LITHUANIAN PARTISAN MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000300270002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 20, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT NO.
COUNTRY
USSR
DATE DISTR. 20 July 54
SUBJECT
Lithuanian Partisan Movement
NO. OF PAGES 6
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
SOURCE
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THIS IS U ,NALUATED INFORMATION
REFERENCES:
YALJAIImmuglutlutUlumBnEatuS
1. To cope with the serious outbreak of partisan activities in Lithuania
after its recapture in WW Ti, the Soviets took the following measures:
a. _,Iwo NKVD Special Purpose Units were dispatched to the country.
They were the 1st Separate Special Designation Moscow Inf. Div.
(Pervaya Otdel'naya MoSkOvskaya Strelkovaya Diviziya OsOogo
Naznacheniya) and the 2nd Special Designation Div. Of Opera-
tional Troops (Vtoraya Diviziya Oterativnykh Voyalc ?Bobo&
Naznacheniya).
b. In addition,. the 23rd, 24th, 94th, 95th and 97th NKVD Border
Guard Det..ts,were also sent to Lithuania.
c. To support the NKVD units there were regular Soviet Army Units,
unknown Soviet and pro-Soviet Lithuanian rice units (the
Lithuanian police wOre dark gray uniforms -plus a group of
Lithuanians known as -"People's Protectors's(Narodnyye Zaachit-
niki).
d. Al]. the above units were dispersed throughout Lithuania but were
mainly located in and around Vil'nyus, Kaunas TaUrage? Panevezhis,
'Trakay, Yurbarkas, and Shaulyay.
e.:Personnel from the above units and groups were formed into so-
Called "punitive detachments" (karatellnyye otryady) for the
purpose of suppressing resistance and carrying out brutal terror
activities against the Lithuanians.
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f. The entire country was divided into operational sectors. Each
sector was headed by a chief who was usually an NKVD representative
from the USSR or occasionally an experienced military troop com-
mander (operativnik). Of the latter, Source knew of Gen. ?VETROV,
who commanded the 2nd Special Purpose Div. of Operational Troops
50:0 with headquarters in Vilinvus: Gen. BYCHKOVSKY; Hero of the Soviet
Union Col. MEDVEDEV; Col. SKORODUMOV.
g. At the same time a Party organizational ,bureau (Org-Byuro) was
formed. It was headed by M. A. SUSLOV.1 The Org-Byuro was
actually the representative organ in Lithuania of the All-Union
Communist Party and was above the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party in Lithuania. SUSLOV was subordinate only to Moscow.
His orders and directives carried absolute authority. The Org-
Byuro was given unlimited powers to accomplish its mission. It
organized and set the entire tempo of the forceful establishment
of Communist Party control in Lithuania. It governed the ideolo-
gical, economic, and political life of the country. Its mission
was:
(1) Quickly to establish Soviet authority throughout the
Lithuanian SSR*
(2) To organize and consolidate Party power throughout
Lithuania.
(3) Quickly to'liquidate any resistance by the Lithuanian people.
(4) Physically to annihilate the Lithuanian partisans.
The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of Lithuania, (fnu)
BARTASHUNAS, was given the responsibility of waging war against the so-
called "banditry" in Lithuania. Several high-ranking NKVD personnel
from the USSR were permanently attached to BARTASHUNAS, as well as a
large headquarters of operational workers (operativnyye rabotniki).
Orders for BARTASHUNAS came from the Org-Byuro via the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Lithuanian SSR.
3. For several months the above-mentioned units and groups hunted down the
partisans. In tbe Prenay and Rudnitz fbrest areas Source heard that
the Red Army even resorted to the use of planes and artillery. Their
efforts were to no avail. The Lithuanian partisans were crafty and
could not be found, mainly because they knew the forests very well.
The partisans avoided open battle with the "punitive detachments". They
would engage detachments only in life or death situations. There was
close contact between the Lithuanian people and the partisans. As a
result, the partisans maintained good intelligence and it was impossible
for the Soviets to make plans for an impending action. In this way the
partisans conserved their strength and were able to take countermeasures
to offset possible Soviet measures.
