ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 1113, TEMPORARY 'M' BUILDING 26TH STREET AND CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.W.30 MARCH 1954

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 20, 1998
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 30, 1954
Content Type: 
MIN
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9.pdf129.16 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9 TAB Approved For Release 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9 Approved For Rse 1999/09/10 : CIA-RDP82-0QV3R000100140012-9 !OMWC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE Mimates of Special Meeting Held in 30 March 1954 PB.ESEzrT Dro Otto E4 Guthe. CIA. Chairman 25X1 A9a Col. lr illi.am CQ Baird, Air Force Mr. N. S. Bennett, Navy Col 3a3a Bothwell, Army Mr0 Bennett Davis, Navy Mr a John Easton,, JCS Mr. Danner Holmes, Army Mr. Clifford Pruefer, Air Force Mr. &Howard Wi. . p S to 25X1A9a CIA,, Executive Secretary R 'C'-P-6s ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO Mm~ Control 4 48289 EICM-34ev 'eed) 1. The meeting was called to discuss action necessitated by the failure of the working group on the subject project to agree to terms of reference,, and if possible to reach agreement upon a sufficient number of major points to permit the working group to complete terms of reference 2. Discussion revealed that there was far more general, agreement as to the broad objectives of the study than had been thought, and that much of the difficulty had been the strong feeling of the Arley and Navy at working level that the unreality of any estimates of military attrition I m the absence of war gaining, bombing, and use of unconventional weapons would ;wake any conclusions unreal for planning or other practical purposes. It was the feeling of the meeting, however, that if the limitations of the study are fully set forth, and if the conclusions are used with cor-- re pondi,ng care,, the paper should prove worth its cost as a point of de tune for more specific studies. 3. The four following major points were agreed upon z an The "hot war" warsupporting capabilities would be as ed., because earlier studies had already dealt with Approved For Release 1999/09/_10 :CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9 Approved For Rase 1999/09/10: CIA-RDP82-0 83R000100140012-9 Soviet capabilities to maintain military forces up to and including mobilization but have not "crossed the threshold" of estimating support capabilities during hostilities. b. Selected force levels or a single force level would be assumed and Soviet capabilities to support these would be amined for various time periods (suggested as six months, 12 months and for two to three years). c. Generalized estimates of combat consumption and attrition would be calculated. d. The potential accretions to the Soviets would be examined in some detail. Ct. The draft terms of reference, dated 5 February 1954, were returned to the working group for such modification as necessary; a redrafted terms of reference is to be submitted by 12 April to the RIC m rbers, for discussion in the ESC meeting on 20 April. 25X1A9a cu ve Economic Intelligence Committee Approved For Release 1999/09/10 CIA-RDP82-00283R000100140012-9