RUMOR CONCERNING STRUGGLE FOR POWER AFTER STALIN S DEATH AND OPINIONS ABOUT TOP-LEVEL PERSONALITIES INVOLVED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000500030003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT
APR 1 1955
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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Washington Comment
1. The Kobulov mentioned on page 2 is probably Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov, who
was executed with Beriya.
4/55
111.1 N
111.4 N
135.5 N
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(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
Rumor Concerning Struggle for Power DATE DISTR.
after Stalin's Death and Opinions about
Top-Level Personalities Involved NO. OF PAGES
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP82-00046R000500030003-0
COUNTRY USSR
DATE DISTR. Ma,9. 1955 50X1
SUBJECT Rumor Concerning Struggle for Power after NO. OF PAGES 4
Stalin's Death and Opinions about Top-Level 50X1
DATE OF INFORMATION REFERENCES:
PLACE ACQUIRED
SOURCE
SECRET
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
source spent twenty-four da s in the sanatorium
i/n Ordzhonikidze in Kislovodsk (N 43-559 E 42-43), USSR. The guests
at this sanatorium are medium-level and high-level Communist Party
officials, Since only first names are used, source cannot identify
specifically any of the guests, but he remembers that two of them
worked for, but were not members of, the Central Committee of the
CPSU in Moscow. Others worked at the bureau chief level in various
ministries, and still others were artists, writers, etc. During his
stay, source became friendly with the other guests and heard several
.stories about top-level Soviet officials, When queried as to how these
guests had access to such information, source stated that in Moscow
it is very difficult to hide anything from the people because so many
have friends and relatives working !.n the government. He also said
that since Stalin's death, the people feel more free to discuss politics
but added that stories are naturally elaborated uporl.,as they are re-
peated. Following is a rumor concerning the struggle for power after
Stalin's death which source heard while at the sanatorium.
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Even while Stalin was still alive, Lavrentiy P. Beriya surrounded
himself with men whom he felt )e could trust. Georgiy M. Malenkov,
as one of his pupils and proteges, was brought into the government
and into the leadership of the Central Committee of the VKP (b)
by Beriya. When Stalin became seriously ill, Beriya confided:to
Malenkov his plan to take the government and the army into his
own hands. He proposed for Malenkov the Central Committee of
the Party, for Dekanozov the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for
Kobulov the MVD, etc.
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Because Malenkov was frightened of this change and, furthermore,
not at all amenable to it, he disclosed eriya's plans to Nikita
S. Khrushchev, The latter called a small meeting of co-workers
whom he considered reliable and trustworthy. The meeting was
attended by perhaps 12 or 15 persons,`including a majority of
the members of the Party Presidium. Source remembers specifically
that Molotov, Voroshilov, Ponomarenko, and Suslov were there;
Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich were not present, nor were any
followers of Beriya or Malenkov. At the meeting Malenkov was
asked to retell the Beriya plot. Khrushchev affirmed the neces-
sity for the leadership of the CC and of the Presidium of the
CPSU to remain united, firm, and single-minded in their decisions
in case Stalin died, pointing out the discord within the Party
and the government which Beriya wished to bring about. He pro-
posed Malenkov for the future head of the government; Khrushchev
himself was named by the others for the post of First Secretary
of the CC of the CPSU. Malenkov was asked to submit his plans
for anew government to the CC of the CPSU for confirmation.
After Stalin's death,. Khrushchev called a second meeting, which
was attended by members of the CC,.including the entire Presidium
as then constituted, and some members of the government.]. Beriya
was fully convinced that he should be the head of the government
and consequently took the seat of the chairman at the conference
table. When all had taken their seats, Beriya stood up and
opened the meeting. Khrushchev interrupted him and announced
that he would not give Beriya the floor.
At this conference Khrushchev summarized the historical situation,
explained the responsibility of this political moment before
the "motherland and the people," and indicated the necessity for
unity and solidarity in the ranks of the Party and the government.
Therefore, he said, from now on all economic and political questions
should be decided by the leadership of the CC jointly, that is,
collectively.
Regarding the question of the death of Stalin, Khrushchev said,
"the CC of the CPSU sets before you, for collective solution, its
proposals for the composition of the new government and the manage-
ment of the CC of the CPSU". The floor was yielded to Ponomarenko
to read the recommendations of the CC. Ponomarenko mentioned
two names for the position of head of the government: first
Malenkov and then Beriya. He named Khrushchev for the position
of First Secretary of the CPSU. Khrushchev was elected unanimously.
