POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-4-56: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1961, DATED 2 AUGUST 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300020004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 20, 1956
• Content Type: NOTES

SECRET
Approved For'1 ease 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400QN0300020004-8
IAC-D-57/49
20 September 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-56:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action Through 1961,
dated 2 August 1956
1. This estimate was approved by the IAC on 2 August 1956
after a more than usually prolonged period of coordination which began
on 7 May 1956. The issues which were most difficult to resolve and.
occasioned the most delay were in the military field. They included:
current Soviet strength in heavy bombers; the future strength of the
Long-Range Air Force; the personnel strength of Soviet forces; and
the likely distribution within them of estimated reductions; Soviet
strategic concepts for the conduct of general war. Political and
economic issues produced less fundamental divergences of views,
although the shifts. in Soviet internal and external policy over the last
year occasioned some differences.
I. Findings
2. General. While long-standing deficiencies of intelligence
on the USSR remain, there have been some gains as the result of a
greater openness on the part of the Soviet leaders as well as the more
extensive contacts in many fields which their current policy permits.
On the whole, estimates of current Soviet strengths, capabilities, and
programs as well as the intentions of the USSR over the short term
are probably more soundly based than formerly. However, longer-
range predictions of Soviet military developments or of Soviet inten-
tions continue to be seriously,andicapped by lack of direct evidence
and lack of knowledge of the weight given various considerations by the
Soviet leaders in their choice of alternative courses of action.
3. Political intelligence. The post-Stalin reforms and the
greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels have given
us a better picture of the forces at work in Soviet society. Gaps
remain with respect to the roles of top Soviet leaders and possible
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000300020004-8
SECS"
 SECRET
Approved For'' (ease 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400iiAD00300020004-8
IAC-D-57/49
20 September 1956
policy differences among them, and with respect to the influence of
the Party',-. military, managerial, and other professional elites.
These gaps probably cannot be filled short of the acquisition of much
more interior knowledge of the regime than we seem likely to get.
However, full exploitation of information gained through the broaden-
ing contacts currently taking place is indicated.
4. The problems of long-run social and political change in the
USSR exceed, in the strict sense, the limits of the five-year estimate.
Nevertheless, judgments concerning Soviet developments over a
longer period do in fact influence the current attitudes of policy-makers
in the Western countries. Answers to questions in this field result
more properly from the research of social analysts than from intelli-
gence evidence, but studies of this sort should be followed and perhaps
stimulated by the intelligence community.
5. Estimates of Soviet intentions in external policy depend
largely on deductions from the general Soviet posture. Since this
seems relatively stable at present, predictions are probably fairly
sound, at least for periods of a year or two. But particular maneuvers
of Soviet policy cannot be anticipated without greater inside knowledge
of Soviet plans, and perhaps not even then because of the opportunistic
character of many Soviet actions. At present, in the field of com-
petitive trade and aid, more intensive collection effort in countries
which are potential recipients might bring useful returns.
6. Economic intelligence. The post-mortem of NIE 11-3-55
identified the costing of the Soviet military effort as the major weakness
in economic intelligence on the USSR. The findings of the IAC Ad Hoc
Military Cost Study Committee incorporated in NIE 11-4-56 represent
a substantial advance in this field but still leave much to be desired
in terms of definitiveness and an appreciation of margins of error
involved. Intelligence effort in this field can fruitfully be concentrated
upon revision of physical estimates of manpower and procurement,
the deficiencies of which were noted in the estimate itself; upon in-
creased price collection and the improvement of indirect pricing
techniques; and upon investigation of particular segments of the Soviet
defense effort such as research and development and atomic energy,
the cost of which must now be estimated in the aggregate. All these
-2-
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300020004-8
SECRET
 SECRET
Approved For`R'e'lease 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040 00300020004-8
IAC-D-57/49
20 September 1956
efforts should be carried forward in conjunction with analysis of
trends in the announced Soviet defense budget and should contain
the documentation necessary for the establishment of error margins.
Building upon the work done to date, such collection and research
should considerably improve our knowledge of the magnitude of the
past and future defense burden and permit better estimates of its
likely impact upon economic growth.
7. Military intelligence. Despite the greater knowledge
which has become available in some other fields, intelligence on
Soviet military plans and programs has profited little from the
slight easing of Soviet security restrictions. Work on NIE 11-4-56
emphasized the necessity for: (a) improved collection of information
on the strength of Soviet forces and continuing re-evaluation of
trends in these strengths; (b) better intelligence on particular weapons
programs, especially nuclear weapons, missiles, and aircraft; and
(c) more knowledge of Soviet strategic concepts which determine the
requirements set by the Soviet leaaers for the development of
weapons systems and for the future strength and composition of
their armed forces.
8. The lAC agencies are requested to:
a. Take appropriate action where possible on
the intelligence deficiencies and needs described
above;
b. Increase efforts to collect information on
which an improved study of the costs of the Soviet
defense effort could be based. Meanwhile, continue
study of this subject with all data available, in
order to obtain a coordinated appraisal in time to
be contributed to the 1957 estimate. (See paragraph
6 above. )
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300020004-8
SECRET