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Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
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December 7, 1998
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January 17, 1947
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u Wsd -O U45TR0003005200 INTELLOFAX 4roved For Release 1999/09Ii4T> CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTEWGENCE REPORT COUNTRY Greece SUBJECT ORIGIN 25X1 A6a Y COPY ^ 25X1X6 DATE: 25X1A2g :NFO. 17 January 1947 MST. February 1947 PAGES SUPPLEMENT 1,- The extreme left wing in Greece. as represented by KX/EAY, realized Fyubstantial moral and political gains during 1946. ILI Among the moral gains, possibly the most important one was the emergence of the extreme left from the position of "accused" in which it found itself during 1945, as a result of the December uprising, into a position of considerable importance in the evolution of Greek and Balkan politics; and it achieved this great improvement without compromise and without once having to abandon its policy of provooation. 34 Thanks to the "semi-official" policy of neutralizing the M and its CLASSIF ICATIQN Dnnmm~nt No. 001 NO C.NA,N Review of KKE Activity in 1946 and Estimate for 1947 various organs,, a policy pursued by the government during the greater part of 1946 either by plan or compulsion, the party was given con- siderable grounds on which to base its passwords of "rightist terrorism, persecution of democrats", etc,,, and it contrived to maintain and elaborate the aura of a party unfustly attacked nd on the defensive, whereas in point of fact it was actually the attacking party all long. The efforts of the party to nourish and enhance this illusion were aided very largely by the fact that the government, mindful of what the party likes to refer to as the "international atmosphere", was unwilling to declare open war on the party and chose to entrust the work unofficially and secretly to individuals both within and without the government structure and to certain rightist organizations. The frequent excesses inevitable in the pursuit of a policy such as this in a politically vindictive people were of no small help to the KKE'a plan and program. The result has been an increase in party members and adherents, especially among traditionally anti-Coxaminist classes such as white-collar employees, small real-estate owners, craftsmen, etc. who had previ. .sly been identified with a center or moderate leftist ideology. The open support and sympathy which the KKR/EM has enjoyed from that part of the world under Russian domination and the common development and use of left-wing arguments and slogans have created an impression in the storm-tossed minds of many underprivileged Greeks that the 09/08 : C This document is hereby regrad CON FID E" ~..,lv'Tlr'i t_ ii~ r..:: co ", d.::?sZv iCf the ~.t '"r . ; e~ o From the Director cf C`e~tral i ence to the Archivist of ih , ited States. Next F'e. ' Date: 2008 00FO(092hy-4falR Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000300520001-4 1121- 25X1A2g l;KE/FJJ1 is the only political group in the country Bich knows that it wants and hi& the potential capacity for achieving it , whereas all its opponents are divided atom; the nualvess turd do .~,t enjoy either a singularity of objoctivc or a solid external oupport. 5e. ).tore tanj able krone as pear to have accrued to they Party as a result of its 194C policies ur:d activities. For extunple. i;horous the anti-party groupu such au thu Putoopoulos group, ELD (Leaguo of Popular lle muraoy), Fourth rnationaliats, este. have cos:-pletely lost l;round, the Klc.L' has increuued ito Ltunbershi.p, an noted in pnrac;rttph 3 above., gird or;;:rstizations such at; the Hellenic-Soviet League hove prospered in their activities. These party gains have ertubled the left tiring; to latutich variouss slogans and oarnpa: L;ns with coi if.arative success. 1'cakinE; the i.rritiettive in 1946 after tt year of de.fenssive retrenchment, the party, in Kay, 1946, arutourtced its policy of "conciliation" anti rcrtetred its drive to expel the British. ",any r=.i ht-wine; exponents are nou; ct.lliii ; for w;.thdrawal of the: British and lornu:tiun u:' tt broudened f;avc:rr;r_tent. To rrauiy of the blind nretnbors of the party this rcprctse:nts a t:otublts political success. The party does not emphasize that by tr.t1idruvrttl of the British it rac:ars erttr7, fil'uratively at leaflt, of the Rusuixais. Whereas the right taeana#igurctive or actual entry of thtu l.merict-r_s and an end to the "ayrtar.tie" rn thods of the Cent sunis ts. 6. In its bmbiguous character of a legal party and an illegal, conspiratorial, forui+;rt-directed and rebellious machine, the party ivui ages to give the appearance of incrveisir. ; strength curd ttttppor t As a legal party, its members "unjustly" incur the "excesses and persecutions" c,f the government, are terrorized at.u exiled in droves, and still the party refuges to bend. ~" an inspirer, organizer and supplier of "dynamic muvcrtenta" (the armed hands), it has driven thLc gvvernu.tent to, the brink of disaster and has s:rovm it. incapab1t of reacting successfully. 7. The KU-v1E 1 is now reported to be expecting; to derive aigrtifieant gain from the impending visit of the Till Investigation Connnission. It its optimiser on the rollowiri lines of reasoning: evidence of M's direct connection with the anted lands will be hard to find, Lind if any exists it can be quashed, whereas the acts of the government agencies and their individuals are tatters-of record; orders issued to burn villages, exile suspects. arm civilian, extra can be proved; the reports of foreign correspondents are on record; the Jouheux episode, the report of the. British Parliamentary Committee cannot be invalidated; and though one conversant vrith the ft.ets tisould not be swayed, the u:rsuspeeting representa- tive of Chile or the predisposed of Poland trill rind the evidence at hand much easier to believe. 8. The party is naturally prepared to set aside all these proofs; against the rent if a new goverment were to be forLued in which the party could expect to have some representation. If this v.~ere to occur, however, the next phase in the party's progrum would be obvious. That is, the party would endeavor to penetrate the state orgunisrt to such an oxtent as to ut ke party control of it a rulaLivc;ly simple, furthur and final step, Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000300520001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 CIA-RDP82-00457R000300520001-4 25X1A2g( L darrinig intervouinC, everts Which Loulc', cause a change in plan (cxtarnal ,, change of t,overw.Lents etc )r it is be:~if~ved that the party ::iii pursue the following general linos in early 1947 a) A partial elu%*~i'e in the, co:ipocition of tho Politburo o.'.the r_trel Coniattee of 14:J: in favor of rx,re noderate elements au it tk oeptive - r- ti ice intended to prc;st;rve- the r item?; tturh of lerallty, b) tternrit? -reriods of intensification and rc1r atiou of bend activity in tidely sep?-roted aroas or the country to corifluse Arai .inaken the effect of army opereitions, c) Cotruission of kidneippiugs and executions, especially ei? ainat the "reueh-ht ted" cantor, r,ith the blame laid conatuntly on the right. ` he:se lines of policy aid action are not new; they are the one., r::ich, in the hinds of the pe,r-ty lendors, have produced reei,lts :,c faze, and it is intended that they be ir:tertsified. The party lenders see victory not 1'kir off, rnd efiort:r, r.111 be acoordini;ly strengthened and incr?c:etsedn This deci ,.nt castain* for ~feettDg the aatio&. dot at the ted States v thin or the lepdoaage Act #0C . 3:1 sad 32 s as to tran~# ea3 an or the ~s its cantests is an mauthized psrOon It ihitede Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000300520001-4