COST ELEMENTS IN PRODUCING ELECTRIC POWER, NINGPO

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2013
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 12, 1954
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9.pdf268.06 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9 50X1 COUNTRY SUBJECT PLACE ACQUIRED DATE 50X1 ACQUIRED BY SOURCE UTE OF INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION CONFIDEETIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT INFORMATION REPORT China Cost Elements in Producing Electric Power, NIngpo TNII DOCUMENT CONTAINS iwrosm AAAAA srrscrims TAO NATIONAL osssort Al THE UNITED AAAAAAA IITNIN TKO MEANINOOFTITLE IS, SECTIONS 793 AND 714, OF TNI U.S. COOS, Al AMENDED. ITS TNANIMISSION OR REVS. NATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT SY AN UNAUTHORISED AAAAAA II PRONI TTTTT SY LAW. ?NI REPRODUCTION or THIS room is ARON' 0000 O. 50X1 CD NO. DATE DISTR. March 1954 NO. OF PAGES 3 50X1 50X1 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO, THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1-HUM SOURCE le I must point out that even if actual currency figures were available, they would not be of great value for analytio purposes because during the period between the end of World War II and the advent of the Communist, the Chinese dollar was steadily and rapidly depreciating, and it would be nearly impossible to convert amounts in Chinese dollars into any stable ourrenoy at a realistic exchange rate* A payment made 123:January would have to be oonverted at a different rate from one made in June or in December. Further because of the currency depreciation a violent inflation of domestic prices 000urred. Thus payments for local products or for wages also increased steadily. 'What it acmes to is that local currency amounts do not afford a reliable yard stick to measure values. Since the Communists took control in 1949, their currency theoretically has remained fairly stable but signs of an actual depreciation are appearing and suggest that the theoretical stability has been maintained largely by the prohibition of private foreign trades official exohange quotations mean little or nothing if no one is permitted to bay or sell. For this reason I would hesitate to take present costs in Jen Min Piao (Communist currency) converted into US$ at the offioial rate as valid. 2. In general the rates charged consumers by the power and light oompanies in the smaller cities of China, or at least of the lower Yangtze valley, tended to be much the same in one city as in another, These rates were somewhat higher than the rates charged in Shanghai, which was a very much larger market especially for industrial conaumptione The spread between Shanghai rates and the outport rates was gradually deoreasing however* Because of the rapid depreciation of the currency, all of the companies were forced to apply constantly for rate increases, and such applications finally became routine every three months* Some of the companies were in better financial ORR� v CODE: CLASSIFICATION C�171DENTIAL DISTRIBUTION Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9 CONFIDENTIAL ,o2o oondition than others and did not really need the same rate increases but as a matter of policy they joined the weaker companies in the demands of the latter. The stronger companies then made some concessions to their own consumers without making formal rate changes. 3. The costs of the several companies expressed in peroentages of gross revenue for wages, cost of administration, and depreciation did not vary greatly between one small oompany and another* For reason. which are explained below there was a great difference in the cost of fuel and lubricants between. different companies and as fuel and lubricants constituted the major operating cost, what profits or what losses a company made depended almost entirely on what it paid for fuel and lubricants. 441 50X1 50X1 6. The Yung Tao Oompanygs ooneumption was divided roughly 36% domestie consumption, 65% industrial consumption and 10% munioipal consumption (street lighting and municipal buildings). The industrial consumption was a higher 'moment in Ningpo than in most of the other small cities. In the latter, domestic and 50X1 industrial consumption were probably about even. Large industrial oonsumers were granted discounts or were Charged a sliding soil., the Charges decreasing as the consumption rose. 43. All of the companies operated onitael oil. I have heard that the Yung Tao Co's plant has -7 bloat converted to ooal but 50X1 I cannot vouch for the feat. The Tung Yee -6.4s, Feting in a good finanoial condition, made a practice of (a) oontracting with one of the major US oil companies for all of ita fuel and lubricanb requirements for a year (or sometimes for two years) forwards (b) it then bought US$ forward to pay for the fuel and lubricants as delivered, By so doing it fixed the price of its fuel end lubricants in local morrenoy at the exchange rate ourrent at date of contracting. Because of the rapid depreciation of the Chinese dollar during l946-49 this policy paid handsomely. In fact the oompany's profits were in reality exchange profits rather than operating profits. By this method the Yung Tao Co held its fuel and lubrioant costs to approx- imately 70% ef its gross revenue. The weaker companies which did not have the cash to settle exchange forward were forced to buy their fuel and lubricants month to month, The result, in many oases was that the cost of fuel and lubricants exceeded the total gross revenue, because while rate increases were granted, it to�k from three to six months to get the increases approved and put into effect. The revenue,therefore, was being collected on 50X1 basis of costs six months earlier, and the costs meanwhile had mounted with the change in exchange. 7. Administrative costs and labor together required approximately 15% of the gross revenue, 80 Depreciation was at varying rates for buildings and for different �lasses of equipment. Depreoiation rates were set by government authority and were the same for all cipeniee. Depreciation required approximately 5% of the gross revenue. 9, Formal taxes were light, the only formal tax collected was the business tax of 1LQ5 of the vet profits paid by all oommeroial and industrial enterprises. *wooer, in addition to formal CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9 CONFIDENTIAL .5. taxes publio utility oompanies were expected to contribute liberally to local welfare funda. Further while the authorities were supposed to pay for current supplied for municipal use, in fact they never did so. In the case of the Yung Tao 0o, as already noted, munioipal consumption' amounted to about 10% of the total. 10. " During the period 194649 many of the oompanies mit de no profits at all because of their inability to increase their tariffs sufficiently promptly to meet their mounting costs. Other companies, like the Yung Tao 0o, which covered fuel and lubricant costs by forward exohange purchases, made satis- factory profits. Prior to the outbreak of the fighting with Japan zrear the Yung Tao Co had paid dividends of as much as 20%. During the post- war pre-Communi et period Z7946-4g7 the Yung Tao Co as a matter of policy reduced its dividend payments to eight or ten percent and used the remain- ing profits to increase its oapitalization. This was done in anticipation of the possible nationalization of public utilities. A physical valuation of the Yung Tao plant made in 1946 showed assets of between US#3 and #5 million as against a much smaller capitalisation, about U8#8000000 if I remember correctly. In event of nationalisation, the government would probably propose to repay the capital investment to share holders rather than the physical value of the assets and it was, therefore, imperative to bring the capitalisation more nearly in line with the physical values. 11. I have no information on the Tunz Tao Cogs operations 'ince the Communists came into control, but I have heard a report that the company has paid a dividend. This seems extraordinary but may be correct. -end- ,RyJ2CT t mczA CODES 5.'H/735.9 581L )-i1/135.9 1L/C ]O-5/735.9 281_ 76J.42 281L CONFIDENTIAL 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/11/04: CIA-RDP82-00047R000400230002-9