The candidacy of Malenkov was listed for voting prior to that
of Beriya. During the voting, Beriya's partisans realized that
the majority of the CC and of the Presidium of the CPSU were voting
for Malenkov, having been prepared for this in advance. They be-
came frightened, defected, and also voted for Malenkov.
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Beriya stood up and in confusion announced that "he could not
.subordinate himself to that cub Malenkov, who had done nothing
meritorious dither for the Party or for the Soviet people.
Therefore, he requested that the question be examined once
more; otherwise he would find another way of coming into power."
From that time on, there was an open struggle between Malenkov
and Beriya.
Malenkov, upon the advice of the CC of the CPSU, began a popular-
ity campaign both among the Party and non-Party actives of the
city of Moscow. For this purpose he held meetings and conferences
in large factories and economic actives. Beriya, on the other
hand, was getting ready directly to seize power, by planting his
assistants everywhere and by readying his apparatus, and partly
the army, for combat.
The CC of the CPSU did not yet dare to isolate Beriya directly
and attempted to quiet him down through peaceful discussions.
When Beriya was personally insulted by Malenkov at one of.the
meetings, he was unable to restrain himself and fired a shot
at Malenkov, wounding him superficially in the left arm. De-
spite this extreme action, Beriya was not removed but was again
warned to be more temperate in his actions. It was not until
Beriya. began moving his troops into Moscow that he was called
to a Presidium meeting, imprisoned, and later executed without
a trial.
2. Source said that everyone believes the story that Beriya shot Malenkov,
although this widely held belief is distorted according to classes.
Source expressed the following opinions about personalities involved
in this story:
a. Malenkov:, It was commonly rumored that Beriya was responsible
nbr~Ie'rikobut,careever Malenkd etas 'atD"appar atu8' -man b to big
g' ;, went oily( among the people., 'or amb'hg'
lower Party personnel. He.was,'therefore, never known to the.-:
rnassesj~nor was he popular with 'them. He was`not"even powerful
in' the `Party until after Stalin's death. After he became
Premi'er, Malenkov thought he was too big to bother with the
apparatus: Khrushchev, on`the other-hand, was busy working be-
hind the scenes.
After the Soviet announcement of 9 February and before the one
of 1 March, source stated that even though Malenkov knows nothing
about electric power, his new ministry is easy to run and is the
least important ministry from the standpoint of being admini-
stered by a man who knows what he is doing. Malenkov's job on
the Party Presidium is only a token, considering his lack of Party
connections. In a year or so he will probably be shuffled out of
his deputy premiership.
b. Ponomarenko is one of-the more brilliant Party workers who was
boosfoo smar for Stalin to allow to become too prominent. He is a
trusted disciple of Khrushehev. For t4is reason and because he
is a very astute politician, he was chosen by Khrushchev to pre.,
sent the recommendations of the CC of the CPSU for the composition
of the new government at the meeting described above,
c. Suslov, like Ponomarenko, is one of the more brilliant Party
wor ers who was too smart to be trusted by Stalin. He is, however,
a trusted disciple of Khrushchevm
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_t}_
d. Mikoyan was not invited to the first meeting called by Khrush-
cbev because Khrushchev does not consider him trustworthy. He
is a careerist who will show allegiance to the top man, whoever
he may be. Prior to the 1 March announcement,source thought
that Mikoyan would be.dt?opped because he had been a partisan. of
Beriya. After the announcement, source said that Mikoyan either
was removed from his post as Minister of Internal Trade by
Malenkov or, knowing that Malenkov's number was up, may have
resigned himself.
e. Ka anovich was not invited to the first meeting called by Khrush-
chev because Khrushchev distrusts him as a careerist, in the
same way he distrusts Mikoyan. It is a common rumor that he. will
also fall from favor. It is even rumored that his name will be-
removed from the plaques at Moscow subway system entrance ways,
f. Pervukhin was a protege'of Malenkov and also a careerist type.
Prior to the 1 March announcement, source believed that his
career would start to decline, since he was not a Khrushchev
man. After the announcement, source reasoned that he must
have turned against Malenkov and sided with Khrushchev prior
to'offioial action against Malenkov, for which action he was
rewarded.
Saburov was a prot4gd of Malenkov and also a careerist type.
nee a was not a Khrushchev man, source believed that his
career would decline. After the 1 March announcement, source
reasoned that he must have turned against Malenkov and that he
was rewarded in same manner as Pervukhin.
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