VALIDITY STUDIES OF : NIE 63.1-55, PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM TO JULY 1956, PUBLISHED 19 JULY 1955; AND NIE 63.1-3-55, PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM TO JULY 1956, PUBLISHED 11 OCTOBER 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300100103-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 103
• Publication Date: July 20, 1956
• Content Type: STUDY

SECRET
Approved For Reease 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400RQQ300100103-9
IAC-D- 100/ 17
20 July 1956
Validity Studies of:
NIE 63. 1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955
1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-55 to the effect that
the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume
widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election
deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience
no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam"
and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will
probably be reduced ithroughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out
by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient
economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for
stability and control. "
2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the
Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with
its own forces to seize Laos.
3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that,
"The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably
be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until
their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In
the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote
friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality. 11
4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-3-55 to the effect
that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements,
make further progress in developing a more effective government, and
refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. How-
ever, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over
the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in
NIE 63. 1-3-55.
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000300100103-9
SECRET