MILITARY CONSTRUCTION: ITS ORGANIZATION, PLANNING, FINANCING, AND INSPECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000400190004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 12, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SUBJECT Military Construction Its Organization, Planning,
Financing, and Inspection
PLACE
ACQUIRE
DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
DATE OF INFO
THIN DOCUMENT CONTAINS IHFCIAM AAAAA AFFECTING THE NATIONAL 0 KKKKKK
Of THE UNITED AAAAAAA WITHIN THI MEANING OF TITLE IN, SECTIONS 710
AND 794, Of THE U.S. CODE, AS ANCHDED. ITS AAAAAA ISSION OR REVS.
LOTION Of ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT ST AN UNAUTNONISIO NNNNNN IS
PROHIBITED NY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION Of THIS PORN IS PRONIBITIO.
DATE DISTR. Mar 1954
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NO. OF PAGES 6
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATir'm
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SOURCE
1. Every July the headquarters of each military district (okrug) in the USSR
sent to the Ministry of Defense in Moscow a detailed reqUest (zayavka)
for new construction and necessary repairs for the next calenflar year.
The "zayavka" was sent in over the signature of the commanding general ,)f
the district. It was taken to Moscow by a district representative from
the EEO (KVartirno Exploatationi Otdel - Building Utilization Department),
who remained in the capital a few days to explain it to the proper author-
ities. The "zayavka" included a detailed list called the "titulni spisok."
Each item referred to in the list was called a "titul" or "obyekt." Each
job, no matter how small - the construction of a latrine or the repair of
a floor in a specific building, was given a number and a description.
Even in a military district which was not very large, as that of Central
Asia, over one thousand numbers we. used. A typical number would be
"134/15" "134" was the number assigned a "gorodok," (military territory
within a city; there could be many "gorodki" within a city). There were
approximately 200 "gorodki" in the Central Asian military district; "19"
was the number of a building in "gorodok 134." There were a key and map,
identifying the "gorodki" and buildings, in the district headquarters
and in the Defense Ministry in Moscow. There were three additional
columns on each page of the detailed list which provided the following
information (a) cubic dimension or area of object; (b) cost per one
cubic meter or one square meter (costs varied depending upon whether the
building would be a dwelling, warehouse, or something else; there were
six or seven categories); and (c) approximate total cost based upon the
AA CODE;
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION
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dimensions of the cbject. There were five general categories of military
construction traiteistv*
(a3 aviation (aviationiye),
(b barracks (kazarminoye),
(c) storage (skladskcye)
(1) district (okruzhnoye - main rear storage
facilities directly under military district
headquarters)
(2) military unit (voiskovoye),
(d) dwellings (zhilishnoye), and
(e) miscellaneous (raznoye).
2. Information for the military district "zayavka" was obtained as follows. Requests
came in to KEO from the various military units. Airfields sent in their re-
quests to the chief of the military diatrict air force, who was subordinate to
the commanding general. of the district. Each military district which was not
unusually large or small had one "avio brigade." The Tb O and E of this type of
unit was frequently changed. The operations section (operativni otdel - equiva-
lent to the US Army's (-3 Section) made plans for general storage facilities and
forwarded them to O. The Soviet Army General Staff in Moscow forwarded each
spring reorganization plans shoving new T/O's for various types ofrunits. Such
reorganizations affected construction planning. At times, the Defense Ministry
issued orders to construct certain installations.
3. The detailed list dealing with planned military construction in the district was
composed by the KBO of the military district headquarters. There were about 65
officers and civilian technicians in the KCO in Tashkent. In about two months
an approved plan (utverzhdeni plan) arrived from Moscow, drawn up by KEU (Evar-.
tirno Exploatationoye Uprevienie - Building Utilization Administration) of the
Defense Ministry. The approved plan eliminated so m Of the original items de-
creased the scope of others, and retained the -retaah00.a q.4A.htly., at a
later date, a representative of KEU visited district " 04.* for pull:Doses
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of consultation.