To get partisan prisoners was an impossibility, since parttsans would
commit suicide rather than be taken prisoner. This was true even when
they were seriously wounded or surrounded.
NKVD leaders were unsuccessful in recruiting agents and secret cells
from among the Lithuanians. Bribes of clothing, food and shoes, and
other inducements were to no avail. Evan deceit, threats, tortures,
third-degree methods and arrests brought no results for the Soviets.
Very few Lithuanians aided the NKVD and from their aid very little was
known of the partisans.
The campaign wore on. When no results were forthcoming the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union introduced the following
two measures in 1944:
a. Thousands of copies of .a joint announcement by the Central Committee
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of the Communist Party, Lithuania, and the Lithuanian government, were
printed and distributed to the populace. The announcement beseeched*
partisans to come out of hiding, surrender their arms and ammunition,
and declare a complete break with the so-called "bandit movement*.
Those that would comply were promised "legalized personal immunity*
and pardon for crimes committed against the USSR In addition, they
were promised jobs and Soviet documents.
The second measure was the arrival of Col. Gen. KRUGLOV, at the time
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR. It was rumored
that KRUGLOV had received personal instructions from STALIN and BERIA.
5. KRUGLOV arrived in September 19440 and called a meeting which was attended
by SNECHKUS, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party, Lithuania; BARTASHUNAS; chiefs of all the operational sectors;
regimental and divisional commanders of the various units; reconnaissance
chiefs of the various units; all deputy commanders for political affairs
in the units; and personnel of the NKVD territorial organs in Lithuania.
At the meeting Col. Gen. KRUGLOV summarized the anti-partisan action. He
then directed a few sarcastic remarks at SNECHKUS, BARTASHUNAS, the
leaders of the NKVD territorial organs, and the unit commanders, and
criticized them for the manner in which they conducted the operations.
He added that STALIN, himself, was extremely dissatisfied with the results.
The main points of KRUGLOV's address were as follows: "Time has come for
action. We must clean out each and every bandit base. These bases are
to be found in every kulak farm, in each well-to-do farustead. All the
intelligentsia are to be considered bandits. Families and relatives of
bandits, all those who have rendered aid to the bandits, anyone having
any tie with the bandits - all are to be considered as being bandit bases.
They must all be seized and deported to far-off areas of the Soviet
Union."
KRUGLOV directed that intelligence be strengthened and broadened. More
agents were to be recruited and the intelligence net was to be widened
in the underground "bandit" areas. Agents were to establish contact
with families and relatives of partisans. Any and all methods of
recruitment were to be used - money payments, threats, deceit, appeals
to patriotism, compromise, etc. All agents were to be well-trained. No
sympathy was to be shown to the "bandits", their contacts, relatives,
or any members of the underground. Any questioning methods could be
used as long as accurate and valuable information was obtained.
He ended his sReech by saying that "I am confident that this'honorable
and responsible 'task will be successfully concluded. Then the Soviet
, system, will be established on Lithuanian soil, and the 'banditry' will
be completely ended. Then normal everyday conditions will be restored
for the Communist Party to be able to carry out its work in Lithuania."
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Source learned of this meeting from:70-15- 1- Col. SKORODUMOV; from the
hi
Cef,pf Staff of the 95th Border Gt t., Lt. Col. PISHKIN; and
from the Deputy CO for Political Affairs of the 95th Border Guards Det.,
Lt. Col, KARNAUKHOV. These three officers had attended the meeting.
6. Following the meeting, KRUGLOV issued orders to alert all military
organizations in Lithuania and to begin searches of all woods, swamps,
and uninhabited areas. All underground headquarters, bunkers, store-
houses, and hiding places were to be vigorously engaged and destroyed.
He also ordered that anyone who ran during a search of populated areas
was to be considered a bandit and fired upon. Whenever anyone ran into
a building during the search, the building was to be burned even if it
meant burning the whole settlement. All livestock and property of
those captured was to be turned over to local representatives of the
territorial Party organs.
