SOVIET ARMY TRAINING AND MANEUVERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000500400001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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316
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
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COUNTRY USSR/Austria REPORT NO.
SUBJECT Soviet Army Training and DATE DISTR.
Maneuvers 50X1
5 December 1955
NO. OF PAGES 16
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
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DATE ACQUIRED
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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Comment: On page 5, paragraph 6, read Shlem-1 gas rask. for
She1m 1 gas mask.
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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re etinlITTAWITMT a?
COUNTRY USSR
SULUECT Soviet Army Training and Mawr/ere
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
REPORT I
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DATE DISTR. 28 Oct 1955
NO. OF PAGES 15
REFERENCES:
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kg=
SOVIET ARMY TRAINING AND MANEUVERS
labla-a-Gaulmatis
A.
BASIC TRAINING
3
B.
REGIMENTAL GARRISON TRLINING
3
1.
General Background
3
2.
Training for New Arrivals
3
3.
Training Periods
3
4.
Schedules
4
5,
Political Training
5
6.
Atcmio Warfare Training
5
7.
Chemical Warfare Training
6
8.
Air-Ground Support Training and Identification
6
9.
Umbined AIms Tug Involving Arty Support and Tank-
6
Infantry Operations
10.
Anti-Tank Training
6
11.
Engineer Bridging Training
6
12.
Passive Air Defense Training
7
13.
Night Training
7
14.
Other Types of Training) Firing
7
15.
Inspections of the Regiment
7
O.
REGIMENTAL AND OTHER SCHOOLS
8
D.
REGIMENTAL SIG 00 TRAINING
9
1.
2.
3.
Instructors
Training Schedule
Signal Training
a. Wire Laying
b. Switchboard and Radio Operations
9
9
10
10
10
4.
Political Training
10
5.
Chemical Warfare Training
10
6.
Weapons Firing
11
7.
Atomic Defense Training
11
S.
inspections
12
E.
ALERTS AND TRAINING EXERCISES
12
1,
Alerts
12
2.
Movement to the Field and Yield Conditions
12
3.
Field Exercises
13
a. Command Post Exercise in Feb 1954
13
b. Field ,Exercise in August 1954
13
0. Field Exercise in January 1955
14
d. OPX in May 1955
14
e. Other Exercise
15
4.
Large Scale Motor *vas
15
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A. BASIC TRAINING
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pOVIET ma TRAINING AND MANEUVERS
Soutce took beide training from 1953 at an Unidentified
guards rifle regiment in Stanislav (N 48-56? E 2442)? the USSR.-" Source has
forgotten most of the details and could only comment generally on his basic
training. His training company of about 200 recruits consisted of four platoont.
The training was given almost totally by platoon groups. About four hour's a day
were spent on close-order drill and about eight hours a week were spent on
ettendede-order drill and individual fortification construction. Political instruc-
tion averaged four to six hours * week. About two hours a day were spent in the
study of basic Soviet field manuals, such as the Disciplinary Manual and interior
Guard Manual. There was no signal or chemical training. Only two to three hours
a"week were spent on physical training outside of the morning calisthenics. Very
little instruction was given on individual arms. Source fired three rounds tilde!
the M1944 carbine and nine rounds from the PPSh SMO. The training schedule was
eight hours, six days per week; but the recruit was actually busy from 0600 to
2400 hours every day.
B. REGIMENTAL GARRISON TRAINING
1$ asslaugangag
Although Source had been a member of the 290th Ods Rifle Mgt from
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information on training matters as practised in his regiment. Since he was
completely uninterested in and unobservant of training matters, such informa-
tion as he was able to give was centered around training as it affected him
personally; and in such eases his information was quite general. H. was
able to give some training information on his own particular company but less
on the regiment as a whole. He Could give practically no information on
specific training in regimental subunits other than his own company.
Since the summer of 1954 each of the two rifle battalions had had one company
on demarcation line duty. One of the battalions also had a company on guard
duty at division headquarters. These three companies never joined the regi-
ment for training, and presumably followed their own training program in
place.
2.Irealang_f_orjew_Arrjaavin
All new arrivals in the regiment had taken a two month basic training course
in the USSR prior to assignment to the regiment. Immediately upon arrival
at the regiment these men underwent a'15 day period of quarantine, during
which they received additional training in basic military subjects. After
the quarantine period these men were assigned to units in the regiment;
a large portion of them were detailed to the regimental school. EM in their
first year of service in the regular regimental subunits took the same train-
ing as the other members of their units, except that the political training
was separate, the physical training exercises more simple and minimum quali-
fication scores for individual arms firing lower.
