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Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 27, 2003
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Publication Date: 
January 3, 1953
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Approved For Release 2003/12/08: CIA-RDP82-00047R000~80009-1 CLASSIFICATION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT COUNTRY , t?( (IrbWim, SUBJECT 'Organization and Operatiane of Ukrainian Nationalist Organization PLACE ACQUIRED 25X1A 25X1 DATE ACQUIRED C D A T E O ' ,INFORMATION TNI( O OOYMINT COMTAINO Itl FOMMATIIN ATTINTINI TNT NATIONAL IIF{N It OF TNT YNITII 1TATA,T,, OI THIN TNT MOANINO MI TITLE III IIITIINI 711 ANN 7101.01 TNT ODoll "'AI AMIN010. ITS TAA N IM I IIION ON AINM? CATION II I. TI IONTINTI TO OA 1101IIT IT AN YNAY TN 1Al11N- PINION I1. NO. OF PAGES 3 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. THIS IS UNEVALUATED' INFORMATION 'twee Cr tzation of Ukrainian Nsltiona7.ists (CUN) under the leadership of Col Andrew M.lnrt is the coatlz cation of an orl , 1Ition of the am =m id founded in the ninetern-twenties by Col wagew amovaletI, who was k in, the Netherlands in 1933. It advocates the establi 1 .ut of a Ukrainian national itltate through a national revelation. Segizains in P.brasry 29400 there has existed a deep split in the OUN b een that section which oon- tia aed to accept the leadership of Col Kelnyk and an otf.shoat organisation Banters as leads' of what is s= tisses 'dense. to Ste an uo ind hi h , p rs c w l as the Orpnisation of Ukrainian Nationalists4evolntiosoa -1ss (OW-1) , This split was the result of personal and tactical differences. Col 97m1s 8ciboruky, (fain) 8s k-" b,bivsky", and Yaroslav Raranovsklrj but not or inallY -401 KWIM% on the one side were opposed to Stepan Randers and Yaroslav 8tetsko (or ate* on the other side. Moreover, Bandera favored a Ukrainian national revolution spinet the Bolsheviks in l9 whereas Xel advocated a policy of waiting until the inevitable collision between Bast and West would take place. In spite of many attempts on the part of OUN, no conciliation with OUN-R has come about since that time. 2. The CUN has not maintained. any friendly contacts with the Gardens at any time. his claim is contradicted by assertions of seep critics of 03N, according to which it enjoyed the support of the Gestapo, whereas the Benders faction orig pally well liked by the German Army and particu- larly the, The Germans first expressed interest in disc>assing the war situation wi' Melnyk in 1939. In view of their refusal to discuss Ukrainian aspirations fore rational indaependence, Col Mel k tus?ned a cold shoulder to their overtures. On 5 A%W 410 4' , Melnyk reached an agrenent with Taras Bulbs, which led to the joint support of the Ukrainian Insmrgent Army.(UPA), which became the military arm of the Ukrainian independence movement and directed its activities Winst the Germans and the Soviets alike. Until the present time, the UPA has contimued its military resis- tance to the Soviets, and the political underground movement has supplasaented such efforts; through less overt non-military activities. -- DISTRIBUTION f7aJ~l ~ ;ZtJ~J 11.5r4j I-W& 9A& Approved For Release 2003/12/08 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1 Approved For Release 2003/12/08 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1 SECRE 25X1A 25X1 3. In January and. February 1942, a number of Ukrainian underground leaders including Rohach, Mihailo, Teliha, and many others were arrested and executed by the German occupation forces. In November 1942, new arrests of underground leaders took place, and those arrested were moved to the concentration cauap in Sachsenhausen-and a separate division of the Sachsen- hausen camp at Brsetz on the Oder. By January 1944, all major Ukrainian underground leaders were apprehended by the Germans. In a last effort to sponsor a united anti-Soviet drive, the Germans released these Ukrainian underground leaders in October 1944. Cal Melnyk moved to Berlin, vkwm German officials approached him to request his collaboration against the Soviets. Ian official 25X1 statement by the German Foreign Minister disclaiming any territorial interest in the Ukraine. The German governnent was still unwilling