The Commanders returned to their units and prepared for action. Large
scale hunts were started, resulting in mass shootings of innocent
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Lithuanian citizens. Officers of the NKVD territorial organs used inhuman
Measures in questioning the populace. People were beaten over the head'
with pistols, rifle butts, cleaning rods, rubber-covered springs, clubs,
50X1 50X1P whips - anything to produce information.
Although a great amount of Source's knowledge on the treatment of the
Lithuanians was hearsay p he did see a few instances
of brutality. These were in August or September 1944 in Eyshishkos
54-12, E 25-0g, in this area searching for a
large partisan band. The unit CP was in a home in Eisiskes, and the
upper floor was occupied by an unknown NKVD colonel who was in charge
of the particular operational sector. The colonel had five or six
operational officers in his headquarters who were charged with the col-
lection of data on partisan activities.
In a house across the street, these NKVD officers had established
detention cells (KamerePredvaritellnogo zaklyueheniya) for the purpose
of questioning suspects. The house was Surrounded by an electrified
fence and was guarded by trenches and MG emplacements manned by a Border
Guard unit of 35-40 men under a Sr. Lt, YATSKOV. The NKVD colonel used
the house for detaining and interrogating anyone that his operational
officers .brought to him.
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Whenever the operational officers had an arrest to make,
kOmendatura provided one or two squads of men, who would return to the
komendatura hq. with the suspect. The NKVD colonel would then order
the suspect confined to the detention cells. If no information was
forthcoming, the person was brought to the colonel's rooms on the upper
floor or the CP. Here the suspect was questioned by the colonel; if he
refused to talk, he was beaten by the colonel or one of the operational.
officers4 Source observed these beatings on several occasions.. The
victims would lose consciousness and were often beaten to the point
where they lost control of normal bodily functions.
In tribute to the stubbornness of the Lithuanians, Source stated that
there were no instances of any information being given during these
interrogations. After it was established that no information was
forthcoming, the suspect was sent to Villnyus for further questioning.
Source did not know the ultimate fate of these persons, but believed
that they were sent to concentration camps. Once arrested, they could
not be released for fear that the methods used by the Communists would
be divulged.
Individual farms and separated settlements were burned and the live-
stock rounded ups mostly to be eaten by troops participating in the
searches. There were also wholesale deportations of Lithuanian
citizens to remote portions of the northern USSR for logging work.
Political activists were imprisoned in camps.
The Lithuanians suffered but did not give up. Taking into account the
great annihilation of civilians, mass arrests., exiles, tortures, and
destrudtion of farms and villages, the partisan leaders decided to go
underground temporarily and slacken their resistance, saving their
strength for the future. Thus, the Soviet government established its
authority in the Lithuanian SSR.
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8. Source gave the following information on methods of operation of Soviet
units in Lithuania. He could give information only on operations in
Since the operations took place several
years ago, he was able to give only general highlights.
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e 95th Border Guard Det., was sent to Lithuania in July
1944 from the grimea, where they had participated in resettlement of
ethnic groups.'" Source was informed verbally that
the unit's mission was to liquidate the "bandit- or partisan movement,
which had grown to alarming proportions.
The unit arrived by rail and bivouacked in tents not far from Villnyus.
Other NKVD units and Border Guard detachments (see subpara la and lb,
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above) arrived in Lithuania about the same time0
ordered by BARTASHUNAS to attach one komendatura to an
NKVD colonel who was chief of one of the operational sectors south of
Vil,nyus. the 4th Komendatura, 95th Border Guard Det.,
was selected. He reported to the NKVD colonel at a small unknown
settlement in August 1944. The troops were bivouacked in the woods just
outside the settlement.
For, the next two weeks, the unit followed up leads on partisan hideouts.
The troops would take up positions five yards apart in a line of
skirmishers and move through an area while the officers formed in back
of the line and controlled the forward movement. At dusk they would
camp in place, and move out again at dawn. This continued until an
entire area was cleared. In the two weeks, not a single partisan was
killed or captured.