3* ,Traininc_rerlo.da
Th, training year began on 1 December of each year and continued until about
'beginning of October the following fall. The training year was split
into a winter and a summer training period. Almost all of the regiment's
training weis conducted in its (worm area. It did not move to the field in
the spring and remain there for a long period; instead, it participated in trv
or three short field exercises, each of which lasted from 10 to 12 days.
These field exercises plus CPX's were conducted at the Allentsteig (N 48-41,
E 1549) training area. In addition regimental artillery and other Units
with crew-served weapons such as mortars, anti-tank pieces, SW80 etc.,
periodically went to Allentsteig for short periods of live firing.
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At the conolusion of the training year in October, there was I period-Of-
ibout two months during which preparations were Made for the new treining -
year. This was also the period when soldiers completing three 'Sere Of servioe
Were demobilised and when new recruits arrived from basic training camps in
tha-VSSR. The soldiers starting their second and third years of service were
kept busy with houaekeeping details and preparation of equipient for the hew
training year. Almost all training was suspended during this period except
few the new recruits who underwent a 15 day period of quarantine separately
from the other personnel. Unit CO's were authorised to hold limited training
in their own units on any subject which they believed was necessary. The Only
required training for second and third year men during this period was politi-
cal training.
AsWham"
Troop training was conducted six hours a day six days a week. The normal
daily training schedule and list of cans was as followss (The times given
are Moscow time)
0700 Reveille
0700 - 0735
0735 - 0750
0750 - 0820
0820 - 0900
0900
0900 1500
Calisthentice
Personal toilet
Free time
Breakfast
Regimental training formation
Training individually by subunits, each according
to its own training schedule. In some unite, such
as the Sig Co, each platoon had its win training
sehedule.
1500 - 1530 Dinner
1530 - 1700 Compulsory rest period
1700 - 1715 Preliminary marksmanship instruction - (Strelkoryy
trenazh).
1715 - 1900 Care and cleaning of equipment period.
1900 - 1930 Free time
1930 - 2000 Political period
2000 - 2100 Supper
After supper until evening roll-call formation,
the EM had free time.
2320 Evening roll-call formation
2330 - 230 Evening walk and singing in formation
2400 Tape
Saturday afternoons were usually set aside for housekeeping duties instead
of training. On Sundays the troops werernerally free, unless there was a
scheduled regimental cross country run (usually three kilometers). In such
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inotances the entire enlisted cadre of the regiment and at least one ender
from each unit was required to participate. No politidal training vis conducted
on Sunday. Many of the men were plated on work details. Some attended the
regimental movie, others engaged in sports. No conscript could legally leiVe
the caserne area. A surprise formation could be held at any time and it was
absolutely necessary that all the conscripts be present.
5. Polit$0111 Wallas
Political training was conducted two to three times a week, each time for a
two hour period, beginning at 0900 hours. This training was conducted by
groups. The entire regiment conducted political training during this period.
Each unit was responsible for its own political training. (See section 0
for other political training, in Source's Sig Co.)
Political training was broken down into two parties the half-hour political
information period in the evening and that conducted two or three times a
week under the regular training schedule. During that conducted under the
training schedule, purely political subject' were given such as the study of
past Communist exploits, Communist theory and teachings and the history of the
Party. The half-hour political information period given during the evening
was used to instill in the men patriotism, courage, discipline and a will to
tight. They included the usual harangues on "imperialist nations", and were
of an anti-western-block nature. This period was .so used to present current
events.
6. Atomic Warfare Trainiqg 2.
In early 1955, regimental personnel were allegedly shown a top secret film,
title unknown, in connection with atomic defense training. An unidentified
major from division headquarters gave a short talk preceding the film and
cautioned the men not to disclose its contents.