4. Each military district headquarters had a Military Cst'UctonAdministration
of the District (VSU - Voenno Straitelnoye'llpraVlenie,,VheVSU era
i
eluded a building or planning bureau (KB - Konistruktorsk Ur-44U or Proyektnoye
Bureau). The KEO would first ask VSU to make "proyeitim '(dOnstruction blue-
in) and -aeeei" (detailed cost estimates) for certain construction which
it was known Mescow would. approve. The KB drew up the blueprints and cost
estimates, for which (EO paidaVSUt?Th4Wals004idatheilplanningeorkOferiall
resatin1na:ritamsprior46o leIaliaaryeeTheldeadkinenwas not always met.
5. rrior to 1938, the VSU worked on both the "zayavka" and the 'proyekti." In the
tsytimarneea1938, howeeer, the KEO was created and the VSU became independent of
the commanding general of the distriot. This reorganization was effective
throughout the USSR- The VSO's were placed. under the authority of the Chief
Military Construction Administration of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
(GLAVVOENSTROI - Glavnaya Voenno Straatelnoye Upravleniya pri Sovnarkome SSSR).
Thereafter, the, commandirg generals of the district could not interfere with
or change military construction. projects. VSU personnel remained on active
military duty, but as their personnel files were kept separately they were not
investigated during the army purges of the late 1930's.
6. Toward the end of each year KEU and GLAVVOENSTROI executed a detailed contract
(dogovor) in which the latter undertook to carry out the construction work
requested. The contract had to be approved by the Soviet Council of Ministers.
A similar contract, reflecting local activity, was signed by KEO and VSU. Once
the basic contract in Moscow was Approved, the council of Ministers gave the
total sum needed to pay for construction activity in all the military districts
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to the Kommunalei Bank SSSR 5ereinafter referred to as the Bang. The only
purpose for the Bank's existence since 1938 was to finance both military and
civilian construction. The necessary funds were sent by the Bank in Moscow to
its branch in the city where the military district headquarters was located.
This branch bank further distributed funds to its branch banks located in cities
of the military district where construction was scheduled.
7. The following illustrates how financing and materials were obtained. The
Council of Ministers authorized the Defense Ministry to spend one and one-half
billion rubles for construction during the next calendar year. The sum was
divided, by quarters, with the second and third quarters of the year seeing the
heaviest expenditure because they were the best time for construction. The
Council of Ministers told the Bank that the Defense Ministry could spend this
sum and also informed GOSPLAN (which controlled building materials) that Defense
could purchase materials worth this sum. In order to prevent the Defense
Ministry from utilizing the funds for other than the designated purposes, OU
turned over its rights to obtain all building materials (pravo realizatii
straitelnikh materialov) to GLAVVOENSTROI. GLAVVOENSTROI distributed these
rights to each VSU of a military district, in accordance with the sum authorized
for construction in each district. The materials were obtained from the trading
trusts which sold them. VSU could refuse in its contract to build small, iso-
lated, impractical "obyekti." The Central Asian military district usually re-
ceived from 25 to 35 million rubles per year for construction. Of this sum, VSU
might have refused work costing one-half million rubles. In such case, KEO
would have taken this sum and the right to buy major building materials (such
as wood) and would have permitted the military units which needed the new
structures to do the building. VSU would have sold minor building materials to
O. Therefore, as the above indicates, the Defense Ministry was allowed to
spend the sum allocated to it for construction only in the sense of authorizing
GLAVVOENSTROI to purchase building materials. About two-thirds of the total
sum was for materials, about one-third was to pay technical personnel and labor.
8. VSU had "osnovnoi kapital" (permanent capital) which consisted of permanent
facilities and equipment owned by the organization, email as buildings, machines,
transport vehicles, tools, barracks, and clothing and bedding for workers. If
VSU needed to construct a new building for its own use tr*Ipuidhase cons-3ruc-
tion machinery it submitted a "zayavka" to GLAVVOENStROT 10JOaleo had "oborotni
kapital" (circulating capital), which consisted of 10% of the year's construction
funds advanced by the Bank on 1 January so that VSU could begin work at once on
new projects. Under VSU, Tashkent, as of 1939, there were eight military con-
struction area offices (voenno straitelaii udhastki) located in Tashkent,
Fergana, Frunze, Samarkend, Termez Marv, Kushka, and Stalinabad. The number
and location of the area offices depended upon where construction was scheduled
to take place. However, the Tashkent,Termez and Stalinabad offices were
permanent. Under each area office there were several military construction sub-
offices (voenno straieelnii ploshadki). These consisted of one engineer, two
technicians, a bookkeeper and had office space and laborers4 VSU headqparters,
except for the KB, was on a state budget authorized by the Council of Ministers.