to tie its bands in this respect, and Melayk therefore left Berlin and moved to lad Kissai,ngen (Bavaria), accompanied by Dmytro Andreyevsky and Osyp loyduyk. Bad Kissi;nngen was liberated by US troops on 7 Apr 43 One of Col Me a lmAs early actions after liberation was to send a cable through EI 25X1 25X1 US Army, to US Secretary of State, Bdward R Stettinius. This cable was sent on 2 May 45 and expressed satisfaction at the separa representation of the Ukraine at the Ban Francisco Connference$ but protested at Msnuilsky's selection as the Uk?aintian representative. In spite of tine descending Iron Curtain, OUN-Melnyk has maintained steady contact with the Ukrainian homeland, both with the area which vas a part of Poland until 1939 and with the Soviet Ukraine. A "referent" (staff- spercialist) for dioarssti,o questions whose identity may Cal Melayc is watbormnsd to divulge to outsider is in rbarge of nsstainting contact with the Ukraine tbraagh mail, couriers, and certain additional ehsncele vb1ch I cannot' ducribe. Even those trusted members of OUN who are in a position to aaamn+nnicate with friends and relatives in the Ukraine have to clear such matters with the competent specialist. Courier service cannot be maintained in wintert ** because of the increased dangers of detection of the couriers by Soviet and Satellite security forces. 5. The latest commamlcations from the heart of the Ukraine to reach OUST II 25X1 25X1 of 'w'hich copies were dated 25 Jul 52 and 13 Sep- 52, respe fly. In Taws reams of conditions in the Soviet Ukraine, the writers claim that the population not only viewed sympathetically the UPA and political underground movement but extenndrd help to these anti-Soviet nationalist organizations within the narrow limits of possibility. It has to be admitted, however, that those organizations can no longer claim to control any part of the Ukraine as they did for a time in the nineteen- Biers. In addition to Col Melnyk and the specialist for domestic questions, the following leaders of OUN deserve mention. Dmytro Andreyevsky is the specialist for foreign policy; Gen My3aolaa Kapustyanski is specialist for military matters; and Osyp Boyduzgk is specialist for internal political questions (other than contact with the homeland). The OUN leaders are also represented in the Ukrainian government-in-exile, which functions through the Vikonniy Organ (Executive Organ) and the Ukrainian National Rada in Western Germany. Dmytro Andreyevsky is Vice Premier and Deputy Foreign Minister, and Gen Mykola Kapustyanski, Minister of War in the Executive Organ; Osyp Boydunyk is Vice President of the Ukrainian National dada. 7. All major Ukrainian exile groups except the Union of Hetmanites-Statists (SED), a monarchist group, were represented in the Ukrainian National Rids from its inception in June 1948 until the OUN-R (Banderists) withdrew in the spring of 1950. In view of the fact that the government-in-exile has no actual executive but only moral powers which stem largely from its claim to represent all major political groups, no organization has been SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/08 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1 Approved For Release 2003/12/08 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1 SECRET/I -3- permitted to dominate the Executive Organ or the Rada. The principle of consolidation on the basis of parity has characterized the two organs of the government-in-exile at all times. The Retmanites have consistently opposed its republican form, and the OU&-R has objected to its allegedly inadequate emphasis upon revolutionary methods in achieving the independence of the Ukraine. (Pnu) Hryhorenko, Minister of Interior in the Executive Organ and a member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party, has concerned himself with the problem of bringing the SIW and OUN-R groups into-the exile government. I doubt whether sufficient concessions, such as awarding key posts to members of these organizations, will be offered to these groups and therefore do not believe that they can be induced to join a united Ukrainian front. SECRE4 25X1A 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/08 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000200350009-1