In general, the film showed the followings Soviet professors at work in
their laboratory on supposed atomic equipment and research, an elementary
explanation of atomic structure, and several types of alleged radiation measur-
ing devices. These latter were small, approximately eight inch on a side box-
like mechanisms; some had a voltmeter-type dial while others had a blinking
red lamp. Source could add no further detail on this equipment. The film
then showed an alleged atomic explosion against Soviet troops occupying defen-
sive positions. The troops were lined face down in their trenches. No indioa-
tion was given as to who was the originator of the blast or under what circum-
stances, Following the blast and the shook wave, chemical reconnaissance men
(called in film *Khim Rasvedchiki") dressed in what appeared to be the conven-
tional impregnated anti-gam suit and gas mask, moved forward out of the
trenches carrying rectangular radiation dosage detection devices (called in
film *Dosimern) in their hands. After they returned the troops moved forward
in the attack, with tank-riding infantry followed by more infantry moving out
after ansrtillery preparation. The tanks were completely buttoned up while the
infantry were wearing the Shelm 1 gas mask and protective socks, gloves and
capes. The attack was successful, and the attackers were then shown returning
to a decontamination point. Here the chemical reconnaissance men, alibi as
before, checked the radiation dosage of each man (again with the rectangular-
like *dosimer"). The more seriously affected were shown being sent to a medi,
cal point. The others stacked their weapons and equipment,. removed their
clothing, tagged it and placed it in a separate pile. The men then took a
shower while their clothing was being brushed and washed by the chemical
reconnaissance personnel. Following this the men were shown receiving their
decontaminated clothing and equipment. An alleged portable laboratory mounted h4
4
on a conventional chassis was then shown. Inside the van there were about
five men seated behind a conveyor belt analysing rations, water and soil for
radioactivity. Source had no Orther information on this van. The film
ended at this point.
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7. raeggasuLaritArejailang
Source did not know specifically what type of chemioal training was given
in the rifle battalions of his regiment. He only knew that their chemical
training was more intensive than that given to the regimental separate
companies.
More intensified chemical training was given separately in the regimental
ehemieal platoon. Each regimental subunit detailed three or four men to
attend training of an unknown nature with this platoon. These men met two
or three times a month for two or three hour periods. These small groups did
not, however in turn, give any chemical training within their own units*
9.gir.Oround lunnorkTratans and Tilloatigloation
There was no air-ground support training except that in the January 1955
field exercises (see !motion D) four unidentified jet fighters made simulated
strafing passes while the regiment was occupying a defensive position. (See
section I for further details). These fighters dropped dynamite charges be-
fore the front lines of the defending elements.
Source knew of no means or system of identification in the regiment used to
identify Soviet ground units to Soviet air units. He knew of no liaison
system in the regiment for coordination of air-ground tactics. He knot
of no air identification panels in the Sig Co supply setup*
9.
1
The only time there was any combined arms training involving artillery
support and lank-infantry training was during the Aug 54 and Jan 55 field
exercises (See section D)* Unknown division tank elements with T-34's together
with the 287th Gd Rifle Regt? simulated an attack on Source's regiment while
it was in defense. T-34 tanks also supported source's regiment in the defense.
Division artillery elements also took part in these exercises, but source
could offer no further information either on lank infantry training or
artillery support. He had seen the regimental SP Btry practising tactical
formations in the regimental area with the rifle battalions. Source could
give no specific information, however,
10. AhlkalAamtalug
In the regiment was a battery of new 107 ma ricket launchers. Source had
no information on the employment of these weapons.
11. iniaggierjarkiglaWsiniagr
Source knew of no engineer bridging operations or training in his regiment,
and he did not even believe that the regiment's parent division had the
means to set up a bridge across anything larger than a brook. At his regiment
there were no means to set up a bridge across any stream larger than a creek,
according to his belief. The regimental engineer company did have a few un-
identified small rubber boats but no bridging equipment of any type*
However, source had heard of a large bridging operation in 1953 (the year
prior to his arrival) in which his division had participated. This had
taken place somewhere in Austria, across the DandbeRiver. It was rumored to
have been a miserable failure because of the swiftness of the river.
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12. pgssive Air Defense Training
NO passive air defense training was given to the individual soldier in
Sourceos regiment. The regimental air advance-warning post was responsible
for air-raid warnings. This post was composed of seven personnel from the
regimental signal company and was located on the top floor of the signal com-
pany billets while the regiment was in winter quarters. The post's equipment
consisted of an SBM-1 radio; binoculars; aircraft identification cards; a
telephone. and a circular, mechanical direction indicator. The post was tied
into the division system of advance air warning posts by the RB1.14. radio.
When the regiment was in the field, this poet set up an air advance-warning
pest at an advantageous point in the front line units and *e tied into the
regimental radio net. Source was of the opinion that air warnings would come
down by radio from division through the regimental member air-warning post.
13. lishl.IrgaLag
There was practically no night training while source's regiment was in its
caserne area. The rifle battalions did some night firing on the regimental
firing range from their individual small arms but he knew no details of this.
Other regimental units did not partioipate in this firing.
