VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 71-54: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA, PUBLISHED 31 AUGUST 1954
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00400R000300100137-2
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 4, 2004
Sequence Number:
137
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 8, 1955
Content Type:
STUDY
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SECRET
Approved Frelease 2004/03/23: CIA-RDP82-004(SF00M 9't b 1 *9D2
8 December 1955
Validity Study of NIE 71- 54:
Probable Developments in North Africa,
published 31 August 1954
1. NIE 71- 54 for the most part remains a basically valid
estimate. Various paragraphs dealing with the current situation
and short-term developments are out-dated in many respects, but
to no greater degree than would normally be anticipated as a re-
sult of the passage of time. Most of the longer-range estimates
cannot be tested at this early date, but so far they appear to be
generally accurate.
2. Current developments are tending to confirm the key
estimates in NIE 71-54 that: (a) there would be a continued growth
in nationalist activity in all three North African areas; and (b)
France would probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first
in Tunisia and later in Morocco, but would not fully satisfy in-
creasing nationalist demands. As stated in the NIE, France has
sought to avoid concessions which would endanger its strategic
control or would destroy the privileged position of the settlers of
French descent.
3. However, NIE 71-54 failed to reflect adequately in
terms of timing two significant developments over the past year:
the early outbreak of nationalist violence in Algeria, and the
sharp acceleration of such violence in Morocco. The short-term
effect on Algeria of events in Tunisia and Morocco was not given
sufficient emphasis in the NIE. Moreover, lacking intelligence on
the development of the CRUA, a revolutionary faction within the
extremist wing of Algerian nationalism, we did not anticipate
violence on the scale of the November 1954 uprising in northeast
Algeria. With regard to terrorism in French Morocco, NIE 71-54
did not indicate sufficiently clearly the likely short-term effect of
nationalist pressure on the French.
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300100137-2
SECRET
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Approved Frelease 2004/03/23 CIA-RDP82-004 OOD aM1Ii0Q1
8 December 1955
4. With respect to Libya, much of the background discussion
is still basically valid, although various details have become out-
dated. NIE 71-54 correctly estimated such short-term developments
as successful conclusion of the US base agreement and increased
friction between France and Libya over the Fezzan. The longer-
range estimates might be worded somewhat differently if written
now, but we believe they remain generally accurate.
Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300100137-2
SECRET