1. TYPES OF BORDER GUARD WATCH 2. BORDER GUARD DEFENSE PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400270007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 15, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT 1 Types of Border Guard Watch
2. Border Guard Defense Plans
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
This mateelal Contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
lag of the aspionege Isws. Title 18, U.S.C. Sam. 783
and IN, the tranemiteion or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
DATE DISTR. .
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
THE SOLACE EVALUATIONS IN THIS RFfORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR or St, REVNR)
DEC 15 1954
6
Comment: In paragraph 7, for Main Border Guard Administration
read Chief Directorate of Border Troops.
ARMY review completed.
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... _ _ SECRET
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT
1. Typee~ of Border Guard Watch
2. Border Guard Defense Plans
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
25X1
DATE DISTR.
17 Nov 1954
NO. OF PAGES
5
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The material in the following report covers four types of border watch
activity in effect under varying conditions. The first two conditions con-
cern those routine; peace time border guard activities involved in surveillance
for--the purpose of sealing the border against individual violators. The
last two conditions describe the two types of border guard defense activity
against armed enemy groups bent on overt forceful penetration.
NORMAL AND INTENSIFIED BORDER GUARD WATCH
Normal Watch
1.
the normal watch was in force when there were to indications
of'imminent border violations. Under such conditions all border guard
officer and enlisted personnel were on an eight-hour guard duty day
(excluding training time).
Intensified Watch
2. Intensified watch conditions prevailed when there were indications
of violations or intended violations of the border area either from
within the USSR or a neighboring country, or when it was ordered
by higher headquarters for practice purposes.
under an intensified watch condition it was not un- 25X1
During a state of intensified watch, all echelons which were normally
engaged in checking personnel activity and travel were also required
to intensify their activity. This included the civil police (militia),
railway and vital statistics registration offices, local MVD operational
hours daily, and for posts along the border to be increased considerably
and. manned on.a 24-hour basis. All training was out from three hours
to one or even suspended.
In an intensified watch, an officer surveillance.(ofitserekoye nablu-
deniye) was invoked in the border guard unit area and behind the frontier
itself. This involved continuous roving inspection by border guard
commissioned personnel for the purpose of maintaining a tightened
security system. Activity of the border guard's secret agent network
in border areas was also intensified as well as the activity of the
more overt cooperative brigades (brigady sodestviya) of informants.
common for all border guard personnel to be on duty from 12 to 18
agent offices, etc.
BORDER GUARD UNIT DEFENSE PLAN (PLAN OBORONI)
General
6. 25X1
every border guard unit, regardless of size, a a e n e p an
which was concerned with the defense of its immediate sector of
responsibility against armed attack.
By a directive issued by the Main Border Guard Administration in Moscow,
this unit plan was required to be instituted in all border areas con-
'tiguous to non-Satellite countries. It was to be approved by the next
higher border guard unit headquarters, to be continuously improved, and,
on.occasion, to be tested by practical exercises. It was to encompass
that defense solution which was deemed most adaptable and practicable
for the given sector and terrain.
The continuous revision and bringing up-to-date.-of the unit defense plan
in each border guard unit was the direct and continuing responsibility
of the unit CO at every level; this revision was accomplished with the
coordination of subordinate CO's whose own plans, beginning with the
zastava level, were incorporated and fused to make up the plan of the
next higher unit.
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CO of the 2nd Komendatu had to personally accomplish a 25X1
detled visual reconnaissance of his area, consider all possible approach
routes, defense positions, fields of fire for various weapons, travel tfms
by'different modes of transportation from various Doints _ 25X1
t neat; , Voints within
o the data compile in
etailed study , when avorably reviewed at the 25X1
e ent level, was then incorporated into 0 unit plan which was 25X1
10.
-- r -- --??-? ..... va.v ?e Va VtuiaC[1 W jJ.LGG7, CTrC .
s
and mat ine a e komendatura head uarters. V athret25X1
q In any unit, only the
CO and, on levels where there was an operations section, the chief of
that section would know the role of his unit in the plan of the next
higher headquarters, the complete plan of the given unit, and those of
dubordinate units.
the "master plan" was cla
sifi d 25X1
Plan of
11.
12.