Most of the night training was conducted during the field exercises. During
these exercises most of the movement was done at night. Driving was dons
with black-out lights and simulated combat conditions were observed. Road
marches were made during the hours of darkness, and units did their displac-
ing also at night. Source had to lay wire a good portion of the time during
the hours of darkness.
14. Othez TYV98 of Traininv Firing
Source stated that no instruction was given in "living off the country".
Source did not know how =oh training was required before a unit or individual
was considered combat-ready. Re believed that this was determined by the semi-
annual inspections.
There was no familiarisation training with individual or crew-served weapons
other than that with which the regimental personnel were regularly armed.
Training WO conducted only with T/E individual arms. Firing was conducted
at the regimental firing range located a short distance outside the regimental
oaserne area. The infantrymen in the rifle battalions fired a more elaborate,
combat course than that given in Source's company (see section D). The course
for those armed with the ONO was as follows* The firer, in a trench and wear-
ing a gas mask and armed with 30 rounds, fired from the prone position in short
S-round bursts at appearing chest-silhouette targets 200 m away. Then he re-
moved his gas mask and moved forward for about 100 m. As he ran, he fired at
a wooden shield in his path, threw a grenade at it, and kept on moving. Now
chest-silhouette targets suddenly appeared to his front at 150 to 200 m dis-
tance. He brought them under his fire from the prone position and then
moved past them. At this time several additional, moving, full-silhouette
targets appeared at a distance of 200 m. He fired fronts prone position at
them, and this finished the exercise.
For infantrymen armed with the carbine, the firing course was basically the
same. Source did not know the scoring procedures for either of these two
courses.
.15. Insoections of the Reriment
Twice, in 1954 and in the spring of 1955, the regiment's training and profi-
ciency were inspected by a commission composed of staff officers from the
division headquarters, OOF headquarters and Defense Ministry headquarters. The
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commanding general CGF inspected the regiment in August 1954. The inspection
commission consisted of about 50 unidentified officers ranging in rank from
senior lieutenant to general. These inspections were of the semi-annual
type which were regularly held in the spring and in the ,fall. -Every aspect
of Military training was touched on. There was no detailed inspectioA of
teehhioal equipment and proficiency, nor was the regiment's tactical pro-
ficiency tested fully at this time.
The procedure of this inspection took the following general form. The regi-
ment was formed, the officers forming several paces forward, the NCO's a
few paces behind the officers, and the other ranks behind the NCO's. The
inspecting group then inspected the EK and officers in the ranks, particular-
lrasking for any complaints, No one ever voiced any complaints during these
inspections.
The regiment was then broken down by units and the close-order drill proficiency
of each unit was inspected. The regiment was again reformed and passed in
review, concluding this phase of the inspection.
On the second day the inspecting body was broken down into smaller groups
to continue the inspections. Each inspecting group then checked a certain
phase of the training in each subunit. In Source's company the second day
was devoted to inspection of each man's physical conditioning. On the third
day the.companyws taken to the regimental small arms range and individual
small arms firing proficiency was inspected. On the fourth and, fifth days
the commission continued the inspection on the remaining military subjects
not yet covered.
The inspecting commission also called a practise alert to test the unit in
thievphase. The regiment was well warned in advance about this portion of
the inepection and performed well.
Detailed inspection of signal personnel proficiency were made later by a
group from division headquarters comprised mostly of division signal officer.,
was the signal equipment of the company and regiment.
The regiment was not inspeOted on any tactical training or required to show
its proficiency in the field.
It had been rumored in the regiment that
beginning with the fall of 1955 these semi-annual inspections were to be held
at unannounced times to more effectively test the units. Before the units
had known the dates of the inspections well in advance and ;Tapered for them
accordingly.
During the spring inspection in 1953 the regimental signal setup was rated
*3,. The general overall rating for Sources Sig Co was Ile. Other ratings
were unknown to Source.
REGIMENTAL AND OTHER SCHOOLS
The regimental school in Source's regiment waslesponsible for training NCO's.
This school wasstaffed by five officers: the CO, the Deputy co for Political
Mater', and three platoon leaders. It had a Mortar Platoon? a-Machine Gun
Plato* and a Rifle Platoon. There were about six NCO'. permanently attached
as cadre, -About 120 students, only those in their first year of service, were
trained ea0A year. Some were volunteers while the remainder of the quota was
detailed to attend.
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The course lasted for nine months, beginning about the end of October or the
first part ef November just after new arrivals had come to: -.the unit and fin-
ished their quarantine period. Source did not knew the exact training given
except. that, generally the same subjects were presented as were given to the
regular units, they were, however, of a more intensified and comprehensive
nature. The discipline was considerably more strict than in the rest of the
regiment. All instruction was given by the school offiCers and cadre. Upon
completion of the course about 90 percent of the graduates :received the
of junieritergeants while the remainder were giventhe rank of FPO or no rank.
