(SANITIZED)REACTION TO KHRUSHECHEV'S SPEECH OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1953(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000200170006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 22, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT, Reaction
Speech ofd September- 1953
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
REPORT
25X1
DATE DISTR.2), SEPT'r,.
to HHRUSHCHEV s NO.OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. N. S. KHRUSHCHEV's speech of 7September 1953, before the Plenary
Session of the' Central Committee of the Communist Party, represented',,
no more than an implementation of the policy' formulated at the nine-
teenth session of the same Committee late in 1952 any 25X1
attempt to unearth evidence in this speech of some bas c c. nge in 25X1
Soviet internal."policy or'in Communist ideology would be a mistake.
it would also lie incorrect to interpret the newly-announced
`
',a',
measures for the development of.Soviet agriculture as indication of
go-easy attitude towards the Russian people. KHRUSHCHEV.has not
opened a drive-to satisfy the needs of the average Russian in the
-stredt with he .m : n___ vie of lidat~mng__the Soviet interna ,_pc2li-
ca a tua ,ion. O presume that he has, springs corn an uninformed
demise that the Soviet internal situation is shaky.
25X1
2. o indication whatsoever that the new agricultural policy means
lz__ge in the.USSR colleetivjzation system. On the contrary, it
embodies no measures alieh to previous enunciations of the Soviet
theory of Socialism - a theory which, when amply developed, Soviet
planners hope will emerge as the model Communism.
110YRITY INFORMATION
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light industry and agriculture. 25X1'
InTestments.-are- no longer necess o must n6 a"-be safely
ary; the
underway or in great measure completed. And the lion's share of the
Soviet national~neome - y now be diverted to the development of
25X1
After World War 14 the major aim of the Soviet government was recon-
struction of the war-ravaged regions and of the country's heavy
industries. A very large percentage of the Soviet national income
was used as capital investments for construction of new heavy indus-
trial plants and expansion of the existing ones. There was not
much money left to help bui11J,up light industry or to spend on agri-
cultural development., Heavy taxes were levied on the rural`popula-
tion to provide the funds needed for a heavy industrial development
designed mainly to bolster military potentials. It is enough to
mention that during this period the government procurement price
(zagottsena) for wheat was approximately .2, rubles per kilogram,
while the selling price was two rubles per kilogram. The procurement
price for meat was about 2d5 rubles per kilogram, and the selling
price was 16 - 20 rubles. In this way the government was making
700 - 1,000% profit to be applied to its heavy industrial projects.
Rather than believe that any catastrophic conditions in the field of
Soviet agriculture have now compelled the government to turn its
the position of collective farmers, not so much in order to satisfy
them as to give them an incentive to increase their production.
the Soviet government is both anxious and able to improve
KHRUSHCHEVts speech was not intended for propaganda purpo es.
ways of improvement and means of government support
s proposa s`ro;r~-their practical significance, for their
KHRUSHCHEV's speech is very significant in its admission of short-
nnminan and even failures in the Soviet agricultural program;
There is an abundance of reasons w y ov a agr cu ure a25X1
not kept pace with visions,for its development since World War II.
They are reasons which can be easily understood and easily justified.
Therefore, the reaction of certain western circles, which refuse to
see in this speech anything but the mere admission of failures, is 25X1
more wishfu atever the condition of Soviet agricu1225X1
ture may be in spite of-all its shortcomings, it is
far from being in ca as rop ie shape), it is most important to ixa 25X1
attention to agriculture and concentrate on improving the collective -
farmer's position, t would probably be more logical to
25X1
25X1
, assume that the deve opmen of hevndwstry_and reconstrt_i_on. in
ov et g n ustry is just as
or an in_,case_o war as heavy industry. The same is true of
agriculture, which has .?-supply raw materials for light industry
and make sure that the USSR will be self-supporting..in foodstuffs
during a war; one,has only to remember the terrible conditions in
the USSR and the Soviet Army in World War II. the 25X1
soldiers were fighting in rags, going barefoot and hungry. There
was a shortage of practically every product of light industry, of
food, and of medicines. Had it not been for the US Lend-Lease
Program, who knows what the outcome of the war might have been,
Soviet tanks, guns, and ammunition notwithstanding? If there is a
third World War, Soviet leaders know that they cannot count again
on US Lend-Lease.
SECRET
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SECRET
-3-
25X1
Every far-reaching economic project in the USSR is carried out by
means of a "campaign". When a campaign is announced, the entire
state apparatus with large financial means swings into operation,
and directs it to realization. national campaigns for 25X1
coal mining, metallurgy, railroad transport, oil production, elec-
trification, exploitation of water resources, among others. Now it
is the turn of agriculture and light industry,.
the Soviet kolkhoznik attaches much importance 25X1
25X1
how much income he can get out.;o this land. If 25X1
deliveries -o -e state could be reduced, leaving tie kolkhoznik
8.
enough food products to market freely with profit to himself, that
would form the best incentive for him to produce. mare. The same
result would come about if the state procurement prices for agricul-
tural products were increased.
The building up of Soviet light industry and the development of
agriculture, as announced in recent speeches by MALHNKOV and KHRUSHCHEV,
would certainly require more than the two or three,years anticipated
by these Soviet leaders. It may even take five or six years. And
if it can be assumed that these measures are to serve primarily to
ensure the preparedness of the USSR for war, it would be logical to
believe that the Soviet rulers would not start a war before this
project were completed.
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