_ r----- -...~-
Union is concerned. However, it is a Soviet axiom that the capitalist
iighestvSoviet-rulers sincerely believe this is difficult to say.
Whether they do or do not is not so important. The point is that
they force their followers to believe in the axiom and are quite
succesbful in this task. That is all that counts. The Soviet
goverment believes that it would not pay to speed up the "inevitable
destruction of the capitalist West" by means of a war. They think
it is quite sufficient to seize every opportunity of weakening capi-
talist countries from the inside. This will be the 25X1
continuing aim of the Soviet government under MALENKOV. That is why.
SECRET
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SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
the MA,LENKOV statement that, "...Soviet foreign policy would seek
peace'and cooperation among nations..." should be understood more to
mean .Cooperation with the respective peoples than with their govern-
ments.
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Whatever the development of events in Eastern Germany, we should not
expect the USSR to leave the area and pull out its troops. Eastern
-Grmany, as well as North Korea, are too important as strategic
areas in case of war for the USSR ever to abandon them (unless the
N' iet government should grow certain that there will not be a war
,.a long time to come). Right now, bona fide withdrawal from 25X1
these areas is quite out of th auestion. because of the state of
mind of the Kremlin leaders. unfortunately]
the CP.and the government of the USSR sincerely believe the West is
preparing for an aggressive war against the USSR, and that they will
spare no effort to put over this idea to the people. And when, in
his speech, MALENKOV says that the "...German problem can be solved",
he does not fail to say "...the Soviet government is supporting and
will continue to support the government of the German Democratic
Republic."
Very significant is the part of MALENKOV's speech devoted to the
intention of the USSR to maintain good relations with Iran, Afghan-
istan, and Turkey, as well as with.Idrael, Finland, France, and 25X1
Egypt.
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