The students were normally returned to their original unite.
The Silvpo,sent three to four win each pert(' the division Sig Bn for enroll-
ment in ,i.:11.1.4o-month service school, All'Sig Co conscripte were eligible
provided they had at least five years ofAschooling and were in their first year
of service. It was also necessary for candidates to have a good ear for ;Orme
code training. The scope of the course waa,unknownto source,: Graduates
received the rank of junior sergeant, and most sig Co personnel attending
became.. senior radio operators upon theii. return to the company. Source did
not know what degree of proficiency was required for this position.
The Sig Co also sent one man to a radio repairman's course at an unknown unit in
Baden each year. This course lasted for one year. Men volunteered for it.
The prerequisites were that men be in their first year of service and have at
least seven years of schooling. No promotions were given upon graduation from
this course.
About 60 mop a year were sent from the regiment to the division:driverla school
in AIlentsteig, to pursue a six week drivers" course and were subsequently
returned'to-the regiment.
Regimental artillery personnel did not attend any special courses. All of their
training was given on the job.
D. REGIMENTAL SIG CO TRAINING
1. Instructors
Company officers in source's unit, the regimental Sig Co, instructed primarily
,o214ignal matters and on political training. The majority of other training
subjects were presented by company NCO's, the officers merely supervising.
Occasionally the regimental chief of communications would present some train-
ing in signal matters.
2. Training Schedule
In source's particular platoon the six hours of training were generally spent
as fellows (they were given between 0900 and 1500 hours)8
let hour - Operation and practical work on the K-10 ,switchboard
(when political lectures were not scheduled).
2d and
3d hours Practical work in telephone line laying.
4th hour ^ Close order drill.
5th hour ? Study of unclassified conventional Soviet army manuals.
411,h hour ^ Physical training.
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Source stated each of the two signal platoons had a separate training schedule.
He could give no specific details on the radio platoon. During the normal
training week about six hours were spent on close order drill, about 15 helms
on signal matters, four to six hours on political training, about two hours
on individual weapons training, about three hours on the study of Soviet Army
manuals and about three to four hours on physical training (besides morning
calisthenics). The remaining hours were filled in with subjects that were
conducted less frequently, such as chemical training and personal hygiene.
Zignaltaulax
a. Wire Laying
Most of the training in Sourd00,plaiten consisted of intensive practical
'Work in line laying. Members, Ofythe:platoon spent much time in the near-
by vicinity of the- oaserne reeling out telephone cable and taking it up.
They were tagghttolay wire 200 m away from roads, when laying line parallel
to them. Areas with high tension lines were crossed at right angles.
When railroads were crossed, the wire was laid under the rails or high
oVerhead. Wire was strung at least three meters above hard-top roads,
but wire was dug in when crossing dirt roads, When crossing small streams,
the Vire was strung over the stream. When crossing large streams under-
water cable was to be used and laid in the water (there was no such cable
in the regiment however). Wire was to be strengthened or .pnagged every
100 m if possible, and wherever possible lines were to be Camouflaged.
Source's platoon had been instructed by its platoon,leader, that the
linesmen were to lay wire in trenches at least 20 am deep, in view of
recent instruction in protecting wire against atomic attack. Even though
efforts were made to have the linemen do this during training, source
stated that they had little success. He said that he would be forever
digging a five kilometer stretch of telephone wire if he had complied.
b. Switchboard and Radio Operations
All Members Of the telephone platoon also had practical instruction in
the operation of the 1C-10 regimental switchboards. This amounted only to
a few hours.
Source's platoon also got a smattering of instruction on the general
characteristics of the regimental radioss44
4, Political TrOdpg
In source's company the political training groups and instructors were as
folloyss
=MR Instructs:
let year troops
24 year troops
3rd year troops
All oompany 1100111
Deputy 00 for political training of the company
Company platoon leaders.
Company CO
The Regimental chief of communications, or the
group studied by itself without an instructor.
