MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN DIRECTOR'S CONFERENCE ROOM, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON 9 NOVEMBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000100010004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 9, 1950
• Content Type: MIN

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 9 November 1950
Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mro W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State
Major General A. R, Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval
Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission
Captain Ra G. McCool, USN, acting for Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ALSO PRESENT
Mr, William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague Central Intelligence Agency
Central. Intelligence Agency
Mro Allan Evans, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Colonel Henry C. Ahalt, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Acting Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency
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Communist Reaction to UN Military Actions in Korea
1. Action: Agreed that the Director should in his discussion
at the NSC this afternoon be guided by the following statement in
respect to anticipated questions regarding USSR and Chinese Com-
munist probable reaction to different courses of UN action in
Korea:
To date there is insufficient evidence to indicate that
the USSR intends to commit Soviet forces overtly in Korea.
However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with
Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the
Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the
risk of general war.
The probability is that the Soviet Union considers that
the U. S. will not launch a general war over Chinese Com-
munist intervention in North Korea and the reaction thereto,
therefore the principal risk of general war is through the
exercise of Soviet initiative which they continue to hold.
The probability is that they have not yet made a decision
directly to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese
situation. There is a good chance that they will not in
the immediate future take such a decision. At what point
they will take a decision to launch a general war is not now
determinable by intelligence.
It was also believed that bombing across the Yalu will not sub-
stantially increase the risk of general war but will increase the
risk of Chinese intervention on a large scale.
2, Discussion: Considerations which were raised in respect
to the foregoing conclusion are as follows:
a. There is no new intelligence which suggests altering
our earlier conclusion that a more desirable time, from the
Soviet point of view, to risk global war would be a couple
of years hence.
b. Local incidents such as the Korean one will not
likely affect the basic timing and decision, It was recog-
nized in this regard that the Soviet retains great flexibility
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in the current situation, being in a position to move toward
peace by calling off the Chinese or to move toward war by
strengthening Chinese resistance or by taking the basic
decision to go to war,
c. Concern was expressed that the USSR has in the past
misjudged the reaction of its enemy in pressing Soviet claims
and that this is always possible again.
d. It is still doubted that the Chinese are completely
the tool of the Soviet. It is believed that the disadvantages
to the Chinese of general hostilities with the United Nations
are so great as to cause Mao to pause, it being noted that a
demolition of key Chinese cities would reduce China to a vassal
of the Soviet, a provisioner of manpower and probably a battle-
field.
e. It appears that the Chinese have given up in their
efforts to achieve a seat in the UN. This view is strengthened
by the invasion of Tibet. In this connection the question was
weighed inconclusively of whether the Chinese still hoped to
retain the friendship and collaboration of the Indians, though
the uncertain position of Nehru in his Cabinet was noted as
portending the trend of Indian thinking.
f. Chinese Communist objectives are probably to reduce
the effects of the North Korean failure and to retain a hold
in Korea for the development of a buffer, guerrilla warfare
or war itself if the USSR desires. Behind this is probably
also a Soviet inspiration to draw us into China to the extent
of causing us to fail in our commitments to rearm Europe.
g. Evaluation of Russian intentions on the basis of
intelligence is not possible at this time, complicating
factors with regard to which lie in the analysis of Russian
and Chinese attitudes toward the expenditure of masses of
human life and the complete unconcern for the amount of time
necessary to reach their long-range objectives. Intelligence
reports regarding deployment of USSR shipping were submitted
as possible evidence that the Russians had made a decision
against global war at this time.
h. It was estimated that for the UN forces to hold a
line at the narrowest part of the Peninsula or the 38th
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Parallel (more difficult in the latter case) would be
hazardous in terms of the psychological effects around the
world and particularly so unless some decision as to where
we go from there has been made,.
i. On the thesis that General MacArthur believes he can
reach the Yalu and on the assumption that that cannot be done
without the 'bombing of the Manchurian side of that River
throughout the communications zone, which. might extend from
50 to 500 miles, the following reactions were anticipated:
(1) The Chinese would have to react vigorously and
extensively to save face. .
(2) Unless it was done with prior ultimatum there
would be danger of defection of some of our supporters
in UN circles, Rated with a threatened bombing of the
Manchurian side of the, Yalu, in terms of the effect on
the Chinese, were measures such as threat of blockade
of the entire Chinese coast or bombing of major Chinese
cities,
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