MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN DIRECTOR'S CONFERENCE ROOM, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON 20 OCTOBER 1950
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00400R000100010001-4
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RIFPUB
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S
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7
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 12, 2004
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1
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Publication Date:
October 20, 1950
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MIN
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20 October 1950
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 20 October 1950
Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State
Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval
Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of
Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
ALSO PRESENT.
Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Fisher Howe, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton Howze, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Brigadier General E. Moore, Department of the Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, Atomic Energy Commission
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
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1. The agenda of the meeting was "Policies and Procedures of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee."
CIA Developments
2. In opening the meeting, General Smith gave a brief resume of
some of the problems affecting the Central Intelligence Agency which were
deemed of interest to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
He referred specifically to certain drafts of proposed NSC directives,
which were under discussion at the time General Smith took over the duties
of Director of Central Intelligence between representatives of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
In general, the drafts under discussion were designed to implement NSC 50.
By agreement of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of
State and. Department of Defense, further consideration of these drafts
was terminated on the basis of General Smith's assurance that NSC 50 con-
stituted a sufficient directive at the present time. General Smith stated
that NSC 50, giving effect in substance to the recommendations of the so-
called Dulles Committee Report, had not yet been carried out by the Central
Intelligence Agency but that it was his intention promptly to carry out
this directive except in one respect.
3. The exception related to the merger of the Office of Special
Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Contact Branch of
the Office of Operations. This merger was considered neither practical nor
advisable at this time. General Smith said he believed the coordination of
these offices, as recommended by the Dulles Report and incorporated in the
directive from the National Security Council, could be achieved by more
effective cooperation without actual merger. General Smith's position in
regard to this aspect of NSC 50 had been made clear to the National Security
Council at its meeting on 12 October 1950 and had been approved by the
Council.
4. General Smith also stated that he had encountered another problem
in the Central Intelligence Agency which arose out of confusion as to the
position of the Office of Policy Coordination in relation to the Central
Intelligence Agency and to OPC's guidance from the Department of State and
the Department of Defense. General Smith said that he construed NSC 10/2,
though somewhat ambiguous, as giving clear responsibility and authority to
the Director of Central Intelligence for the activities of the Office of
Policy Coordination. He said that guidance from the Department of State
and the Department of Defense was essential for the success of these
operations and that, as a matter of procedure, he was willing that such
guidance be given by representatives of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense directly to Mr. Wisner. However, Mr. Wisner would
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act under the authority and subject to the control of the Director of
Central Intelligence, who, under NSC 10/2, was responsible for Mr. Wisner's
operations.
Meetings of the IAC
5. In referring directly to the work of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee in the future, General Smith expressed his opinion that this
Committee should meet more often and for longer periods although, as chair-
man, he would make every effort to keep the meetings as brief as possible.
He stated that the Intelligence Advisory Committee must be geared for rapid
cooperative work.
National Intelligence Estimates
6. In opening the subject of national intelligence estimates,
General Smith read from a memorandum written by Mr. William H. Jackson,
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as follows:
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National
Intelligence Estimates.
One of the principal duties assigned to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency or the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies
in the interest of national security" is "to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for its
appropriate dissemination." The Central Intelligence Agency is
thus given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United
States has adequate central machinery for the examination and inter-
pretation of intelligence so that the national security will not be
jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best intelligence opinion
in the country, based on all available information.
Although the Act provides that "the departments and other
agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence," the statute
does not limit the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency to
correlate and evaluate intelligence, except by the standard of
"national security."
The purport of the National Security Act can be understood
and justified in the light of the history and general objectives
of the Act, Behind the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency
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lay the necessity not only for the coordination of diversified
intelligence activities, and for the performance by the central
agency itself of certain services of common usefulness, but also
for the coordination of intelligence opinion in the form of
reports or estimates affecting generally the national security
as a whole.
The Act apparently gives the Central Intelligence Agency
the independent right of producing national intelligence. As
a practical matter, such estimates can be written only with
the collaboration of experts in many fields of intelligence
and with the cooperation of several departments and agencies
of the Government. A national intelligence report or estimate
as assembled and produced by the Central Intelligence Agency
should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion,
based on all available information. It should deal with topics
of wide scope relevant to the determination of basic policy,
such as the assessment of a country's war potential, its pre-
paredness for war, its strategic capabilities and intentions,
its vulnerability to various forms of direct attack or indirect
pressures. An intelligence estimate of such scope would go
beyond the competence of any single Department or Agency of
the Government,, A major objective, then, in establishing the
Central Intelligence Agency was to provide the administrative
machinery for the coordination of intelligence opinion, for
its assembly and review, objectively and. impartially, and for
its expression in the form of estimates of national scope and
importance.