Unit 25X1
incorporate
of a similar natured
the defense plan
all of the following features among others
a. Informational data on and detailed schematic drawings of the
t
mos
practical routes of attack in the vicinity of Kushka by
an armed enemy group; these included routes of communications
and supply, natural obstacles, and other terrain features.,
-Present locations and proposed areas of deployment
c. Circumstances under which they would be alerted.
d. Proposed firing positions and fields of fire.
e. -F!ro>,osed function in emerrene of each individual 25X1
[duty stations, and responsibilities.
f. Calculations showing type and number of support troops required
from higher headquarters and by lower headquarters under different
circumstances; at what pointswhen, from where, howand by
what routes they could be expected to arrive.
g. Schematic drawings and charts to show types of vehicles and'loads
needed under different combat circumstances.
h. Details on liaison, communications, and reconnaissance resppnsi-
bilities.
i. Evacuation plan for wounded, to ihlude proposed locations for
aid
t
s
ations, and evacuation points.
Schematic sketches of proposed withdrawal and assembly areas.
k. Designation of responsibility for the evacuation of dependents.
This included evacuation plans detailed as to means, time, and
places of evacuation, as well as a roster of evacuees.
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1. Destruction priority list of documents and equipment and
designation of officers responsible for destruction of documents.
m. Evacuation priority for secret documents.
Practice Alerts
13. Practice alerts, to test the efficiency and timing of.border units in
eari'
i t
y
ng ou unit defense plans, were the responsibility of the :unit
CO or the next higher headquarters. There was time or fre-
quency for these practice alerts, the calling of
an alert was arather informal affa typical alert
25X1
Co of the komendatura[ would go to any ~~ subunits at 25X1
any time, regardless of the day or hour, find the duty officer 25X1
dezhurny), and sa to him, 'There is an unidentified force of 25X1
any type of enemy) uniformed men of battalion size proceeding
toward area one, do your duty, this is practice.' From this
point, the duty officer would awaken all of his troops, by
either firing his weapon in bursts, or getting the first ser-
geant to awaken the men. The CO of the alerted unit would then
be called to report to (his own) headquarters. He would then
assume command and direct all moving-out operations; The troops
would never take to the field; the only thing that was required
.in these alerts was that they be assembled, roll call taken,
and'then they would stand b for orders. The CO of the alerted
unit would then report how long it took to get 25X1
ready to move out, the exact time that he was ready to move out and
to where the unit was to be moved. then give the order 25X1
to return the troops to the barracks, and critique the alert with
the CO of the alerted unit, point out deficiencies, give repri-
mands, and advice to the'CO on how to remedy the deficiencies.=25X1
MUTUAL BORDER GUARD"-'ARMY!
F r~+pr?i,N, ' ; 1MOI?ESTV1YA)
General
14.
in addition to the plan discussed in
normally encountered at the komendatura and detachment ~level vfor
purely local defensive purposes, that there was also a system of plans
set up to cover cooperation between'nearby army units and border guard
units should such interaction appear warranted.. These were called
mutual action plans.
Kushka,Area
.In the Kushka area, the mutual action plan was worked out between
komendatura the Border Guard Detachment
and the 3 7th Rifle Div., which also had
rsa us a, An alert SOP had been worked out by border
guard and army authorities at Kushka to provide for the following;
a. Within 10 minutes after notification of an attack, one
battalion of infantry from the .47th Rifle Div was to be
25X1
25X1
at disposal as the Border Guard Komendatura GO. 25X1
b. -Upon notification that an attack was in progress, the division
CG was responsible for alerting his troops and dispersing them
in combat formation to engage the hostile force.
e. After initial contact had been made by division troops, the
division CG was to assume command of the area, and all troops,
including border guards within the area then become directly
subordinate to him.
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C f,
15.
d. After the combat situation appeared to have stabilized, or
upon direction from higher headquarters, the border guard unit
was to be relieved; sent to-,the rear to take over rear area
defense, and the- army divi' ion CG would assume entire
b. Road and railroad security.
c. litary traffic control.
d. Suppression of partisan groups.
responsibility for the front.
At this time, the komendatura was to assume
area for the following:
a. Defense against airborne troops.
Security of military depots and
f. General maintenance of order;.
16.
responsibility in the rear
storage areas.
army- order guard
it had been worked out Jointly and, in complete
cooperation with border guard and army officers participating
in all phases, and It had been tested in local border guard-
army maneuvers and exercises under both day and night conditions.
17. Concerning the Question of separate army access to the border,
he army could not, under any circumstances,
conauez e en-en maneuvers in the border area; that any army
operation in the border area required border guard sanction. This
control was carried to the extent that "the border guard would not
even allow army colonels to go rabbit hunting on the border".
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