The NKVD colonel then told Source that his biggest worry was partisan
activity in theExhishkes area, so the 4th Komendatura Hq. was set up
in that town. Other komendaturas from the 95th Border Guard Det, took
up positions in the surrounding area. Source was informed that the
biggest problem to the Soviets was a group of "bandits" led by a man
nicknamed "The Iron Wolf". The entire 95th Border Guard Det, took
part in the search for this group. The area to be covered was quite
large and contained many dense forests and swamps. The entire opera-
tion lasted about one month and included many minor skirmishes. When-
ever possible, the partisans avoided battle. To complete a thorough
search of the area, other Border Guard Detachments in the vicinity
(exact ones unknown) had to be called in.
During this search, komendatura lost a master sergeant and a
sergeant. The master sergeant was instantly killed by rifle fire and
50X1 the sergeant was critically wounded. These were the only casualties
In the entire 95th Border Guard Det., Source
knew of one lieutenant from Det. Hq., three EM from the 1st Komendatura,
and three EM from the 3rd Komendatura being killed. These casualties
covered a period from July 1944 to February 1945. Source was unable
to estimate the number of wounded. He was not able to give losses of
any other Soviet units, or any estimate of partisan losses.
Source was finally informed by the NKVD colonel that "The Iron Wolf"
had been killed in a minor skirmish. He also heard this from other
officers in the 95th Border Guard Det., but believed that it was highly
possible that the story was faked to pacify Moscow.
Source claimed that the search of settled areas was conducted by
Operational Troops and the NKVD territorial organs.
participated mainly in the search for "The Iron Woli ucnecuukiy
he did not know any activities in other areas of Lithuania, except
for what he learned by hearsay. He had heard of robbery, rape, and
plundering by the NKVD territorial organs, and of entire families being
sent to distant parts of the USSR. However, he could give no specific
numbers nor relate any incidents. He maintained that he knew of these
occurrences from general knowledge, rumor, and contacts because of his
rank.
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ania, partisan activity was still continuing but had decreased greatly.
He knew only the following details.
In the Prenay forests near KaUnas, a search was organized in 1950 for
a partisan leader named MESHKENIS. Source heard that MESHKEN1S had
been operating as a partisan leader from 1946 to 1950 and that he had
received two years of US intelligence training and was parachuted into
Lithuania. Gen. KRUGLOV was responsible for the search. Source heard
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that MESHKENIS had been killed, but there were two versions.. to the story:
a. MESHKENIS had a meeting with a liaiBon officer at the edge of a
forest. Unknown to MESHKENIS? the officer was. an MOB agent, and
the area was encircled by NKVD troops The partisan leader did not
fully trust the liaison officer and had come armed with a grenade -
and pistol. He pulled the pin on the grenade, and warned the Oa-
der that he vicitld be killed if the meeting was a trick. They walked
about the area conversing-, until MESHKENIS accidentally stepped on -
the hand of a hidden aoldier, The soldier fired at him immediately,
hitting him in the leg. MESHKENTS then killed himself with the
hand grenade.
b. In the second version, MESHKENIS was in! shall Village restaurant
Just outside of Kaunas. Someone saw him and reported to the.MOB,
which encircled the restaurant. MESHKENIS then killed himself.
0. Source knew of a partisan band that operated in the Kalvaria-Mariyampoll
area from 1946 to 1951, led by a man named SKIRMONTASS. Source esti-
mated that this group had 21-25 men in 1946 and about nine men in 1951.J
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Comment: As of July 1954, SUSLOV was Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Comment: comment:
Source was extremely cautious to refrain from implicating
himself or his unit in any acts of violence that he reported. Such
acts were always committed by the NKVD territorial organs. He
admitted troops were guilty of killing livestock for their
own use or o s ealing intoxicating beverages from the Lithuanian
peasants, but insisted that this was the extent of their unorthodox
methods during the searches.
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