PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000200050002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 11, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
IAC-D-29 3
11 September 191
PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY
1. There is attached hereto a revised draft of Annex 6 to
be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United
States' Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68/4).
2. In view of the fact that substantial agreement was
reached in the IAC meeting of September 10th, informal clearance
will be asked on the attached revised draft.
25X1
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
TOP SECRET
IAC -D -297
r RR 11 September 1951
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DOC. DATE 11 Se 51
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning in?terms
comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment
of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must
intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's
growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in
itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement
in the intelligence product is dependent'not only upon increased
collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill
with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates.
Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel skilled in
collection and analysis.
2. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training
are presently in process of construction. Existing plans
contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the
current strength of personnel engaged in intelligence and Related
Activities. A sizeable proportion of that strength should. consist
of personnel from the armed forces.
25X1
TOP SECRET
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11 September 1951
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TO improve the overall value of their intelligence
product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added
emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in
field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to
the political and military problems confronting members of the
National Security Council.
Second, they must allocate responsibility among intelligence
rJ,.vn
agencies of the government that the resources and activities of
each are 40.synchronized sA to provide for maximum support for
the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources,
5. It is especially important that collection facilities of
the national intelligence agencies be improved, Efforts are being
made in the establishment of an accurate priority of essential
elements of information. This requirement is especially important
in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary
difficulties are encountered.
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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a
better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U.S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its
satellites.
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence
by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific
intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this
field.
8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligencg is
required by law to correlate the, i-ti . -"each in order to
ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the
same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate action to
prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon
the field of action or functions of another. The Central
Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for
services of common concern which can most advantageously be
performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process
of coordination, there is still need for improvement.
9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation
from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been
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increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange
of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means
whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can
comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals,
or conclusions regarding problems of -mutual concern-.
10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant
military or political events there has been created an interdepart-
mental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review
systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications
of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for
evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.
11. a. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is
anticipated that more and more critical information within
the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and
clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine
operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit
where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast
counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely
restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the
enormous difficulties of such clandestine operations strain
available resources of qualified personnel but they may be
expected to multiply in costliness and thus require
increasingly greater expenditures.
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b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost
directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities.
Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum
program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the
greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing
demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation.
In the opinion of the I. A. C. representatives of the Armed
Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The
Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining
budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet
relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensifica-
tion of intelligence and related activities. -Extraordinary
di ffi c>lties -exist especially in the collection-of clandes--
one intelligence--within _the--.&overt orbit where-state
e?rveilla.nce_and mass counterespionage activity str}ngent1
-limit access to critical-information. Additional funds and
personnel will continue to be required, not only for
expansion of the intelligence services but for the improve-
ment in the quality of their product, which neither now or
in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the
planners and policy-makers desire.
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b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently
taxed with expanded requirements ?as he-result of hosti &
i-n-,-Korea -andr_ear-mament n -Eur-opea, must adequately prepare for
vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If
the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime
operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain
their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain
sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for
the execution of these tasks.
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