This was over and above funds approved for construction. The KB and the area
offices were supported by a portion of the construction funds. For each division
area there was a EECh (Kvartirno Explotationaya Chest - Building Utilization
Section), which came under the KEO of the district.
9. Once every. two weeks, a commission for acceptunce of work (komisia po priomki
raboti) visited construction sites. A representative of KBO, of VSU, and the
engineer of the area office made up the commirsion, A report indicating
progress in the construction job was signed by the IO representative. The
bank, after checRing its cost estimates (smeti), paid the area office a sum
to cover materials and. labor. The payment was based on the commission's report.
Occasionallyea representative of the Bank would check on construction. These
inspections were thorough and strict. The contractieetween MO and VSU in-
cluded a time limit for construction projects and provide r fines if the
work was not finished in time. However, the time limit war4re1y met and
fines usually were not levied.
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10. From 1932 to the present, certain frontier military districts, such as those
of" Byelorussia., Kiev, TranScacasuS, and Far East, had a different and
separate VSU, which came under the authority of the chief of engineers of the
military district. These VSU's were used only to build defense fortifications
similar to the Siegfried line
11. In regard to the contractual status of civilian workers on military construction
projects, a form contract good for a certain period was used for each worker.
The rates paid were those of the labor union (profsoyuz). In theory, the union
had agreed on these rates with the Government. All workers of one certain type
were paid the same. The worker was paid only for the amount of work he did. In
practise, workers in the Central Asian military district were paid two or three
times the union rates. If this had not been done, a sufficient number of workers
could not have been found. Therefore, at the end of a construction job, one had
almost always spent more than the planned figure. Engineers also had contracts,
but not limited by any specific time period. The engineers received a certain
monthly salary and no more. The area office of VSU paid the workers in cash
obtained from construction funds. No one in the USSR was paid by check and in-
dividuals practically never had bank accounts.
12. Military personnel were not engaged to a great extent in actual construction
work. The chief (nachalnik) of the VSU was always a military man and an engineer.
The chief of an area office was alas? always a military man, but rarely an
engineer. However, he was often a technician, such as an officer of the army
engineers. The area office chief had a chief engineer under him who was a
civilian. The chief of a suboffioe was a civilian and could be an engineer or
technician. All constructioa workers were civilians, as were most of the en-
gineers and technicians.
13. NOD security precautions greatly complicated work on military construction
and resulted in much lost time. Each worker had to be checked. Once cleared
he often could still work only in a nonsensitiva area such as building
barracks in a city, but not be admitteu to a "gorOdolk?4 fhe,should be
transferred to work in another area he would have v,14in. There
was also much time lost in checking passes of workers as tiiy entered Or left
building areas.
i. When an item (obyekt) was completed, the transfer (zdaaha obYekta) or aceept;ftrice
(priomka obyekta) occurred. A new, special commission was formed to inspect and
accept the completed construction, which could be, for example, a military
school building. The commission was composed of a representative of IO, of
the military unit accepting the structure, of the area office or even of the
VSU, and perhaps of the city engineer, if the building happened to be in a city.
When the inspection was satisfactorily completed, the Bank paid the last of the
construction funds to the area office and the new building became the property
of the military district. up to that time it had belonged to the area office.
15. In regard to limits of financing, it was easier to obtain additional funds and
materials, if necessary, for military construction than for civilian. As in-
dicated above, KEU and GLAVVOENSTROI were created in 1938 to control military
construction and spending. If more money than planned had *been spent on a
project, then other projects were postponed or cancelled. Planning (proyekt-
irovaniya) was poor and often resulted in underestimation. Although the plan-
ning was done by VSU it was considered KEO's, as KEO had to approve the plans.
