IAC LIST OF INDICATORS OF SOVIET INTENTION TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000200060017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 22, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CIA 49402
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Copy No.
22 October 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT : IAC List of Indicators of Soviet Intention to Initiate
General War
ENCLOSURE: Proposed IAC List of Indicators
1. In accordance with the IAC decision of 30 August 1951, a
proposed list of indicators of Soviet aggressive intentions is trans-
mitted herewith. The indicators listed represent condensations and
combinations of those submitted by the IAC agencies.
2. The sixteen indicators and their subordinate elements des-
cribe actions which might be undertaken by the USSR in preparation
for an open full-scale military offensive launched across zonal or
international boundaries. For the most part, these actions represent
improvements in Soviet military capabilities. While no single action,
when undertaken, would necessarily signify that war is imminent, the
generally simultaneous occurrence of several or many such actions
would indicate that an abnormally high level of preparedness for war
existed in the USSR.
3. The Ad Hoc Committee recognized that the existence of a high
level of preparedness does not, by itself, imply that the USSR intends
to initiate a full-scale war. In attempting to specify indicators
of intention to initiate general war, the Committee found that the con-
cept of such an indicator was very vague and that the basis for in-
ferring this particular intention was obscure. It felt that a re-
examination of the indicator approach to the intention problem might
be desirable.
4. Meanwhile, the Committee proceeded on the assumption that the
nearest approximation to indicators of intention to initiate a general
war are represented by preparatory actions. The evaluation of infor-
mation relevant to these indicators is at present complicated by the
advanced state of readiness of the Soviet armed forces, by the exist-
ence of a state of war in the Far East, and by the fact that the USSR,
in order to achieve surprise, might launch an offensive without under-
taking further preparatory action. Nevertheless, because the USSR may
take steps to raise its level of readiness before starting a war, the
proposed list of indicators should be useful in determining Soviet
progress toward maximum preparedness and Soviet intentions based thereon.
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TOP SECRET
5. In the selection of indicators, no consideration has been given
to the likelihood that pertinent information will be available in time.
An attempt has been made to select indicators which describe actions
occurring within one to two months prior to the initiation of hostilities
and which reflect offensive rather than defensive preparations and plans,
although they are frequently indistinguishable. No attempt has been made
to list negative indicators or to isolate preparatory actions which
would be peculiar to specific regions; the list is applicable, in prin-
ciple, to all areas from which the USSR might launch an offensive. The
arrangement of the sixteen indicators and their subordinate elements in
the list does not reflect any judgment of relative importance.
FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
KINGMAN DOUG SS
Assistant Director,
Current Intelligence
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FORM ND. 38-13
MAR 1551 $ T 18-83138-2 GPO
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