THE POSITION OF THE MGB/GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMUNIST PARTY POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000100330002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 16, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. All officers - Party members, candidates or Komsomol members, posted to
or from the HQ 12 Guards Tank Div report to the Political Branch in
order to be registered in the Party records or to obtain their Party
Transfer Authorizations. This registration concerns all officers including
MGB officers serving with the Army Counter Espionage detachments..
(a) An MGB Officers' College is in Novosibirsk and is located in the
Ippodromskiy Region of the town. The Transfer Authorizations
were issued by the Party Organization of the Ippodromskiy Region
of Novosibirsk.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORI
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
5W
COUNTRY USSR/Germany (Soviet Zone)
DATE DISTR. ho Apr 52
SUBJECT The Position of the MGB/Governmental and NO. OF PAGES 4
Communist Party Policies
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(b) As both officers were Lieutenants) Ithe course in the Novosibirsk 25X1
College lasted at least two years, because cadets who completed an Officers'
School Course of less than two years duration receive the rank of Jr Lieutenant.
(c). Training in the Novosibirsk College was apparently on a high level because the
`'senior OIL. officers of the 12 Tank Div were highly impressed with the ability
11 and scope of knowledge of these two young officers.
4.
the Army has very little to 25X1
say in personnel matters concerning M' B officers posted to the Army. In my opinion, all
postings and transfers of MGB staff are carried out by the MGB Records and Personnel
Department and officers are transferred from. the I4GB to the Army and vice versa according
to the plans and directives given by the 1,03 higher authorities. The MGB fears nobody
except the Party. The Party rank-and-file realize very clearly how dangerous it is to
cross words with the :MGB while the 143E are aware that at the highest level the leading
factor is the VKP (b) and that they are only a powerful tool of the Party. The result
is that MGB personnel and Party members show a wholesome respect for each other, though
watching-each other closely, and they work together whenever necessary and possible.
In the Army the Counter Espionage personnel is subordinated in all Party matters to the
Army Political officers. The Political Officers are not allowed to ask the MGB personnel
unnecessary questions, but they are obliged to check in al.1 details their Party records.
5. An MGB officer posted to the Army should without delay present his credentials in the
Political Branch of his unit. The P.+rty Records Instructor and the head of the Political
Branch check his Party documents including his Party transfer authorization (Otkryepity-
elniy -Talon), Party Membership Card and identity. papers. An MGB officer cannot refuse
to present his identity papers in the Political Branch for all Party members are in-
structed and know very well that the Party Membership:'Card (Partiyniy Bilyet) can in no
circumstances replace an identity document and should.. be supported by the usual Military
or civilian identity papers. Any person insisting that the Partbilyet is his only
identity document would automatically create suspicion and according to the Party in-
structions should be arrested and handed over to the Security authorities.
6. The MB personnel serving with the Army (Counter Espionage Branch) continue to be con-
trolled by the MGB and very often, after varying periods,, of service with the Army Counter
Espionage, return to the civilian branch of the,I B.
7. Postings of Counter Espionage officers from the Army to the MGB or from one Army unit to
another are secret. Even the Party Records instructor does not know where an MGB officer
is posted, he is only told to which Party organization he should send the Party documents
and can perhaps tguess approximately where the MGB man might be. The posting of an.MGB
officer returning from the Army Group to the MGB in the USSR is published 25X1
very br it Orders, eg "Capt after completing his service with the Soviet 25X1
Forces is :Leaving the, unit for continuation of his duties in the interior
districts o the SSR'". (DI, Prokhozjdya ya ^azlnyeyshey Sl.uz'hby Vo Vnutryennikh
Okrugakh SSSR). In the Movement Order of?y une place of destination is shown and never
a unit or organization.
8. There is a clear tendency in the Party instructions not to discuss or explain the
political and strategical position of the Soviet troops in Europe on any but the higher
levels of the Armed Forces personnel.
9. the Party realizes the positive and negative sides of the situation of the 25X1
would be in the event of war ard considers it undesirable to discuss or comment on these
problems on the lower levels.
S
oviet troops in Central 'and South-Eastern Europe as they exist at present and as they
10. The higher army commanders from Division upwards are informed on strategical and political
problems in the special lectures and conferences organized in the Army Grou FQ at
Potsdam. There it is emphasized the necessity of strong armed forces
and
25X1
Poland which are the guaranty for the carrying into effect of the Soviet policy in
Central and Eastern Europe. It would be impossible to realize the policy of the Moscow
Government in Europe without a strong Armyy Group supported by an Army Group
25X1
in Poland.. The latter secured also the Soviet lines of communication between the USSR
and 25X1
11. For the masses of officers and men inside the USSR and abroad, the explanation of the
presence of Soviet forces in Europe is short and very simple: "Soviet Armed forces are
in Europe not as the conquerors of the new territories, their task is to secure our
victory and the freedom of the other nations". (Nye 7avoyevanye Novikh Tyerritorii A
Die. Obyespyschyenya Nashey Pobyedi I Svobodi Drugikh Narodov).