16. I would like to emphasize that not the amount of money granted for construction
but the quantity of materials was Important. Moscow, ie GOSPLAN, GLAVVOENSTROI,
and other governmental bodies, allotted only a part of the materials needed to
fulfill the plan for construction One hundred percent of the needed materials was provided
only for certain defense activities such as iaaaa iactories, aircraft paazits,
and building of fortifications. For general military construction about 701,
was granted. This varied of course, with a higher percentage granted for
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barracks than for living quarters. The percentage was always small for
electric materials and nonferrous metals. The Soviet Government granted
only 50% of needed materials for schools and only 33 1/3% for living gee-eters.
Therefore, it must be remembered in analyzing Soviet planning that the plans
can never be fulfilled on time. Moscow naturally knows this very well but
adopts the attitude that the builders must nevertheless meet the goals set.
This is done to force people to work 'larder. In planning for living quarters,
electric utilities were included, but the authorities forced the people to
live without electricity by not providing the necessary materials. Then the
engineers were blamed for it all. This policy was followed in order to mis-
lead the people in the USSR and abroad. At times, because it cost more to build
a house or apartment over a period of three years rather than six months, speed-
up campaigns were initiated in order that a few units could be completed quickly.
17. Incidentally, to continue on the subject of misleading figures used by the USSR
to impress the world, it is my opinion that the population at present in the
USSR is approximately between 160 and 170 million people, rather than the re-
ported 200 or more million. In 1941 it was 190 million. The losses were very
great during World War II: between 20 and 25 million fatal war casualties and
10 to 15 million related deaths. I would say that the population in
have been down to about 150 million. There was also a period of starvation
during the years of 1946 and 1947. The annual birth rate is approximately one
and one-half to two million.
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18. In regard to whether the price of materials was lower for military construction
works than for civilian works, it was the same. It would have been too com-
plicated to have different prices and, moreover, the cost of transportation was
a major factor. For example, in 1939 a railroad carload of wood (25 cubic meters)
cost 500 rubles, or 20 rubles per cubic meter. The cost of transporting the wood
from Buriat NOngolia to Tashkent was 1800 rubles per car. However, such items as
food were obtained by the military at cost. Also, in 1939 gasoline for military
use cost seven kopecks per kilogram. For civilian use the price was one ruole
per kilogram, CT over 13 times the military price. Therefore, transportatien by
means of gasoline-burning military vehicles was much cheaper than civilian. As
a result, local building materials (in Central Asia these were stone, sand, and
gravel) were cheaper for the military to obtain. The same price for the material,
bricks for example, was paid by the military as by the civilian authorities, but
the cost of local transportation was much lower for the military. This factor
was taken into account in making up the cost estimates.
19. Building materials and other items which could be used braeither military or
civilian authorities were not designated ineiny particular way as to whether
they would be used by the military or by civilians. However, items specially
manufactured for military purposes, such as prime movers, were marked in a
special way. I do not recall exactly the markings, but I believe they consisted
of a red star, the number of the series, the number of the item, and the year of
manufacture.
20. In regard to construction of plants, the military had no direct, active partici-
pation in this field, even if the factory was to produce military equipment.
The appropriate civilian ministry handled the matter. However, if the matter
concerned military production, such as tanks, a meeting of the 'Small" (Maloi)
Council of Ministers would initially be held, attended by the Premier, Defense
Minister, and the head of the industrial ministry concerned with production.
This meeting was also attended. by a representative Of the Soviet Army's General
Staff and of the appropriate arm or branch. If it was decided to produce tanks
in --a tractor factory, or to build a new tank factory, the military representative
of the armored forces would sit in on the planning. Once the plant was in pro-
duction, an office of the military representative (voenni predstavitel) would be
established there.
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21, I have no information on long range planning for construction of plants in
Turkestan. The emphasis on industry and planning changed in that area afte'
World War II. NOre industry was developed there and 'hydroelectric power sta-
tions were built. A factor in this trend is the fact that thi6 region is safer
from air attack than other areas in the USSR. A railroad was built specifically
for the purpose of transporting coal from Xaraganda. The route follows the
western shore of Lake Balkhash and joins the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad near
the bridge over the Chu river. The road was finished in approximately 1952 or 1953.
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