5. Chemical Warfare Trelligag
Chemical training in the Sig Co averaged two or three periods a month,
lasting 20 to 30 minutes each time. The majority of time was spent in
practical training in the use of chemical protective equipment. The latter
consisted of Shlem-1 gas mask, the gas-protective cape and the gas-protective
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stockings, There were no other individual protective chemical items such as
anti-gas packets and salves. Personnel were trained to don their gas masks
in four seconds and also to don the remainder of the chemical protective
items in. no more than one and one-half Minutes. This portion of the training
was the responsibility of the squad leaders. On very rare occasions one of
the company officers would lecture on chemical training. In one such lecture
the company CO gave a general description and identifications of such gases
as tewisite? Phosgene, mustard, hydrocyenic acid and other gases (which source
has forgotten). The existence of Tabun gas was also mentioned, but it was
described only as a nerve gas. NO mention was made that the Soviet Army
possessed any Of these gases.
Source knew that his company gave some general training On decontamination
methods to be used by the individual'eadierA, Individuals were to use either
the buddy system to wipe exposed parts ofthatOdywith cotton swabs, using an
unidentified decontamination solu#910fhiCh Would be provided by the regimental
Chemical platoon, or tolmdividually-use anti-gas packets which would be
issued.
6. Weapons FirIng
In source's company the men fired three to four times a year. Those armed with
the. SES carbine fired five rounds slow fire from the prone position at chest
silhouette targets 200 in distant. For soldiers in the firat year of service
one hit :was considered poor, two hits fair, three hits good and four hits
exCellent. For all other soldiers two hits were considered poor, three hits
fair, four hits good and five hits excellent. Military personnel armed with
the Kalashnikov SMC fired 20 rounds in short bursts from the prone position
at three to four moving full-silhouette targets 200 in away. Detailed scoring
methods for this weapon were unknown to source, but he knew that each target
had to be hit for a good score.
7. itandAlatemalrlaulaug
Source vaguely associated training in atomic defense matters with chemical
training, although the subject was given during periods other tan those
given for use of chemical defense training. Basically, the same Sig Co instrus-
tore Whgcgave instruction in chemical defense training also gave instruction
in atomic defense matters. The basic material used for atomic defense instruc-
tion was the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Handbook for Defense Against Atomic
attiok. .,When this manual first made its appearance in the regiment in 1954,
there had been much emphasis placed on it. Less and less training as outlined
in thie manual was given in 1955, however.
The Company Commander read lectures from another unidentified manual dealing
with atomic warfare mattera. Source could only recall certain portions of
or items from the contents of this manual. These odd bits are indicated heres
a) shock waves travel two kilometers in two minutes and three kilometers in
five minutes, b) radio-active rays lose 70 percent of their effectiveness
one kilometer ProM the burst; c) a one meter layer of earth will give protec-
tion to an individual at tie distance; d) individual soldiers should seek
cover when they seethe flash of light following the burst, should lie in
his trench or behind a tank, if possible; and e) his individual Chemical
protective items. will give some protection against radiation and he should
put these on after seeking cover. 5.
This manual also stated that one kilogram ofsatomic matter needed "320 kilo-
grams of easing" and that a hydrogen bomb must be set off by an atomic bomb.
Source knew nothing concerning the actual meaning of this last statement
but insisted that he had heard it. Source could not recall any other perti-
nent data from these lectures. There was no mention from this manual of
unit formations under atomic warfare conditions.
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Squad leaders gave very little atomic defense training. They continued
instructing their squads in the use of the conventional chemical defense
protective items and give some general instruction on decontamination
procedures. Again, the "buddy system" was stressed. Men were shown how to
brush atomic "dust" from each other with a email hand brush and to kelp
each other remove badly contaminated clothing. It was Stated that water
was effective in decontamination, and it was streised that all Ike washing
of the body or-Squipment should start from the top and work down.
Imppections
The regimental Chief of Communication:1i inspected trainire in the Sig Go
daily.' The regimental Chief Of S4aff4iipected about once weekly. The
regimental CO rarely cane to the'Sign41:COmpany to inspect training. The
Div CO visited the tom10447 Otuti*004iiii**14:1-althoOkk_he made monthly
staff visits' to the regiment. (See Section 0fOr.ftrther information on
inspection of the Sig Co.) (See section B for regimental-level inspections
including the sig Co.)
E. ALERTS AND TRAINING EXERCISES
1. Alagla
Each year there were at least two regimental or larger unit alerts. Besides
those alerti-the regimental subunits conducted itheir awn limited ones. The
aiSembly point for the regiment was two kilometers outside of the caserne
on the Ulmerfeld (11 48-04, E 14-49) Mauer Oehling road. Contact by phone
was established between the caserne and the assembly area on permanent lines
already installed. As soon as an alert was sounded, all caserne windows
were blacked out with blankets. The personnel than put on full-field equip-
ment, grabbed their weapons and proceeded to assigned jobs. Units loaded
small arms ammunition, which was kept in each unit area. Assigned drivers
vent to their vehicles (which were normally on blocks).? hooked up the batteries,
hitched any towed equipment or guns, and were ready to move out within 15
minutes. Normally it took the regiment two hours to clear the caserne after
an alert was sounded. Source did not know how much, if any, ammunition was
taken frOm the regimental ammunition dump. He knew, however, that rear
services supply was not moved.
