MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN DIRECTOR'S CONFERENCE ROOM, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON 13 AUGUST 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000100030016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 13, 1951
• Content Type: MIN

S -R-E-T
Approved or Release 2004/03/23: CIA-RDP82 iT00030016-6
13 August 1951
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 13 Aug ust 1951
Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,.
Department of S'eate
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ALSO PRESENT
Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Intelligence Agency
Intelligence
Mr. Sherman Kent,
USA (Ret.), Central
USN (Ret.), Central
Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
oral Intelligence Agency
Mr ose arvey, Department of State
Colonel 0. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel James F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air
James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
S -E -C -.R -E -T
1A C -M -4k-) +10
13 August 1951
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000100030016-6
 Approved Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00 0 000100030016-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC M-4-O (Pg. 1, Final)
13 August 1951
Soviet Position at the
San Francisco Conference
1. Discussion: Dr. Langer asked whether a crash estimate
would be required on this question. It was reported that State
is preparing such an estimate and that it would be shortly sub-
mitted for comment by the IAC agencies.
Probability of Communist
Assault on Japan in 1951.
2. Action: This paper was approved with certain changes and
with a phrasing of the conclusions acceptable to the majority. The
Director of Central Intelligence and. the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence dissented from the accepted wording. This paper will be issued
with a second annex on indications directed to certain individuals
only; no reference will be made to this annex in the body of the
paper.
3. Discussion: It was observed by Admiral Johnson that since
the statement of Soviet capabilities for an invasion of Japan was
made without reference to U. S. defensive capabilities, this fact
should be mentioned, in a footnote. This suggestion, it was noted.,
highlights an increasingly important problem in making estimates of
this character. Admiral Johnson also questioned the stated capability
of the Communists to follow up an initial landing, noting that optimum
conditions for the offensive would be required. Inasmuch as such
conditions would not realistically obtain, a conditional phrasing,
indicating that this capability in fact assumed optimum conditions,
was substituted.
4. The major discussion was on the ultimate conclusion of the
paper: the likelihood of a major Communist assault on Japan. State,
Army, Air Force and the Joint Staff felt that a Soviet assault on
Japan would. be unlikely except in the event of global. war. The
National Estimates Board and Navy were of the opinion that even if
the Kremlin decided to precipitate general war in 1951 it is unlikely
that the Kremlin would undertake a major campaign against Japan in
1951. AEC and FBI abstained from expressing a view on this point.
General Smith, observing that the ground appeared equally firm in
support of both possible answers, accepted the majority view as that
which should appear in the text of the estimate, even though on the
advice of his own staff he dissented therefrom. He pointed out,
however, that his dissent under these circumstances was not to be
considered a precedent.
IAC-M-7O Pg. 1, Final)
13 August 1951
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040OR000100030016-6