ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 3, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/12/08: CIA-RDP82-00047R000~80009-1
CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY , t?( (IrbWim,
SUBJECT 'Organization and Operatiane of Ukrainian
Nationalist Organization
PLACE
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ACQUIRED C
D A T E O ' ,INFORMATION
TNI( O OOYMINT COMTAINO Itl FOMMATIIN ATTINTINI TNT NATIONAL IIF{N It
OF TNT YNITII 1TATA,T,, OI THIN TNT MOANINO MI TITLE III IIITIINI 711
ANN 7101.01 TNT ODoll "'AI AMIN010. ITS TAA N IM I IIION ON AINM?
CATION II I. TI IONTINTI TO OA 1101IIT IT AN YNAY TN 1Al11N- PINION I1.
NO. OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED' INFORMATION
'twee Cr tzation of Ukrainian Nsltiona7.ists (CUN) under the leadership of
Col Andrew M.lnrt is the coatlz cation of an orl , 1Ition of the am =m
id
founded in the ninetern-twenties by Col wagew amovaletI, who was k
in, the Netherlands in 1933. It advocates the establi 1 .ut of a Ukrainian
national itltate through a national revelation. Segizains in P.brasry 29400
there has existed a deep split in the OUN b een that section which oon-
tia aed to accept the leadership of Col Kelnyk and an otf.shoat organisation
Banters as leads' of what is s= tisses 'dense. to
Ste
an
uo ind
hi
h
,
p
rs
c
w
l as the Orpnisation of Ukrainian Nationalists4evolntiosoa -1ss (OW-1) , This
split was the result of personal and tactical differences. Col 97m1s
8ciboruky, (fain) 8s k-" b,bivsky", and Yaroslav Raranovsklrj but not or inallY
-401 KWIM% on the one side were opposed to Stepan Randers and Yaroslav 8tetsko
(or ate* on the other side. Moreover, Bandera favored a Ukrainian national
revolution spinet the Bolsheviks in l9 whereas Xel advocated a policy
of waiting until the inevitable collision between Bast and West would take
place. In spite of many attempts on the part of OUN, no conciliation with
OUN-R has come about since that time.
2. The CUN has not maintained. any friendly contacts with the Gardens at any
time. his claim is contradicted by assertions of seep critics of 03N,
according to which it enjoyed the support of the Gestapo, whereas the
Benders faction orig pally well liked by the German Army and particu-
larly the Abwe.br, The Germans first expressed interest in disc>assing the
war situation wi' Melnyk in 1939. In view of their refusal to discuss
Ukrainian aspirations fore rational indaependence, Col Mel k tus?ned a cold
shoulder to their overtures. On 5 A%W 410 4' , Melnyk reached an agrenent
with Taras Bulbs, which led to the joint support of the Ukrainian Insmrgent
Army.(UPA), which became the military arm of the Ukrainian independence
movement and directed its activities Winst the Germans and the Soviets
alike. Until the present time, the UPA has contimued its military resis-
tance to the Soviets, and the political underground movement has supplasaented
such efforts; through less overt non-military activities.
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3. In January and. February 1942, a number of Ukrainian underground leaders
including Rohach, Mihailo, Teliha, and many others were arrested and
executed by the German occupation forces. In November 1942, new arrests
of underground leaders took place, and those arrested were moved to the
concentration cauap in Sachsenhausen-and a separate division of the Sachsen-
hausen camp at Brsetz on the Oder. By January 1944, all major Ukrainian
underground leaders were apprehended by the Germans. In a last effort
to sponsor a united anti-Soviet drive, the Germans released these Ukrainian
underground leaders in October 1944. Cal Melnyk moved to Berlin, vkwm
German officials approached him to request his collaboration against the
Soviets. Ian official 25X1
statement by the German Foreign Minister disclaiming any territorial interest
in the Ukraine. The German governnent was still unwilling to tie its bands
in this respect, and Melayk therefore left Berlin and moved to lad Kissai,ngen
(Bavaria), accompanied by Dmytro Andreyevsky and Osyp loyduyk.
Bad Kissi;nngen was liberated by US troops on 7 Apr 43 One of Col
Me a lmAs early actions after liberation was to send a cable through EI 25X1
25X1 US Army, to US Secretary of State, Bdward R Stettinius. This
cable was sent on 2 May 45 and expressed satisfaction at the separa
representation of the Ukraine at the Ban Francisco Connference$ but protested
at Msnuilsky's selection as the Uk?aintian representative. In spite of tine
descending Iron Curtain, OUN-Melnyk has maintained steady contact with the
Ukrainian homeland, both with the area which vas a part of Poland until 1939
and with the Soviet Ukraine. A "referent" (staff- spercialist) for dioarssti,o
questions whose identity may Cal Melayc is watbormnsd to divulge to
outsider is in rbarge of nsstainting contact with the Ukraine tbraagh mail,
couriers, and certain additional ehsncele vb1ch I cannot' ducribe. Even
those trusted members of OUN who are in a position to aaamn+nnicate with
friends and relatives in the Ukraine have to clear such matters with the
competent specialist. Courier service cannot be maintained in wintert **
because of the increased dangers of detection of the couriers by Soviet
and Satellite security forces.
5. The latest commamlcations from the heart of the Ukraine to reach OUST II 25X1
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of 'w'hich copies were dated 25 Jul 52 and 13 Sep-
52, respe fly. In Taws reams of conditions in the Soviet Ukraine,
the writers claim that the population not only viewed sympathetically the
UPA and political underground movement but extenndrd help to these anti-Soviet
nationalist organizations within the narrow limits of possibility. It has
to be admitted, however, that those organizations can no longer claim to
control any part of the Ukraine as they did for a time in the nineteen-
Biers.
In addition to Col Melnyk and the specialist for domestic questions, the
following leaders of OUN deserve mention. Dmytro Andreyevsky is the
specialist for foreign policy; Gen My3aolaa Kapustyanski is specialist for
military matters; and Osyp Boyduzgk is specialist for internal political
questions (other than contact with the homeland). The OUN leaders are
also represented in the Ukrainian government-in-exile, which functions
through the Vikonniy Organ (Executive Organ) and the Ukrainian National
Rada in Western Germany. Dmytro Andreyevsky is Vice Premier and Deputy
Foreign Minister, and Gen Mykola Kapustyanski, Minister of War in the
Executive Organ; Osyp Boydunyk is Vice President of the Ukrainian National
dada.
7. All major Ukrainian exile groups except the Union of Hetmanites-Statists
(SED), a monarchist group, were represented in the Ukrainian National Rids
from its inception in June 1948 until the OUN-R (Banderists) withdrew in
the spring of 1950. In view of the fact that the government-in-exile has
no actual executive but only moral powers which stem largely from its
claim to represent all major political groups, no organization has been
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permitted to dominate the Executive Organ or the Rada. The principle of
consolidation on the basis of parity has characterized the two organs of
the government-in-exile at all times. The Retmanites have consistently
opposed its republican form, and the OU&-R has objected to its allegedly
inadequate emphasis upon revolutionary methods in achieving the independence
of the Ukraine. (Pnu) Hryhorenko, Minister of Interior in the Executive
Organ and a member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party, has
concerned himself with the problem of bringing the SIW and OUN-R groups
into-the exile government. I doubt whether sufficient concessions, such
as awarding key posts to members of these organizations, will be offered
to these groups and therefore do not believe that they can be induced to
join a united Ukrainian front.
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