One evening in April 1955, after dark during a heavy rainstorm, a particularly
disastrous regimental alert was sounded by the division CO who had gone to
the demarcation line to inspect the units there. it this point he had cut
off telephone contact without this being known at regiment. He then directed
that a phony message be sent via radio from the demarcation line to the
regimental caserne that the demarcation line units were under attack. He
then cut off radio communications. Complete chaos ruled inihe regimental
area. One battalion was hurriedly organized and left the caserne area in
about 15 minutes in complete disorder, while the other units still were
getting ready Before the remainder of the regiment was prepared to move
out, this battalion returned after being gone about two hours and learning
what had actually happened. Source very humorously recalledthe fear among
the officers, and in particular he recalled how his company political officer
finally got control of himself, gathered what men he could in the political
dayroom and -almost incoherently urged them to give their all and fight to the
end. He was the laughing stock of the regiment for a long time thereafter.
(Source understood that the division CO later severely criticized the
regimental staff for its unpreparedness.)
lif2XAMEMLtio...thiLitialLAmiLiielLfaisilligna
When the regiment went to the field at Allentsteig? the regimental school
was left behind to guard the (*Berne. Each company also left two or three
men behind in its company area to guard its buildings and company property.
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The line units of the regiment took all their organio-weapons and equipment
to the field, except for a few rear area servibe VehieleS and deadlined
vehicles. The regimental supply and seririce tnitii-tOok just enough equip-
ment and esupplies to last the regiment for the length ofthe exercise. All
post, camp and stationproperty, at well as most orthe supplies in the
regimental warehouses and storerooms, was left-behind.--The two regimental
fuel tank trucks brought up the rear of the motor column and serviced the
regimental vehicles in the field.
Most of the regimental companies did not have tentage -Some of the regimental
headquarters Units had some squad-size tents but not enough for all their
personnel. Most of the 12,1 made tlikeMselVes is'oomfortable as they could with
their poaches and over coats or built lean-tols. '
There were no shower facilities in the field, nor were there any recreational
facilities. Each battalion and the regimental headquarters had several
type towed field kitchens fortessing:ficilities.$0metimes dry rations
were given out. At other times the kitchens Mere.I0datedin a group some
distance behind the regiment during a tactical exercise while at still other
times they were with their units.
Camouflage was practiced in the field only during the actual play of an
exercise. Most Of the regimental units used foliage for camouflage. Some
of the regimental artillery units had camouflage nets, but even these were
few and far between.
During the field period all personnel were restricted to the regimental
area, No one knew whenithe regiment would get up and move to another loca-
tion in the course of the exercise; therefore all personnel obeyed this
restriction,.H
There was little or no free time in the field. No additional training
schedule was observed since ithe regiment was usually in a continuous tacti-
cal situation while in the field.
yield Exercipes
Field exercises of source's regiment were held in the AllentSteig training
area. Source saw some other elements of the division here and therefore
concluded that for the most part these were division-level exercises.
a, Command Post Exercise in Feb 54
A command post exercise, involving portions of what source believed to
be moat of all of the division elements, were held in Feb 54 which
lasted about six days. Source participated in them. The purpose of
this exercise was to give CO's practical training in commanding and
directing their units in simulated combat situations. The exercise of
Feb 54 continued day and night and covered much ground. Source's job
50X1 The representation from source's regiment
included Only the command and signal elements of the regiment and its
subordinate units.
b. Field Exercise in Aug 54
This field exercise lasted for about 12 days and was of regimental size.
Source knew that it included training on the "regiment in the attack",
"regiment in defame" and "regiment in the pursuit". Again source's job
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unialOWA tans elements of the division simulated an attack on the regiment
when it was in defense.
cs, Field Exeroise in Jen 55.