The concept of national intelligence estimates under-
lying the statute is that of an authoritative interpretation
and appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers
and planners. A national intelligence estimate should reflect
the coordination of the best intelligence opinion, with notation
of and reasons for dissent in the instances when there is not
unanimity. It should be based on all available information
and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in
the light of our own policy requirements. The estimate should
be compiled and assembled centrally by an agency whose objec-
tivity and disinterestedness are not open to question. Its
ultimate approval should rest upon the collective judgment of
the highest officials in the various intelligence agencies.
Finally, it should command. recognition and respect throughout
the Government as the best available and presumably the most
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authoritative intelligence estimate.
Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of
general acceptance of the concept of national intelligence
estimates in the Government, it is, nevertheless, the clear
duty and responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the statute to assemble and produce such coordinated
and authoritative estimates. ,
7. There followed a discussion of the above excerpt from the memoran-
dum and there was general assent at the meeting to its statement of the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for national intelligence
estimates. General Smith stated that, in order to discharge this respon-
sibility, he proposed at the earliest possible time to set up in the
Central Intelligence Agency an Office of National Estimates. This division,
in his opinion, would. become the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency
and of the national intelligence machinery. Services of common concern, now
performed in the present Office of Reports and Estimates but not including
the production of political intelligence, would be placed in a separate
office or division which might properly be called the Office of Research
and Reports. The latter would confine its activities to the production
of reports as a service of common concern in fields assigned specifically
by directives of the National Security Council. It was pointed out by
Mr. Jackson that the fact that the Office of Reports and Estimates has in
the past produced both national estimates and miscellaneous reports in
various fields, which could not possibly be construed as national estimates,
had blurred and. confused both the product and function of the Office of
Reports and Estimates There has been insufficient differentiation between
the form and the coordination procedure in connection with the two products
and in their methods of production.
8. General Smith said that, as to the matter of form, in the future
intelligence estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Agency on the
basis of intelligence contributions from the various intelligence agencies
and concurred in or dissented from by the respective agencies would be
published under a cover showing plainly that the estimate was a collective
effort the result of which would be labeled as a national intelligence
estimate.
Action
9. After discussion the following procedural steps were agreed upon
in the production of national estimates:
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a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will adopt an
intelligence plan, or more specifically, a list of required national
estimates in an order of priority.
b. In the case of a particular estimate, a frame of reference
and the assumptions on which the estimate is based will be discussed
and approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee
c. Work on the estimate will be referred in the first instance
to the Office of Reports and Estimates, or to the Office of National
Estimates when it is established in the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the several intelligence agencies will be consulted and a time-
table fixed for contributions to the national estimate within the
fields of their respective interests.
d. On the basis of these contributions, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency will produce a first draft of the proposed national
estimate.
e. This draft will be sent back to the agencies for comment
and modification and for further discussion if required, On the
basis of such comments and discussion, the Central Intelligence
Agency will produce a second draft of the estimate.
f. This second, or later drafts if required, will be submitted
to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for final discussion, resolution
of differences and approval.
g. If differences cannot be resolved and approval obtained,
the estimate will be published with notation of substantial dissent
and reasons therefor.
It was made clear by General Smith that this procedure would not and could
not be followed in the case of so-called "crisis estimates." In the event
of need arising for a quick or crisis estimate, a procedure similar to
that used in the recent instance when the President called for a series
of estimates prior to his departure for the meeting with General MacArthur
would be followed. That is, a special meeting of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee will be called and representatives of the various intelligence
agencies assigned at once to the production of a draft of the required
estimate for immediate submission to the Intelligence Advisory Committee
for discussion, revision and approval.
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Agenda for the Next IAC Meetirl
Action:
10. It was determined that at the next meeting of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee there would be discussion of national estimates priorities
and the frame of references and assumptions to form the basis of an intelli-
gence estimate of the situation in Indo-China. It was also agreed that at
a future date General Smith will produce a paper for submission to the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee indicating how the Central Intelligence Agency
will function in the theater of operation in time of war. The next meeting
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was scheduled for Wednesday, 25 Octo-
ber, 3:00 P. M.
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