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3ECLET/i;ECTJRITY III'FORWTION 25X1
12. The policy of the VKP (b) and the Moscow Government Towards so-called "liberated
countries" of Europe is it a great measure the continuation of the policy towards the non-
Russian national groups inside the USSR.
13. In the Soviet Union the official Party policy is to develop and cultivate a feeling of
unity and friendship among all nations of the Soviet Union, but the first place and the
leading role must be reserved for the Russian nation. The .'+.;.us;>ian nation is the "elder
brother" in. the family of Soviet nations.
14. The last war showed clearly that the Russian Stato (Ftusskoye Gosudarstvo) was strong
enough not only to endure the German invasion but also to win the war and extend the
frontiers of USSR and her influence on such a large scale as never happened before in
Russian history.
15. The Russian nation is the main factor of consolidation of the other nations of the Soviet
Union.
16. As long as the various nations of the Soviet Union we?ea haxiered together into one nation
("Skolachivanye SSSR V Odin Narod") the Kremlin proclaimed the equality of all nations and
could not give the Russians pride of place. On the contrary they let the Russians be
convinced that they were treated worse and suffered raaore than any other nation in the
Soviet Uhion.
17. World War II, 1941-1945, was the. last act of the harr,.~ering together of Soviet nations
and the Russians were officially proclaimed the leading nation of the Union. There
is at present a strong tendency to extend the meanin of the word "Russians" to include
Ukrainians and Byelorussians. This tendency does nrk refer to the Western Ukrainians
whom "the Polish masters (Polskiye Fany) converted to their religion".
18. The Moscow policy towards the S.Ttellite States is very similar to the interior Soviet
national politics. During the first years after the collapse of Germany when the
period of "liberation" and lootir: ended, the Soviet Government e;lloweed the satellite
nations to cultivate their own traditions and national way of life. Then the Russians
began gradually to achieve their c refully isrepared plans itaich could be roughly de-
scribed as complete liquidation of all anti-colrLm nist and anti-Russian groups, im-
poverishment of the population c owrn to a level with the Russian .,tanda.rd, sovietisation
of administration and economic life and finally rusnification of th- masses.
19. In the fulf:Lllarent of its policy the Soviet Govern ent net with a in uibor of serious very
natural obstsaeles, such a;> higher st_-.rid.ards of civilizra.tioii in Pol..arici, Cz; chosl..ovakia
and 1-1ungary, national traditions r~nd a hostile attitude t:ow;.'r da Russians c cased either
by very had experiences during the last three centuries c>r b the swage b haviour of
the Soviet troops during the "li.berati on" period.
20. One of the most difficult problems was that the Soviet Gravrr?rrerient and the Party distrusted
and still distrust foreign cornrr?unists. The Politburo suspects every foreign Corniunist
of being a camouflaged nationalist. The most distrusted. Cords iun.i_sts ;re Poles becai se of
their past and "in spite of their Part, ~ training and corium.st d + f? y ine they are
nationalists and consider us (Russiansy) ats savages and potentia''. r. ?xna_ ,_; of Po'.:_nd".
I even suspect PVMars))ai Rokossovskiy of Polish nationalism, for Le was not born and
brought up in Russia .
21. The Kremlin realized very well that Russians were not popular in the s atell1te countries.
The plan was made to popularize Russian trad; ti.ons and culture in order to raise more inter-
est for Russia. and her life among the populations of the satellite countries. Instructions
given by the Politburo were either misunderstood or the Pol.i. tburo, considering the increase
of friendly feeling to USSR too slow, lost its temper and ordered. the speeding up of the
process of development of Russian propaganda in the "people's democracies". As a result
of this the brutal russification and glorification of Russia (Vospyevanye Russia )
started all around Central and Eastern Evxope.
22. This glorification of ever ;'thing Russian, and t - ' n.z, is :foolish arid definitely
wrong for Soviet interests in those countries. glorification of +nsai.an
culture among the people whose culture is higher t an Russian hear is their nation 3'. i:a.ry ? A:
and results in an increase of anti-Rus Tian and of nationalist feo]ir-eg.
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23. There is no danger of incorporation of satellite countries into the Soviet Union. The
most important for the USSR are Poland and Czechoslovakia. These two countries are not
yet prepared for incorporation. In spite of the fact that Czechs are morally weaker than
Poles there would be lots of trouble in both countries even if the Soviet Government
were able to prepare "a spontaneous decision" of their parliaments. But the main reasons
for postponement of incorporation of Poland and Czechoslovakia are that the fact of in-
corporation of any European or Asiatic country into the Soviet Union would disclose
Soviet methods of extension of the frontiers of the USSR and would frighten other nations
including their own Communists and fellow-travellers. This is against the policy of the
Party and the Government.
24. In case of w6-T and Soviet victory over the Western coalition the political situation would
change completely and then Poland and Czechoslovakia would be the first countries ready
to be incorporated into the Soviet Union.
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