This exercise laSted for about 10 days and was apparently of division
size since source had seen the 287th Gds Rifle Regt? the Arty Gun
Regt of the division division 'tank elements and ether unknown division
units in it. He could not give .any great amount of detail on this
exercise but did know that his own regiment was engagedboth in the
defense of a hastily prepared position and participated subsequently in
what source thought was a march to the'ettadi.--Hie regiment thus moved
out of its Mauer Oehling caserne late one-eveningi made a motor march
along the Vienna-Linz highway towards Ehne 48=12-A-E 14-28), crossed
the Danube somewhere near.Mattheula.e?mordinates-not available) by ,
bridge and then bivouaced in the woods near tirfalar (N 48-19, E 14-16).
The next day it made a motor move to .the Allentsteig training area by
daylight, arriving there at night and taking up hastily prepared defen-
sive ?ositions alo wi
Hale regiment remained in this defensive
position -for two days, during which other unidentified division elements
made a Simulated gas attack on its defensive position, using amok. pots.
Front-line regimental troops put on gas masks. Four unidentified jet
aircraftalso made bombing runs on the defenders, drepping small dyna-
mite rockets to the defenders" front on these passes Which simulated
strafing attacks. Moreover, this attack was supported by unidentified
division tank elements.
Source's regiment was considered beaten but it was then reorganized for
a counter-attack, being supported in this by elements of the 287th Gds
Rifle Regt and unidentified division tank elements. This attack was
tads by means of a road march which was spearheaded by tanks; during it
the units participating moved about 20 kilometers. While on the march
word was passed that the enemy was "preparing to drop an atomic bomb".
The attackers were ordered to don their gas masks if it became necessary
to cross a simulated contaminated area immediately ahead of the column.
Source did not know, however, if the forward elements actually carried
out an attack or if the atomic bomb drop was simulated.
Following this counter-attack the exercises were ended and the regiment
was set up administratively to reorganize, clean its equipment and pre-
pare for movement to the regimental caserne area. Source himself spent
most of his time during the second phase at the 1st Rifle Bn Bqs and saw
very little of the overall exercise. However, he did form an opinion
that the tactics stressed were as followss "When the enemy is withdrawing,
strike herd and swiftly with tank elements so that if the enemy is pre-
paring to use atomic weapons, it will not be able to do so because you
have moved up too close for them to use such weapons without endangering
their own forces."
GPX in May 55
These command post exercises, assumed by source to be division level
ones, lasted about 10 days. Source did not participate. This exercise
was allegedly observed by Molotov and other Soviet dignitaries. Parti-
cipating elements were essentially those in the Feb 54 CPX.
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e. Other Exercise
In June 55 the reziment was due for a rumored rezimentali size exercise.
4. Lame Seale Motor Moves
The only large scale motor moves source over witnessed wai on the occasions
when the regiment moved to the Allensteig Treining-Aree'dUrincthe above
mentioned'field.exercises and CPX'si When the-eatire regiment, lees three
companies, moved to the training area, the ton:mint-14i stppOsed to be made
as a tactical march. At (his time, the regikenta-RecOn Co precededqtke
column (whose deployment he did not know), followed by the rifle battalions,
which were followed by the Regt'l SP Miry, Tho-roMaiiider7of the regiment
followed behind:those units, with the rear services bringing up the rear.
Contact between the Recon Co and the rifie"lattilidtS.Whe by radio. Distances
within serials to be maintained were 20 a between vehicles, and the speed
was up to 40 km per hour.-Sourde did not know distance:: between various
serials. Slightly over 100 vehicles were required to move the regiment.
The trip was abOUt 170 km and required about 10 hours. However, the vehicles
all became strung out along the way, and it took about 10 hours for all the
units of the regiment to arrive at the training area. These moves to the
training area were made by regimental organic transportation.
Only once did the bulk of the regiment make the movement by train. This was
in Jan 541 when one battalion was stationed on the demarcation line. Then
the regiment Was fall loaded (administrative loading) at Mauer ?skiing
for this move. Source could give no further specific information on this
50X1 MOTS.
50X11.
for source's OR information on this as well as other units given in
2.a OOMMents' At least two other
50X1 eported having seen Classified films dealing with atomic warfare
3.
4.
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5?
6.
ma ere,
for further information an the 107 ma rocket launcher.
fOr"iource's description Of regimental and Signal company radio
communications procedures, for his description of the R-105 and
R-106 radios.
Comment: Some of source's technical information appears to
vary rrom generally accepted results of an atomic explosion ,aid reanammble
atomic defense procedures. It is given as representing source's own description
accurately transmitted.
Comment: This exercise was at the time of the Vienna Conference.
LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES--30
3-02-0406 12/55
238.2 N
238.21 N
(73.5 N
236.22 N
238.41 N
223.46 N
223.44 N
238.5 N
238.3 N
238.25 N
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