CENSUS AND VERIFICATION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000200030010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 4, 1951
• Content Type: NOTES

CIA 36150 I COPY NO.
Approved For Release 2005/11/24: CIA-RD_ 2OOi4D'~R000200030010-1
IAC l7
L April 1951
CENSUS AND VERIFICATION OF
ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
0
The attached paper was received from the State Department,
which requested a coordinated answer from the intelligence
agencies. It is proposed to undertake this project as a Spe-
cial Estimate. The matter will be discussed at the next IAC
meeting.
secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
TOP SECRET
IAC -D-17
4 April 1951
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FORM NO. 38
MAR 1951 38
 Approved For Relea`
2005/11/24: CIA-RDP82-00400R0002t30010-1
CIA 36150
TOP SECRET
TACK,--.
4 April 1951
CENSUS AND VERIFICATION OF
ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
Assuming that a continuing census and verification of all
armed forces* and armaments, including atomic weapons, of the
United States and the USSR were undertaken on a phased basis as
the first step of an agreed international system for control,
regulation, and limitation of armed forces* and armaments, includ-
ing atomic energy activities (but recognizing that the agreed
international system may never be implemented because the Soviet
Union might in bad faith either not comply fully with or renege
on its agreement in any stage of the implementation):
a. What are the relative advantages to the United
States and to the USSR, from the intelligence point of
view, of an inspection and verification of their respec-
tive atomic energy positionst
(1) With respect to the present?
(2) With respect to a period 5-10 years hence?
b. What would be the nature and extent of the
verification procedure:
(1) What should be the phases of the inspection
of atomic energy activities? The following phases have
including para-military, internal security, and polio forces*
TOP SECRET
TAC-D-D-17
4 April 1951
Approved For Release 2005/11/24: CIA-RDP82-00400R000200030010-1
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TOP SECRET
TAG-D-17
April 1951
been suggested: mines, refining processes, production
facilities, and stockpiles. Would you recommend any
changes therein?
(2) What phases would you recommend for the inspec-
tion and verification of armed forces and other armaments?
(3) Should research and development activities for
either or both b(l) and b(2) above be included in the
census and verification system?
c. What would be the probable advantages and disad-
vantages to the United States, from the intelligence point
of view, of the data that might be secured during each phase
of the census and verification of atomic energy activities?
Of armed forces and of other armaments?
d. What would be the probable advantages and disad-
vantages to the USSR, from the intelligence point of view,
of the data that might be secured during each phase of the
census and verification of atomic energy activities? Of
armed forces and of other armaments?
e. What would be the nature of the inspection that you
would recommend to obtain the various kinds of data?
f. What advantages could we expect to accrue to the
United States from the collateral intelligence that might
be obtained in the course of the implementation of a system
of inspection and verification?
TOP SECRET
IAC-D17 _
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TOP SECRET
4 April l9Sl
g. On balance, from the intelligence point of view,
what are your recommendations as to the United States
position with respect to census and verification as the
first step of an agreed international system for control,
regulation, and limitation of armed forces and armaments?
TOP SECRET
IAC-D-17
14 April 1951
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